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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group M. Nottingham 3 Internet-Draft August 16, 2018 4 Intended status: Standards Track 5 Expires: February 17, 2019 7 The secret-token URI Scheme 8 draft-nottingham-how-did-that-get-into-the-repo-00 10 Abstract 12 This document registers the "secret-token" URI scheme, to aid in the 13 identification of authentication tokens. 15 Note to Readers 17 _RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication_ 19 The issues list for this draft can be found at 20 https://github.com/mnot/I-D/labels/how-did-that-get-into-the-repo 21 [1]. 23 The most recent (often, unpublished) draft is at 24 https://mnot.github.io/I-D/how-did-that-get-into-the-repo/ [2]. 26 Recent changes are listed at https://github.com/mnot/I-D/commits/gh- 27 pages/how-did-that-get-into-the-repo [3]. 29 See also the draft's current status in the IETF datatracker, at 30 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nottingham-how-did-that-get- 31 into-the-repo/ [4]. 33 Status of This Memo 35 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 36 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 38 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 39 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 40 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 41 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 43 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 44 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 45 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 46 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 48 This Internet-Draft will expire on February 17, 2019. 50 Copyright Notice 52 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 53 document authors. All rights reserved. 55 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 56 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 57 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 58 publication of this document. Please review these documents 59 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 60 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 61 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 62 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 63 described in the Simplified BSD License. 65 Table of Contents 67 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 68 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 69 2. The secret-token URI scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 70 3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 71 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 72 5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 73 5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 74 5.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 75 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 77 1. Introduction 79 It has become increasingly common to use bearer tokens as an 80 authentication mechanism. 82 Unfortunately, the number of security incidents involving accidental 83 disclosure of these tokens has also increased. For example, we now 84 regularly hear about a developer committing an access token to a 85 public source code repository, either because they didn't realise it 86 was included in the committed code, or because they didn't realise 87 the implications of its disclosure. 89 This specification registers the "secret-token" URI scheme to aid 90 prevention of such accidental disclosures. When tokens are easier to 91 unambiguously identify, they can trigger warnings in Continuous 92 Integration systems, or be used in source code repositories 93 themselves. They can also be scanned for separately. 95 For example, if cloud.example.net issues access tokens to its clients 96 for later use, and it does so by formatting them as secret-token 97 URIs, tokens that "leak" into places that they don't belong are 98 easier to identify. This could be through a variety of mechanisms; 99 for example, if repo.example.com can be configured to refuse commits 100 containing secret-token URIs, it helps its customers avoid accidental 101 disclosures. 103 secret-token URIs are intended to aid in identification of generated 104 secrets like API keys and similar tokens. They are not intended for 105 use in controlled situations where ephemeral tokens are used, such as 106 things ike CSRF tokens. 108 1.1. Notational Conventions 110 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 111 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 112 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 113 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 114 capitals, as shown here. 116 This document uses ABNF [RFC5234], including by reference the 117 following rules: ALPHA, DIGIT. 119 2. The secret-token URI scheme 121 The secret-token URI scheme identifies a token that is intended to be 122 a secret. 124 secret-token-URI = secret-token-scheme ":" token 125 secret-token-scheme = "secret-token" 126 token = 1*tchar 127 tchar = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_" / "." / "~" 129 Note that characters outside the range allowed by tchar MUST be 130 percent-encoded ([RFC3986], Section 2.1. 132 When a token is both generated and presented for authentication, the 133 entire URI MUST be used, without changes. 135 For example, given the URI: 137 secret-token:E92FB7EB-D882-47A4-A265-A0B6135DC842%20foo 139 This string (character-for-character, case-sensitive) will both be 140 issued by the token authority, and required for later access. 142 3. IANA Considerations 144 This document registers the following value in the URI Scheme 145 registry: 147 o Scheme name: secret-token 149 o Status: permanent 151 o Applications / protocols that use this scheme: none yet 153 o Contact: iesg@iesg.org 155 o Change Controller: IESG 157 o References: [this document] 159 4. Security Considerations 161 The token ABNF rule allows tokens as small as one character. This is 162 not recommended practice; applications should evaluate their 163 requirements for entropy and issue tokens correspondingly. 165 This URI scheme is intended to prevent accidental disclosure; it 166 cannot prevent intentional disclosure. 168 If it is difficult to correctly handle secret material, or unclear as 169 to what the appropriate handling is, users might choose to obfuscate 170 their secret tokens in order to evade detection (for example, 171 removing the URI scheme for storage). Clear guidelines and helpful 172 tools are good mitigations here. 174 5. References 176 5.1. Normative References 178 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 179 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 180 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 181 . 183 [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform 184 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, 185 RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, 186 . 188 [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax 189 Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, 190 DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008, 191 . 193 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 194 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 195 May 2017, . 197 5.2. URIs 199 [1] https://github.com/mnot/I-D/labels/how-did-that-get-into-the-repo 201 [2] https://mnot.github.io/I-D/how-did-that-get-into-the-repo/ 203 [3] https://github.com/mnot/I-D/commits/gh-pages/how-did-that-get- 204 into-the-repo 206 [4] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nottingham-how-did-that- 207 get-into-the-repo/ 209 Author's Address 211 Mark Nottingham 213 Email: mnot@mnot.net 214 URI: https://www.mnot.net/