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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Outdated reference: draft-ietf-tls-tls13 has been published as RFC 8446 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5077 (Obsoleted by RFC 8446) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5246 (Obsoleted by RFC 8446) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Experimental RFC: RFC 5878 == Outdated reference: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis has been published as RFC 8422 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 6961 (Obsoleted by RFC 8446) Summary: 3 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 8 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 TLS WG J. Salowey 3 Internet-Draft Tableau Software 4 Updates: 3749, 5077, 4680, 5246, 5705, S. Turner 5 5878, 6520, 7301 (if approved) sn3rd 6 Intended status: Standards Track January 3, 2018 7 Expires: July 7, 2018 9 IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS 10 draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-03 12 Abstract 14 This document describes a number of changes to (D)TLS IANA registries 15 that range from adding notes to the registry all the way to changing 16 the registration policy. These changes were mostly motivated by WG 17 review of the (D)TLS-related registries undertaken as part of the 18 TLS1.3 development process. This document updates many (D)TLS RFCs 19 (see updates header). 21 Status of This Memo 23 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 24 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 26 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 27 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 28 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 29 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 31 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 32 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 33 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 34 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 36 This Internet-Draft will expire on July 7, 2018. 38 Copyright Notice 40 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 41 document authors. All rights reserved. 43 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 44 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 45 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 46 publication of this document. Please review these documents 47 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 48 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 49 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 50 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 51 described in the Simplified BSD License. 53 Table of Contents 55 1. Process Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 56 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 57 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 4. Add "TLS" to Registry Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 5. Aligning with RFC 8126 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 6. Adding recommended Column . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 7. Session Ticket TLS Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 8. TLS ExtensionType Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 63 9. TLS Cipher Suite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 64 10. TLS Supported Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 65 11. TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 66 12. New Session Ticket TLS Handshake Message Type . . . . . . . . 10 67 13. TLS Exporter Label Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 68 14. Add Missing Item to TLS Alert Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 11 69 15. TLS Certificate Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 70 16. Orphaned Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 71 17. Orphaned Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 72 18. Designated Expert Pool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 73 19. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 74 20. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 75 21. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 76 21.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 77 21.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 78 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 80 1. Process Note 82 As the authors of this draft are also the WG chairs, the responsible 83 Area Director has agreed to judge consensus. 85 RFC EDITOR: Please delete section prior to publication. 87 2. Introduction 89 This document instructs IANA to make changes to a number of (D)TLS- 90 related IANA registries. These changes were almost entirely 91 motivated by the development of TLS1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. 93 The changes introduced by this document range from simple, e.g., 94 adding notes, to complex, e.g., changing a registry's registration 95 policy. Instead of listing the changes and their rationale in this, 96 the introductory, section each section provides rationale for the 97 proposed change(s). 99 This document proposes no changes to the registration policies for 100 TLS Alert [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], TLS ContentType [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], 101 TLS HandshakeType [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], and TLS Certificate Status 102 Types [RFC6961] registries; the existing policies (Standards Action 103 for the first three; IETF Review for the last), are appropriate for 104 these one-byte code points because of their scarcity. 106 3. Terminology 108 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 109 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 110 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 111 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 112 capitals, as shown here. 114 4. Add "TLS" to Registry Names 116 For consistency amongst TLS registries, IANA [SHALL prepend/has 117 prepended] "TLS" to the following registries: 119 o Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs 120 [RFC7301], 122 o ExtensionType Values, 124 o Heartbeat Message Types [RFC6520], and 126 o Heartbeat Modes [RFC6520]. 128 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for these four 129 registries to also refer to this document. The remainder of this 130 document will use the registry names with the "TLS" prefix. 132 5. Aligning with RFC 8126 134 Many of the TLS-related IANA registries were defined prior to 135 [RFC8126] where "IETF Consensus" was used instead of the 136 RFC8126-defined "IETF Review". To align with the new terminology, 137 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the following registries to use "IETF 138 Review" in place of "IETF Consensus": 140 o TLS Authorization Data Formats [RFC4680] 142 o TLS Supplemental Data Formats (SupplementalDataType) [RFC5878] 143 This is not a universal change as some registries originally defined 144 with "IETF Consensus" are undergoing other changes either as a result 145 of this document or [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis]. 147 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for these two 148 registries to also refer to this document. 150 6. Adding recommended Column 152 The instructions in this document add a recommended column to many of 153 the TLS registries to indicate parameters that are generally 154 recommended for implementations to support. Adding a recommended 155 parameter to a registry or updating a parameter to recommended status 156 requires standards action. Not all parameters defined in standards 157 track documents need to be marked as recommended. 159 If an item is marked as not recommended it does not necessarily mean 160 that it is flawed, rather, it indicates that either the item has not 161 been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, 162 or is intended only for specific use cases. 164 7. Session Ticket TLS Extension 166 The nomenclature for the registry entries in the TLS ExtensionType 167 Values registry correspond to the presentation language field name 168 except for entry 35. To ensure that the values in the registry are 169 consistently identified in the registry, IANA: 171 o [SHALL rename/has renamed] entry 35 to "session_ticket (renamed 172 from "SessionTicket TLS")" [RFC5077]. 174 o [SHALL add/has added] a reference to this document in the 175 Reference column for entry 35. 177 8. TLS ExtensionType Values 179 Experience has shown that the IETF Review registry policy for TLS 180 Extensions was too strict. Based on WG consensus, the decision was 181 taken to change the registration policy to Specification Required 182 [RFC8126] while reserving a small part of the code space for 183 experimental and private use. Therefore, IANA [SHALL update/has 184 updated] the TLS ExtensionType Values registry to: 186 o Change the registry policy to: 188 Values with the first byte in the range 0-254 (decimal) are 189 assigned via Specification Required [RFC8126]. Values with the 190 first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use [RFC8126]. 192 o Update the "Reference" to also refer to this document. 194 o Add the following note: 196 Note: Experts are to verify that there is in fact a publicly 197 available standard. 199 See Section 18 for additional information about the designated expert 200 pool. 202 Despite wanting to "loosen" the registration policies for TLS 203 Extensions, it is still useful to indicate in the IANA registry which 204 extensions the WG recommends be supported. Therefore, IANA [SHALL 205 update/has updated] the TLS ExtensionType Values registry to: 207 o Add a "Recommended" column with the contents as listed below. 208 This table has been generated by marking Standards Track RFCs as 209 "Yes" and all others as "No". Future extensions MUST define the 210 value of the Recommended column. A Standards Track document 211 [RFC8126] is REQUIRED to register an extension with the value 212 "Yes". IESG action is REQUIRED for a Yes->No transition. 214 +----------------------------------------+-------------+ 215 | Extension | Recommended | 216 +----------------------------------------+-------------+ 217 | server_name | Yes | 218 | | | 219 | max_fragment_length | Yes | 220 | | | 221 | client_certificate_url | Yes | 222 | | | 223 | trusted_ca_keys | Yes | 224 | | | 225 | truncated_hmac | Yes | 226 | | | 227 | status_request | Yes | 228 | | | 229 | user_mapping | Yes | 230 | | | 231 | client_authz | No | 232 | | | 233 | server_authz | No | 234 | | | 235 | cert_type | Yes | 236 | | | 237 | supported_groups | Yes | 238 | | | 239 | ec_point_formats | Yes | 240 | | | 241 | srp | No | 242 | | | 243 | signature_algorithms | Yes | 244 | | | 245 | use_srtp | Yes | 246 | | | 247 | heartbeat | Yes | 248 | | | 249 | application_layer_protocol_negotiation | Yes | 250 | | | 251 | status_request_v2 | Yes | 252 | | | 253 | signed_certificate_timestamp | No | 254 | | | 255 | client_certificate_type | Yes | 256 | | | 257 | server_certificate_type | Yes | 258 | | | 259 | padding | Yes | 260 | | | 261 | encrypt_then_mac | Yes | 262 | | | 263 | extended_master_secret | Yes | 264 | | | 265 | session_ticket | Yes | 266 | | | 267 | renegotiation_info | Yes | 268 +----------------------------------------+-------------+ 270 9. TLS Cipher Suite Registry 272 Experience has shown that the IETF Consensus registry policy for TLS 273 Cipher Suites was too strict. Based on WG consensus, the decision 274 was taken to change the TLS Cipher Suite registry's registration 275 policy to Specification Required [RFC8126] while reserving a small 276 part of the code space for experimental and private use. Therefore, 277 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the TLS Cipher Suite registry's 278 policy as follows: 280 Values with the first byte in the range 0-254 (decimal) are 281 assigned via Specification Required {{RFC8126}}. Values with the 282 first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use {{RFC8126}}. 284 See Section 18 for additional information about the designated expert 285 pool. 287 The cipher suite registry has grown significantly and will continue 288 to do so. To better guide those not intimately involved in TLS, IANA 289 [shall update/has updated] the TLS Cipher Suite registry as follows: 291 o Add a "Recommended" column to the TLS Cipher Suite registry. The 292 cipher suites that follow in the two tables are marked as "Yes". 293 All other cipher suites are marked as "No". Future cipher suites 294 MUST define the value of the Recommended column. A Standards 295 Track document [RFC8126] is REQUIRED to register a cipher suite 296 with the value "Yes". IESG action is REQUIRED for a Yes->No 297 transition. 299 The cipher suites that follow are standards track server- 300 authenticated (and optionally client-authenticated) cipher suites 301 which are currently available in TLS 1.2. 303 RFC EDITOR: The previous paragraph is for document reviewers and is 304 not meant for the registry. 306 Cipher Suite Name | Value 307 ----------------------------------------------+------------ 308 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0x00,0x9E} 309 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0x00,0x9F} 310 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0xC0,0x2B} 311 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0xC0,0x2C} 312 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0xC0,0x2F} 313 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0xC0,0x30} 314 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | {0xC0,0x9E} 315 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | {0xC0,0x9F} 316 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xA8} 317 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xA9} 318 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xAA} 320 The cipher suites that follow are standards track ephemeral pre- 321 shared key cipher suites which are available in TLS 1.2. [RFC6655] 322 is inconsistent with respect to the ordering of components within PSK 323 AES CCM cipher suite names; those names are used here without 324 modification. 326 RFC EDITOR: The previous paragraph is for document reviewers and is 327 not meant for the registry. 329 Cipher Suite Name | Value 330 ----------------------------------------------+------------ 331 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0x00,0xAA} 332 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0x00,0xAB} 333 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM | {0xC0,0xA6} 334 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM | {0xC0,0xA7} 335 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {TBD} 336 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {TBD} 337 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 | {TBD} 338 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_SHA384 | {TBD} 339 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xAC} 340 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xAD} 342 Despite the following behavior being crazy, experience has shown that 343 some customers use the IANA registry as checklist against which to 344 measure an implementation's completeness and some implementers 345 blindly implement cipher suites. Therefore, IANA [SHALL add/has 346 added] the following warning to the registry: 348 WARNING: Cryptographic algorithms and parameters will be broken or 349 weakened over time. Blindly implementing cipher suites listed 350 here is not advised. Implementers and users need to check that 351 the cryptographic algorithms listed continue to provide the 352 expected level of security. 354 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following note to ensure that those 355 that focus on IANA registries are aware that TLS 1.3 356 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] uses the same registry but defines ciphers 357 differently: 359 Note: Although TLS 1.3 uses the same cipher suite space as previous 360 versions of TLS, TLS 1.3 cipher suites are defined differently, 361 only specifying the symmetric ciphers, and cannot be used for TLS 362 1.2. Similarly, TLS 1.2 and lower cipher suite values cannot be 363 used with TLS 1.3. 365 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following notes to document the rules 366 for populating the Recommended column: 368 Note: Cipher suites marked as "Yes" are those allocated via 369 Standards Track RFCs. Cipher suites marked as "No" are not; 370 cipher suites marked "No" range from "good" to "bad" from a 371 cryptographic standpoint. 373 Note: CCM_8 cipher suites are not marked as Recommended. These 374 cipher suites have a significantly truncated authentication tag 375 that represents a security trade-off that may not be appropriate 376 for general environments. 378 Note: The designated expert [RFC8126] only ensures that the 379 specification is publicly available. 381 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for this registry to 382 also refer to this document. 384 10. TLS Supported Groups 386 Similar to cipher suites, supported groups have proliferated over 387 time and some use the registry to measure implementations. 388 Therefore, IANA [SHALL add/has added] a "Recommended" column with a 389 "Yes" for secp256r1, secp384r1, x25519, and x448 while all others are 390 "No". These "Yes" groups are taken from Standards Track RFCs. Not 391 all groups from [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis], which is standards track, 392 are marked as "Yes"; these groups apply to TLS 1.3 393 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] and previous versions of TLS. Future supported 394 groups MUST define the value of this column. A Standards Track 395 document [RFC8126] is REQUIRED to register an entry with the value 396 "Yes". IESG action is REQUIRED for a Yes->No transition. 398 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following note: 400 Note: Supported Groups marked as "Yes" are those allocated via 401 Standards Track RFCs. Supported Groups marked as "No" are not; 402 supported groups marked "No" range from "good" to "bad" from a 403 cryptographic standpoint. 405 Note: The designated expert [RFC8126] only ensures that the 406 specification is publicly available. 408 Despite the following behavior being crazy, experience has shown that 409 some customers use the IANA registry as checklist against which to 410 measure an implementation's completeness and some implementers 411 blindly implement cipher supported. Therefore, IANA [SHALL add/has 412 added] the following warning to the registry: 414 WARNING: Cryptographic algorithms and parameters will be broken or 415 weakened over time. Blindly implementing cipher suites listed 416 here is not advised. Implementers and users need to check that 417 the cryptographic algorithms listed continue to provide the 418 expected level of security. 420 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for this registry to 421 also refer to this document. 423 The value 0 (0x0000) is to be marked as reserved. 425 11. TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers 427 Experience has shown that the IETF Consensus registry policy for TLS 428 ClientCertificateType Identifiers is too strict. Based on WG 429 consensus, the decision was taken to change registration policy to 430 Specification Required [RFC8126] while reserving a small part of the 431 code space for experimental and prviate use. Therefore, IANA [SHALL 432 update/has updated] the TLS Cipher Suite registry's policy as 433 follows: 435 Values in the range 0-223 are assigned via Specification Required 436 {{RFC8126}}. Values 224-255 are reserved for Private Use. 438 See Section 18 for additional information about the designated expert 439 pool. 441 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following notes: 443 Note: The designated expert [RFC8126] only ensures that the 444 specification is publicly available. 446 Note: ClientCertificateType Identifiers marked as "Yes" are those 447 allocated via Standards Track RFCs. ClientCertificateTypes marked 448 as "No" are not. 450 12. New Session Ticket TLS Handshake Message Type 452 To align with TLS implementations and to align the naming 453 nomenclature with other Handshake message types, IANA: 455 o [SHALL rename/has renamed] entry 4 in the TLS HandshakeType 456 registry to "new_session_ticket (renamed from NewSessionTicket)" 457 [RFC5077]. 459 o [SHALL add/has added] a reference to this document in the 460 Reference column for entry 4 in the TLS HandshakeType registry. 462 13. TLS Exporter Label Registry 464 To aid those reviewers who start with the IANA registry, IANA [SHALL 465 add/has added]: 467 o The following note to the TLS Exporter Label Registry: 469 Note: [RFC5705] defines keying material exporters for TLS in terms 470 of the TLS PRF. [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] replaced the PRF with HKDF, 471 thus requiring a new construction. The exporter interface remains 472 the same, however the value is computed different. 474 o A "Recommended" column to the TLS Exporter Label registry. The 475 table that follows has been generated by marking Standards Track 476 RFCs as "Yes" and all others as "No". Future exporters MUST 477 define the value of this column. A Standards Track document 478 [RFC8126] is REQUIRED to register an extension with the value 479 "Yes". IESG action is REQUIRED for a Yes->No transition. 481 Exporter Value 482 ------------------------------- 483 client finished 484 server finished 485 master secret 486 key expansion 487 client EAP encryption 488 ttls keying material 489 ttls challenge 490 EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp 491 EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP 492 EXPORTER: teap session key seed 494 To provide additional information for the designated experts, IANA 495 [SHALL add/has added] the following note: 497 Note: The designated expert [RFC8126] ensures that the specification 498 is publicly available. The expert also verifies that the label is 499 a string consisting of printable ASCII characters beginning with 500 "EXPORTER". IANA MUST also verify that one label is not a prefix 501 of any other label. For example, labels "key" or "master 502 secretary" are forbidden. 504 Note: Exporters Labels marked as "Yes" are those allocated via 505 Standards Track RFCs. Exporter Labels marked as "No" are not. 507 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for this registry to 508 also refer to this document. 510 14. Add Missing Item to TLS Alert Registry 512 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following entry to the TLS Alert 513 Registry; the entry was omitted from the IANA instructions in 514 [RFC7301]: 516 120 no_application_protocol Y [RFC7301] 518 15. TLS Certificate Types 520 Experience has shown that the IETF Consensus registry policy for TLS 521 Certificate Types is too strict. Based on WG consensus, the decision 522 was taken to change registration policy to Specification Required 523 [RFC8126] while reserving a small part of the code space for 524 experimental and private use. Therefore, IANA [SHALL add/has added] 525 a "Recommended" column to the registry. X.509 and Raw Public Key are 526 "Yes". All others are "No". A Standards Track document [RFC8126] is 527 required to register a certificate type with the value "Yes". Future 528 Certificate Types MUST define the value of this column. A Standards 529 Track document [RFC8126] is REQUIRED to register an entry with the 530 value "Yes". IESG action is REQUIRED for a Yes->No transition. 532 See Section 18 for additional information about the designated expert 533 pool. 535 IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following note: 537 Note: Certificate Types marked as "Yes" are those allocated via 538 Standards Track RFCs. Certificate Types marked as "No" are not. 540 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for this registry to 541 also refer this document. 543 16. Orphaned Extensions 545 To make it clear that (D)TLS 1.3 has orphaned certain extensions 546 (i.e., some extensions are only applicable to version of (D)TLS prior 547 to 1.3), IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following note to the TLS 548 ExtensionType Values registry: 550 Note: The following extensions are only applicable to (D)TLS 551 protocol versions prior to 1.3: trusted_ca_keys, truncated_hmac, 552 user_mapping, cert_type, ec_point_formats, srp, status_request_v2, 553 encrypt_then_mac, extended_master_secret, session_ticket, and 554 renegotiation_info. These extensions are not applicable to (D)TLS 555 1.3. 557 17. Orphaned Registries 559 To make it clear that (D)TLS 1.3 has orphaned certain registries 560 (i.e., they are only applicable to version of (D)TLS protocol 561 versions prior to 1.3), IANA: 563 o [SHALL add/has added] the following to the TLS Compression Method 564 Identifiers registry [RFC3749]: 566 Note: Value 0 (NULL) is the only value in this registry applicable 567 to (D)TLS protocol version 1.3 or later. 569 o [SHALL add/has added] the following to the TLS HashAlgorithm 570 [RFC5246] and TLS SignatureAlgorithm registries [RFC5246]: 572 Note: The values in this registry are only applicable to (D)TLS 573 protocol versions prior to 1.3. 575 o [SHALL update/has updated] the "Reference" field in the TLS 576 Compression Method Identifiers, TLS HashAlgorithm and TLS 577 SignatureAlgorithm registries to also refer to this document. 579 o [SHALL update/has updated] the TLS HashAlgorithm Registry to list 580 values 7-223 as "Reserved" and the TLS SignatureAlgorithm registry 581 to list values 4-223 as "Reserved". 583 Despite the fact that the HashAlgorithm and SignarureAlgorithm 584 registries are orphaned, it is still import to warn implementers of 585 pre-TLS1.3 implementations about the dangers of blinding implementing 586 cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, IANA [SHALL add/has added] the 587 following warning to the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithm: 589 WARNING: Cryptographic algorithms and parameters will be broken or 590 weakened over time. Blindly implementing cipher suites listed 591 here is not advised. Implementers and users need to check that 592 the cryptographic algorithms listed continue to provide the 593 expected level of security. 595 18. Designated Expert Pool 597 Specification Required [RFC8126] registry requests are registered 598 after a three-week review period on the (tbd but maybe tls-reg- 599 review@ietf.org) mailing list, on the advice of one or more 600 Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values 601 prior to publication, the Designated Experts may approve registration 602 once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published. 604 Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review SHOULD use 605 an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register value in TLS bar 606 registry"). 608 Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve 609 or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the 610 review list and IANA. Denials SHOULD include an explanation and, if 611 applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. 612 Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 613 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the 614 iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution. 616 Criteria that SHOULD be applied by the Designated Experts includes 617 determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing 618 functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or 619 useful only for a single application, and whether the registration 620 description is clear. 622 IANA MUST only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts 623 and SHOULD direct all requests for registration to the review mailing 624 list. 626 It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are 627 able to represent the perspectives of different applications using 628 this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of 629 registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could 630 be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular 631 Expert, that Expert SHOULD defer to the judgment of the other 632 Experts. 634 19. Security Considerations 636 The change to Specification Required from IETF Review lowers the 637 amount of review provided by the WG for cipher suites and supported 638 groups. This change reflects reality in that the WG essentially 639 provided no cryptographic review of the cipher suites or supported 640 groups. This was especially true of national cipher suites. 642 Recommended algorithms regarded as secure for general use at the time 643 of registration, however, cryptographic algorithms and parameters 644 will be broken or weakened over time. It is possible that the 645 recommended status in the registry lags behind the most recent 646 advances in cryptanalysis. Implementers and users need to check that 647 the cryptographic algorithms listed continue to provide the expected 648 level of security. 650 Designated experts ensure the specification is publicly available. 651 They may provide more in depth reviews. Their review should not be 652 taken as an endorsement of the cipher suite, extension, supported 653 group, etc. 655 20. IANA Considerations 657 This document is entirely about changes to TLS-related IANA 658 registries. 660 21. References 662 21.1. Normative References 664 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] 665 Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 666 Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-22 (work in progress), 667 November 2017. 669 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 670 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 671 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . 674 [RFC3749] Hollenbeck, S., "Transport Layer Security Protocol 675 Compression Methods", RFC 3749, DOI 10.17487/RFC3749, May 676 2004, . 678 [RFC4680] Santesson, S., "TLS Handshake Message for Supplemental 679 Data", RFC 4680, DOI 10.17487/RFC4680, October 2006, 680 . 682 [RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig, 683 "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without 684 Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077, 685 January 2008, . 687 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 688 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, 689 DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, . 692 [RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport 693 Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705, 694 March 2010, . 696 [RFC5878] Brown, M. and R. Housley, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) 697 Authorization Extensions", RFC 5878, DOI 10.17487/RFC5878, 698 May 2010, . 700 [RFC6520] Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport 701 Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security 702 (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520, 703 DOI 10.17487/RFC6520, February 2012, . 706 [RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for 707 Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, 708 DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012, . 711 [RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan, 712 "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol 713 Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301, 714 July 2014, . 716 [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for 717 Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, 718 RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, 719 . 721 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 722 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 723 May 2017, . 725 21.2. Informative References 727 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis] 728 Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic 729 Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer 730 Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", draft-ietf-tls- 731 rfc4492bis-17 (work in progress), May 2017. 733 [RFC6961] Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 734 Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961, 735 DOI 10.17487/RFC6961, June 2013, . 738 Authors' Addresses 740 Joe Salowey 741 Tableau Software 743 Email: joe@salowey.net 745 Sean Turner 746 sn3rd 748 Email: sean@sn3rd.com