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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2050 (Obsoleted by RFC 7020) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2985 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2986 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3280 (Obsoleted by RFC 5280) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 4158 Summary: 7 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 7 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDR G. Huston 3 Internet-Draft G. Michaelson 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans 5 Expires: August 28, 2007 APNIC 6 February 24, 2007 8 A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates 9 draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-05.txt 11 Status of this Memo 13 By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any 14 applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware 15 have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes 16 aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. 18 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 19 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 20 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 21 Drafts. 23 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 24 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 25 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 26 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 28 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 31 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 32 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 28, 2007. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 40 Abstract 42 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 43 the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" 44 of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System 45 Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization 46 of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of- 47 use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the 48 associated Resource Certificate. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 54 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 55 3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 56 3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 57 3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8 65 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 68 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 71 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 72 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 73 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 74 3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 75 3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 76 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13 77 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 78 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 79 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 80 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 81 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 82 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 83 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 84 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 85 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 86 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 87 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 88 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 89 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 90 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 91 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 92 5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 93 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 17 94 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 17 95 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 96 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 97 6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 98 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 21 99 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 100 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 23 101 7. Example Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 102 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 103 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 104 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 105 11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 106 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 107 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27 108 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 109 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 30 111 1. Introduction 113 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 114 use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. 115 These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to 116 the PKIX profile [RFC3280] and also conform to the constraints 117 specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest that the 118 issuer has granted the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of 119 IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers. 121 A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer 122 that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject 123 of the certificate. The binding is identified by the association of 124 the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in 125 the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the 126 certificate's issuer. 128 In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number 129 resources within this context, it is intended that Resource 130 Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the 131 public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a 132 number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an 133 entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource 134 Certificate. This Certificate is issued by the number registry, and 135 the subject's public key that is being certified by the Issuer 136 corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair 137 that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the 138 number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the 139 certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or 140 assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public 141 number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI 142 structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one 143 'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificated from a 144 "Root" Certificate Authority to a valid certificate. 146 Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can 147 be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer - subject certificate 148 chain from a trust anchor certificate authority to the certificate 149 [RFC4158], with the additional constraint of ensuring that each 150 subject's listed resources are fully encompassed by those of the 151 issuer at each step in the issuer-subject chain. 153 Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of 154 secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an 155 IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, 156 to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related 157 use contexts include validation of Internet Routing Registry objects, 158 validation of routing requests, and detection of potential 159 unauthorised used of IP addresses. 161 This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource 162 Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. 163 Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to 164 this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. 166 1.1. Terminology 168 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 169 described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 170 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509 171 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet 172 Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing 173 Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" 174 [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management 175 policy documents. 177 The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 178 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 179 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 181 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 183 The framework for describing an association between the subject of a 184 certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current 185 control is described in [RFC3779]. 187 There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in 188 this profile: 190 1. RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL 191 extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate 192 profile further specifies that the use of this certificate 193 extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be 194 marked as CRITICAL. 196 2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource 197 set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix 198 masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile 199 MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in 200 the resource extension field. 202 3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate 203 validity includes the condition that the resources described in 204 the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the 205 certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a 206 resource set (called here the "Issuer's resource set") that must 207 encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this 208 context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be 209 the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set. 211 A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a 212 sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the 213 subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next 214 certificate in the sequence) from one, and only one, trust anchor to 215 the certificate being validated, and that the resource extensions in 216 this certificate sequence from the trust anchor to the certificate 217 form a sequence of encompassing relationships. 219 3. Resource Certificate Fields 221 A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, 222 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields 223 listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, 224 all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST 225 NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value 226 is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource 227 Certificates. 229 3.1. Version 231 Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field 232 MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this 233 field is 2). 235 3.2. Serial number 237 The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per 238 Issuer. 240 3.3. Signature Algorithm 242 This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on 243 this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with 244 RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 245 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 246 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 11 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055]. 248 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 249 both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be 250 taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 252 3.4. Issuer 254 This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the 255 certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 257 If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of 258 the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the 259 issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the 260 immediate superior certificate. 262 This field MUST be non-empty. 264 3.5. Subject 266 This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been 267 allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 269 In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and 270 each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using 271 a subject name that is unique per issuer. 273 This field MUST be non-empty. 275 3.6. Valid From 277 The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this 278 profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of 279 certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], 280 Certificate Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always 281 encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as 282 UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as 283 GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280]. 285 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 286 this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior 287 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 288 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 289 other than the current time. 291 3.7. Valid To 293 The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the 294 certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime 295 of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the 296 issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs 297 conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's 298 "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 299 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats 300 are defined in [RFC3280]. 302 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 303 this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior 304 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 305 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 306 other than the current time. 308 Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a 309 certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity 310 interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the 311 issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is 312 anticipated that a CA may have good reason to issue a certificate 313 with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the 314 CA's certificate. 316 3.8. Subject Public Key Info 318 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with 319 which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, 320 accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is 321 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024 322 bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that 323 certificates that are intended to be used as root certificates, and 324 their immediate subordinates SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 325 bits. Immediate subordinates of these certificates, when used in the 326 context of continued level of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key 327 size of 2048 bits. 329 In the application of this profile to certification of public number 330 resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the 331 Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits, and that 332 their immediate subordinate certificate authorities also use a key 333 size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate certificates MAY use a key 334 size of 1024 bits. 336 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 337 both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be 338 taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 340 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 342 As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate 343 is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate- 344 using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical 345 extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension 346 MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280]. 348 The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming 349 Resource Certificate. 351 3.9.1. Basic Constraints 353 The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the 354 certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification 355 paths that include this certificate. 357 The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit 358 is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue 359 resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the 360 subject is permitted be a CA). 362 The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST 363 NOT be present. 365 The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the 366 Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present. 368 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 370 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 371 certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate 372 certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all 373 Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. 375 The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in 376 the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of 377 immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the 378 subject of this certificate). 380 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 381 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as 382 described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC3280]. 384 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 386 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 387 certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by 388 providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate 389 path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource 390 Certificates. The keyIdentifier subfield MUST be present in all 391 Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self- 392 signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and 393 authorityCertSerialNumber subfields MUST NOT be present. This 394 extension is non-critical. 396 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 397 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as 398 described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 400 3.9.4. Key Usage 402 This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical 403 extension, and it MUST be present. 405 In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits 406 are set to TRUE and MUST be the only bits set to TRUE. 408 In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and 409 MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. 411 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 413 This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) 414 associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile 415 uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access 416 mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references 417 a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. 419 In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, 420 implying at the CRLIssuer subfield MUST be omitted, and the 421 distributionPoint subfield MUST be present. The Reasons subfield 422 MUST be omitted. 424 The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT 425 contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST 426 be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified 427 to be all certificates issued by this issuer. The sequence of 428 distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single 429 DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain 430 more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the 431 DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of 432 this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs 433 MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI. 435 This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. 437 3.9.6. Authority Information Access 439 This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the 440 certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA, 441 where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a 442 single reference object to publication location of the immediate 443 superior certificate MUST be used. 445 This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred 446 URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified 447 with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST 448 reference the point of publication of the certificate where this 449 issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). 450 Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be 451 included in the value sequence of this extension. 453 When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate,the subordinate 454 certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA 455 field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re- 456 issuance in and of itself implies a requirement to re-issue all 457 subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a 458 persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies 459 that re-issued certificates overwrite prevously issued certificates 460 to the same subject, and use the same publication name as previously 461 issued certificates. In this way subordinate certificates can 462 maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due 463 solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate. The issuers' 464 policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued 465 certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certificate Practice 466 Statement. 468 Alternatively, if the certificate issuer does not maintain a 469 persistent URL for the must recent issued certificate for each 470 subject, then the entity who is subject of a certificate MAY keep the 471 most recent copy of the superior's issued certificate in the 472 subject's publication space, and set the AIA to reference this 473 subject-maintained copy of the immediate superior certificate. 475 In the case of self-signed certificates that undertake the role of a 476 "root" trust anchor within a certificate hierarchy the AIA extension 477 field SHOULD be omitted. In all other cases this field MUST be 478 present, and is non-critical. 480 3.9.7. Subject Information Access 482 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services 483 relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension 484 appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information 485 and service collection will include all current valid certificates 486 that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the 487 subject's corresponding private key. 489 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The 490 preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be 491 specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the 492 subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an 493 object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a 494 trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs that reference the 495 same location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this 496 extension. 498 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- 499 critical. 501 For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this 502 field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it references 503 the location where objects signed by the key pair associated with the 504 End Entity certificate can be accessed. The id-ad- 505 signedObjectRepository OID is used when the subject is an End Entity 506 and it publishes objects signed with the matching private key in a 507 repository. 509 id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } 511 id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 } 513 3.9.8. Certificate Policies 515 This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using 516 the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field 517 MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource 518 Certificates. 520 PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. 522 This extension MUST be present and it is critical. 524 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name 526 This is an optional extension, and MAY contain an X.501 Name as 527 supplied by the subject in the Certificate Request, or as assigned by 528 the issuer. 530 3.9.10. IP Resources 532 This field contains the list of IP address resources as per 533 [RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a 534 particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates 535 describing public number resources for use in the public Internet, 536 the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 537 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 538 extensions. 540 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 542 3.9.11. AS Resources 544 This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779], 545 or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported 546 in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 547 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 548 extensions. 550 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 552 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 554 Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), 555 consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect 556 CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL MUST be 557 "all certificates issued by this CA". The contents of the CRL are a 558 list of all non-expired certificates issued by the CA that have been 559 revoked by the CA. 561 An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one 562 regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's 563 validity period. 565 This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. 567 The profile does not allow the issuance of multiple current CRLs with 568 different scope by a single CA. 570 No CRL fields other than those listed below are allowed in CRLs 571 issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields 572 MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a 573 single CA are present in a certificate repository, the CRL with the 574 highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs 575 issued by this CA. 577 4.1. Version 579 Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the 580 integer value of this field is 1). 582 4.2. Issuer Name 584 The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is 585 also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in 586 the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer. 588 4.3. This Update 590 This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The 591 value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the 592 year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the 593 year 2050 or later. 595 4.4. Next Update 597 This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued. 598 The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through 599 the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in 600 the year 2050 or later. 602 4.5. Signature 604 This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. The 605 signature algorithm MUST be SHA-256 with RSA. This field MUST be 606 present. 608 4.6. Revoked Certificate List 610 When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate 611 list MUST be absent. 613 For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST 614 be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, 615 and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL. 617 4.6.1. Serial Number 619 The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate. 621 4.6.2. Revocation Date 623 The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a 624 future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for 625 dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime 626 for dates in the year 2050 or later. 628 4.7. CRL Extensions 630 The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The 631 following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be 632 present in a CRL. 634 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier 636 The authority key identifier extension provides a means of 637 identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to 638 sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier 639 method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 640 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 642 This extension is non-critical. 644 4.7.2. CRL Number 646 The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence 647 number of positive integers for a given CA. This extension allows 648 users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes another 649 CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs issued 650 by the CA within the scope of this profile. 652 This extension is non-critical. 654 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile 656 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile 658 This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to 659 Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, 660 formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority 661 as the initial step in issuing a certificate. 663 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 664 (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. 666 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 667 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 668 certificate. 670 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 672 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 673 that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo: 675 Version 676 This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0. 678 Subject 679 The CA SHOULD consider this name as the subject's suggestion, but 680 the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, as the subject name 681 MUST be unique per issuer in certificates issued by this issuer. 682 This field MAY be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a 683 subject name that is unique in the context of certificates issued 684 by this issuer. 686 SubjectPublicKeyInfo 687 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm 688 with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, 689 and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field 690 also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public 691 key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the 692 DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey. 694 Attributes 695 [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where 696 the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key. 698 The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest 699 attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3 700 Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate 701 requests is specified in Section 5.3. 703 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 704 that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object: 706 signatureAlgorithm 707 Must be SHA-256 with RSA encryption (sha256WithRSAEncryption). 708 Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be the OID value 709 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 711 5.2. CRMF Profile 713 This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) 714 specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates. 715 A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the 716 CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in 717 issuing a certificate. 719 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 720 (RA), acting under the direction of a subject. 722 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 723 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 724 certificate.. 726 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 728 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 729 that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: 731 Version 732 This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version 733 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted. 735 SerialNumber 736 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 737 omitted in this profile. 739 SigningAlgorithm 740 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 741 omitted in this profile. 743 Issuer 744 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 745 profile. 747 Validity 748 This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a 749 Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If 750 specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with 751 dates as determined by the CA. 753 Subject As the subject name is assigned by the CA, this field MAY be 754 omitted, in which case the subject name will be generated by the 755 CA. If specified, the CA SHOULD consider this as the subject's 756 suggestion, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion. 758 PublicKey 759 This field MUST be present. 761 extensions 762 This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The 763 profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in 764 Section 5.3. 766 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields 768 The following control fields are supported in this profile: 770 Authenticator Control 771 It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the 772 subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211] 773 is that the Authenticator Control field be used. 775 [Note - not for publication: The method of generation and 776 authentication of this field is not specified in this document. 777 It is assumed that the Certificate Issuer and subject have 778 securely exchanged credentials using some other mechanism and the 779 Authenticator Control shall reference these credentials. The 780 desirable properties include the ability to validate the subject 781 and the authenticity of the provided public key.] 783 Resource Class 784 The profile defines an additional control for Resource Certificate 785 Requests, namely a Resource Class control. 787 The Subject MUST specify a Resource Class value as specified by 788 the CA to which the request refers. The CA will issue a 789 certificate with the IP Address and AS Number resources that match 790 the subject's right-of-use of these resources within the class of 791 resources specified by the Resource Class control value. 793 [Note - not for publication: This specification of the resource 794 class is related the various forms of resource allocation which 795 imply that an entity may be the holder of resources with differing 796 validation dates and differing validation paths, even when the 797 entity is the recipient of resources allocated from a single 798 'upstream' issuing registry. Due to this consideration it may not 799 be possible to issue a single certificate with an all-encompassing 800 resource set. Alternatively it is possible to define a structure 801 where there is no Resource Class specified and the issuer issues a 802 set of spanning certificates for all resources held by the subject 803 (i.e. all resources that fall under the subject's "right-of-use")] 805 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests 807 This profile allows the following extensions to appear in a PKCS#10 808 and CRMF Certificate Request: 810 BasicConstraints 811 If this is omitted then this field is assigned by the CA. 813 The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource 814 Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this 815 profile. 817 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit 818 is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue 819 resource certificates within this overall framework. 821 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set of off (End Entity 822 certificate request). 824 SubjectKeyIdentifier 825 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 826 profile. 828 AuthorityKeyIdentifier 829 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 830 profile. 832 KeyUsage 833 The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and 834 CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the 835 BasicConstraints SubjectType subfield, when specified. 837 SubjectInformationAccess 838 This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA 839 issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit 840 set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning. 842 If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single 843 RSYNC URI that references a single publication point that will be 844 used by the subject for all certificates that published by the 845 subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the 846 CA. 848 If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning 849 then the CA MUST generate a URI value for the 850 SubjectInformationAccess field based on out-of-band information 851 that has been passed between the CA and the requester. 853 [Note not for publication - if this field is missing than it is 854 also an option for the Issuer to deny the request and not issue a 855 certificate if the issued certificate was to have the CA bit set.] 857 SubjectAlternateName 858 This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the 859 SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate. 861 CRLDistributionPoints 862 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 863 profile. 865 AuthorityInformationAccess 866 This field is assigned by the CA and MAY be omitted in this 867 profile. If specified the CA MAY choose to use this value as the 868 AIA field. 870 SubjectInformationAccess 871 This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA 872 issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit 873 set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning. 875 If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single 876 rsync URL that references a single publication point that will be 877 used by the subject for all certificates that published by the 878 subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the 879 CA. 881 If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning 882 then the CA MUST generate a SIA URL based on out-of-band 883 information that has been passed between the CA and the requester. 885 [Note not for publication - the same considerations with respect 886 to the CRL DistributionPoints apply to this field as well. i.e. if 887 this field is missing than it is also an option for the Issuer to 888 deny the request and not issue a certificate if the issued 889 certificate was to have the CA bit set.] 891 CertificatePolicies 892 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 893 profile. 895 SubjectAlternateName 896 This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the 897 SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate. 899 IPResources 900 This field is assigned by the CA if omitted by the requestor, and 901 shall be intereted as a request to certify all IP Resources 902 assigned to the requestor within the context of this CA. If 903 present, this is to be interepreted as the maximal set of IP 904 Resources to be certified by the CA, and the CA may reduce this to 905 the the certified IP Resource set based on the IP Resources 906 assigned to the request under this CA. 908 ASResources 909 This field is assigned by the CA if omitted by the requestor, and 910 shall be intereted as a request to certify all AS Resources 911 assigned to the requestor within the context of this CA. If 912 present, this is to be interepreted as the maximal set of AS 913 Resources to be certified by the CA, and the CA may reduce this to 914 the the certified IP Resource set based on the AS Resources 915 assigned to the request under this CA. 917 With the exception of the publicKey field, the CA is permitted to 918 alter any requested field. 920 6. Resource Certificate Validation 922 This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. 923 This refines the generic procedure described insection 6 of 924 [RFC3280]: 926 To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other 927 things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n 928 certificates) satisfies the following conditions: 930 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 931 issuer of certificate x+1; 933 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 935 3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and 937 4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid. 939 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates 941 The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate 942 framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number 943 resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top- 944 down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from 945 a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct 946 recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these 947 recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform 948 further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in 949 that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has 950 only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e. 951 there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and 952 corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct 953 or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in 954 question (i.e. no loops in the hierarchy). The only exception to the 955 "no loop" condition would be where a putative trust anchor may issue 956 a self-signed root certificate. 958 The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor is 959 a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the resource 960 certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of trust 961 models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional caveat on 962 the general applicability of trust models and PKIX frameworks, namely 963 that in forming a validation path to a trust anchor, the sequence of 964 certificates MUST preserve the resource extension validation 965 property, as described in Section 6.2. 967 6.2. Resource Extension Validation 969 The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical 970 extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded 971 representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a 972 prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. 974 Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS 975 number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource 976 Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This 977 validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource 978 sets: 980 more specific Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A 981 and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP 982 addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is 983 larger than range A. 985 equal Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, 986 A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same 987 collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B. 988 The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779]is equivalent to this 989 "equality" comparison. 990 encompass Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X 991 "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or 992 AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more 993 specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the 994 set X. 996 Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an 997 ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is a trust 998 anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the subject of 999 certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, implies that 1000 the resources described in certificate 'x', for 'x' is greater than 1001 1, "encompass" the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1. 1003 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation 1005 Validation of signed resource data using a target resource 1006 certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or 1007 'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a trust 1008 anchor, and 'n' is the target certificate) verifying that all of the 1009 following conditions hold: 1011 1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and 1012 the signature algorithm 1014 2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and 1015 To values. 1017 3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and 1018 contains field values as specified in this profile for all field 1019 values that MUST be present. 1021 4. No field value that MUST NOT be present is present in the 1022 certificate. 1024 5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the 1025 certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate 1026 Revocation List, and the CRL is itself valid. 1028 6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource 1029 extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer 1030 is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence) 1032 7. The Certificate Path originates at a trust anchor, and there 1033 exists a signing chain across the Certificate Path where the 1034 Subject of Certificate x in the Certificate Path matches the 1035 Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the Certificate Path. 1037 A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any 1038 chosen order. 1040 Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally 1041 maintained repository, maintained by a regular top-down 1042 synchronization pass from the Root Trust Anchors via reference to 1043 Issuer certificates and their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus 1044 the CRLDP. Alternatively, validation may be performed using a 1045 bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the AIA and 1046 CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process. 1048 There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that 1049 are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as 1050 means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. 1052 Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation 1053 process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts 1054 to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of 1055 Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if 1056 the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration 1057 parameter. 1059 7. Example Use Cases 1061 [1 - signing a Route Registry Object] [2 - signing a Route 1062 Origination Authority - note validity time] [3 - performing a 1063 resource (sub) allocation - An example of this in situations where 1064 there are contractual period differences between the entity and its 1065 resource supplier, and the entity and its resource allocation 1066 subjects.] 1068 8. Security Considerations 1070 [To be completed] 1072 9. IANA Considerations 1074 [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA 1075 considerations stated in this version of the document.] 1077 10. Acknowledgements 1079 The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from 1080 Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo 1081 Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of 1082 this document. 1084 11. Normative References 1086 [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, 1087 September 1981. 1089 [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and 1090 J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", 1091 BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. 1093 [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object 1094 Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, 1095 November 2000. 1097 [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification 1098 Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, 1099 November 2000. 1101 [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet 1102 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 1103 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, 1104 April 2002. 1106 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 1107 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 1109 [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 1110 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in 1111 the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 1112 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, 1113 June 2005. 1115 [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. 1116 Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 1117 Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005. 1119 [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 1120 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, 1121 September 2005. 1123 [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing 1124 Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. 1126 [rsync] Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006, 1127 . 1129 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate 1131 The following is an example Resource Certificate. 1133 Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer 1135 Data: 1136 Version: 3 1137 Serial: 3 1138 Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1139 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1140 E=ca@apnic.net 1141 Validity: 1143 Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT 1144 Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT 1145 Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources 1146 Subject Key Identifier: 1147 86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d: 1148 8b:97:49:14 1149 Subject Key Identifier g(SKI): 1150 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ 1151 Subject Public Key Info: 1152 Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 1153 RSA Public Key: Modulus: 1154 c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1: 1155 59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a: 1156 0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3: 1157 f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb: 1158 b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4: 1159 5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe: 1160 e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e: 1161 4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c: 1162 56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5: 1163 c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba: 1164 dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c: 1165 f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d: 1166 92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03: 1167 d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87: 1168 24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27: 1169 03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7 1170 RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537 1171 Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE 1172 Subject Info Access: 1173 caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1174 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1175 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1176 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ 1177 Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign 1178 CRL Distribution Points: 1179 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1180 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1181 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1182 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1183 Authority Info Access: caIssuers - 1184 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1185 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1186 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1187 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1188 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02: 1189 51:c2:a9:1c 1190 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1192 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1193 Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2 1194 IPv4: 202.12.27.0-202.12.29.255, 202.12.31.0/24, 1195 203.119.0.0/24, 203.119.42.0/23 1196 IPv6: 2001:dc0::/32 1197 ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370 1198 Signature: 1199 c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b: 1200 4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59: 1201 0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2: 1202 a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7: 1203 11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3: 1204 92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28: 1205 f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f: 1206 e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51: 1207 26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0: 1208 4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12: 1209 5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4: 1210 81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28: 1211 33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3: 1212 bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c: 1213 1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54: 1214 52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d 1216 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List 1218 The following is an example Certificate Revocation List. 1220 CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1222 Data: 1223 Version: 2 1224 Signature Algorithm: 1225 Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1226 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1227 E=ca@apnic.net 1228 This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1229 Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1230 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1231 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05: 1232 07:02:51:c2:a9:1c 1233 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1234 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1235 CRLNumber: 4 1236 Revoked Certificates: 1 1237 Serial Number: 1 1238 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT 1239 Serial Number: 2 1240 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT 1241 Serial Number: 4 1242 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT 1243 Signature: 1244 b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46: 1245 0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12: 1246 f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27: 1247 17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a: 1248 f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09: 1249 d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e: 1250 b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54: 1251 66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29: 1252 6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2: 1253 d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12: 1254 cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8: 1255 c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c: 1256 d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a: 1257 09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da: 1258 02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d: 1259 59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f: 1260 34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02: 1261 d9 1263 Authors' Addresses 1265 Geoff Huston 1266 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1268 Email: gih@apnic.net 1269 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1271 George Michaelson 1272 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1274 Email: ggm@apnic.net 1275 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1277 Robert Loomans 1278 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1280 Email: robertl@apnic.net 1281 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1283 Full Copyright Statement 1285 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 1287 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 1288 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 1289 retain all their rights. 1291 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an 1292 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS 1293 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND 1294 THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS 1295 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF 1296 THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED 1297 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 1299 Intellectual Property 1301 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 1302 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 1303 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 1304 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 1305 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 1306 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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