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Checking references for intended status: Informational ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == Outdated reference: draft-ietf-sidr-arch has been published as RFC 6480 == Outdated reference: draft-ietf-sidr-cp has been published as RFC 6484 == Outdated reference: draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs has been published as RFC 6487 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3447 (Obsoleted by RFC 8017) Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 4 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDR G. Huston 3 Internet-Draft APNIC 4 Intended status: Informational May 16, 2010 5 Expires: November 17, 2010 7 A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public 8 Key Infrastructure 9 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs-01.txt 11 Abstract 13 This document defines a profile for the algorithm and key size to be 14 used for signatures applied to certificates, Certificate Revocation 15 Lists, and signed objects in the context of the Resource Public Key 16 Infrastructure. 18 Status of this Memo 20 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 21 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 23 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 24 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 25 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 26 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 28 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 29 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 30 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 31 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 33 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 17, 2010. 35 Copyright Notice 37 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 38 document authors. All rights reserved. 40 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 41 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 42 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 43 publication of this document. Please review these documents 44 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 45 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 46 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 47 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 48 described in the Simplified BSD License. 50 1. Introduction 52 This document defines a profile for the algorithm and key size to be 53 used for signatures applied to certificates, Certificate Revocation 54 Lists (CRLs), and signed objects in the context of the Resource 55 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. 57 This section of the profile is specified in a distinct profile 58 document, referenced by the RPKI Certificate Policy (CP) 59 [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp] and the RPKI Certificate Profile 60 [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs], in order to allow for a degree of 61 algorithm and key agility in the RPKI, while permitting some longer 62 term stability in the CP and Certificate Profile specifications. 64 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 65 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 66 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 68 2. Algorithm and Key Size 70 This profile specifies the use of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC3447] with 71 the SHA-256 hash algorithm to compute the signature of certificates, 72 CRLs, and signed objects in the context of the RPKI. Accordingly, 73 the OID value in the RPKI for such signatures MUST be 74 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 (sha256WithRSAEncryption). The RSA key pairs 75 used to compute the signatures MUST have a 2048-bit modulus and a 76 public exponent (e) of 65,537. 78 In order to facilitate a potential need to transition to stronger 79 cryptographic algorithms in the future, Certification Authorities 80 (CAs) and Relying Parties (RPs) SHOULD be able to generate and verify 81 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures using the SHA-512 hash algorithm and RSA 82 key sizes of 3072 and 4096 bits. 84 3. Future Upates 86 It is anticipated that the RPKI will require the adoption of updated 87 key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over 88 time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic 89 security to protect the integrity of signed products in the RPKI. 90 This profile should be updated to specify such future requirements, 91 as and when appropriate. 93 CAs and RPs should be capable of supporting a transition to allow for 94 the phased introduction of additional encryption algorithms and key 95 specifications, and also accomodate the orderly deprecation of 96 previously specified algorithms and keys. Accordingly, CAs and RPs 97 SHOULD be capable of supporting multiple RPKI algorithm and key 98 profiles simultaneously within the scope of such anticipated 99 transitions. 101 Note: This document specifies the current algorithm requirements for 102 the RPKI. The document acknowledges a requirement for algorithm 103 agility, both in terms of larger key sizes in conjunction with the 104 current algorithms, and transition to other algorithms. It is noted 105 that the SIDR architecture is one where each CA is required to 106 generate signed material that may be validated by the entire 107 collection of Relying Parties. This architectural requirement 108 precludes the use of any negotiation between a CA and a RP as to the 109 algorithm to use for signed products in the RPKI. This constraint 110 implies that any transition of key size or algorithm will require a 111 phased approach with the concurrent support of both old and new 112 algorithms until such time as it is deemed that all RPs can support 113 the new algorithm. Given that there is no accommodation for multiple 114 signature algorithms in the current collection of RPKI 115 specifications, either the colelction of RPKI specifications will 116 require subsequent revision to support the use of multiple signature 117 algorithms within the specifications of signed objects in the RPKI, 118 which itself poses a transition issue, or all such form of algorithm 119 transition will require the construction and operation of a parallel 120 RPKI structure that is entirely distinct from the "current" RPKI 121 structure by virtue of its exclusive use of a "new" algorithm for 122 signature generation. The latter option, that of the concurrent 123 operation of parallel RPKI structures, poses some complex issues in 124 terms of synchronisation of actions across the set of RPKI CAs, as 125 well as issues of consistency and coherency in the operation of 126 multiple parallel RPKI frameworks, as well as the uncertainties 127 associated with a global determination of when any such transition 128 can be considered "complete". The alternate approach, of allowing 129 multiple signature algorithms in the RPKI certificate profile, and in 130 the specification of CMS signatures as used in manifests, ROAS, other 131 signed objects, and in the provisioning protocol, allows for 132 algorithm transition to occur within a single RPKI framework, and 133 allows for individual CAs to commence use of multiple algorithms in a 134 piecemeal fashion without reliance on the algorithm transition of the 135 immediate superior CA and without a forced synchronisation of 136 algorithm transition with subordinate CAs. In the light of this 137 consideration, this document recommends the comprehensive revision of 138 the existing RPKI specification and architecture documents to include 139 provision for multiple signatures with multiple algorithms in order 140 to support an orderly transition to longer key sizes and to other 141 signature algorithms in the RPKI. 143 4. Security Considerations 145 The Security Considerations of [RFC3779], [RFC5280], and [RFC4055] 146 apply to signatures as defined by this profile, and their use. 148 Algorithm transition poses some particular security issues, relating 149 to potential vulnerabilities in the parallel operation of an RPKI 150 framework where a potentially compromised algorithm remains in use 151 beyond a reasonable time for retirement. These issues should be 152 considered in detail in a future version of this document. 154 5. IANA Considerations 156 [There are no IANA considerations in this document.] 158 6. Acknowledgments 160 The author acknowledges the re-use in this draft of material 161 originally contained in working drafts the RPKI Certificate Policy 162 and Resource Certificate profile documents. The co-authors of these 163 two documents, namely Stephen Kent, Derrick Kong, Karen Seo, Ronald 164 Watro, George Michaelson and Robert Loomans, are acknowledged with 165 thanks. The constraint on key size noted in this profile is the 166 outcome of comments from Stephen Kent and review comments from David 167 Cooper. 169 7. Normative References 171 [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] 172 Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 173 Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in 174 progress), July 2009. 176 [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp] 177 Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and S. Kent, "Certificate 178 Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", 179 draft-ietf-sidr-cp (work in progress), July 2009. 181 [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs] 182 Husotn, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 183 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", 184 draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs (work in progress), 185 February 2008. 187 [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography 188 Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications 189 Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003. 191 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 192 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 194 [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 195 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in 196 the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 197 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, 198 June 2005. 200 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 201 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 202 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 203 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 205 Author's Address 207 Geoff Huston 208 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 210 Email: gih@apnic.net