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1 S/MIME WG James Randall, Randall Consulting
2 Internet Draft Burt Kaliski, EMC
3 Intended Status: Standards Track John Brainard, RSA
4 Sean Turner, IECA
5 Expires: November 29, 2010 May 29, 2010
7 Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in CMS
8
10 Abstract
12 The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward)
13 mechanism for transporting keying data to a recipient using the
14 recipient's RSA public key. This document specifies the conventions
15 for using the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm with the Cryptographic
16 Message Syntax (CMS). The ASN.1 syntax is aligned with an expected
17 forthcoming change to ANS X9.44.
19 Status of this Memo
21 This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may contain material
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49 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 29, 2010.
51 Copyright Notice
53 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
54 document authors. All rights reserved.
56 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
57 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
58 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
59 publication of this document. Please review these documents
60 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
61 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
62 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
63 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
64 described in the Simplified BSD License.
66 Conventions Used in This Document
68 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
69 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
70 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [STDWORDS].
72 Table of Contents
74 1. Introduction...................................................3
75 2. Use in CMS.....................................................4
76 2.1. Underlying Components.....................................4
77 2.2. RecipientInfo Conventions.................................5
78 2.3. Certificate Conventions...................................5
79 2.4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions...................6
80 3. Security Considerations........................................7
81 4. IANA Considerations............................................9
82 5. Acknowledgements...............................................9
83 6. References....................................................10
84 6.1. Normative References.....................................10
85 6.2. Informative References...................................11
86 Appendix A. RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm......................11
87 A.1. Underlying Components....................................12
88 A.2. Sender's Operations......................................12
89 A.3. Recipient's Operations...................................13
90 Appendix B. ASN.1 Syntax.........................................15
91 B.1. RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm..........................15
92 B.2. Selected Underlying Components...........................17
93 B.2.1. Key Derivation Functions............................17
94 B.2.2. Symmetric Key-Wrapping Schemes......................19
95 B.3. ASN.1 module.............................................20
96 B.4. Examples.................................................26
97 Authors' Addresses...............................................28
99 1. Introduction
101 The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward)
102 mechanism for transporting keying data to a recipient using the
103 recipient's RSA public key.
105 Most previous key transport algorithms based on the RSA public-key
106 cryptosystem (e.g., the popular PKCS #1 v1.5 algorithm [PKCS1]) have
107 the following general form:
109 1. Format or "pad" the keying data to obtain an integer m.
111 2. Encrypt the integer m with the recipient's RSA public key:
113 c = m^e mod n
115 3. Output c as the encrypted keying data.
117 The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm takes a different approach that
118 provides higher security assurance, by encrypting a _random_ integer
119 with the recipient's public key, and using a symmetric key-wrapping
120 scheme to encrypt the keying data. It has the following form:
122 1. Generate a random integer z between 0 and n-1.
124 2. Encrypt the integer z with the recipient's RSA public key:
126 c = z^e mod n
128 3. Derive a key-encrypting key KEK from the integer z.
130 4. Wrap the keying data using KEK to obtain wrapped keying data WK.
132 5. Output c and WK as the encrypted keying data.
134 This different approach provides higher security assurance because
135 (a) the input to the underlying RSA operation is effectively a random
136 integer between 0 and n-1, where n is the RSA modulus, so it does not
137 have any structure that could be exploited by an adversary, and (b)
138 the input is independent of the keying data so the result of the RSA
139 decryption operation is not directly available to an adversary. As a
140 result, the algorithm enjoys a "tight" security proof in the random
141 oracle model. (In other padding schemes, such as PKCS #1 v1.5, the
142 input has structure and/or depends on the keying data, and the
143 provable security assurances are not as strong.) The approach is also
144 architecturally convenient because the public-key operations are
145 separate from the symmetric operations on the keying data. Another
146 benefit is that the length of the keying data is bounded only by the
147 symmetric key-wrapping scheme, not the size of the RSA modulus.
149 The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in various forms is being adopted
150 in several draft standards as well as in ANS-X9.44 [ANS-9.44]. It has
151 also been recommended by the NESSIE project [NESSIE]. Originally,
152 [ANS-9.44] specified the of different object identifier to identify
153 the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm. [ANS-9.44] used id-ac-generic-
154 hybrid while this document uses id-rsa-kem. These OIDs are used in
155 the KeyTransportInfo field to indicate the key encryption algorithm,
156 in certificates to allow recipients to restrict their public keys for
157 use with RSA-KEM only, and in SMIME Capability attributes to allow
158 recipients to advertise their support for RSA-KEM. Legacy
159 implementations that wish to interoperate with [ANS-X9.44] should
160 consult that specification for more information on id-ac-generic-
161 hybrid.
163 For completeness, a specification of the algorithm is given in
164 Appendix A of this document; ASN.1 syntax is given in Appendix B.
166 NOTE: The term KEM stands for "key encapsulation mechanism" and
167 refers to the first three steps of the process above. The
168 formalization of key transport algorithms (or more generally,
169 asymmetric encryption schemes) in terms of key encapsulation
170 mechanisms is described further in research by Victor Shoup leading
171 to the development of the ISO/IEC 18033-2 standard [SHOUP].
173 2. Use in CMS
175 The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm MAY be employed for one or more
176 recipients in the CMS enveloped-data content type (Section 6 of
177 [CMS]), where the keying data processed by the algorithm is the CMS
178 content-encryption key.
180 2.1. Underlying Components
182 A CMS implementation that supports the RSA-KEM Key Transport
183 Algorithm MUST support at least the following underlying components:
185 o For the key derivation function, KDF3 (see [ANS-9.44]) based on
186 SHA-256 (see [FIPS-180-3]). KDF3 is an instantiation of the
187 Concatenation Key Derivation Function defined in [NIST-SP800-
188 56A].
190 o For the key-wrapping scheme, AES-Wrap-128, i.e., the AES Key
191 Wrap with a 128-bit key encrypting key (see [AES-WRAP]).
193 An implementation SHOULD also support KDF2 (see [ANS-X9.44]) based on
194 SHA-1 (this function is also specified as the key derivation function
195 in [ANS-X9.63]). The Camellia key wrap algorithm (see [CAMELLIA])
196 SHOULD be supported if Camellia is supported as a content-encryption
197 cipher. The Triple-DES Key Wrap (see [3DES-WRAP]) SHOULD also be
198 supported if Triple-DES is supported as a content-encryption cipher.
200 It MAY support other underlying components. When AES or Camellia are
201 used, the data block size is 128 bits and the key size can be 128,
202 192, or 256 bits, while Triple DES requires a data block size of 64
203 bits and a key size of 112 or 168 bits.
205 2.2. RecipientInfo Conventions
207 When the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is employed for a recipient,
208 the RecipientInfo alternative for that recipient MUST be
209 KeyTransRecipientInfo. The algorithm-specific fields of the
210 KeyTransRecipientInfo value MUST have the following values:
212 o keyEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm MUST be id-rsa-kem (see
213 Appendix B);
215 o keyEncryptionAlgorithm.parameters MUST be a value of type
216 GenericHybridParameters, identifying the RSA-KEM key
217 encapsulation mechanism (see Appendix B);
219 o encryptedKey MUST be the encrypted keying data output by the
220 algorithm, where the keying data is the content-encryption key
221 (see Appendix A).
223 2.3. Certificate Conventions
225 The conventions specified in this section augment RFC 5280 [PROFILE].
227 A recipient who employs the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm MAY
228 identify the public key in a certificate by the same
229 AlgorithmIdentifier as for the PKCS #1 v1.5 algorithm, i.e., using
230 the rsaEncryption object identifier [PKCS1]. The fact that the user
231 will accept RSA-KEM with this public key is not indicated by the use
232 of this identifier. This MAY be signaled by the use of the
233 appropriate SMIME Capabilities either in a message or in the
234 certificate.
236 If the recipient wishes only to employ the RSA-KEM Key Transport
237 Algorithm with a given public key, the recipient MUST identify the
238 public key in the certificate using the id-rsa-kem object identifier
239 (see Appendix B). When the id-rsa-kem algorithm identifier appears in
240 the SubjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field, the encoding SHALL omit the
241 parameters field from AlgorithmIdentifier. That is, the
242 AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the object
243 identifier id-rsa-kem.
245 Regardless of the AlgorithmIdentifier used, the RSA public key is
246 encoded in the same manner in the subject public key information. The
247 RSA public key MUST be encoded using the type RSAPublicKey type:
249 RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
250 modulus INTEGER, -- n
251 publicExponent INTEGER -- e
252 }
254 Here, the modulus is the modulus n, and publicExponent is the public
255 exponent e. The DER encoded RSAPublicKey is carried in the
256 subjectPublicKey BIT STRING within the subject public key
257 information.
259 The intended application for the key MAY be indicated in the key
260 usage certificate extension (see [PROFILE], Section 4.2.1.3). If the
261 keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that conveys an RSA
262 public key with the id-rsa-kem object identifier as discussed above,
263 then the key usage extension MUST contain the following value:
265 keyEncipherment.
267 dataEncipherment SHOULD NOT be present. That is, a key intended to be
268 employed only with the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm SHOULD NOT
269 also be employed for data encryption or for authentication such as in
270 signatures. Good cryptographic practice employs a given RSA key pair
271 in only one scheme. This practice avoids the risk that vulnerability
272 in one scheme may compromise the security of the other, and may be
273 essential to maintain provable security.
275 2.4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions
277 RFC 3851 [MSG], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities signed
278 attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs) to be
279 used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software
280 announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support. When constructing a
281 signedData object, compliant software MAY include the
282 SMIMECapabilities signed attribute announcing that it supports the
283 RSA-KEM Key Transport algorithm.
285 The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing the RSA-KEM Key Transport
286 Algorithm MUST include the id-rsa-kem object identifier (see Appendix
287 B) in the capabilityID field and MUST include a
288 GenericHybridParameters value in the parameters field identifying the
289 components with which the algorithm is to be employed.
291 The DER encoding of a SMIMECapability SEQUENCE is the same as the DER
292 encoding of an AlgorithmIdentifier. Example DER encodings for typical
293 sets of components are given in Appendix B.4.
295 3. Security Considerations
297 The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm should be considered for new CMS-
298 based applications as a replacement for the widely implemented RSA
299 encryption algorithm specified originally in PKCS #1 v1.5 (see
300 [PKCS1] and Section 4.2.1 of [CMSALGS]), which is vulnerable to
301 chosen-ciphertext attacks. The RSAES-OAEP Key Transport Algorithm
302 has also been proposed as a replacement (see [PKCS1] and [CMS-OAEP]).
303 RSA-KEM has the advantage over RSAES-OAEP of a tighter security
304 proof, but the disadvantage of slightly longer encrypted keying data.
306 The security of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm described in this
307 document can be shown to be tightly related to the difficulty of
308 either solving the RSA problem or breaking the underlying symmetric
309 key-wrapping scheme, if the underlying key derivation function is
310 modeled as a random oracle, and assuming that the symmetric key-
311 wrapping scheme satisfies the properties of a data encapsulation
312 mechanism [SHOUP]. While in practice a random-oracle result does not
313 provide an actual security proof for any particular key derivation
314 function, the result does provide assurance that the general
315 construction is reasonable; a key derivation function would need to
316 be particularly weak to lead to an attack that is not possible in the
317 random oracle model.
319 The RSA key size and the underlying components should be selected
320 consistent with the desired symmetric security level for an
321 application. Several security levels have been identified in NIST
322 FIPS PUB 800-57 [NIST-GUIDELINE]. For brevity, the first three levels
323 are mentioned here:
325 o 80-bit security. The RSA key size SHOULD be at least 1024 bits,
326 the hash function underlying the KDF SHOULD be SHA-1 or above,
327 and the symmetric key-wrapping scheme SHOULD be AES Key Wrap,
328 Triple-DES Key Wrap, or Camellia Key Wrap.
330 o 112-bit security. The RSA key size SHOULD be at least 2048 bits,
331 the hash function underlying the KDF SHOULD be SHA-224 or above,
332 and the symmetric key-wrapping scheme SHOULD be AES Key Wrap,
333 Triple-DES Key Wrap, or Camellia Key Wrap.
335 o 128-bit security. The RSA key size SHOULD be at least 3072 bits,
336 the hash function underlying the KDF SHOULD be SHA-256 or above,
337 and the symmetric key-wrapping scheme SHOULD be AES Key Wrap or
338 Camellia Key Wrap.
340 Note that the AES Key Wrap or Camellia Key Wrap MAY be used at all
341 three of these levels; the use of AES or Camellia does not require a
342 128-bit security level for other components.
344 Implementations MUST protect the RSA private key and the content-
345 encryption key. Compromise of the RSA private key may result in the
346 disclosure of all messages protected with that key. Compromise of the
347 content-encryption key may result in disclosure of the associated
348 encrypted content.
350 Additional considerations related to key management may be found in
351 [NIST-GUIDELINE].
353 The security of the algorithm also depends on the strength of the
354 random number generator, which SHOULD have a comparable security
355 level. For further discussion on random number generation, please see
356 [RANDOM].
358 Implementations SHOULD NOT reveal information about intermediate
359 values or calculations, whether by timing or other "side channels",
360 or otherwise an opponent may be able to determine information about
361 the keying data and/or the recipient's private key. Although not all
362 intermediate information may be useful to an opponent, it is
363 preferable to conceal as much information as is practical, unless
364 analysis specifically indicates that the information would not be
365 useful.
367 Generally, good cryptographic practice employs a given RSA key pair
368 in only one scheme. This practice avoids the risk that vulnerability
369 in one scheme may compromise the security of the other, and may be
370 essential to maintain provable security. While RSA public keys have
371 often been employed for multiple purposes such as key transport and
372 digital signature without any known bad interactions, for increased
373 security assurance, such combined use of an RSA key pair is NOT
374 RECOMMENDED in the future (unless the different schemes are
375 specifically designed to be used together).
377 Accordingly, an RSA key pair used for the RSA-KEM Key Transport
378 Algorithm SHOULD NOT also be used for digital signatures. (Indeed,
379 ASC X9 requires such a separation between key establishment key pairs
380 and digital signature key pairs.) Continuing this principle of key
381 separation, a key pair used for the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm
382 SHOULD NOT be used with other key establishment schemes, or for data
383 encryption, or with more than one set of underlying algorithm
384 components.
386 Parties MAY formalize the assurance that one another's
387 implementations are correct through implementation validation, e.g.
388 NIST's Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP).
390 4. IANA Considerations
392 Within the CMS, algorithms are identified by object identifiers
393 (OIDs). With one exception, all of the OIDs used in this document
394 were assigned in other IETF documents, in ISO/IEC standards
395 documents, by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
396 (NIST), and in Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) documents.
397 The one exception is that the ASN.1 module's identifier (see Appendix
398 B.3) is assigned in this document. No further action by the IANA is
399 necessary for this document or any anticipated updates.
401 5. Acknowledgements
403 This document is one part of a strategy to align algorithm standards
404 produced by ASC X9, ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27, NIST, and the IETF. We would
405 like to thank the members of the ASC X9F1 working group for their
406 contributions to drafts of ANS X9.44 which led to this specification.
408 Our thanks to Russ Housley as well for his guidance and
409 encouragement. We also appreciate the helpful direction we've
410 received from Blake Ramsdell and Jim Schaad in bringing this document
411 to fruition. A special thanks to Magnus Nystrom for his assistance on
412 Appendix B. Thanks also to Bob Griffin and John Linn for both
413 editorial direction and procedural guidance.
415 6. References
417 6.1. Normative References
419 [3DES-WRAP] Housley, R. Triple-DES and RC2 Key Wrapping. RFC
420 3217. December 2001.
422 [AES-WRAP] Schaad, J. and R. Housley. Advanced Encryption
423 Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm. RFC 3394.
424 September 2002.
426 [ANS-X9.44] ASC X9F1 Working Group. American National Standard
427 X9.44: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
428 Services Industry -- Key Establishment Using
429 Integer Factorization Cryptography. 2007.
431 [ANS-X9.63] American National Standard X9.63-2002: Public Key
432 Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry:
433 Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic
434 Curve Cryptography.
436 [CAMELLIA] Kato, A., Moriai, S., and Kanda, M.: Use of the
437 Camellia Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic
438 Message Syntax. RFC 3657. December 2005.
440 [CMS] Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax. RFC
441 5652. September 20009.
443 [CMSALGS] Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
444 Algorithms. RFC 3370. August 2002.
446 [FIPS-180-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology
447 (NIST). FIPS 180-3: Secure Hash Standard. October
448 2008.
450 [MSG] Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner. S/MIME Version 3.2
451 Message Specification. RFC 5751. January 2010.
453 [PROFILE] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen,
454 S., Housley, R., and W. Polk. Internet X.509
455 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
456 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. RFC
457 5280. May 2008.
459 [STDWORDS] Bradner, S. Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
460 Requirement Levels. RFC 2119. March 1997.
462 6.2. Informative References
464 [AES-WRAP-PAD] Housley, R., and M. Dworkin. Advanced Encryption
465 Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm.
466 RFC 5649. August 2009.
468 [CMS-OAEP] Housley, R. Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport
469 Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
470 (CMS). RFC 3560. July 2003.
472 [NESSIE] NESSIE Consortium. Portfolio of Recommended
473 Cryptographic Primitives. February 27, 2003.
474 Available via http://www.cryptonessie.org/.
476 [NIST-GUIDELINE] National Institute of Standards and Technology.
477 Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for
478 Pairwise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
479 Logarithm Cryptography. March 2007. Available via:
480 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/index.html.
482 [NIST-SP800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology.
483 Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for
484 Key Management. Part 1: General Guideline. August
485 2005. Available via:
486 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/index.html.
488 [PKCS1] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski. PKCS #1: RSA
489 Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1. RFC 3447.
490 February 2003.
492 [RANDOM] Eastlake, D., S. Crocker, and J. Schiller.
493 Randomness Recommendations for Security. RFC 4086.
494 June 2005.
496 [SHOUP] Shoup, V. A Proposal for an ISO Standard for
497 Public Key Encryption. Version 2.1, December 20,
498 2001. Available via http://www.shoup.net/papers/.
500 Appendix A. RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm
502 The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward)
503 mechanism for transporting keying data to a recipient using the
504 recipient's RSA public key.
506 With this type of algorithm, a sender encrypts the keying data using
507 the recipient's public key to obtain encrypted keying data. The
508 recipient decrypts the encrypted keying data using the recipient's
509 private key to recover the keying data.
511 A.1. Underlying Components
513 The algorithm has the following underlying components:
515 o KDF, a key derivation function, which derives keying data of a
516 specified length from a shared secret value;
518 o Wrap, a symmetric key-wrapping scheme, which encrypts keying
519 Data using a key-encrypting key.
521 In the following, kekLen denotes the length in bytes of the key-
522 encrypting key for the underlying symmetric key-wrapping scheme.
524 In this scheme, the length of the keying data to be transported MUST
525 be among the lengths supported by the underlying symmetric key-
526 wrapping scheme. (Both the AES and Camellia Key Wraps, for instance,
527 require the length of the keying data to be a multiple of 8 bytes,
528 and at least 16 bytes.) Usage and formatting of the keying data
529 (e.g., parity adjustment for Triple-DES keys) is outside the scope of
530 this algorithm. With some key derivation functions, it is possible to
531 include other information besides the shared secret value in the
532 input to the function. Also, with some symmetric key-wrapping
533 schemes, it is possible to associate a label with the keying data.
534 Such uses are outside the scope of this document, as they are not
535 directly supported by CMS.
537 A.2. Sender's Operations
539 Let (n,e) be the recipient's RSA public key (see [PKCS1] for details)
540 and let K be the keying data to be transported.
542 Let nLen denote the length in bytes of the modulus n, i.e., the least
543 integer such that 2^{8*nLen} > n.
545 The sender performs the following operations:
547 1. Generate a random integer z between 0 and n-1 (see Note), and
548 convert z to a byte string Z of length nLen, most significant byte
549 first:
551 z = RandomInteger (0, n-1)
553 Z = IntegerToString (z, nLen)
555 2. Encrypt the random integer z using the recipient's public key
556 (n,e) and convert the resulting integer c to a ciphertext C, a byte
557 string of length nLen:
559 c = z^e mod n
561 C = IntegerToString (c, nLen)
563 3. Derive a key-encrypting key KEK of length kekLen bytes from the
564 byte string Z using the underlying key derivation function:
566 KEK = KDF (Z, kekLen)
568 4. Wrap the keying data K with the key-encrypting key KEK using the
569 underlying key-wrapping scheme to obtain wrapped keying data WK:
571 WK = Wrap (KEK, K)
573 5. Concatenate the ciphertext C and the wrapped keying data WK to
574 obtain the encrypted keying data EK:
576 EK = C || WK
578 6. Output the encrypted keying data EK.
580 NOTE: The random integer z MUST be generated independently at random
581 for different encryption operations, whether for the same or
582 different recipients.
584 A.3. Recipient's Operations
586 Let (n,d) be the recipient's RSA private key (see [PKCS1]; other
587 private key formats are allowed) and let EK be the encrypted keying
588 data.
590 Let nLen denote the length in bytes of the modulus n.
592 The recipient performs the following operations:
594 1. Separate the encrypted keying data EK into a ciphertext C of
595 length nLen bytes and wrapped keying data WK:
597 C || WK = EK
599 If the length of the encrypted keying data is less than nLen
600 bytes, output "decryption error" and stop.
602 2. Convert the ciphertext C to an integer c, most significant byte
603 first. Decrypt the integer c using the recipient's private key
604 (n,d) to recover an integer z (see Note):
606 c = StringToInteger (C)
608 z = c^d mod n
610 If the integer c is not between 0 and n-1, output "decryption
611 error" and stop.
613 3. Convert the integer z to a byte string Z of length nLen, most
614 significant byte first (see Note):
616 Z = IntegerToString (z, nLen)
618 4. Derive a key-encrypting key KEK of length kekLen bytes from the
619 byte string Z using the underlying key derivation function (see
620 Note):
622 KEK = KDF (Z, kekLen)
624 5. Unwrap the wrapped keying data WK with the key-encrypting key KEK
625 using the underlying key-wrapping scheme to recover the keying
626 data K:
628 K = Unwrap (KEK, WK)
630 If the unwrapping operation outputs an error, output "decryption
631 error" and stop.
633 6. Output the keying data K.
635 NOTE: Implementations SHOULD NOT reveal information about the integer
636 z and the string Z, nor about the calculation of the exponentiation
637 in Step 2, the conversion in Step 3, or the key derivation in Step 4,
638 whether by timing or other "side channels". The observable behavior
639 of the implementation SHOULD be the same at these steps for all
640 ciphertexts C that are in range. (For example, IntegerToString
641 conversion should take the same amount of time regardless of the
642 actual value of the integer z.) The integer z, the string Z and other
643 intermediate results MUST be securely deleted when they are no longer
644 needed.
646 Appendix B. ASN.1 Syntax
648 The ASN.1 syntax for identifying the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm
649 is an extension of the syntax for the "generic hybrid cipher" in ANS
650 X9.44 [ANS-X9.44]. The syntax for the scheme is given in Section B.1.
651 The syntax for selected underlying components including those
652 mentioned above is given in B.2.
654 The following object identifier prefixes are used in the definitions
655 below:
657 is18033-2 OID ::= { iso(1) standard(0) is18033(18033) part2(2) }
659 nistAlgorithm OID ::= {
660 joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
661 gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
662 }
664 pkcs-1 OID ::= {
665 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1)
666 }
668 x9-44 OID ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133)
669 country(16) x9(840) x9Standards(9) x9-44(44) }
671 x9-44-components OID ::= { x9-44 components(1) }
673 NullParms is a more descriptive synonym for NULL when an algorithm
674 identifier has null parameters:
676 NullParms ::= NULL
678 The material in this Appendix is based on ANS X9.44.
680 B.1. RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm
682 The object identifier for the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is id-
683 rsa-kem, which is defined in the draft as:
685 id-rsa-kem OID ::= {
686 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
687 pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 14
688 }
690 When id-rsa-kem is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters
691 MUST employ the GenericHybridParameters syntax. The parameters MUST
692 be absent when used in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field. The syntax for
693 GenericHybridParameters is as follows:
695 GenericHybridParameters ::= {
696 kem KeyEncapsulationMechanism,
697 dem DataEncapsulationMechanism
698 }
700 The fields of type GenericHybridParameters have the following
701 meanings:
703 o kem identifies the underlying key encapsulation mechanism, which
704 in this case is also denoted as RSA-KEM.
706 The object identifier for RSA-KEM (as a key encapsulation
707 mechanism) is id-kem-rsa as:
709 id-kem-rsa OID ::= {
710 is18033-2 key-encapsulation-mechanism(2) rsa(4)
711 }
713 The associated parameters for id-kem-rsa have type
714 RsaKemParameters:
716 RsaKemParameters ::= {
717 keyDerivationFunction KeyDerivationFunction,
718 keyLength KeyLength
719 }
721 The fields of type RsaKemParameters have the following meanings:
723 * keyDerivationFunction identifies the underlying key derivation
724 function. For alignment with ANS X9.44, it MUST be KDF2 or KDF3.
725 However, other key derivation functions MAY be used with CMS.
726 Please see B.2.1 for the syntax for KDF2 and KDF3.
728 KeyDerivationFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDFAlgorithms}}
730 KDFAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
731 kdf2 | kdf3,
732 ... -- implementations may define other methods
733 }
735 * keyLength is the length in bytes of the key-encrypting key,
736 which depends on the underlying symmetric key-wrapping scheme.
738 KeyLength ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
740 o dem identifies the underlying data encapsulation mechanism. For
741 alignment with ANS X9.44, it MUST be an X9-approved symmetric
742 key-wrapping scheme. (See Note.) However, other symmetric key-
743 wrapping schemes MAY be used with CMS. Please see B.2.2 for the
744 syntax for the AES, Triple-DES, and Camellia Key Wraps.
746 DataEncapsulationMechanism ::=
747 AlgorithmIdentifier {{DEMAlgorithms}}
749 DEMAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
750 X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes,
751 Camellia-KeyWrappingSchemes,
752 ... -- implementations may define other methods
753 }
755 X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= {
756 aes128-Wrap | aes192-Wrap | aes256-Wrap | tdes-Wrap,
757 ... -- allows for future expansion
758 }
760 Camellia-KeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= {
761 Camellia128-Wrap | Camellia192-Wrap | Camellia256-Wrap
762 }
764 B.2. Selected Underlying Components
766 B.2.1. Key Derivation Functions
768 The object identifier for KDF2 (see [ANS X9.44]) is:
770 id-kdf-kdf2 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf2(1) }
772 The associated parameters identify the underlying hash function. For
773 alignment with ANS X9.44, the hash function MUST be an ASC X9-
774 approved hash function. However, other hash functions MAY be used
775 with CMS.
777 kdf2 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-kdf-kdf2 PARMS KDF2-HashFunction }
779 KDF2-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDF2-HashFunctions}}
781 KDF2-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
782 X9-HashFunctions,
783 ... -- implementations may define other methods
784 }
785 X9-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
786 sha1 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512,
787 ... -- allows for future expansion
788 }
790 The object identifier for SHA-1 is:
792 id-sha1 OID ::= {
793 iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
794 algorithms(2) sha1(26)
795 }
797 The object identifiers for SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 are
799 id-sha224 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha224(4) }
800 id-sha256 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(1) }
801 id-sha384 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha384(2) }
802 id-sha512 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha512(3) }
804 There has been some confusion over whether the various SHA object
805 identifiers have a NULL parameter, or no associated parameters. As
806 also discussed in [PKCS1], implementations SHOULD generate algorithm
807 identifiers without parameters, and MUST accept algorithm identifiers
808 either without parameters, or with NULL parameters.
810 sha1 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha1 } -- NULLParms MUST be
811 sha224 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha224 } -- accepted for these
812 sha256 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha256 } -- OIDs
813 sha384 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha384 } -- ""
814 sha512 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha512 } -- ""
816 The object identifier for KDF3 (see [ANS X9.44]) is:
818 id-kdf-kdf3 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf3(2) }
820 The associated parameters identify the underlying hash function. For
821 alignment with the draft ANS X9.44, the hash function MUST be an ASC
822 X9-approved hash function. However, other hash functions MAY be used
823 with CMS.
825 kdf3 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-kdf-kdf3 PARMS KDF3-HashFunction }
827 KDF3-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { KDF3-HashFunctions }
829 KDF3-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
830 X9-HashFunctions,
831 ... -- implementations may define other methods
832 }
834 B.2.2. Symmetric Key-Wrapping Schemes
836 The object identifiers for the AES Key Wrap depends on the size of
837 the key encrypting key. There are three object identifiers (see [AES-
838 WRAP]):
840 id-aes128-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes128-Wrap(5) }
841 id-aes192-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes192-Wrap(25) }
842 id-aes256-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes256-Wrap(45) }
844 These object identifiers have no associated parameters.
846 aes128-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-aes128-Wrap }
847 aes192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-aes192-Wrap }
848 aes256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-aes256-Wrap }
850 The object identifier for the Triple-DES Key Wrap (see [3DES-WRAP])
851 is:
853 id-alg-CMS3DESwrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
854 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
855 smime(16) alg(3) 6
856 }
858 This object identifier has a NULL parameter.
860 tdes-Wrap ALGORITHM ::=
861 { OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NullParms }
863 NOTE: ASC X9 has not yet incorporated AES Key Wrap with Padding [AES-
864 WRAP-PAD] in to ANS X9.44. When ASC X9.44 adds AES Key Wrap with
865 Padding, this document will also be updated.
867 The object identifiers for the Camellia Key Wrap depend on the size
868 of the key encrypting key. There are three object identifiers:
870 id-camellia128-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
871 { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
872 algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
873 camellia128-wrap(2) }
875 id-camellia192-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
876 { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
877 algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
878 camellia192-wrap(3) }
880 id-camellia256-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
881 { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
882 algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
883 camellia256-wrap(4) }
885 These object identifiers have no associated parameters.
887 camellia128-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-camellia128-Wrap }
888 camellia192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-camellia192-Wrap }
889 camellia256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-camellia256-Wrap }
891 B.3. ASN.1 module
893 CMS-RSA-KEM
894 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
895 pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms-rsa-kem(21) }
897 DEFINITIONS ::=
899 BEGIN
901 -- EXPORTS ALL
903 -- IMPORTS None
905 -- Useful types and definitions
907 OID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- alias
909 -- Unless otherwise stated, if an object identifier has associated
910 -- parameters (i.e., the PARMS element is specified), the
911 -- parameters field shall be included in algorithm identifier
912 -- values. The parameters field shall be omitted if and only if
913 -- the object identifier does not have associated parameters
914 -- (i.e., the PARMS element is omitted), unless otherwise stated.
916 ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
917 &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
918 &Type OPTIONAL
919 }
920 WITH SYNTAX { OID &id [PARMS &Type] }
921 AlgorithmIdentifier { ALGORITHM:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE {
922 algorithm ALGORITHM.&id( {IOSet} ),
923 parameters ALGORITHM.&Type( {IOSet}{@algorithm} ) OPTIONAL
924 }
926 NullParms ::= NULL
928 -- ISO/IEC 18033-2 arc
930 is18033-2 OID ::= { iso(1) standard(0) is18033(18033) part2(2) }
932 -- NIST algorithm arc
934 nistAlgorithm OID ::= {
935 joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
936 gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
937 }
939 -- PKCS #1 arc
941 pkcs-1 OID ::= {
942 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1)
943 }
945 -- RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm
947 id-rsa-kem OID ::= {
948 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
949 pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 14
950 }
952 GenericHybridParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
953 kem KeyEncapsulationMechanism,
954 dem DataEncapsulationMechanism
955 }
957 KeyEncapsulationMechanism ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KEMAlgorithms}}
959 KEMAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { kem-rsa, ... }
961 kem-rsa ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-kem-rsa PARMS RsaKemParameters }
963 id-kem-rsa OID ::= {
964 is18033-2 key-encapsulation-mechanism(2) rsa(4)
965 }
966 RsaKemParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
967 keyDerivationFunction KeyDerivationFunction,
968 keyLength KeyLength
969 }
971 KeyDerivationFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDFAlgorithms}}
973 KDFAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
974 kdf2 | kdf3,
975 ... -- implementations may define other methods
976 }
978 KeyLength ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
980 DataEncapsulationMechanism ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{DEMAlgorithms}}
982 DEMAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
983 X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes |
984 Camellia-KeyWrappingSchemes,
985 ... -- implementations may define other methods
986 }
988 X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= {
989 aes128-Wrap | aes192-Wrap | aes256-Wrap | tdes-Wrap,
990 ... -- allows for future expansion
991 }
993 X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingScheme ::=
994 AlgorithmIdentifier {{ X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes }}
996 Camellia-KeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= {
997 camellia128-Wrap | camellia192-Wrap | camellia256-Wrap,
998 ... -- allows for future expansion
999 }
1001 Camellia-KeyWrappingScheme ::=
1002 AlgorithmIdentifier {{ Camellia-KeyWrappingSchemes }}
1004 -- Key Derivation Functions
1006 id-kdf-kdf2 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf2(1) }
1007 -- Base arc
1009 x9-44 OID ::= {
1010 iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
1011 x9Standards(9) x9-44(44)
1012 }
1014 x9-44-components OID ::= { x9-44 components(1) }
1016 kdf2 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-kdf-kdf2 PARMS KDF2-HashFunction }
1018 KDF2-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{ KDF2-HashFunctions }}
1020 KDF2-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
1021 X9-HashFunctions,
1022 ... -- implementations may define other methods
1023 }
1025 id-kdf-kdf3 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf3(2) }
1027 kdf3 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-kdf-kdf3 PARMS KDF3-HashFunction }
1029 KDF3-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{ KDF3-HashFunctions }}
1031 KDF3-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
1032 X9-HashFunctions,
1033 ... -- implementations may define other methods
1034 }
1036 -- Hash Functions
1038 X9-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
1039 sha1 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512,
1040 ... -- allows for future expansion
1041 }
1043 id-sha1 OID ::= {
1044 iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
1045 algorithms(2) sha1(26)
1046 }
1048 id-sha224 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(4) }
1050 id-sha256 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(1) }
1052 id-sha384 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha384(2) }
1053 id-sha512 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha512(3) }
1055 sha1 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha1 } -- NullParms MUST be
1057 sha224 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha224 } -- accepted for these
1059 sha256 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha256 } -- OIDs
1061 sha384 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha384 } -- ""
1063 sha512 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha512 } -- ""
1065 -- Symmetric Key-Wrapping Schemes
1067 id-aes128-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes128-Wrap(5) }
1069 id-aes192-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes192-Wrap(25) }
1071 id-aes256-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes256-Wrap(45) }
1073 aes128-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-aes128-Wrap }
1075 aes192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-aes192-Wrap }
1077 aes256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-aes256-Wrap }
1079 id-alg-CMS3DESwrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
1080 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
1081 smime(16) alg(3) 6
1082 }
1084 tdes-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NullParms }
1086 id-camellia128-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
1087 { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
1088 algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
1089 camellia128-wrap(2) }
1091 id-camellia192-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
1092 { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
1093 algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
1094 camellia192-wrap(3) }
1096 id-camellia256-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
1097 { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
1098 algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
1099 camellia256-wrap(4) }
1101 camellia128-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-camellia128-Wrap }
1103 camellia192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-camellia192-Wrap }
1105 camellia256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-camellia256-Wrap }
1107 END
1109 B.4. Examples
1111 As an example, if the key derivation function is KDF3 based on SHA-
1112 256 and the symmetric key-wrapping scheme is the AES Key Wrap with a
1113 128-bit KEK, the AlgorithmIdentifier for the RSA-KEM Key Transport
1114 Algorithm will have the following value:
1116 SEQUENCE {
1117 id-rsa-kem, -- RSA-KEM cipher
1118 SEQUENCE { -- GenericHybridParameters
1119 SEQUENCE { -- key encapsulation mechanism
1120 id-kem-rsa, -- RSA-KEM
1121 SEQUENCE { -- RsaKemParameters
1122 SEQUENCE { -- key derivation function
1123 id-kdf-kdf3, -- KDF3
1124 SEQUENCE { -- KDF3-HashFunction
1125 id-sha256 -- SHA-256; no parameters (preferred)
1126 },
1127 16 -- KEK length in bytes
1128 },
1129 SEQUENCE { -- data encapsulation mechanism
1130 id-aes128-Wrap -- AES-128 Wrap; no parameters
1131 }
1132 }
1133 }
1135 This AlgorithmIdentifier value has the following DER encoding (??
1136 indicates the algorithm number which is to be assigned):
1138 30 47
1139 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 0e -- id-rsa-kem
1140 30 38
1141 30 29
1142 06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 02 04 -- id-kem-rsa
1143 30 1e
1144 30 19
1145 06 0a 2b 81 05 10 86 48 09 2c 01 02 -- id-kdf-kdf3
1146 30 0b
1147 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 -- id-sha256
1148 02 01 10 -- 16 bytes
1149 30 0b
1150 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05 -- id-aes128-Wrap
1152 The DER encodings for other typical sets of underlying components are
1153 as follows:
1155 o KDF3 based on SHA-384, AES Key Wrap with a 192-bit KEK
1157 30 47 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 0e 30
1158 38 30 29 06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 02 04 30 1e 30 19
1159 06 0a 2b 81 05 10 86 48 09 2c 01 02 30 0b 06 09
1160 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 02 01 18 30 0b 06 09
1161 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 19
1163 o KDF3 based on SHA-512, AES Key Wrap with a 256-bit KEK
1165 30 47 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 0e 30
1166 38 30 29 06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 02 04 30 1e 30 19
1167 06 0a 2b 81 05 10 86 48 09 2c 01 02 30 0b 06 09
1168 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 02 01 20 30 0b 06 09
1169 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2d
1171 o KDF2 based on SHA-1, Triple-DES Key Wrap with a 128-bit KEK (two-
1172 key triple-DES)
1174 30 45 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 0e 30
1175 36 30 25 06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 02 04 30 1a 30 15
1176 06 0a 2b 81 05 10 86 48 09 2c 01 01 30 07 06 05
1177 2b 0e 03 02 1a 02 01 10 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86
1178 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
1180 Authors' Addresses
1182 James Randall
1183 Randall Consulting
1184 55 Sandpiper Drive
1185 Dover, NH 03820
1186 USA
1188 Email: jdrandall@comcast.net
1190 Burt Kaliski
1191 EMC
1192 176 South Street
1193 Hopkinton, MA 01748
1194 USA
1196 Email: kaliski_burt@emc.com
1198 John Brainard
1199 RSA, The Security Division of EMC
1200 174 Middlesex Turnpike
1201 Bedford, MA 01730
1202 USA
1204 Email: jbrainard@rsa.com
1206 Sean Turner
1207 IECA, Inc.
1208 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
1209 Fairfax, VA 22031
1210 USA
1212 Email: turners@ieca.com