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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Outdated reference: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis has been published as RFC 8422 == Outdated reference: draft-ietf-tls-tls13 has been published as RFC 8446 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5246 (Obsoleted by RFC 8446) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6347 (Obsoleted by RFC 9147) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 4492 (Obsoleted by RFC 8422) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group J. Mattsson 3 Internet-Draft D. Migault 4 Intended status: Standards Track Ericsson 5 Expires: November 25, 2017 May 24, 2017 7 ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer 8 Security (TLS) Protocol version 1.2 9 draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 11 Abstract 13 This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport 14 Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.2. The cipher suites are all 15 based on the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared 16 Key (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated 17 Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES- 18 CCM. PSK provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides 19 forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and 20 integrity protection. 22 Status of This Memo 24 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 25 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 27 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 28 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 29 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 30 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 32 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 33 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 34 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 35 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 37 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2017. 39 Copyright Notice 41 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 42 document authors. All rights reserved. 44 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 45 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 46 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 47 publication of this document. Please review these documents 48 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 49 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 50 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 51 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 52 described in the Simplified BSD License. 54 Table of Contents 56 1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 57 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 58 3. ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites . . . . . . 3 59 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 64 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 65 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 67 1. Requirements notation 69 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 70 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 71 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 73 2. Introduction 75 This document defines new cipher suites that provide Pre-Shared Key 76 (PSK) authentication, Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), and 77 Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). The cipher 78 suites are defined for version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security 79 (TLS) [RFC5246] protocol and version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport 80 Layer Security (DTLS) protocol [RFC6347]. 82 Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Authentication is widely used in many scenarios. 83 One deployment is 3GPP networks where pre-shared keys are used to 84 authenticate both subscriber and network. Another deployment is 85 Internet of Things where PSK authentication is often preferred for 86 performance and energy efficiency reasons. In both scenarios the 87 endpoints are owned/controlled by a party that provisions the pre- 88 shared keys and makes sure that they provide a high level of entropy. 90 Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is a strongly recommended feature in 91 security protocol design and can be accomplished by using an 92 ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange method. Ephemeral Elliptic 93 Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) provides PFS with excellent performance 94 and small key sizes. ECDHE is mandatory to implement in both HTTP/2 95 [RFC7540] and CoAP [RFC7252]. 97 AEAD algorithms that combine encryption and integrity protection are 98 strongly recommended for (D)TLS [RFC7525] and non-AEAD algorithms are 99 forbidden to use in TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. The AEAD 100 algorithms considered in this document are AES-GCM and AES-CCM. The 101 use of AES-GCM in TLS is defined in [RFC5288] and the use of AES-CCM 102 is defined in [RFC6655]. 104 [RFC4279] defines Pre-Shared Key (PSK) cipher suites for TLS but does 105 not consider Elliptic Curve Cryptography. [RFC4492] introduces 106 Elliptic Curve Cryptography for TLS but does not consider PSK 107 authentication. [RFC5487] describes the use of AES-GCM in 108 combination with PSK authentication, but does not consider ECDHE. 109 [RFC5489] describes the use of PSK in combination with ECDHE but does 110 not consider AES-GCM or AES-CCM. 112 3. ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites 114 The cipher suites defined in this document are based on the AES-GCM 115 and AES-CCM Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) 116 algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM, AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 117 defined in [RFC6655] and AEAD_AES_128_CCM defined in [RFC5116]. 119 Messages and premaster secret construction in this document are 120 defined in [RFC5489]. The ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange 121 messages are used and the premaster secret is computed as for the 122 ECDHE_PSK key exchange. The elliptic curve parameters used in in the 123 Diffie-Hellman parameters are negotiated using extensions defined in 124 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis]. 126 For TLS 1.2, the following cipher suites are defined: 128 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD,0xTBD}; 129 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xTBD,0xTBD}; 130 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD,0xTBD}; 131 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD,0xTBD}; 133 The assigned code points can only be used for TLS 1.2. 135 The cipher suites defined in this document MUST NOT be negotiated for 136 any version of (D)TLS other than TLS 1.2. Servers MUST NOT select 137 one of these cipher suites when selecting TLS version other than TLS 138 1.2. A client MUST treat the selection of these cipher suites in 139 combination with a different version of TLS as an error and generate 140 a fatal 'illegal_parameter' TLS alert. 142 Cipher suites TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 143 TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 and TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 are used to 144 support equivalent functionality in TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. 146 4. IANA Considerations 148 This document defines the following new cipher suites, whose values 149 have been assigned in the TLS Cipher Suite Registry defined by 150 [RFC5246]. 152 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x01}; 153 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x02}; 154 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x03}; 155 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x05}; 157 NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS PARAGRAPH. The cipher 158 suite numbers listed in the last column are numbers used for cipher 159 suite interoperability testing and it's suggested that IANA use these 160 values for assignment. 162 5. Security Considerations 164 The security considerations in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347], 165 PSK Ciphersuites for TLS [RFC4279], ECDHE_PSK [RFC5489], AES-GCM 166 [RFC5288], and AES-CCM [RFC6655] apply to this document as well. 168 All the cipher suites defined in this document provide 169 confidentiality, mutual authentication, and forward secrecy. The 170 AES-128 cipher suites provide 128-bit security and the AES-256 cipher 171 suites provide at least 192-bit security. However, AES_128_CCM_8 172 only provides 64-bit security against message forgery. 174 The Pre-Shared Keys used for authentication MUST have a security 175 level equal or higher than the cipher suite used, i.e., at least 176 128-bit for the AES-128 cipher suites and at least 192-bit for the 177 AES-256 cipher suites. 179 GCM or CCM encryption - even of different clear text - re-using a 180 nonce with a same key undermines the security of GCM and CCM. As a 181 result, GCM and CCM MUST only be used with a system guaranteeing 182 nonce uniqueness [RFC5116]. 184 6. Acknowledgements 186 The authors would like to thank Ilari Liusvaara, Eric Rescorla, Dan 187 Harkins, Russ Housley, Dan Harkins, Martin Thomson, Nikos 188 Mavrogiannopoulos, Peter Dettman, Xiaoyin Liu, Joseph Salowey, Sean 189 Turner Dave Garrett, Martin Rex and Kathleen Moriarty for their 190 valuable comments and feedback. 192 7. References 194 7.1. Normative References 196 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis] 197 Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic 198 Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer 199 Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", draft-ietf-tls- 200 rfc4492bis-17 (work in progress), May 2017. 202 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] 203 Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 204 Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20 (work in progress), 205 April 2017. 207 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 208 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 209 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 210 . 212 [RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key 213 Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", 214 RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005, 215 . 217 [RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated 218 Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008, 219 . 221 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 222 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, 223 DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, 224 . 226 [RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois 227 Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288, 228 DOI 10.17487/RFC5288, August 2008, 229 . 231 [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer 232 Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, 233 January 2012, . 235 [RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for 236 Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, 237 DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012, 238 . 240 7.2. Informative References 242 [RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B. 243 Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites 244 for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, 245 DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006, 246 . 248 [RFC5487] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA- 249 256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487, 250 DOI 10.17487/RFC5487, March 2009, 251 . 253 [RFC5489] Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, "ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for 254 Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5489, 255 DOI 10.17487/RFC5489, March 2009, 256 . 258 [RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained 259 Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, 260 DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, 261 . 263 [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, 264 "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer 265 Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security 266 (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 267 2015, . 269 [RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext 270 Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, 271 DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015, 272 . 274 Authors' Addresses 276 John Mattsson 277 Ericsson AB 278 SE-164 80 Stockholm 279 Sweden 281 Phone: +46 76 115 35 01 282 Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com 283 Daniel Migault 284 Ericsson 285 8400 boulevard Decarie 286 Montreal, QC H4P 2N2 287 Canada 289 Phone: +1 514-452-2160 290 Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com