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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 S/MIME WG Sean Turner, IECA 2 Internet Draft Dan Brown, Certicom 3 Intended Status: Informational May 5, 2009 4 Obsoletes: 3278 (once approved) 5 Expires: November 5, 2009 7 Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms 8 in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 9 draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-07.txt 11 Status of this Memo 13 This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the 14 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may contain material 15 from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly 16 available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the 17 copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF 18 Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the 19 IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from 20 the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this 21 document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and 22 derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards 23 Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to 24 translate it into languages other than English. 26 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 27 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 28 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 29 Drafts. 31 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 32 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 33 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 34 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 36 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 37 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt 39 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 40 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 42 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 5, 2009. 44 Copyright Notice 46 Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 47 document authors. All rights reserved. 49 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 50 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of 51 publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). 52 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights 53 and restrictions with respect to this document. 55 Abstract 57 This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 58 public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The 59 ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the 60 exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content. The definition 61 of the algorithm processing is based on the NIST FIPS 186-3 for 62 digital signature, NIST SP800-56A and SEC1 for key agreement, RFC 63 3370 and RFC 3565 for key wrap and content encryption, NIST FIPS 180- 64 3 for message digest, SEC1 for key derivation, and RFC 2104 and RFC 65 4231 for message authentication code standards. This document 66 obsoletes RFC 3278. 68 Discussion 70 This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To 71 subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the 72 single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site 73 for the mailing list at . 75 Table of Contents 77 1. Introduction...................................................3 78 1.1. Requirements Terminology..................................4 79 2. SignedData using ECC...........................................4 80 2.1. SignedData using ECDSA....................................4 81 3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms.............................5 82 3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH...............5 83 3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV..........................8 84 4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC.............10 85 4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................11 86 4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................12 87 5. Certificates using ECC........................................13 88 6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC...........................13 89 7. ASN.1 Syntax..................................................21 90 7.1. Algorithm Identifiers....................................21 91 7.2. Other Syntax.............................................24 92 8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves....................26 93 9. Security Considerations.......................................28 94 10. IANA Considerations..........................................33 95 11. References...................................................33 96 11.1. Normative...............................................33 97 11.2. Informative.............................................35 98 Appendix A ASN.1 Modules.........................................36 99 Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module................................36 100 Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module................................43 101 Appendix B Changes since RFC 3278................................53 102 Acknowledgements.................................................56 103 Author's Addresses...............................................56 105 1. Introduction 107 The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm 108 independent. This specification defines a profile for the use of 109 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS. 110 The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content 111 types: 113 - 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods 114 (ECDSA) to sign content; 116 - 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement 117 methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption 118 keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content 119 encryption; 121 - 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement 122 methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to 123 encrypt message-authentication keys used for content 124 authentication and integrity; and, 126 - 'AuthEnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement 127 methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to 128 encrypt message-authentication and content-encryption keys used 129 for content authentication, integrity, and encryption. 131 Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public- 132 key distribution in support of the specified techniques. 134 The document will obsolete [CMS-ECC]. The technical changes 135 performed since RFC 3278 are detailed in Appendix B. 137 1.1. Requirements Terminology 139 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 140 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 141 document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST]. 143 2. SignedData using ECC 145 This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS 146 SignedData format to sign data. 148 2.1. SignedData using ECDSA 150 This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital 151 Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData. ECDSA is specified in 152 [FIPS186-3]. The method is the elliptic curve analog of the Digital 153 Signature Algorithm (DSA) [FIPS186-3]. ECDSA is used with the Secure 154 Hash Algorithm (SHA) [FIPS180-3]. 156 In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the 157 following techniques and formats MUST be used. 159 2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData 161 When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in 162 [CMS], but with the following restrictions: 164 - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash 165 algorithm (see Section 7.1.1) which MUST be one of the 166 following: id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, or id- 167 sha512. 169 - signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier 170 (see Section 7.1.3): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa- 171 with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512. The hash 172 algorithm identified in the name of the signature algorithm MUST 173 be the same as the digestAlgorithm (e.g., digestAlgorithm is id- 174 sha256 therefore signatureAlgorithm is ecdsa-with-SHA256). 176 - signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a 177 value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 7.2). 179 When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the 180 certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the 181 ECDSA signatures in SignedData. ECC certificates are discussed in 182 Section 5. 184 2.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 186 When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the message 187 digest calculation process and signature generation process for 188 SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To sign data, the sending 189 agent uses the signature method specified in [FIPS186-3]. 191 The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the 192 ECDSA-Sig-Value syntax (see Section 7.2) and places it in the 193 SignerInfo signature field. 195 2.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 197 When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the 198 message digest calculation process and signature verification process 199 for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To verify SignedData, 200 the receiving agent uses the signature verification method specified 201 in [FIPS186-3]. 203 In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the 204 integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the received 205 message. 207 3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms 209 This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS 210 EnvelopedData format. 212 This document does not specify the static-static ECDH, method C(0,2, 213 ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A]. Static-static ECDH is analogous to 214 static-static DH, which is specified in [CMS-ALG]. Ephemeral-static 215 ECDH and 1-Pass ECMQV were specified because they provide better 216 security due to the originator's ephemeral contribution to the key 217 agreement scheme. 219 3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH 221 This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve 222 Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, 223 method C(1, 1, ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A] and ECDH with the standard 224 primitive from Section 3.3.1 of [SEC1]. Ephemeral-static ECDH is the 225 elliptic curve analog of the ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key 226 agreement algorithm specified jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG] and 227 [CMS-DH]. 229 If an implementation uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData, then the 230 following techniques and formats MUST be used. 232 The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS]; as ECDH is a key 233 agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. 235 3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 237 When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of 238 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows: 240 - version MUST be 3. 242 - originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The 243 originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey 244 object identifier (see Section 7.1.2). The parameters 245 associated with id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent, ECParameters, or 246 NULL. The parameters associated with id-ecPublicKey SHOULD be 247 absent or ECParameters, and NULL is allowed to support legacy 248 implementations. The previous version of this document required 249 NULL to be present. If the parameters are ECParameters, then 250 they MUST be namedCurve. The originatorKey publicKey field MUST 251 contain the value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), 252 which represents the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key. 253 The ECPoint in uncompressed form MUST be supported. 255 - ukm MAY be present or absent. However, message originators 256 SHOULD include the ukm. As specified in RFC 3852 [CMS], 257 implementations MUST support ukm message recipient processing, 258 so interoperability is not a concern if the ukm is present or 259 absent. The ukm is placed in the entityUInfo field of the ECC- 260 CMS-SharedInfo structure. When present, the ukm is used to 261 ensure that a different key-encryption key is generated, even 262 when the ephemeral private key is improperly used more than 263 once, by using the ECC-CMS-SharedInfo as an input to the key 264 derivation function (see Section 7.2). 266 - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the object identifier of the 267 key encryption algorithm, which in this case is a key agreement 268 algorithm (see Section 7.1.4). The parameters field contains 269 KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm 270 identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm 271 used to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with the key- 272 encryption key (KEK) and any associated parameters (see Section 273 7.1.5). Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8. 275 - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted 276 key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey 277 KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the 278 issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or 279 the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier 280 from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the 281 recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECDH 282 public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the 283 content-encryption key encrypted with the ephemeral-static, 284 ECDH-generated pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm 285 specified by the KeyWrapAlgorithm. 287 3.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 289 When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending 290 agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain 291 parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate). The sending 292 agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the 293 KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string 294 "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see 295 Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and 296 the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 297 Scheme specified in [SP800-56A] or [SEC1]; in either case, use the 298 KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1] with the hash algorithm 299 identified in the key agreement algorithm. As a result the sending 300 agent obtains: 302 - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of the 303 type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string and 304 placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator originatorKey 305 publicKey field, and 307 - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise 308 key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. 310 In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, 311 then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for 312 that recipient in each of the different layers. 314 3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 316 When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving 317 agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER 318 encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer 319 "keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The 320 receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit 321 string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type 322 ECPoint (see Section 7.2) encapsulated as a bit string, and if 323 present, originally supplied additional user key material from the 324 ukm field. The receiving agent performs the key agreement operation 325 of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SP800-56A] 326 or [SEC1]; in either case, use the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of 327 [SEC1]. As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit 328 string "K", which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to 329 unwrap the CEK. 331 3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV 333 This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV 334 (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, method 335 C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-KEA], 336 1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a static 337 key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the receiving 338 agent. Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for 339 knowledge of the message creator, this means that authentication can, 340 in some circumstances, be obtained for AuthEnvelopedData and 341 AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass ECMQV can be a common 342 algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData, 343 while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData. 345 If an implementation uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData, then 346 the following techniques and formats MUST be used. 348 The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS]; as 1-Pass ECMQV is a key 349 agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When 350 using 1-Pass ECMQV, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY 351 include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the 352 formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in 353 Section 5. 355 3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 357 When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the fields of 358 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are: 360 - version MUST be 3. 362 - originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender. It 363 SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or 364 subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's 365 certificates. 367 - ukm MUST be present. The ukm field is an octet string which MUST 368 contain the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see 369 Section 7.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey 370 algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object 371 identifier (see Section 7.1.2). The parameters associated with 372 id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent, ECParameters, or NULL. The 373 parameters associated with id-ecPublicKey SHOULD be absent or 374 ECParameters, as NULL is allowed to support legacy 375 implementations. The previous version of this document required 376 NULL to be present. If the parameters are ECParameters, then 377 they MUST be namedCurve. The MQVuserKeyingMaterial 378 ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field MUST contain the DER-encoding 379 of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section 7.2) representing the 380 sending agent's ephemeral EC public key. The 381 MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if present, contains 382 additional user keying material from the sending agent. 384 - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the object identifier of the 385 key encryption algorithm, which in this case is a key agreement 386 algorithm (see Section 7.1.4). The parameters field contains 387 KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric 388 encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK 389 generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm and any associated 390 parameters (see Section 7.1.5). Algorithm requirements are 391 found in Section 8. 393 - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted 394 key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey 395 KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the 396 issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or 397 the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier 398 from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the 399 recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECMQV 400 public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the 401 content-encryption key encrypted with the 1-Pass ECMQV-generated 402 pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm specified by the 403 KeyWrapAlgorithm. 405 3.2.2. Actions of the sending agent 407 When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first 408 obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters (e.g. 409 from the recipient's certificate), and checks that the domain 410 parameters are the same as the sender's domain parameters. The 411 sending agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the 412 KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string 413 "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see 414 Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and 415 key agreement operations of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified 416 in [SP800-56A], but uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. 417 As a result, the sending agent obtains: 419 - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type 420 ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed 421 in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field 422 (see Section 7.2), and 424 - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise 425 key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. 427 In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, 428 then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for 429 that recipient in each of the different layers. 431 3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent 433 When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent 434 determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of 435 ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer "keydatalen" 436 from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving 437 agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the 438 originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in 439 Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key identified in the rid 440 field and checks that the originator's domain parameters are the same 441 as the recipient's domain parameters. The receiving agent then 442 performs the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme 443 [SP800-56A], but uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. As 444 a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K", 445 which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK. 447 4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC 449 This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS 450 AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation, 451 and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For example, 452 the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when 453 forwarded.) 455 This section also describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS 456 AuthEnvelopedData format [CMS-AUTHENV]. AuthEnvelopedData supports 457 authentication and encryption, and in some instances is preferable to 458 signing and then encrypting data. 460 For both AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData, data origin 461 authentication with 1-Pass ECMQV can only be provided when there is 462 one and only one recipient. When there are multiple recipients, an 463 attack is possible where one recipient modifies the content without 464 other recipients noticing [BON]. A sending agent who is concerned 465 with such an attack SHOULD use a separate AuthenticatedData or 466 AuthEnvelopedData for each recipient. 468 Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for 469 knowledge of the message creator; this means that authentication can, 470 in some circumstances, be obtained for AuthEnvelopedData and 471 AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass ECMQV can be a common 472 algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData 473 while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData. 475 4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV 477 This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV 478 (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is 479 method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. 481 When using ECMQV with AuthenticatedData, the fields of 482 AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], but with the following 483 restrictions: 485 - macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message 486 authentication code (MAC) algorithm (see Section 7.1.7) which 487 MUST be one of the following: hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id- 488 hmacWITHSHA256, id-hmacWITHSHA384, or id-hmacWITHSHA512. 490 - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash 491 algorithm (see Section 7.1.1) which MUST be one of the 492 following: id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, and id- 493 sha512. 495 As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari 496 choice is used in the AuthenticatedData. When using 1-Pass ECMQV, 497 the AuthenticatedData originatorInfo field MAY include the 498 certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the 499 pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5. 501 4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 503 The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the 504 same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData 505 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document. 507 4.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 509 The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 510 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document. 512 In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, 513 then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for 514 that recipient in each of the different layers. 516 4.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 518 The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 519 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document. 521 4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV 523 This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV 524 (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData. ECMQV is 525 method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. 527 When using ECMQV with AuthEnvelopedData, the fields of 528 AuthEnvelopedData are as in [CMS-AUTHENV]. 530 As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari 531 choice is used. When using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthEnvelopedData 532 originatorInfo field MAY include the certificate(s) for the EC public 533 key used in the formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are 534 discussed in Section 5. 536 4.2.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 538 The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the 539 same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData 540 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document. 542 4.2.2. Actions of the sending agent 544 The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 1- 545 Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document. 547 In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, 548 then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for 549 that recipient in each of the different layers. 551 4.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent 553 The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 554 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document. 556 5. Certificates using ECC 558 Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with 559 this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of ECC 560 algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in [PKI- 561 ALG]. 563 6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC 565 A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one 566 or more of the ECC algorithms specified in this document by using the 567 SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG] in either a signed message 568 or a certificate [CERTCAP]. 570 The SMIMECapabilities attribute value indicates support for one of 571 the ECDSA signature algorithms in a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID 572 field containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 with NULL 573 parameters and ecdsa-with-SHA* (where * is 224, 256, 384, or 512) 574 with absent parameters. The DER encodings are: 576 ecdsa-with-SHA1: 30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00 578 ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01 580 ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 582 ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 584 ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 586 NOTE: The SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates that parameters for 587 ECDSA with SHA-1 are NULL; however, the parameters are absent when 588 used to generate a digital signature. 590 The SMIMECapabilities attribute value indicates support for 591 a) the standard ECDH key agreement algorithm, 592 b) the cofactor ECDH key agreement algorithm, or 593 c) the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement algorithm and 594 is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object 595 identifier 596 a) dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme, 597 b) dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme, or 598 c) mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme 599 respectively (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the 600 parameters present. The parameters indicate the supported key- 601 encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier. 603 The DER encodings that indicate capabilities are as follows (KA is 604 key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key wrap 605 algorithm): 607 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES 609 30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 610 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00 612 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=Triple-DES 614 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 00 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 615 09 10 03 06 617 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=Triple-DES 619 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 620 09 10 03 06 622 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=Triple-DES 624 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 625 09 10 03 06 627 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=Triple-DES 629 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 03 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 630 09 10 03 06 632 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-128 634 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 635 65 03 04 01 05 637 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-128 639 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 640 01 05 642 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128 644 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 645 01 05 647 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-128 649 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 650 01 05 652 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-128 654 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 655 01 05 657 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-192 659 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 660 65 03 04 01 19 662 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-192 664 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 665 01 19 667 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-192 669 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 670 01 19 672 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-192 674 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 675 01 19 677 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-192 679 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 680 01 19 682 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-256 684 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 685 65 03 04 01 2D 687 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-256 689 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 690 01 2D 692 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-256 694 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 695 01 2D 697 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256 699 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 700 01 2D 05 00 702 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-256 704 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 705 01 2D 707 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES 709 30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 710 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00 712 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=Triple-DES 714 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 00 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 715 09 10 03 06 717 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=Triple-DES 719 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 720 09 10 03 06 722 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=Triple-DES 724 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 725 09 10 03 06 727 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=Triple-DES 729 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 03 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 730 09 10 03 06 732 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-128 734 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 735 65 03 04 01 05 737 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-128 739 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 740 01 05 742 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128 744 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 745 01 05 747 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-128 749 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 750 01 05 752 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-128 754 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 755 01 05 757 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-192 759 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 760 65 03 04 01 19 762 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-192 764 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 765 01 19 767 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-192 769 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 770 01 19 772 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-192 774 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 775 01 19 777 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-192 779 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 780 01 19 782 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-256 784 30 15 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 785 65 03 04 01 2D 787 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-256 789 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 790 01 2D 792 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-256 794 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 795 01 2D 797 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256 799 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 800 01 2D 802 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-256 804 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 805 01 2D 807 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES 809 30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 810 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00 812 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=Triple-DES 814 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 00 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 815 09 10 03 06 817 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=Triple-DES 819 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 820 09 10 03 06 822 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=Triple-DES 824 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 825 09 10 03 06 827 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=Triple-DES 829 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 830 09 10 03 06 832 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-128 834 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 835 65 03 04 01 05 837 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-128 839 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 840 01 05 842 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128 844 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 845 01 05 847 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-128 849 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 850 01 05 852 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-128 854 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 855 01 05 857 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-192 859 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 860 65 03 04 01 19 862 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-192 864 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 865 01 19 867 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-192 869 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 870 01 19 872 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-192 874 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 875 01 19 877 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-192 879 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 880 01 19 882 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-256 884 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 885 65 03 04 01 2D 887 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-256 889 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 890 01 2D 892 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-256 894 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 895 01 2D 897 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256 899 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 900 01 2D 902 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-256 904 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 905 01 2D 907 NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities indicate that parameters for the key 908 wrap algorithm AES-* (where * is 128, 192, or 256) are NULL; however, 909 the parameters are absent when used to encrypt/decrypt a content 910 encryption key. 912 NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities for the supported AES content 913 encryption key sizes are defined in [CMS-AES]. 915 NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities for the supported MAC algorithms are 916 defined in [CMS-ASN]. 918 7. ASN.1 Syntax 920 The ASN.1 syntax used in this document is gathered in this section 921 for reference purposes. 923 7.1. Algorithm Identifiers 925 This section provides the object identifiers for the algorithms used 926 in this document along with any associated parameters. 928 7.1.1. Digest Algorithms 930 Digest algorithm object identifiers are used in the SignedData 931 digestAlgorithms and digestAlgorithm fields and the AuthenticatedData 932 digestAlgorithm field. The digest algorithms used in this document 933 are: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The object 934 identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found 935 in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-SHA2]. 937 7.1.2. Originator Public Key 939 The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field uses the following object 940 identifier to indicate an elliptic curve public key: 942 id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 943 ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 } 945 where 947 ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 948 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 } 950 When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an 951 algorithm identifier, the associated parameters MUST be either absent 952 or ECParameters. Implementations MUST accept id-ecPublicKey with 953 absent and ECParameters parameters. If ECParameters is present, its 954 value MUST match the recipient's ECParameters. Implementations 955 SHOULD generate absent parameters for the id-ecPublicKey object 956 identifier in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field. 958 NOTE: [CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for this 959 legacy form is OPTIONAL. 961 7.1.3. Signature Algorithms 963 Signature algorithm identifiers are used in the SignedData 964 signatureAlgorithm and signature fields. The signature algorithms 965 used in this document are ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA 966 with SHA-256, ECDSA with SHA-384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. The object 967 identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found 968 in [PKI-ALG]. 970 NOTE: [CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for this 971 legacy form is OPTIONAL. 973 7.1.4. Key Agreement Algorithms 975 Key agreement algorithms are used in EnvelopedData, 976 AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 977 keyEncryptionAlgorithm field. The following object identifiers 978 indicate the key agreement algorithms used in this document: 980 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 981 x9-63-scheme 2 } 983 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 984 secg-scheme 11 0 } 986 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 987 secg-scheme 11 1 } 989 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 990 secg-scheme 11 2 } 992 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 993 secg-scheme 11 3 } 995 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 996 x9-63-scheme 3 } 998 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 999 secg-scheme 14 0 } 1001 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1002 secg-scheme 14 1 } 1004 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1005 secg-scheme 14 2 } 1007 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1008 secg-scheme 14 3 } 1010 mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1011 x9-63-scheme 16 } 1013 mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1014 secg-scheme 15 0 } 1016 mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1017 secg-scheme 15 1 } 1019 mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1020 secg-scheme 15 2 } 1022 mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1023 secg-scheme 15 3 } 1025 where 1027 x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1028 iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) 1029 x9(840) x9-63(63) schemes(0) } 1031 and 1033 secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1034 iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } 1036 When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm 1037 identifier, the associated parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm 1038 to indicate the key wrap algorithm and any associated parameters. 1040 7.1.5. Key Wrap Algorithms 1042 Key wrap algorithms are used as part of the parameters in the key 1043 agreement algorithm. The key wrap algorithms used in this document 1044 are Triple-DES, AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256. The object 1045 identifiers and parameters for these algorithms are found in [CMS- 1046 ALG] and [CMS-AES]. 1048 7.1.6. Content Encryption Algorithms 1050 Content encryption algorithms are used in EnvelopedData and 1051 AuthEnvelopedData in the EncryptedContentInfo 1052 contentEncryptionAlgorithm field. The content encryption algorithms 1053 used with EnvelopedData in this document are 3-Key Triple DES in CBC 1054 mode, AES-128 in CBC mode, AES-192 in CBC mode, and AES-256 in CBC 1055 mode. The object identifiers and parameters associated with these 1056 algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-AES]. The content 1057 encryption algorithms used with AuthEnvelopedData in this document 1058 are AES-128 in CCM mode, AES-192 in CCM mode, AES-256 in CCM mode, 1059 AES-128 in GCM mode, AES-192 in GCM mode, and AES-256 in GCM mode. 1060 The object identifiers and parameters associated with these 1061 algorithms are found in [CMS-AESCG]. 1063 7.1.7. Message Authentication Code Algorithms 1065 Message authentication code algorithms are used in AuthenticatedData 1066 in the macAlgorithm field. The message authentication code 1067 algorithms used in this document are HMAC with SHA-1, HMAC with SHA- 1068 224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, and HMAC with SHA-512. 1069 The object identifiers and parameters associated with these 1070 algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [HMAC-SHA2]. 1072 7.1.8. Key Derivation Algorithm 1074 The KDF used in this document is as specified in 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. 1075 The hash algorithm is identified in key agreement algorithm. For 1076 example, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme uses the KDF from [SEC1] 1077 but uses SHA-256 instead of SHA-1. 1079 7.2. Other Syntax 1081 The following additional syntax is used here. 1083 When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using 1084 the type: 1086 ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { 1087 r INTEGER, 1088 s INTEGER } 1090 ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [PKI-ALG]. Within CMS, ECDSA-Sig- 1091 Value is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field of 1092 SignedData. 1094 When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and 1095 AuthEnvelopedData, ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using 1096 the type ECPoint. Implementations MUST support uncompressed keys, MAY 1097 support compressed keys, and MUST NOT support hybrid keys. 1099 ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING 1101 When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and 1102 AuthEnvelopedData, the sending agent's ephemeral public key and 1103 additional keying material are encoded using the type: 1105 MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { 1106 ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, 1107 addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL } 1109 The ECPoint syntax is used to represent the ephemeral public key and 1110 is placed in the ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field. The additional 1111 user keying material is placed in the addedukm field. Then the 1112 MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within the ukm 1113 field of EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData. 1115 When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or 1116 AuthEnvelopedData, the key-encryption keys are derived by using the 1117 type: 1119 ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1120 keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier, 1121 entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 1122 suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING } 1124 The fields of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo are as follows: 1126 keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption 1127 algorithm (used to wrap the CEK) and associated parameters. In 1128 this specification, 3DES wrap has NULL parameters while the AES 1129 wraps have absent parameters. 1131 entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material 1132 supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the 1133 entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with 1134 ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string addedukm 1135 (encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial). 1137 suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits, 1138 represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH] and [CMS-AES]. 1139 (E.g. for AES-256 it would be 00 00 01 00.) 1141 Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to 1142 the key derivation function, as specified in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. 1144 NOTE: ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in 1145 [CMS-DH]. Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field 1146 because the key derivation function specified in Section 3.6.1 of 1147 [SEC1] ensures that sufficient keying data is provided. 1149 8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves 1151 It is RECOMMENDED that implementations of this specification support 1152 SignedData and EnvelopedData. Support for AuthenticatedData and 1153 AuthEnvelopedData is OPTIONAL. 1155 In order to encourage interoperability, implementations SHOULD use 1156 the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by [PKI-ALG]. 1158 Implementations that support SignedData with ECDSA: 1160 - MUST support ECDSA with SHA-256; and, 1162 - MAY support ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA with SHA- 1163 384, and ECDSA with SHA-512; other digital signature algorithms 1164 MAY also be supported. 1166 When using ECDSA, to promote interoperability it is RECOMMENDED that 1167 the P-192, P-224, and the P-256 curves be used with SHA-256, the P- 1168 384 curve be used with SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA- 1169 512. 1171 If EnvelopedData is supported, then ephemeral-static ECDH standard 1172 primitive MUST be supported. Support for ephemeral-static ECDH co- 1173 factor is OPTIONAL and support for 1-Pass ECMQV is also OPTIONAL. 1175 Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static 1176 ECDH standard primitive: 1178 - MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key 1179 agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and 1180 the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and, 1182 - MAY support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass- 1183 stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme and 1184 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, 1185 the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key 1186 wrap algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id- 1187 aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY 1188 also be supported. 1190 Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static 1191 ECDH cofactor primitive: 1193 - MUST support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme key 1194 agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and 1195 the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and, 1197 - MAY support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme, 1198 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass- 1199 cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH- 1200 sha512kdf-scheme key agreement, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id- 1201 aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the des- 1202 ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-aes256-cbc content encryption 1203 algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported. 1205 Implementations that support EnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: 1207 - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement 1208 algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id- 1209 aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and, 1211 - MAY support mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- 1212 sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and 1213 mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id- 1214 alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap 1215 algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-aes256- 1216 cbc content encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be 1217 supported. 1219 Implementations that support AuthenticatedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: 1221 - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement, 1222 the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, the id-sha256 message digest, and 1223 id-hmacWithSHA256 message authentication code algorithms; and, 1225 - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- 1226 sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- 1227 sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-alg- 1228 CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap 1229 algorithms, the id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha384, and id-sha512, 1230 message digest algorithms, and the hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224, 1231 id-hmacWithSHA384, and id-hmacWithSHA512 message authentication 1232 code algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported. 1234 Implementations that support AuthEnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: 1236 - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement, 1237 the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, and the id-aes128-ccm 1238 authenticated-content encryption; and, 1240 - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- 1241 sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and 1242 mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id- 1243 alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap 1244 algorithms, the id-aes192-ccm, id-aes256-ccm, id-aes128-gcm, id- 1245 aes192-gcm, and id-aes256-ccm authenticated-content encryption 1246 algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported. 1248 9. Security Considerations 1250 Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over time. 1251 Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic 1252 algorithms listed in this document continue to provide the expected 1253 level of security. The IETF from time to time may issue documents 1254 dealing with the current state of the art. 1256 Cryptographic algorithms rely on random numbers. See [RANDOM] for 1257 guidance on generation of random numbers. 1259 Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that 1260 encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing 1261 usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys 1262 larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could 1263 send keys and/or certificates with keys which would result in 1264 excessive cryptographic processing, for example keys larger than 1265 those mandated in this specification, which could swamp the 1266 processing element. Agents which use such keys without first 1267 validating the certificate to a trust anchor are advised to have some 1268 sort of cryptographic resource management system to prevent such 1269 attacks. 1271 Using secret keys of an appropriate size is crucial to the security 1272 of a Diffie-Hellman exchange. For elliptic curve groups, the size of 1273 the secret key must be equal to the size of n (the order of the group 1274 generated by the point g). Using larger secret keys provides 1275 absolutely no additional security, and using smaller secret keys is 1276 likely to result in dramatically less security. (See [SP800-56A] for 1277 more information on selecting secret keys.) 1278 This specification is based on [CMS], [CMS-AES], [CMS-AESCG], [CMS- 1279 ALG], [CMS-AUTHENV], [CMS-DH], [CMS-SHA2], [FIPS180-3], [FIPS186-3], 1280 and [HMAC-SHA2], and the appropriate security considerations of those 1281 documents apply. 1283 In addition, implementers of AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData 1284 should be aware of the concerns expressed in [BON] when using 1285 AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData to send messages to more than 1286 one recipient. Also, users of MQV should be aware of the 1287 vulnerability described in [K]. 1289 When implementing EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and 1290 AuthEnvelopedData, there are five algorithm related choices that need 1291 to be made: 1293 1) What is the public key size? 1294 2) What is the KDF? 1295 3) What is the key wrap algorithm? 1296 4) What is the content encryption algorithm? 1297 5) What is the curve? 1299 Consideration must be given to the strength of the security provided 1300 by each of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a 1301 strong symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X 1302 bits of security. It is recommended that the bits of security 1303 provided by each are roughly equivalent. The following table provides 1304 comparable minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDH/ECMQV key 1305 sizes, KDFs, key wrapping algorithms, and content encryption 1306 algorithms. It also lists curves [PKI-ALG] for the key sizes. 1308 Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curves 1309 Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption | 1310 Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. | 1311 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1312 80 | 160-223 | SHA-1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | sect163k1 1313 | | SHA-224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp163r2 1314 | | SHA-256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp192r1 1315 | | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | 1316 | | SHA-512 | | | 1317 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- 1318 112 | 224-255 | SHA-1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1 1319 | | SHA-224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | sect233k1 1320 | | SHA-256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | sect233r1 1321 | | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | 1322 | | SHA-512 | | | 1323 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- 1324 128 | 256-383 | SHA-1 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1 1325 | | SHA-224 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | sect283k1 1326 | | SHA-256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | sect283r1 1327 | | SHA-384 | | | 1328 | | SHA-512 | | | 1329 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- 1330 192 | 384-511 | SHA-224 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp384r1 1331 | | SHA-256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | sect409k1 1332 | | SHA-384 | | | sect409r1 1333 | | SHA-512 | | | 1334 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- 1335 256 | 512+ | SHA-256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1 1336 | | SHA-384 | | | sect571k1 1337 | | SHA-512 | | | sect571r1 1338 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- 1339 To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED: 1341 Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curve 1342 Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption | 1343 Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. | 1344 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1345 80 | 192 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp192r1 1346 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1347 112 | 224 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1 1348 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1349 128 | 256 | SHA-256 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1 1350 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1351 192 | 384 | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp384r1 1352 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1353 256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1 1354 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1356 When implementing SignedData, there are three algorithm related 1357 choices that need to be made: 1359 1) What is the public key size? 1360 2) What is the hash algorithm? 1361 3) What is the curve? 1363 Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each 1364 of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong 1365 symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of 1366 security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by 1367 each choice are roughly equivalent. The following table provides 1368 comparable minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDSA key 1369 sizes and message digest algorithms. It also lists curves [PKI-ALG] 1370 for the key sizes. 1372 Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve 1373 Bits of | Key Size | Digest | 1374 Security | | Algorithm | 1375 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1376 80 | 160-223 | SHA-1 | sect163k1 1377 | | SHA-224 | secp163r2 1378 | | SHA-256 | secp192r1 1379 | | SHA-384 | 1380 | | SHA-512 | 1381 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1382 112 | 224-255 | SHA-224 | secp224r1 1383 | | SHA-256 | sect233k1 1384 | | SHA-384 | sect233r1 1385 | | SHA-512 | 1386 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1387 128 | 256-383 | SHA-256 | secp256r1 1388 | | SHA-384 | sect283k1 1389 | | SHA-512 | sect283r1 1390 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1391 192 | 384-511 | SHA-384 | secp384r1 1392 | | SHA-512 | sect409k1 1393 | | | sect409r1 1394 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1395 256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | secp521r1 1396 | | | sect571k1 1397 | | | sect571r1 1398 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1400 To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED: 1402 Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve 1403 Bits of | Key Size | Digest | 1404 Security | | Algorithm | 1405 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1406 80 | 192 | SHA-256 | sect192r1 1407 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1408 112 | 224 | SHA-256 | secp224r1 1409 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1410 128 | 256 | SHA-256 | secp256r1 1411 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1412 192 | 384 | SHA-384 | secp384r1 1413 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1414 256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | secp521r1 1415 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1417 10. IANA Considerations 1419 This document makes extensive use of object identifiers to register 1420 originator public key types and algorithms. The algorithm object 1421 identifiers are registered in the ANSI X9.62, ANSI X9.63, NIST, RSA, 1422 and SECG arcs. Additionally, object identifiers are used to identify 1423 the ASN.1 modules found in Appendix A. These are defined in an arc 1424 delegated by IANA to the SMIME Working Group. No further action by 1425 IANA is necessary for this document or any anticipated updates. 1427 11. References 1429 11.1. Normative 1431 [CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 1432 3852, July 2004. 1434 [CMS-AES] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard 1435 (AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message 1436 Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003. 1438 [CMS-AESCG] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated 1439 Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax 1440 (CMS)", RFC 5084, November 2007. 1442 [CMS-ALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 1443 Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002. 1445 [CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for 1446 CMS", draft-ietf-smime-new-asn1, work-in-progress. 1448 [CMS-AUTHENV] Housley, R. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 1449 Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083, 1450 November 2007. 1452 [CMS-DH] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", 1453 RFC 2631, June 1999. 1455 [CMS-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic 1456 Message Syntax", draft-ietf-smime-sha2, work-in- 1457 progress. 1459 [FIPS180-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology 1460 (NIST), FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard, 1461 October 2008. 1463 [FIPS186-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology 1464 (NIST), FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature 1465 Standard, (draft) November 2008. 1467 [HMAC-SHA2] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC- 1468 SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA- 1469 512", RFC 4231, December 2005. 1471 [MUST] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate 1472 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 1474 [MSG] Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "S/MIME Version 3.2 1475 Message Specification", draft-ietf-smime-3851bis, 1476 work-in-progress. 1478 [PKI] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S. 1479 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 1480 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation 1481 List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 1483 [PKI-ALG] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W. 1484 Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key 1485 Information", RFC 5480, March 2009. 1487 [RANDOM] Eastlake 3rd, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller, 1488 "Randomness Recommendations for Security", RFC 4086, 1489 June 2005. 1491 [RSAOAEP] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 1492 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for 1493 use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 1494 Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) 1495 Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005. 1497 [SEC1] SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for 1498 Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000. Available from 1499 www.secg.org/collateral/sec1.pdf. 1501 [SP800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology 1502 (NIST), Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation 1503 Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete 1504 Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), March 2007. 1506 [X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 1507 1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 1508 Notation One. 1510 11.2. Informative 1512 [BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC", 1513 Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000, 1514 Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University 1515 of Waterloo, 2000. Paper version available from 1516 http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps 1518 [CERTCAP] Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for 1519 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) 1520 Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005. 1522 [CMS-ECC] Blake-Wilson, S., Brown, D., and P. Lambert, "Use of 1523 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in 1524 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3278, April 1525 2002. 1527 [CMS-KEA] Pawling, J., "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC 1528 2876, July 2000. 1530 [K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1 1531 and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998. 1533 [PKI-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for 1534 PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, work-in-progress. 1536 [SP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology 1537 (NIST), Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation 1538 for Key Management - Part 1 (Revised), March 2007. 1540 [X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 1541 2:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 1542 Notation One: Information Object Specification. 1544 [X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 1545 3:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 1546 Notation One: Constraint Specification. 1548 [X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 1549 4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 1550 Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1 1551 Specifications, 2002. 1553 Appendix A ASN.1 Modules 1555 Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the 1556 structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in 1557 [X.680] for compilers that support the 1988 ASN.1. 1559 Appendix A.2 provides an informative ASN.1 definitions for the 1560 structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in 1561 [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683] for compilers that support the 1562 2002 ASN.1. This appendix contains the same information as Appendix 1563 A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1 notation, however Appendix 1564 A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict. 1566 NOTE: The values for the TBAs will be included during AUTH48. 1568 //** RFC Editor: Remove this note prior to publication **// 1570 Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module 1572 SMIMEECCAlgs-1988 1573 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1574 smime(16) modules(0) TBA1 } 1576 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= 1578 BEGIN 1580 -- EXPORTS ALL 1582 IMPORTS 1584 -- From [PKI] 1586 AlgorithmIdentifier 1587 FROM PKIX1Explicit88 1588 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) 1589 internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0) 1590 pkix1-explicit(18) } 1592 -- From [RSAOAEP] 1594 id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512 1595 FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms 1596 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 1597 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 1598 id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs(33) } 1600 -- From [PKI-ALG] 1602 id-sha1, ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, 1603 ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, ecdsa-with-SHA512, 1604 id-ecPublicKey, ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint, ECParameters 1605 FROM PKIXAlgIDs-2008 1606 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 1607 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA1 } 1609 -- From [CMS] 1611 OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial 1612 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 1613 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1614 smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } 1616 -- From [CMS-ALG] 1618 hMAC-SHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224, id-hmacWithSHA256, id-hmacWithSHA384, 1619 id-hmacWithSHA512, des-ede3-cbc, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, CBCParameter 1620 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms 1621 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1622 smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2008(TBD) } 1624 -- From [CMS-AES] 1626 id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV, 1627 id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes256-wrap 1628 FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep 1629 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1630 smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) } 1632 -- From [CMS-AESCG] 1634 id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters 1635 id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters 1636 FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM 1637 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1638 smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) } 1640 ; 1641 -- 1642 -- Message Digest Algorithms 1643 -- 1645 -- id-sha1 Parameters are preferred absent 1646 -- id-sha224 Parameters are preferred absent 1647 -- id-sha256 Parameters are preferred absent 1648 -- id-sha384 Parameters are preferred absent 1649 -- id-sha512 Parameters are preferred absent 1651 -- 1652 -- Signature Algorithms 1653 -- 1655 -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Parameters are NULL 1656 -- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Parameters are absent 1657 -- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Parameters are absent 1658 -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Parameters are absent 1659 -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Parameters are absent 1661 -- ECDSA Signature Value 1662 -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING 1664 -- ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { 1665 -- r INTEGER, 1666 -- s INTEGER 1667 -- } 1669 -- 1670 -- Key Agreement Algorithms 1671 -- 1673 x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1674 iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840) 1675 x9-63(63) schemes(0) } 1677 secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1678 iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } 1680 -- 1681 -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs 1682 -- 1684 -- Parameters are always present and indicate the key wrap algorithm 1685 -- with KeyWrapAlgorithm. 1687 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1688 x9-63-scheme 2 } 1690 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1691 secg-scheme 11 0 } 1693 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1694 secg-scheme 11 1 } 1696 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1697 secg-scheme 11 2 } 1699 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1700 secg-scheme 11 3 } 1702 -- 1703 -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs 1704 -- 1706 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1707 x9-63-scheme 3 } 1709 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1710 secg-scheme 14 0 } 1712 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1713 secg-scheme 14 1 } 1715 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1716 secg-scheme 14 2 } 1718 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1719 secg-scheme 14 3 } 1721 -- 1722 -- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs 1723 -- 1725 mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1726 x9-63-scheme 16 } 1728 mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1729 secg-scheme 15 0 } 1731 mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1732 secg-scheme 15 1 } 1734 mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1735 secg-scheme 15 2 } 1737 mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1738 secg-scheme 15 3 } 1740 -- 1741 -- Key Wrap Algorithms 1742 -- 1744 KeyWrapAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 1746 -- id-alg-CMS3DESwrap Parameters are NULL 1747 -- id-aes128-wrap Parameters are absent 1748 -- id-aes192-wrap Parameters are absent 1749 -- id-aes256-wrap Parameters are absent 1751 -- 1752 -- Content Encryption Algorithms 1753 -- 1755 -- des-ede3-cbc Parameters are CBCParameter 1756 -- id-aes128-CBC Parameters are AES-IV 1757 -- id-aes192-CBC Parameters are AES-IV 1758 -- id-aes256-CBC Parameters are AES-IV 1759 -- id-aes128-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters 1760 -- id-aes192-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters 1761 -- id-aes256-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters 1762 -- id-aes128-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters 1763 -- id-aes192-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters 1764 -- id-aes256-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters 1766 -- 1767 -- Message Authentication Code Algorithms 1768 -- 1770 -- hMAC-SHA1 Parameters are preferred absent 1771 -- id-hmacWithSHA224 Parameters are absent 1772 -- id-hmacWithSHA256 Parameters are absent 1773 -- id-hmacWithSHA384 Parameters are absent 1774 -- id-hmacWithSHA512 Parameters are absent 1775 -- 1776 -- Originator Public Key Algorithms 1777 -- 1779 -- id-ecPublicKey Parameters are absent, NULL, or ECParameters 1781 -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys 1783 -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING 1785 -- ECParameters ::= CHOICE { 1786 -- namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1787 -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] implicitCurve NULL 1788 -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain 1789 -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] Extensible 1790 -- } 1791 -- implicitCurve and specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX. 1792 -- Details for SpecifiedECDomain can be found in [X9.62]. 1793 -- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated 1794 -- with ANSI X9. 1796 -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with 1797 -- ECMQV 1799 MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { 1800 ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, 1801 addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL 1802 } 1804 -- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with 1805 -- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData 1807 ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1808 keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier, 1809 entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 1810 suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING 1811 } 1812 -- 1813 -- S/MIME Capabilities 1814 -- An identifier followed by type. 1815 -- 1817 -- 1818 -- S/MIME Capabilities: Message Digest Algorithms 1819 -- 1821 -- Found in [CMS-SHA2]. 1823 -- 1824 -- S/MIME Capabilities: Signature Algorithms 1825 -- 1827 -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Type NULL 1828 -- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Type absent 1829 -- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Type absent 1830 -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Type absent 1831 -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Type absent 1833 -- 1834 -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard 1835 -- 1837 -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1838 -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1839 -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1840 -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1841 -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1843 -- 1844 -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Cofactor 1845 -- 1847 -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1848 -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1849 -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1850 -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1851 -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1852 -- 1853 -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECMQV, Single Pass, Standard 1854 -- 1856 -- mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1857 -- mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1858 -- mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1859 -- mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1860 -- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1862 END 1864 Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module 1866 SMIMEECCAlgs-2008 1867 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1868 smime(16) modules(0) TBA2 } 1870 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= 1872 BEGIN 1874 -- EXPORTS ALL 1876 IMPORTS 1878 -- From [PKI-ALG] 1880 mda-sha1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA224, sa-ecdsaWithSHA256, 1881 sa-ecdsaWithSHA384, sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, id-ecPublicKey, 1882 ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint, ECParameters 1883 FROM PKIXAlgIDs-2008 1884 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 1885 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA2 } 1887 -- FROM [PKI-ASN] 1889 KEY-WRAP, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, 1890 PUBLIC-KEY, MAC-ALGORITHM, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, KEY-AGREE 1891 FROM AlgorithmInformation 1892 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 1893 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 1894 id-mod-algorithmInformation(TBA5) } 1896 -- From [PKI-ASN] 1898 mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512 1899 FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms 1900 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 1901 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA7 } 1903 -- From [CMS] 1905 OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial 1906 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 1907 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1908 smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } 1910 -- From [CMS-ASN] 1912 maca-hMAC-SHA1, maca-hMAC-SHA224, maca-hMAC-SHA256, maca-hMAC-SHA384, 1913 maca-hMAC-SHA512, cea-des-ede3-cbc, kwa-3DESWrap, CBCParameter 1914 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms 1915 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1916 smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) } 1918 -- From [CMS-ASN] 1920 cea-aes128-CBC, cea-aes192-CBC, cea-aes256-CBC, kwa-aes128-wrap, 1921 kwa-aes192-wrap, kwa-aes256-wrap 1922 FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep 1923 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1924 smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) } 1926 -- From [CMS-ASN] 1928 cea-aes128-ccm, cea-aes192-ccm, cea-aes256-ccm, cea-aes128-gcm, 1929 cea-aes192-gcm, cea-aes256-gcm 1930 FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM 1931 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1932 smime(16) modules(0) cms-aes-ccm-and-gcm(32) } 1934 ; 1935 -- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field 1936 -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field 1937 -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field 1939 -- MessageDigestAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { 1940 -- mda-sha1 | 1941 -- mda-sha224 | 1942 -- mda-sha256 | 1943 -- mda-sha384 | 1944 -- mda-sha512, 1945 -- ... -- Extensible 1946 -- } 1948 -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field 1950 -- SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { 1951 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 | 1952 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 | 1953 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 | 1954 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 | 1955 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, 1956 -- ... -- Extensible 1957 -- } 1959 -- ECDSA Signature Value 1960 -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING 1962 -- ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { 1963 -- r INTEGER, 1964 -- s INTEGER 1965 -- } 1967 -- 1968 -- Key Agreement Algorithms 1969 -- 1971 -- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 1972 -- keyEncryption Algorithm field 1973 -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo 1974 -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field 1975 -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo 1976 -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field 1978 -- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or 1979 -- AuthEnvelopedData 1980 KeyAgreementAlgs KEY-AGREE ::= { 1981 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme | 1982 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme | 1983 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme | 1984 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme | 1985 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme | 1986 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme | 1987 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme | 1988 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme | 1989 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme | 1990 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme | 1991 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme | 1992 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme | 1993 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme | 1994 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme | 1995 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme, 1996 ... -- Extensible 1997 } 1999 x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2000 iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840) 2001 x9-63(63) schemes(0) } 2003 secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2004 iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } 2006 -- 2007 -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs 2008 -- 2010 -- Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm 2012 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2013 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme 2014 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2015 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2016 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2017 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme } 2018 } 2020 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2021 x9-63-scheme 2 } 2023 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2024 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme 2025 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2026 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2027 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2028 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme } 2029 } 2031 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2032 secg-scheme 11 0 } 2034 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2035 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme 2036 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2037 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2038 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2039 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme } 2040 } 2042 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2043 secg-scheme 11 1 } 2045 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2046 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme 2047 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2048 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2049 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2050 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme } 2051 } 2053 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2054 secg-scheme 11 2 } 2056 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2057 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme 2058 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2059 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2060 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2061 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme } 2062 } 2064 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2065 secg-scheme 11 3 } 2067 -- 2068 -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs 2069 -- 2071 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2072 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme 2073 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2074 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2075 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2076 IDENTIFIED BY 2077 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme } 2078 } 2080 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2081 x9-63-scheme 3 } 2083 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2084 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme 2085 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2086 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2087 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2088 IDENTIFIED BY 2089 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme } 2090 } 2092 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2093 secg-scheme 14 0 } 2095 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2096 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme 2097 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2098 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2099 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2100 IDENTIFIED BY 2101 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme } 2102 } 2104 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2105 secg-scheme 14 1 } 2107 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2108 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme 2109 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2110 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2111 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2112 IDENTIFIED BY 2113 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme } 2114 } 2116 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2117 secg-scheme 14 2 } 2119 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2120 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme 2121 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2122 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2123 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2124 IDENTIFIED BY 2125 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme } 2126 } 2128 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2129 secg-scheme 14 3 } 2131 -- 2132 -- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs 2133 -- 2135 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2136 IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme 2137 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2138 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2139 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2140 IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme } 2141 } 2143 mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2144 x9-63-scheme 16 } 2146 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2147 IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme 2148 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2149 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2150 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2151 IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme } 2152 } 2153 mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2154 secg-scheme 15 0 } 2156 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2157 IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme 2158 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2159 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2160 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2161 IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme } 2162 } 2164 mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2165 secg-scheme 15 1 } 2167 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2168 IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme 2169 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2170 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2171 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2172 IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme } 2173 } 2175 mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2176 secg-scheme 15 2 } 2178 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2179 IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme 2180 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2181 UKM TYPE -- unencoded data -- IS preferredPresent 2182 SMIME CAPS { TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2183 IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme } 2184 } 2186 mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2187 secg-scheme 15 3 } 2189 -- 2190 -- Key Wrap Algorithms 2191 -- 2193 KeyWrapAlgorithm ::= KeyWrapAlgs 2194 KeyWrapAlgs KEY-WRAP ::= { 2195 kwa-3des | 2196 kwa-aes128 | 2197 kwa-aes192 | 2198 kwa-aes256, 2199 ... -- Extensible 2200 } 2202 -- 2203 -- Content Encryption Algorithms 2204 -- 2206 -- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent 2207 -- field and the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo 2208 -- contentEncryptionAlgorithm field 2210 -- ContentEncryptionAlgorithms CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= { 2211 -- cea-des-ede3-cbc | 2212 -- cea-aes128-cbc | 2213 -- cea-aes192-cbc | 2214 -- cea-aes256-cbc | 2215 -- cea-aes128-ccm | 2216 -- cea-aes192-ccm | 2217 -- cea-aes256-ccm | 2218 -- cea-aes128-gcm | 2219 -- cea-aes192-gcm | 2220 -- cea-aes256-gcm, 2221 -- ... -- Extensible 2222 -- } 2224 -- des-ede3-cbc and aes*-cbc are used with EnvelopedData and 2225 -- EncryptedData 2226 -- aes*-ccm are used with AuthEnvelopedData 2227 -- aes*-gcm are used with AuthEnvelopedData 2228 -- (where * is 128, 192, and 256) 2229 -- 2230 -- Message Authentication Code Algorithms 2231 -- 2233 -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData 2234 -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field 2235 -- 2237 -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { 2238 -- maca-hMAC-SHA1 | 2239 -- maca-hMAC-SHA224 | 2240 -- maca-hMAC-SHA256 | 2241 -- maca-hMAC-SHA384 | 2242 -- maca-hMAC-SHA512, 2243 -- ... -- Extensible 2244 -- } 2246 -- 2247 -- Originator Public Key Algorithms 2248 -- 2250 -- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey 2251 -- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field 2253 -- PARAMS are NULL 2255 OriginatorPKAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 2256 opka-ec, 2257 ... -- Extensible 2258 } 2260 opka-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::={ 2261 IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey 2262 KEY ECPoint 2263 PARAMS TYPE CHOICE { n NULL, p ECParameters } ARE preferredAbsent 2264 } 2266 -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys 2268 -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING 2269 -- ECParameters ::= CHOICE { 2270 -- namedCurve CURVE.&id({NamedCurve}) 2271 -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] implicitCurve NULL 2272 -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain 2273 -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] ... Extensible 2274 -- } 2275 -- implicitCurve and specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX. 2276 -- Details for SpecifiedECDomain can be found in [X9.62]. 2277 -- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated 2278 -- with ANSI X.9. 2280 -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with 2281 -- ECMQV 2283 MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { 2284 ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, 2285 addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL 2286 } 2288 -- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with 2289 -- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData 2291 ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 2292 keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier { KeyWrapAlgorithm }, 2293 entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 2294 suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING 2295 } 2297 END 2299 Appendix B Changes since RFC 3278 2301 The following summarizes the changes: 2303 - Abstract: The basis of the document was changed to refer to NIST 2304 FIPS 186-3 and SP800-56A. However, to maintain backwards 2305 compatibility the Key Derivation Function from ANSI/SEC1 is 2306 retained. 2308 - Section 1: A bullet was added to address AuthEnvelopedData. 2310 - Section 2.1: A sentence was added to indicate FIPS180-3 is used 2311 with ECDSA. Replaced reference to ANSI X9.62 with FIPS186-3. 2313 - Section 2.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms were expanded from 2314 SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. 2316 - Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3: The bullet addressing integer "e" was 2317 deleted. 2319 - Section 3: Added explanation of why static-static ECDH is not 2320 included. 2322 - Section 3.1: The reference for DH was changed from RFC 3852 to 2323 RFC 3370. Provided text to indicate fields of EnvelopedData are 2324 as in CMS. 2326 - Section 3.1.1: The text was updated to include description of all 2327 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields. Parameters for id-ecPublicKey 2328 field changed from NULL to absent or ECParameter. Additional 2329 information about ukm was added. 2331 - Section 3.2: The sentence describing the advantages of 1-Pass 2332 ECMQV was rewritten. 2334 - Section 3.2.1: The text was updated to include description of all 2335 fields. Parameters for id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL 2336 to absent or ECPoint. 2338 - Sections 3.2.2 and 4.1.2: The re-use of ephemeral keys paragraph 2339 was reworded. 2341 - Section 4.1: The sentences describing the advantages of 1-Pass 2342 ECMQV was moved to Section 4. 2344 - Section 4.1.2: The note about the attack was moved to Section 4. 2346 - Section 4.2: This section was added to address AuthEnvelopedData 2347 with ECMQV. 2349 - Section 5: This section was moved to Section 8. The 1st 2350 paragraph was modified to recommend both SignedData and 2351 EnvelopedData. The requirements were updated for hash 2352 algorithms and recommendations for matching curves and hash 2353 algorithms. Also the requirements were expanded to indicate 2354 which ECDH and ECMQV variants, key wrap algorithms, and content 2355 encryption algorithms are required for each of the content types 2356 used in this document. The permitted digest algorithms used in 2357 key derivations functions (KDFs) were expanded from SHA-1 to 2358 SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. 2360 - Section 6 (formerly 7): This section was updated to allow for 2361 SMIMECapabilities to be present in certificates. The S/MIME 2362 capabilities for ECDSA with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA- 2363 512 were added to the list of S/MIME Capabilities. Also updated 2364 to include S/MIME capabilities for ECDH and ECMQV using the SHA- 2365 224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the KDF. 2367 - Section 7.1 (formerly 8.1): Added sub-sections for digest, 2368 signature, originator public key, key agreement, content 2369 encryption, key wrap, and message authentication code 2370 algorithms. Pointed to algorithms and parameters in appropriate 2371 documents for: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as 2372 SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA. Also added 2373 algorithm identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV 2374 with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the 2375 KDF. Changed id-ecPublicKey parameters to be absent, NULL, or 2376 ECParameters, and if present the originator's ECParameters must 2377 match the recipient's ECParameters. 2379 - Section 7.2 (formerly 8.2): Updated to include AuthEnvelopedData. 2380 Also, added text to address support requirement for compressed, 2381 uncompressed, and hybrid keys, changed pointers from ANSI X9.61 2382 to PKIX (where ECDSA-Sig-Value is imported), changed pointers 2383 from SECG to NIST specs, and updated example of suppPubInfo to 2384 be AES-256. keyInfo's parameters changed from NULL to any 2385 associated parameters (AES wraps have absent parameters). 2387 - Section 9: Replaced text, which was a summary paragraph, with an 2388 updated security considerations section. Paragraph referring to 2389 definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 is 2390 deleted. 2392 - Updated references. 2394 - Added ASN.1 modules. 2396 - Updated acknowledgements section. 2398 Acknowledgements 2400 The methods described in this document are based on work done by the 2401 ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their thanks to 2402 ANSI X9F1 for their assistance. The authors also wish to thank Peter 2403 de Rooij for his patient assistance. The technical comments of 2404 Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions. 2406 Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake- 2407 Wilson and Paul Lambert. Without RFC 3278 this version wouldn't 2408 exist. 2410 The authors also wish to thank Alfred Hoenes, Paul Hoffman, Russ 2411 Housley, and Jim Schaad for their valuable input. 2413 Authors' Addresses 2415 Sean Turner 2417 IECA, Inc. 2418 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 2419 Fairfax, VA 22031 2420 USA 2422 Email: turners@ieca.com 2424 Daniel R. L. Brown 2426 Certicom Corp 2427 5520 Explorer Drive #400 2428 Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1 2429 CANADA 2431 Email: dbrown@certicom.com