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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 TLS WG J. Salowey 3 Internet-Draft Tableau Software 4 Updates: 3749, 5077, 4680, 5246, 5705, S. Turner 5 5878, 6520, 7301 (if approved) sn3rd 6 Intended status: Standards Track February 15, 2018 7 Expires: August 19, 2018 9 IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS 10 draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-04 12 Abstract 14 This document describes a number of changes to (D)TLS IANA registries 15 that range from adding notes to the registry all the way to changing 16 the registration policy. These changes were mostly motivated by WG 17 review of the (D)TLS-related registries undertaken as part of the 18 TLS1.3 development process. This document updates many (D)TLS RFCs 19 (see updates header). 21 Status of This Memo 23 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 24 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 26 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 27 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 28 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 29 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 31 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 32 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 33 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 34 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 36 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, 2018. 38 Copyright Notice 40 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 41 document authors. All rights reserved. 43 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 44 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 45 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 46 publication of this document. Please review these documents 47 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 48 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 49 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 50 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 51 described in the Simplified BSD License. 53 Table of Contents 55 1. Process Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 56 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 57 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 4. Add "TLS" to Registry Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 5. Aligning with RFC 8126 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 6. Adding Recommended Column . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 7. Session Ticket TLS Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 8. TLS ExtensionType Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 63 9. TLS Cipher Suite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 64 10. TLS Supported Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 65 11. TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 66 12. New Session Ticket TLS Handshake Message Type . . . . . . . . 11 67 13. TLS Exporter Label Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 68 14. Add Missing Item to TLS Alert Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 13 69 15. TLS Certificate Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 70 16. Orphaned Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 71 17. Orphaned Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 72 18. Designated Expert Pool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 73 19. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 74 20. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 75 21. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 76 21.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 77 21.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 78 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 80 1. Process Note 82 As the authors of this draft are also the WG chairs, the responsible 83 Area Director has agreed to judge consensus. 85 RFC EDITOR: Please delete section prior to publication. 87 2. Introduction 89 This document instructs IANA to make changes to a number of (D)TLS- 90 related IANA registries. These changes were almost entirely 91 motivated by the development of TLS1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. 93 The changes introduced by this document range from simple, e.g., 94 adding notes, to complex, e.g., changing a registry's registration 95 policy. Instead of listing the changes and their rationale in this, 96 the introductory, section each section provides rationale for the 97 proposed change(s). 99 This document proposes no changes to the registration policies for 100 TLS Alert [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], TLS ContentType [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], 101 TLS HandshakeType [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], and TLS Certificate Status 102 Types [RFC6961] registries; the existing policies (Standards Action 103 for the first three; IETF Review for the last), are appropriate for 104 these one-byte code points because of their scarcity. 106 3. Terminology 108 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 109 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 110 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 111 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 112 capitals, as shown here. 114 4. Add "TLS" to Registry Names 116 For consistency amongst TLS registries, IANA [SHALL prepend/has 117 prepended] "TLS" to the following registries: 119 o Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs 120 [RFC7301], 122 o ExtensionType Values, 124 o Heartbeat Message Types [RFC6520], and 126 o Heartbeat Modes [RFC6520]. 128 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for these four 129 registries to also refer to this document. The remainder of this 130 document will use the registry names with the "TLS" prefix. 132 5. Aligning with RFC 8126 134 Many of the TLS-related IANA registries were defined prior to 135 [RFC8126] where "IETF Consensus" was used instead of the 136 RFC8126-defined "IETF Review". To align with the new terminology, 137 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the following registries to use "IETF 138 Review" in place of "IETF Consensus": 140 o TLS Authorization Data Formats [RFC4680] 142 o TLS Supplemental Data Formats (SupplementalDataType) [RFC5878] 143 This is not a universal change as some registries originally defined 144 with "IETF Consensus" are undergoing other changes either as a result 145 of this document or [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis]. 147 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for these two 148 registries to also refer to this document. 150 6. Adding Recommended Column 152 The instructions in this document add a Recommended column to many of 153 the TLS registries to indicate parameters that are generally 154 recommended for implementations to support. Adding a recommended 155 parameter to a registry or updating a parameter to recommended status 156 requires standards action. Not all parameters defined in standards 157 track documents need to be marked as recommended. 159 If an item is marked as not recommended it does not necessarily mean 160 that it is flawed, rather, it indicates that either the item has not 161 been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, 162 or is intended only for specific use cases. 164 7. Session Ticket TLS Extension 166 The nomenclature for the registry entries in the TLS ExtensionType 167 Values registry correspond to the presentation language field name 168 except for entry 35. To ensure that the values in the registry are 169 consistently identified in the registry, IANA: 171 o [SHALL rename/has renamed] entry 35 to "session_ticket (renamed 172 from "SessionTicket TLS")" [RFC5077]. 174 o [SHALL add/has added] a reference to this document in the 175 Reference column for entry 35. 177 8. TLS ExtensionType Values 179 Experience has shown that the IETF Review registry policy for TLS 180 Extensions was too strict. Based on WG consensus, the decision was 181 taken to change the registration policy to Specification Required 182 [RFC8126] while reserving a small part of the code space for 183 experimental and private use. Therefore, IANA [SHALL update/has 184 updated] the TLS ExtensionType Values registry to: 186 o Change the registry policy to: 188 Values with the first byte in the range 0-254 (decimal) are 189 assigned via Specification Required [RFC8126]. Values with the 190 first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use [RFC8126]. 192 o Update the "Reference" to also refer to this document. 194 o Add the following notes: 196 Note: Experts are to verify that there is in fact a publicly 197 available standard. An Internet Draft that is posted and never 198 published or a standard in another standards body, industry 199 consortium, university site, etc. suffices. 201 Note: As specified in [RFC8126], assignments made in the Private Use 202 space are not generally useful for broad interoperability. It is 203 the responsibility of those making use of the Private Use range to 204 ensure that no conflicts occur (within the intended scope of use). 205 For widespread experiments, temporary reservations are available. 207 See Section 18 for additional information about the designated expert 208 pool. 210 Despite wanting to "loosen" the registration policies for TLS 211 Extensions, it is still useful to indicate in the IANA registry which 212 extensions the WG recommends be supported. Therefore, IANA [SHALL 213 update/has updated] the TLS ExtensionType Values registry to: 215 o Add a "Recommended" column with the contents as listed below. 216 This table has been generated by marking Standards Track RFCs as 217 "Yes" and all others as "No". Future extensions MUST define the 218 value of the Recommended column. In order to register an 219 extension with the value "Yes", a Standards Track document 220 [RFC8126] is REQUIRED. IESG action is REQUIRED for a Yes->No 221 transition. 223 +----------------------------------------+-------------+ 224 | Extension | Recommended | 225 +----------------------------------------+-------------+ 226 | server_name | Yes | 227 | | | 228 | max_fragment_length | Yes | 229 | | | 230 | client_certificate_url | Yes | 231 | | | 232 | trusted_ca_keys | Yes | 233 | | | 234 | truncated_hmac | Yes | 235 | | | 236 | status_request | Yes | 237 | | | 238 | user_mapping | Yes | 239 | | | 240 | client_authz | No | 241 | | | 242 | server_authz | No | 243 | | | 244 | cert_type | Yes | 245 | | | 246 | supported_groups | Yes | 247 | | | 248 | ec_point_formats | Yes | 249 | | | 250 | srp | No | 251 | | | 252 | signature_algorithms | Yes | 253 | | | 254 | use_srtp | Yes | 255 | | | 256 | heartbeat | Yes | 257 | | | 258 | application_layer_protocol_negotiation | Yes | 259 | | | 260 | status_request_v2 | Yes | 261 | | | 262 | signed_certificate_timestamp | No | 263 | | | 264 | client_certificate_type | Yes | 265 | | | 266 | server_certificate_type | Yes | 267 | | | 268 | padding | Yes | 269 | | | 270 | encrypt_then_mac | Yes | 271 | | | 272 | extended_master_secret | Yes | 273 | | | 274 | session_ticket | Yes | 275 | | | 276 | renegotiation_info | Yes | 277 +----------------------------------------+-------------+ 279 NOTE: The following is from [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] and is included 280 here to ensure aligment between these specifications. 282 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] also uses the TLS ExtensionType Registry 283 originally created in [RFC4366]. IANA has updated it to reference 284 this document. The registry and its allocation policy is listed 285 below: 287 o IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this registry to include the 288 "key_share", "pre_shared_key", "psk_key_exchange_modes", 289 "early_data", "cookie", "supported_versions", 290 "certificate_authorities", "oid_filters", "post_handshake_auth", 291 and "signature_algorithms_certs", extensions with the values 292 defined in this document and the Recommended value of "Yes". 294 o IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this registry to include a "TLS 295 1.3" column which lists the messages in which the extension may 296 appear. This column [SHALL be/has been] initially populated from 297 the table in Section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] with any 298 extension not listed there marked as "-" to indicate that it is 299 not used by TLS 1.3. 301 9. TLS Cipher Suite Registry 303 Experience has shown that the IETF Consensus registry policy for TLS 304 Cipher Suites was too strict. Based on WG consensus, the decision 305 was taken to change the TLS Cipher Suite registry's registration 306 policy to Specification Required [RFC8126] while reserving a small 307 part of the code space for experimental and private use. Therefore, 308 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the TLS Cipher Suite registry's 309 policy as follows: 311 Values with the first byte in the range 0-254 (decimal) are 312 assigned via Specification Required {{RFC8126}}. Values with the 313 first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use {{RFC8126}}. 315 See Section 18 for additional information about the designated expert 316 pool. 318 The cipher suite registry has grown significantly and will continue 319 to do so. To better guide those not intimately involved in TLS, IANA 320 [shall update/has updated] the TLS Cipher Suite registry as follows: 322 o Add a "Recommended" column to the TLS Cipher Suite registry. The 323 cipher suites that follow in the two tables are marked as "Yes". 324 All other cipher suites are marked as "No". Future cipher suites 325 MUST define the value of the Recommended column. In order to 326 register an extension with the value "Yes, a Standards Track 327 document [RFC8126] is REQUIRED. IESG action is REQUIRED for a 328 Yes->No transition. 330 The cipher suites that follow are standards track server- 331 authenticated (and optionally client-authenticated) cipher suites 332 which are currently available in TLS 1.2. 334 RFC EDITOR: The previous paragraph is for document reviewers and is 335 not meant for the registry. 337 Cipher Suite Name | Value 338 ----------------------------------------------+------------ 339 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0x00,0x9E} 340 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0x00,0x9F} 341 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0xC0,0x2B} 342 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0xC0,0x2C} 343 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0xC0,0x2F} 344 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0xC0,0x30} 345 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | {0xC0,0x9E} 346 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | {0xC0,0x9F} 347 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xA8} 348 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xA9} 349 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xAA} 351 The cipher suites that follow are standards track ephemeral pre- 352 shared key cipher suites which are available in TLS 1.2. [RFC6655] 353 is inconsistent with respect to the ordering of components within PSK 354 AES CCM cipher suite names; those names are used here without 355 modification. 357 RFC EDITOR: The previous paragraph is for document reviewers and is 358 not meant for the registry. 360 Cipher Suite Name | Value 361 ----------------------------------------------+------------ 362 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0x00,0xAA} 363 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0x00,0xAB} 364 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM | {0xC0,0xA6} 365 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM | {0xC0,0xA7} 366 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {TBD} 367 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {TBD} 368 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 | {TBD} 369 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_SHA384 | {TBD} 370 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xAC} 371 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xAD} 373 Despite the following behavior being misguided, experience has shown 374 that some customers use the IANA registry as checklist against which 375 to measure an implementation's completeness and some implementers 376 blindly implement cipher suites. Therefore, IANA [SHALL add/has 377 added] the following warning to the registry: 379 WARNING: Cryptographic algorithms and parameters will be broken or 380 weakened over time. Blindly implementing cipher suites listed 381 here is not advised. Implementers and users need to check that 382 the cryptographic algorithms listed continue to provide the 383 expected level of security. 385 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following note to ensure that those 386 that focus on IANA registries are aware that TLS 1.3 387 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] uses the same registry but defines ciphers 388 differently: 390 Note: Although TLS 1.3 uses the same cipher suite space as previous 391 versions of TLS, TLS 1.3 cipher suites are defined differently, 392 only specifying the symmetric ciphers, and cannot be used for TLS 393 1.2. Similarly, TLS 1.2 and lower cipher suite values cannot be 394 used with TLS 1.3. 396 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following notes to document the rules 397 for populating the Recommended column: 399 Note: Cipher suites marked as "Yes" are those allocated via 400 Standards Track RFCs. Cipher suites marked as "No" are not; 401 cipher suites marked "No" range from "good" to "bad" from a 402 cryptographic standpoint. 404 Note: CCM_8 cipher suites are not marked as recommended. These 405 cipher suites have a significantly truncated authentication tag 406 that represents a security trade-off that may not be appropriate 407 for general environments. 409 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following notes for additional 410 information: 412 Note: The designated expert [RFC8126] only ensures that the 413 specification is publicly available. An Internet Draft that is 414 posted and never published or a standard in another standards 415 body, industry consortium, university site, etc. suffices. 417 Note: As specified in [RFC8126], assignments made in the Private Use 418 space are not generally useful for broad interoperability. It is 419 the responsibility of those making use of the Private Use range to 420 ensure that no conflicts occur (within the intended scope of use). 421 For widespread experiments, temporary reservations are available. 423 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for this registry to 424 also refer to this document. 426 10. TLS Supported Groups 428 Similar to cipher suites, supported groups have proliferated over 429 time and some use the registry to measure implementations. 430 Therefore, IANA [SHALL add/has added] a "Recommended" column with a 431 "Yes" for secp256r1, secp384r1, x25519, and x448 while all others are 432 "No". These "Yes" groups are taken from Standards Track RFCs. Not 433 all groups from [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis], which is standards track, 434 are marked as "Yes"; these groups apply to TLS 1.3 435 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] and previous versions of TLS. Future supported 436 groups MUST define the value of this column. In order to register an 437 extension with the value "Yes", a Standards Track document [RFC8126] 438 is REQUIRED. IESG action is REQUIRED for a Yes->No transition. 440 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following note: 442 Note: Supported Groups marked as "Yes" are those allocated via 443 Standards Track RFCs. Supported Groups marked as "No" are not; 444 supported groups marked "No" range from "good" to "bad" from a 445 cryptographic standpoint. 447 Note: The designated expert [RFC8126] only ensures that the 448 specification is publicly available. An Internet Draft that is 449 posted and never published or a standard in another standards 450 body, industry consortium, university site, etc. suffices. 452 Despite the following behavior being misguided, experience has shown 453 that some customers use the IANA registry as checklist against which 454 to measure an implementation's completeness and some implementers 455 blindly implement groups supported. Therefore, IANA [SHALL add/has 456 added] the following warning to the registry: 458 WARNING: Cryptographic algorithms and parameters will be broken or 459 weakened over time. Blindly implementing cipher suites listed 460 here is not advised. Implementers and users need to check that 461 the cryptographic algorithms listed continue to provide the 462 expected level of security. 464 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for this registry to 465 also refer to this document. 467 The value 0 (0x0000) is to be marked as reserved. 469 11. TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers 471 Experience has shown that the IETF Consensus registry policy for TLS 472 ClientCertificateType Identifiers is too strict. Based on WG 473 consensus, the decision was taken to change registration policy to 474 Specification Required [RFC8126] while reserving a small part of the 475 code space for experimental and prviate use. Therefore, IANA [SHALL 476 update/has updated] the TLS Cipher Suite registry's policy as 477 follows: 479 Values in the range 0-223 are assigned via Specification Required 480 {{RFC8126}}. Values 224-255 are reserved for Private Use. 482 See Section 18 for additional information about the designated expert 483 pool. 485 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following notes: 487 Note: The designated expert [RFC8126] only ensures that the 488 specification is publicly available. An Internet Draft that is 489 posted and never published or a standard in another standards 490 body, industry consortium, university site, etc. suffices. 492 Note: As specified in [RFC8126], assignments made in the Private Use 493 space are not generally useful for broad interoperability. It is 494 the responsibility of those making use of the Private Use range to 495 ensure that no conflicts occur (within the intended scope of use). 496 For widespread experiments, temporary reservations are available. 498 Note: ClientCertificateType Identifiers marked as "Yes" are those 499 allocated via Standards Track RFCs. ClientCertificateTypes marked 500 as "No" are not. 502 12. New Session Ticket TLS Handshake Message Type 504 To align with TLS implementations and to align the naming 505 nomenclature with other Handshake message types, IANA: 507 o [SHALL rename/has renamed] entry 4 in the TLS HandshakeType 508 registry to "new_session_ticket (renamed from NewSessionTicket)" 509 [RFC5077]. 511 o [SHALL add/has added] a reference to this document in the 512 Reference column for entry 4 in the TLS HandshakeType registry. 514 13. TLS Exporter Label Registry 516 To aid those reviewers who start with the IANA registry, IANA [SHALL 517 add/has added]: 519 o The following note to the TLS Exporter Label Registry: 521 Note: [RFC5705] defines keying material exporters for TLS in terms 522 of the TLS PRF. [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] replaced the PRF with HKDF, 523 thus requiring a new construction. The exporter interface remains 524 the same, however the value is computed different. 526 o A "Recommended" column to the TLS Exporter Label registry. The 527 table that follows has been generated by marking Standards Track 528 RFCs as "Yes" and all others as "No". Future exporters MUST 529 define the value of this column. In order to register an 530 extension with the value "Yes", a Standards Track document 531 [RFC8126] is REQUIRED. IESG action is REQUIRED for a Yes->No 532 transition. 534 Exporter Value | Recommended | 535 --------------------------------|-------------| 536 client finished | Yes | 537 server finished | Yes | 538 master secret | Yes | 539 key expansion | Yes | 540 client EAP encryption | Yes | 541 ttls keying material | Yes | 542 ttls challenge | Yes | 543 EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp | Yes | 544 EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP | Yes | 545 EXPORTER: teap session key seed | Yes | 547 To provide additional information for the designated experts, IANA 548 [SHALL add/has added] the following note: 550 Note: The designated expert [RFC8126] ensures that the specification 551 is publicly available. An Internet Draft that is posted and never 552 published or a standard in another standards body, industry 553 consortium, university site, etc. suffices. The expert also 554 verifies that the label is a string consisting of printable ASCII 555 characters beginning with "EXPORTER". IANA MUST also verify that 556 one label is not a prefix of any other label. For example, labels 557 "key" or "master secretary" are forbidden. 559 Note: Exporters Labels marked as "Yes" are those allocated via 560 Standards Track RFCs. Exporter Labels marked as "No" are not. 562 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for this registry to 563 also refer to this document. 565 14. Add Missing Item to TLS Alert Registry 567 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following entry to the TLS Alert 568 Registry; the entry was omitted from the IANA instructions in 569 [RFC7301]: 571 120 no_application_protocol Y [RFC7301] 573 15. TLS Certificate Types 575 Experience has shown that the IETF Consensus registry policy for TLS 576 Certificate Types is too strict. Based on WG consensus, the decision 577 was taken to change registration policy to Specification Required 578 [RFC8126] while reserving a small part of the code space for 579 experimental and private use. Therefore, IANA [SHALL add/has added] 580 a "Recommended" column to the registry. X.509 and Raw Public Key are 581 "Yes". All others are "No". In order to register an extension with 582 the value "Yes", a Standards Track document [RFC8126] is REQUIRED. 583 Future Certificate Types MUST define the value of this column. A 584 Standards Track document [RFC8126] is REQUIRED to register an entry 585 with the value "Yes". IESG action is REQUIRED for a Yes->No 586 transition. 588 See Section 18 for additional information about the designated expert 589 pool. 591 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following note: 593 Note: Certificate Types marked as "Yes" are those allocated via 594 Standards Track RFCs. Certificate Types marked as "No" are not. 596 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for this registry to 597 also refer this document. 599 16. Orphaned Extensions 601 To make it clear that (D)TLS 1.3 has orphaned certain extensions 602 (i.e., some extensions are only applicable to version of (D)TLS prior 603 to 1.3), IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following note to the TLS 604 ExtensionType Values registry: 606 Note: The following extensions are only applicable to (D)TLS 607 protocol versions prior to 1.3: trusted_ca_keys, truncated_hmac, 608 user_mapping, cert_type, ec_point_formats, srp, status_request_v2, 609 encrypt_then_mac, extended_master_secret, session_ticket, and 610 renegotiation_info. These extensions are not applicable to (D)TLS 611 1.3. 613 17. Orphaned Registries 615 To make it clear that (D)TLS 1.3 has orphaned certain registries 616 (i.e., they are only applicable to version of (D)TLS protocol 617 versions prior to 1.3), IANA: 619 o [SHALL add/has added] the following to the TLS Compression Method 620 Identifiers registry [RFC3749]: 622 Note: Value 0 (NULL) is the only value in this registry applicable 623 to (D)TLS protocol version 1.3 or later. 625 o [SHALL add/has added] the following to the TLS HashAlgorithm 626 [RFC5246] and TLS SignatureAlgorithm registries [RFC5246]: 628 Note: The values in this registry are only applicable to (D)TLS 629 protocol versions prior to 1.3. 631 o [SHALL update/has updated] the "Reference" field in the TLS 632 Compression Method Identifiers, TLS HashAlgorithm and TLS 633 SignatureAlgorithm registries to also refer to this document. 635 o [SHALL update/has updated] the TLS HashAlgorithm Registry to list 636 values 7-223 as "Reserved" and the TLS SignatureAlgorithm registry 637 to list values 4-223 as "Reserved". 639 Despite the fact that the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithm 640 registries are orphaned, it is still import to warn implementers of 641 pre-TLS1.3 implementations about the dangers of blinding implementing 642 cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, IANA [SHALL add/has added] the 643 following warning to the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithm: 645 WARNING: Cryptographic algorithms and parameters will be broken or 646 weakened over time. Blindly implementing cipher suites listed 647 here is not advised. Implementers and users need to check that 648 the cryptographic algorithms listed continue to provide the 649 expected level of security. 651 18. Designated Expert Pool 653 Specification Required [RFC8126] registry requests are registered 654 after a three-week review period on the tls-reg-review@ietf.org 655 mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. 656 However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, 657 the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are 658 satisfied that such a specification will be published. 660 Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review SHOULD use 661 an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register value in TLS bar 662 registry"). 664 Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve 665 or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the 666 review list and IANA. Denials SHOULD include an explanation and, if 667 applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. 668 Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 669 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the 670 iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution. 672 Criteria that SHOULD be applied by the Designated Experts includes 673 determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing 674 functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or 675 useful only for a single application, and whether the registration 676 description is clear. 678 IANA MUST only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts 679 and SHOULD direct all requests for registration to the review mailing 680 list. 682 It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are 683 able to represent the perspectives of different applications using 684 this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of 685 registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could 686 be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular 687 Expert, that Expert SHOULD defer to the judgment of the other 688 Experts. 690 19. Security Considerations 692 The change to Specification Required from IETF Review lowers the 693 amount of review provided by the WG for cipher suites and supported 694 groups. This change reflects reality in that the WG essentially 695 provided no cryptographic review of the cipher suites or supported 696 groups. This was especially true of national cipher suites. 698 Recommended algorithms are regarded as secure for general use at the 699 time of registration, however, cryptographic algorithms and 700 parameters will be broken or weakened over time. It is possible that 701 the recommended status in the registry lags behind the most recent 702 advances in cryptanalysis. Implementers and users need to check that 703 the cryptographic algorithms listed continue to provide the expected 704 level of security. 706 Designated experts ensure the specification is publicly available. 707 They may provide more in depth reviews. Their review should not be 708 taken as an endorsement of the cipher suite, extension, supported 709 group, etc. 711 20. IANA Considerations 713 This document is entirely about changes to TLS-related IANA 714 registries. 716 21. References 718 21.1. Normative References 720 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] 721 Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 722 Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23 (work in progress), 723 January 2018. 725 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 726 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 727 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . 730 [RFC3749] Hollenbeck, S., "Transport Layer Security Protocol 731 Compression Methods", RFC 3749, DOI 10.17487/RFC3749, May 732 2004, . 734 [RFC4680] Santesson, S., "TLS Handshake Message for Supplemental 735 Data", RFC 4680, DOI 10.17487/RFC4680, October 2006, 736 . 738 [RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig, 739 "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without 740 Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077, 741 January 2008, . 743 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 744 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, 745 DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, . 748 [RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport 749 Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705, 750 March 2010, . 752 [RFC5878] Brown, M. and R. Housley, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) 753 Authorization Extensions", RFC 5878, DOI 10.17487/RFC5878, 754 May 2010, . 756 [RFC6520] Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport 757 Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security 758 (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520, 759 DOI 10.17487/RFC6520, February 2012, . 762 [RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for 763 Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, 764 DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012, . 767 [RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan, 768 "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol 769 Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301, 770 July 2014, . 772 [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for 773 Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, 774 RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, 775 . 777 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 778 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 779 May 2017, . 781 21.2. Informative References 783 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis] 784 Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic 785 Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer 786 Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", draft-ietf-tls- 787 rfc4492bis-17 (work in progress), May 2017. 789 [RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J., 790 and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) 791 Extensions", RFC 4366, DOI 10.17487/RFC4366, April 2006, 792 . 794 [RFC6961] Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 795 Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961, 796 DOI 10.17487/RFC6961, June 2013, . 799 Authors' Addresses 800 Joe Salowey 801 Tableau Software 803 Email: joe@salowey.net 805 Sean Turner 806 sn3rd 808 Email: sean@sn3rd.com