idnits 2.17.00 (12 Aug 2021) /tmp/idnits58789/draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-04.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** The abstract seems to contain references ([RFC6811]), which it shouldn't. Please replace those with straight textual mentions of the documents in question. Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document date (April 8, 2020) is 766 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) No issues found here. Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus 4 Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk 5 Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom 6 Expires: October 10, 2020 J. Heitz 7 Cisco 8 April 8, 2020 10 BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export 11 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-04 13 Abstract 15 A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes 16 received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from 17 other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP 18 neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the 19 classification uses the 'effective origin AS' of the processed route, 20 which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs 21 such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other 22 modifications of the origin AS. This document updates [RFC6811]. 24 Requirements Language 26 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 27 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 28 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 29 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 30 capitals, as shown here. 32 Status of This Memo 34 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 35 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 37 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 38 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 39 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 40 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 42 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 43 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 44 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 45 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 47 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 10, 2020. 49 Copyright Notice 51 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 52 document authors. All rights reserved. 54 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 55 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 56 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 57 publication of this document. Please review these documents 58 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 59 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 60 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 61 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 62 described in the Simplified BSD License. 64 Table of Contents 66 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 67 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 68 3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 69 4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 70 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 71 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 72 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 73 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 74 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 75 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 76 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 78 1. Introduction 80 This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811], 81 BGP prefix origin validation. It highlights an important use case of 82 origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of 83 correct implementation in this context. 85 The term 'effective origin AS' as used in this document refers to the 86 Route Origin ASN [RFC6811] of the UPDATE to be sent to neighboring 87 BGP speakers. 89 The effective origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration 90 and outbound policy of the BGP speaker. A validating BGP speaker 91 MUST apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics (see [RFC6811] 92 Sec 2 and [RFC8481] Sec 4) after applying any egress configuration 93 and policy. 95 This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by 96 removal of private ASs, confederation [RFC5065], migration [RFC7705], 97 etc. Any AS_PATH modifications resulting in effective origin AS 98 change MUST be taken into account. 100 This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations 101 must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation 102 state when applying egress policy. 104 2. Suggested Reading 106 It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, 107 [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based 108 Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications, 109 [RFC8481]. 111 3. Egress Processing 113 BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation MUST 114 provide the same policy configuration primitives for decisions based 115 on validation state available for use in ingress, redistribution, and 116 egress policies. When applied to egress policy, validation state 117 MUST be determined using the effective origin AS of the route as it 118 will (or would) be announced to the peer. The effective origin AS 119 may differ from that of the route in the RIB due to commonly 120 available knobs such as: removal of private ASs, AS path 121 manipulation, confederation handling, etc. 123 Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for 124 outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected, 125 static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly - 126 better support for the robustness principle. 128 4. Operational Considerations 130 Configurations may have complex policy where the effective origin AS 131 may not be easily determined before the outbound policies have been 132 run. It SHOULD be possible to specify a selective origin validation 133 policy to be applied after any existing non-validating outbound 134 policies. 136 An implementation SHOULD be able to list announcements that were not 137 sent to a peer, e.g., because they were marked Invalid, as long as 138 the router still has them in memory. 140 5. Security Considerations 142 This document does not create security considerations beyond those of 143 [RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. By facilitating more correct validation, it 144 attempts to improve BGP reliability. 146 6. IANA Considerations 148 This document has no IANA Considerations. 150 7. Acknowledgments 152 Thanks to reviews and comments from Linda Dunbar, Nick Hilliard, 153 Benjamin Kaduk, Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Alvaro Retana, Alvaro 154 Retana, Job Snijders, Robert Sparks, and Robert Wilton. 156 8. References 158 8.1. Normative References 160 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 161 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 162 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 163 . 165 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A 166 Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, 167 DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, 168 . 170 [RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous 171 System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, 172 DOI 10.17487/RFC5065, August 2007, 173 . 175 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 176 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 177 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 178 . 180 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 181 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, 182 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 183 . 185 [RFC7705] George, W. and S. Amante, "Autonomous System Migration 186 Mechanisms and Their Effects on the BGP AS_PATH 187 Attribute", RFC 7705, DOI 10.17487/RFC7705, November 2015, 188 . 190 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 191 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 192 May 2017, . 194 [RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based 195 on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481, 196 DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018, 197 . 199 8.2. Informative References 201 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 202 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 203 February 2012, . 205 Authors' Addresses 207 Randy Bush 208 Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus 209 5147 Crystal Springs 210 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 211 US 213 Email: randy@psg.com 215 Ruediger Volk 216 Deutsche Telekom 218 Email: rv@nic.dtag.de 220 Jakob Heitz 221 Cisco 222 170 West Tasman Drive 223 San Jose, CA 95134 224 USA 226 Email: jheitz@cisco.com