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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Internet Draft C. Adams 3 PKIX Working Group Entrust, Inc. 4 December, 2001 S. Farrell 5 Expires in 6 Months Baltimore Technologies 7 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 8 Certificate Management Protocols 9 11 Status of this Memo 13 This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with 14 all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. 16 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 17 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other 18 groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. 20 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 21 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 22 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 23 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 25 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 26 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt 28 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 31 This Internet-Draft will expire in June, 2002. Comments or 32 suggestions for improvement may be made on the "ietf-pkix" mailing 33 list, or directly to the authors. 35 Copyright Notice 37 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved. 39 Abstract 41 This document describes the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 42 (PKI) Certificate Management Protocols. Protocol messages are defined 43 for all relevant aspects of certificate creation and management. 44 Note that "certificate" in this document refers to an X.509v3 45 Certificate as defined in [COR95, X509-AM]. 47 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", 48 "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in uppercase, 49 as shown) are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. PKI Management Overview ............................................ 4 54 1.1 PKI Management Model ........................................... 4 55 1.2 Definitions of PKI Entities .................................... 4 56 1.3 PKI Management Requirements .................................... 6 57 1.4 PKI Management Operations ...................................... 8 59 2. Assumptions and Restrictions ....................................... 12 60 2.1 End Entity Initialization ...................................... 12 61 2.2 Initial Registration/Certification ............................. 12 62 2.3 Proof of Possession (POP) of Private Key ....................... 15 63 2.4 Root CA Key Update ............................................. 17 65 3. Data Structures .................................................... 21 66 3.1 Overall PKI Message ............................................ 21 67 3.2 Common Data Structures ......................................... 28 68 3.3 Operation-Specific Data Structures ............................. 38 69 3.3.1 Initialization Request ................................... 38 70 3.3.2 Initialization Response .................................. 38 71 3.3.3 Certification Request .................................... 38 72 3.3.4 Certification Response ................................... 39 73 3.3.5 Key Update Request ....................................... 40 74 3.3.6 Key Update Response ...................................... 40 75 3.3.7 Key Recovery Request ..................................... 40 76 3.3.8 Key Recovery Response .................................... 40 77 3.3.9 Revocation Request ....................................... 41 78 3.3.10 Revocation Response ...................................... 41 79 3.3.11 Cross-Certification Request .............................. 41 80 3.3.12 Cross-Certification Response ............................. 42 81 3.3.13 CA Key Update Announcement ............................... 42 82 3.3.14 Certificate Announcement ................................. 42 83 3.3.15 Revocation Announcement .................................. 42 84 3.3.16 CRL Announcement ......................................... 43 85 3.3.17 PKI Confirmation ......................................... 43 86 3.3.18 Certificate Confirmation ................................. 43 87 3.3.19 PKI General Message ...................................... 44 88 3.3.20 PKI General Response ..................................... 47 89 3.3.21 Error Message ............................................ 47 90 3.3.22 Polling Request and Response ............................. 47 92 4. Mandatory PKI Management Functions ................................. 49 93 4.1 Root CA Initialization ......................................... 49 94 4.2 Root CA Key Update ............................................. 50 95 4.3 Subordinate CA Initialization .................................. 50 96 4.4 CRL Production ................................................. 50 97 4.5 PKI Information Request ........................................ 50 98 4.6 Cross-Certification ............................................ 51 99 4.7 End Entity Initialization ...................................... 53 100 4.8 Certificate Request ............................................ 54 101 4.9 Key Update ..................................................... 54 103 5. Version Negotiation ................................................ 55 104 5.1 Supporting RFC 2510 Implementations ............................ 55 106 Security Considerations ............................................... 56 108 References ............................................................ 57 110 Acknowledgements ...................................................... 58 112 Authors' Addresses .................................................... 58 114 Appendix A: Reasons for the presence of RAs ........................... 59 115 Appendix B: PKI Management Message Profiles (REQUIRED) ................ 60 116 Appendix C: PKI Management Message Profiles (OPTIONAL) ................ 70 117 Appendix D: Request Message Behavioral Clarifications ................. 77 118 Appendix E: The Use of "Revocation Passphrase" ........................ 78 119 Appendix F: "Compilable" ASN.1 Module Using 1988 Syntax ............... 80 120 Appendix G: Registration of MIME Type for E-Mail or HTTP Use .......... 91 122 Full Copyright Statement .............................................. 92 124 1 PKI Management Overview 126 The PKI must be structured to be consistent with the types of 127 individuals who must administer it. Providing such administrators 128 with unbounded choices not only complicates the software required but 129 also increases the chances that a subtle mistake by an administrator 130 or software developer will result in broader compromise. Similarly, 131 restricting administrators with cumbersome mechanisms will cause them 132 not to use the PKI. 134 Management protocols are REQUIRED to support on-line interactions 135 between Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) components. For example, a 136 management protocol might be used between a Certification Authority 137 (CA) and a client system with which a key pair is associated, or 138 between two CAs that issue cross-certificates for each other. 140 1.1 PKI Management Model 142 Before specifying particular message formats and procedures we first 143 define the entities involved in PKI management and their interactions 144 (in terms of the PKI management functions required). We then group 145 these functions in order to accommodate different identifiable types 146 of end entities. 148 1.2 Definitions of PKI Entities 150 The entities involved in PKI management include the end entity (i.e., 151 the entity to whom the certificate is issued) and the 152 certification authority (i.e., the entity that issues the certificate). 153 A registration authority MAY also be involved in PKI management. 155 1.2.1 Subjects and End Entities 157 The term "subject" is used here to refer to the entity to whom the 158 certificate is issued, typically named in the subject or 159 subjectAltName field of a certificate. When we wish to distinguish the 160 tools and/or software used by the subject (e.g., a local certificate 161 management module) we will use the term "subject equipment". In 162 general, the term "end entity" (EE) rather than subject is preferred 163 in order to avoid confusion with the field name. 165 It is important to note that the end entities here will include not 166 only human users of applications, but also applications themselves 167 (e.g., for IP security). This factor influences the protocols which 168 the PKI management operations use; for example, application software 169 is far more likely to know exactly which certificate extensions are 170 required than are human users. PKI management entities are also end 171 entities in the sense that they are sometimes named in the subject or 172 subjectAltName field of a certificate or cross-certificate. Where 174 appropriate, the term "end-entity" will be used to refer to end 175 entities who are not PKI management entities. 177 All end entities require secure local access to some information -- 178 at a minimum, their own name and private key, the name of a CA which 179 is directly trusted by this entity and that CA's public key (or a 180 fingerprint of the public key where a self-certified version is 181 available elsewhere). Implementations MAY use secure local storage 182 for more than this minimum (e.g., the end entity's own certificate or 183 application-specific information). The form of storage will also vary 184 -- from files to tamper-resistant cryptographic tokens. Such local 185 trusted storage is referred to here as the end entity's Personal 186 Security Environment (PSE). 188 Though PSE formats are beyond the scope of this document (they are 189 very dependent on equipment, et cetera), a generic interchange format 190 for PSEs is defined here - a certification response message MAY be 191 used. 193 1.2.2 Certification Authority 195 The certification authority (CA) may or may not actually be a real 196 "third party" from the end entity's point of view. Quite often, the 197 CA will actually belong to the same organization as the end entities 198 it supports. 200 Again, we use the term CA to refer to the entity named in the issuer 201 field of a certificate; when it is necessary to distinguish the 202 software or hardware tools used by the CA we use the term "CA 203 equipment". 205 The CA equipment will often include both an "off-line" component and 206 an "on-line" component, with the CA private key only available to the 207 "off-line" component. This is, however, a matter for implementers 208 (though it is also relevant as a policy issue). 210 We use the term "root CA" to indicate a CA that is directly trusted 211 by an end entity; that is, securely acquiring the value of a root CA 212 public key requires some out-of-band step(s). This term is not meant 213 to imply that a root CA is necessarily at the top of any hierarchy, 214 simply that the CA in question is trusted directly. 216 A "subordinate CA" is one that is not a root CA for the end entity in 217 question. Often, a subordinate CA will not be a root CA for any 218 entity but this is not mandatory. 220 1.2.3 Registration Authority 222 In addition to end-entities and CAs, many environments call for the 223 existence of a Registration Authority (RA) separate from the 224 Certification Authority. The functions which the registration 225 authority may carry out will vary from case to case but MAY include 226 personal authentication, token distribution, revocation reporting, 227 name assignment, key generation, archival of key pairs, et cetera. 229 This document views the RA as an OPTIONAL component - when it is not 230 present the CA is assumed to be able to carry out the RA's functions 231 so that the PKI management protocols are the same from the end- 232 entity's point of view. 234 Again, we distinguish, where necessary, between the RA and the tools 235 used (the "RA equipment"). 237 Note that an RA is itself an end entity. We further assume that all 238 RAs are in fact certified end entities and that RAs have private keys 239 that are usable for signing. How a particular CA equipment identifies 240 some end entities as RAs is an implementation issue (i.e., this 241 document specifies no special RA certification operation). We do not 242 mandate that the RA is certified by the CA with which it is 243 interacting at the moment (so one RA may work with more than one CA 244 whilst only being certified once). 246 In some circumstances end entities will communicate directly with a 247 CA even where an RA is present. For example, for initial registration 248 and/or certification the subject may use its RA, but communicate 249 directly with the CA in order to refresh its certificate. 251 1.3 PKI Management Requirements 253 The protocols given here meet the following requirements on PKI 254 management. 256 1. PKI management must conform to the ISO 9594-8 standard and the 257 associated amendments (certificate extensions) 259 2. PKI management must conform to the other parts of this series. 261 3. It must be possible to regularly update any key pair without 262 affecting any other key pair. 264 4. The use of confidentiality in PKI management protocols must be 265 kept to a minimum in order to ease regulatory problems. 267 5. PKI management protocols must allow the use of different 268 industry-standard cryptographic algorithms, (specifically 269 including RSA, DSA, MD5, SHA-1) -- this means that any given 270 CA, RA, or end entity may, in principle, use whichever 271 algorithms suit it for its own key pair(s). 273 6. PKI management protocols must not preclude the generation of 274 key pairs by the end-entity concerned, by an RA, or by a CA -- 275 key generation may also occur elsewhere, but for the purposes 276 of PKI management we can regard key generation as occurring 277 wherever the key is first present at an end entity, RA, or CA. 279 7. PKI management protocols must support the publication of 280 certificates by the end-entity concerned, by an RA, or by a CA. 281 Different implementations and different environments may choose 282 any of the above approaches. 284 8. PKI management protocols must support the production of 285 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) by allowing certified end 286 entities to make requests for the revocation of certificates - 287 this must be done in such a way that the denial-of-service 288 attacks which are possible are not made simpler. 290 9. PKI management protocols must be usable over a variety of 291 "transport" mechanisms, specifically including mail, http, 292 TCP/IP and ftp. 294 10. Final authority for certification creation rests with the CA; 295 no RA or end-entity equipment can assume that any certificate 296 issued by a CA will contain what was requested -- a CA may 297 alter certificate field values or may add, delete or alter 298 extensions according to its operating policy. In other words, 299 all PKI entities (end-entities, RAs, and CAs) must be capable 300 of handling responses to requests for certificates in which 301 the actual certificate issued is different from that requested 302 (for example, a CA may shorten the validity period requested). 303 Note that policy may dictate that the CA must not publish or 304 otherwise distribute the certificate until the requesting 305 entity has reviewed and accepted the newly-created certificate 306 (typically through use of the certConf message). 308 11. A graceful, scheduled change-over from one non-compromised CA 309 key pair to the next (CA key update) must be supported (note 310 that if the CA key is compromised, re-initialization must be 311 performed for all entities in the domain of that CA). An end 312 entity whose PSE contains the new CA public key (following a 313 CA key update) must also be able to verify certificates 314 verifiable using the old public key. End entities who directly 316 trust the old CA key pair must also be able to verify 317 certificates signed using the new CA private key. (Required 318 for situations where the old CA public key is "hardwired" into 319 the end entity's cryptographic equipment). 321 12. The Functions of an RA may, in some implementations or 322 environments, be carried out by the CA itself. The protocols 323 must be designed so that end entities will use the same 324 protocol (but, of course, not the same key!) regardless of 325 whether the communication is with an RA or CA. 327 13. Where an end entity requests a certificate containing a given 328 public key value, the end entity must be ready to demonstrate 329 possession of the corresponding private key value. This may be 330 accomplished in various ways, depending on the type of 331 certification request. See Section 2.3, "Proof of Possession 332 of Private Key", for details of the in-band methods defined 333 for the PKIX-CMP (i.e., Certificate Management Protocol) 334 messages. 336 1.4 PKI Management Operations 338 The following diagram shows the relationship between the entities 339 defined above in terms of the PKI management operations. The letters 340 in the diagram indicate "protocols" in the sense that a defined set 341 of PKI management messages can be sent along each of the lettered 342 lines. 344 +---+ cert. publish +------------+ j 345 | | <--------------------- | End Entity | <------- 346 | C | g +------------+ "out-of-band" 347 | e | | ^ loading 348 | r | | | initial 349 | t | a | | b registration/ 350 | | | | certification 351 | / | | | key pair recovery 352 | | | | key pair update 353 | C | | | certificate update 354 | R | PKI "USERS" V | revocation request 355 | L | -------------------+-+-----+-+------+-+------------------- 356 | | PKI MANAGEMENT | ^ | ^ 357 | | ENTITIES a | | b a | | b 358 | R | V | | | 359 | e | g +------+ d | | 360 | p | <------------ | RA | <-----+ | | 361 | o | cert. | | ----+ | | | 362 | s | publish +------+ c | | | | 363 | i | | | | | 364 | t | V | V | 365 | o | g +------------+ i 366 | r | <------------------------| CA |-------> 367 | y | h +------------+ "out-of-band" 368 | | cert. publish | ^ publication 369 | | CRL publish | | 370 +---+ | | cross-certification 371 e | | f cross-certificate 372 | | update 373 | | 374 V | 375 +------+ 376 | CA-2 | 377 +------+ 379 Figure 1 - PKI Entities 381 At a high level the set of operations for which management messages 382 are defined can be grouped as follows. 384 1 CA establishment: When establishing a new CA, certain steps are 385 required (e.g., production of initial CRLs, export of CA public 386 key). 388 2 End entity initialization: this includes importing a root CA 389 public key and requesting information about the options 390 supported by a PKI management entity. 392 3 Certification: various operations result in the creation of new 393 certificates: 395 3.1 initial registration/certification: This is the process 396 whereby an end entity first makes itself known to a CA or 397 RA, prior to the CA issuing a certificate or certificates 398 for that end entity. The end result of this process (when it 399 is successful) is that a CA issues a certificate for an end 400 entity's public key, and returns that certificate to the end 401 entity and/or posts that certificate in a public repository. 402 This process may, and typically will, involve multiple 403 "steps", possibly including an initialization of the end 404 entity's equipment. For example, the end entity's equipment 405 must be securely initialized with the public key of a CA, to 406 be used in validating certificate paths. Furthermore, an 407 end entity typically needs to be initialized with its own 408 key pair(s). 410 3.2 key pair update: Every key pair needs to be updated 411 regularly (i.e., replaced with a new key pair), and a new 412 certificate needs to be issued. 414 3.3 certificate update: As certificates expire they may be 415 "refreshed" if nothing relevant in the environment has 416 changed. 418 3.4 CA key pair update: As with end entities, CA key pairs need 419 to be updated regularly; however, different mechanisms are 420 required. 422 3.5 cross-certification request: One CA requests issuance of a 423 cross-certificate from another CA. For the purposes of this 424 standard, the following terms are defined. A "cross- 425 certificate" is a certificate in which the subject CA and 426 the issuer CA are distinct and SubjectPublicKeyInfo contains 427 a verification key (i.e., the certificate has been issued 428 for the subject CA's signing key pair). When it is 429 necessary to distinguish more finely, the following terms 430 may be used: a cross-certificate is called an "inter-domain 431 cross-certificate" if the subject and issuer CAs belong to 432 different administrative domains; it is called an "intra- 433 domain cross-certificate" otherwise. 435 Notes: 437 Note 1. The above definition of "cross-certificate" aligns 438 with the defined term "CA-certificate" in X.509. Note that 439 this term is not to be confused with the X.500 "cACertificate" 440 attribute type, which is unrelated. 442 Note 2. In many environments the term "cross-certificate", 443 unless further qualified, will be understood to be synonymous 444 with "inter-domain cross-certificate" as defined above. 446 Note 3. Issuance of cross-certificates may be, but is not 447 necessarily, mutual; that is, two CAs may issue 448 cross-certificates for each other. 450 3.6 cross-certificate update: Similar to a normal certificate 451 update but involving a cross-certificate. 453 4 Certificate/CRL discovery operations: some PKI management 454 operations result in the publication of certificates or CRLs: 456 4.1 certificate publication: Having gone to the trouble of 457 producing a certificate, some means for publishing it is 458 needed. The "means" defined in PKIX MAY involve the 459 messages specified in Sections 3.3.13 - 3.3.16, or MAY 460 involve other methods (LDAP, for example) as described in 461 [RFC2559, RFC2585] (the "Operational Protocols" documents 462 of the PKIX series of specifications). 464 4.2 CRL publication: As for certificate publication. 466 5 Recovery operations: some PKI management operations are used 467 when an end entity has "lost" its PSE: 469 5.1 key pair recovery: As an option, user client key materials 470 (e.g., a user's private key used for decryption purposes) 471 MAY be backed up by a CA, an RA, or a key backup system 472 associated with a CA or RA. If an entity needs to recover 473 these backed up key materials (e.g., as a result of a 474 forgotten password or a lost key chain file), a protocol 475 exchange may be needed to support such recovery. 477 6 Revocation operations: some PKI operations result in the 478 creation of new CRL entries and/or new CRLs: 480 6.1 revocation request: An authorized person advises a CA of an 481 abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation. 483 7 PSE operations: whilst the definition of PSE operations (e.g., 484 moving a PSE, changing a PIN, etc.) are beyond the scope of this 485 specification, we do define a PKIMessage (CertRepMessage) which 486 can form the basis of such operations. 488 Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the 489 above operations. For all operations there are off-line methods of 490 achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate 491 use of on-line protocols. For example, when hardware tokens are 492 used, many of the operations MAY be achieved as part of the physical 493 token delivery. 495 Later sections define a set of standard messages supporting the above 496 operations. Transport protocols for conveying these exchanges in 497 different environments (file based, on-line, E-mail, and WWW) are 498 beyond the scope of this document and are specified separately. 500 2. Assumptions and restrictions 502 2.1 End entity initialization 504 The first step for an end entity in dealing with PKI management 505 entities is to request information about the PKI functions supported 506 and to securely acquire a copy of the relevant root CA public key(s). 508 2.2 Initial registration/certification 510 There are many schemes that can be used to achieve initial 511 registration and certification of end entities. No one method is 512 suitable for all situations due to the range of policies which a CA 513 may implement and the variation in the types of end entity which can 514 occur. 516 We can however, classify the initial registration / certification 517 schemes that are supported by this specification. Note that the word 518 "initial", above, is crucial - we are dealing with the situation 519 where the end entity in question has had no previous contact with the 520 PKI. Where the end entity already possesses certified keys then some 521 simplifications/alternatives are possible. 523 Having classified the schemes that are supported by this 524 specification we can then specify some as mandatory and some as 525 optional. The goal is that the mandatory schemes cover a sufficient 526 number of the cases which will arise in real use, whilst the optional 527 schemes are available for special cases which arise less frequently. 528 In this way we achieve a balance between flexibility and ease of 529 implementation. 531 We will now describe the classification of initial registration / 532 certification schemes. 534 2.2.1 Criteria used 536 2.2.1.1 Initiation of registration / certification 538 In terms of the PKI messages which are produced we can regard the 539 initiation of the initial registration / certification exchanges as 540 occurring wherever the first PKI message relating to the end entity 541 is produced. Note that the real-world initiation of the registration 542 / certification procedure may occur elsewhere (e.g., a personnel 543 department may telephone an RA operator). 545 The possible locations are at the end entity, an RA, or a CA. 547 2.2.1.2 End entity message origin authentication 549 The on-line messages produced by the end entity that requires a 550 certificate may be authenticated or not. The requirement here is to 551 authenticate the origin of any messages from the end entity to the 552 PKI (CA/RA). 554 In this specification, such authentication is achieved by the PKI 555 (CA/RA) issuing the end entity with a secret value (initial 556 authentication key) and reference value (used to identify the 557 secret value) via some out-of-band means. The initial authentication 558 key can then be used to protect relevant PKI messages. 560 We can thus classify the initial registration/certification scheme 561 according to whether or not the on-line end entity -> PKI messages 562 are authenticated or not. 564 Note 1: We do not discuss the authentication of the PKI -> end entity 565 messages here as this is always REQUIRED. In any case, it can be 566 achieved simply once the root-CA public key has been installed at the 567 end entity's equipment or it can be based on the initial 568 authentication key. 570 Note 2: An initial registration / certification procedure can be 571 secure where the messages from the end entity are authenticated via 572 some out- of-band means (e.g., a subsequent visit). 574 2.2.1.3 Location of key generation 576 In this specification, "key generation" is regarded as occurring 577 wherever either the public or private component of a key pair first 578 occurs in a PKIMessage. Note that this does not preclude a 580 centralized key generation service - the actual key pair MAY have 581 been generated elsewhere and transported to the end entity, RA, or CA 582 using a (proprietary or standardized) key generation request/response 583 protocol (outside the scope of this specification). 585 There are thus three possibilities for the location of "key 586 generation": the end entity, an RA, or a CA. 588 2.2.1.4 Confirmation of successful certification 590 Following the creation of an initial certificate for an end entity, 591 additional assurance can be gained by having the end entity 592 explicitly confirm successful receipt of the message containing (or 593 indicating the creation of) the certificate. Naturally, this 594 confirmation message must be protected (based on the initial 595 authentication key or other means). 597 This gives two further possibilities: confirmed or not. 599 2.2.2 Mandatory schemes 601 The criteria above allow for a large number of initial registration / 602 certification schemes. This specification mandates that conforming CA 603 equipment, RA equipment, and EE equipment MUST support the second 604 scheme listed below. Any entity MAY additionally support other 605 schemes, if desired. 607 2.2.2.1 Centralized scheme 609 In terms of the classification above, this scheme is, in some ways, 610 the simplest possible, where: 612 - initiation occurs at the certifying CA; 613 - no on-line message authentication is required; 614 - "key generation" occurs at the certifying CA (see Section 2.2.1.3); 615 - no confirmation message is required. 617 In terms of message flow, this scheme means that the only message 618 required is sent from the CA to the end entity. The message must 619 contain the entire PSE for the end entity. Some out-of-band means 620 must be provided to allow the end entity to authenticate the message 621 received and decrypt any encrypted values. 623 2.2.2.2 Basic authenticated scheme 625 In terms of the classification above, this scheme is where: 627 - initiation occurs at the end entity; 628 - message authentication is REQUIRED; 629 - "key generation" occurs at the end entity (see Section 2.2.1.3); 630 - a confirmation message is REQUIRED. 632 In terms of message flow, the basic authenticated scheme is as 633 follows: 635 End entity RA/CA 636 ========== ============= 637 out-of-band distribution of Initial Authentication 638 Key (IAK) and reference value (RA/CA -> EE) 639 Key generation 640 Creation of certification request 641 Protect request with IAK 642 -->>--certification request-->>-- 643 verify request 644 process request 645 create response 646 --<<--certification response--<<-- 647 handle response 648 create confirmation 649 -->>--cert conf message-->>-- 650 verify confirmation 651 create response 652 --<<-- conf ack (optional) --<<-- 653 handle response 655 (Where verification of the cert confirmation message fails, the RA/CA 656 MUST revoke the newly issued certificate if it has been published or 657 otherwise made available.) 659 2.3 Proof of Possession (POP) of Private Key 661 In order to prevent certain attacks and to allow a CA/RA to properly 662 check the validity of the binding between an end entity and a key 663 pair, the PKI management operations specified here make it possible 664 for an end entity to prove that it has possession of (i.e., is able 665 to use) the private key corresponding to the public key for which a 666 certificate is requested. A given CA/RA is free to choose how to 667 enforce POP (e.g., out-of-band procedural means versus PKIX-CMP in- 668 band messages) in its certification exchanges (i.e., this may be a 669 policy issue). However, it is REQUIRED that CAs/RAs MUST enforce POP 670 by some means because there are currently many non-PKIX operational 671 protocols in use (various electronic mail protocols are one example) 672 that do not explicitly check the binding between the end entity and 673 the private key. Until operational protocols that do verify the 675 binding (for signature, encryption, and key agreement key pairs) 676 exist, and are ubiquitous, this binding can only be assumed to have 677 been verified by the CA/RA. Therefore, if the binding is not verified 678 by the CA/RA, certificates in the Internet Public-Key Infrastructure 679 end up being somewhat less meaningful. 681 POP is accomplished in different ways depending upon the type of key 682 for which a certificate is requested. If a key can be used for 683 multiple purposes (e.g., an RSA key) then any appropriate method MAY 684 be used (e.g., a key which may be used for signing, as well as other 685 purposes, SHOULD NOT be sent to the CA/RA in order to prove 686 possession). 688 This specification explicitly allows for cases where an end entity 689 supplies the relevant proof to an RA and the RA subsequently attests 690 to the CA that the required proof has been received (and validated!). 691 For example, an end entity wishing to have a signing key certified 692 could send the appropriate signature to the RA which then simply 693 notifies the relevant CA that the end entity has supplied the 694 required proof. Of course, such a situation may be disallowed by some 695 policies (e.g., CAs may be the only entities permitted to verify POP 696 during certification). 698 2.3.1 Signature Keys 700 For signature keys, the end entity can sign a value to prove 701 possession of the private key. 703 2.3.2 Encryption Keys 705 For encryption keys, the end entity can provide the private key to 706 the CA/RA, or can be required to decrypt a value in order to prove 707 possession of the private key (see Section 3.2.8). Decrypting a value 708 can be achieved either directly or indirectly. 710 The direct method is for the RA/CA to issue a random challenge to 711 which an immediate response by the EE is required. 713 The indirect method is to issue a certificate which is encrypted for 714 the end entity (and have the end entity demonstrate its ability to 715 decrypt this certificate in the confirmation message). This allows a 716 CA to issue a certificate in a form which can only be used by the 717 intended end entity. 719 This specification encourages use of the indirect method because this 720 requires no extra messages to be sent (i.e., the proof can be 721 demonstrated using the {request, response, confirmation} triple of 722 messages). 724 2.3.3 Key Agreement Keys 726 For key agreement keys, the end entity and the PKI management entity 727 (i.e., CA or RA) must establish a shared secret key in order to prove 728 that the end entity has possession of the private key. 730 Note that this need not impose any restrictions on the keys that can 731 be certified by a given CA -- in particular, for Diffie-Hellman keys 732 the end entity may freely choose its algorithm parameters -- provided 733 that the CA can generate a short-term (or one-time) key pair with the 734 appropriate parameters when necessary. 736 2.4 Root CA key update 738 This discussion only applies to CAs that are a root CA for some end 739 entity. 741 The basis of the procedure described here is that the CA protects its 742 new public key using its previous private key and vice versa. Thus 743 when a CA updates its key pair it must generate two extra 744 cACertificate attribute values if certificates are made available 745 using an X.500 directory (for a total of four: OldWithOld; 746 OldWithNew; NewWithOld; and NewWithNew). 748 When a CA changes its key pair those entities who have acquired the 749 old CA public key via "out-of-band" means are most affected. It is 750 these end entities who will need access to the new CA public key 751 protected with the old CA private key. However, they will only 752 require this for a limited period (until they have acquired the new 753 CA public key via the "out-of-band" mechanism). This will typically 754 be easily achieved when these end entities' certificates expire. 756 The data structure used to protect the new and old CA public keys is 757 a standard certificate (which may also contain extensions). There are 758 no new data structures required. 760 Note 1. This scheme does not make use of any of the X.509 v3 761 extensions as it must be able to work even for version 1 762 certificates. The presence of the KeyIdentifier extension would make 763 for efficiency improvements. 765 Note 2. While the scheme could be generalized to cover cases where 766 the CA updates its key pair more than once during the validity period 767 of one of its end entities' certificates, this generalization seems 768 of dubious value. Not having this generalization simply means that 769 the validity period of a CA key pair must be greater than the 770 validity period of any certificate issued by that CA using that key 771 pair. 773 Note 3. This scheme ensures that end entities will acquire the new CA 774 public key, at the latest by the expiry of the last certificate they 775 owned that was signed with the old CA private key (via the 776 "out-of-band" means). Certificate and/or key update operations 777 occurring at other times do not necessarily require this (depending on 778 the end entity's equipment). 780 2.4.1 CA Operator actions 782 To change the key of the CA, the CA operator does the following: 784 1. Generate a new key pair; 786 2. Create a certificate containing the old CA public key signed 787 with the new private key (the "old with new" certificate); 789 3. Create a certificate containing the new CA public key signed 790 with the old private key (the "new with old" certificate); 792 4. Create a certificate containing the new CA public key signed 793 with the new private key (the "new with new" certificate); 795 5. Publish these new certificates via the repository and/or other 796 means (perhaps using a CAKeyUpdAnn message); 798 6. Export the new CA public key so that end entities may acquire 799 it using the "out-of-band" mechanism (if required). 801 The old CA private key is then no longer required. The old CA public 802 key will however remain in use for some time. The time when the old 803 CA public key is no longer required (other than for non-repudiation) 804 will be when all end entities of this CA have securely acquired the 805 new CA public key. 807 The "old with new" certificate must have a validity period starting 808 at the generation time of the old key pair and ending at the expiry 809 date of the old public key. 811 The "new with old" certificate must have a validity period starting 812 at the generation time of the new key pair and ending at the time by 813 which all end entities of this CA will securely possess the new CA 814 public key (at the latest, the expiry date of the old public key). 816 The "new with new" certificate must have a validity period starting 817 at the generation time of the new key pair and ending at or before the 818 time by which the CA will next update its key pair. 820 2.4.2 Verifying Certificates. 822 Normally when verifying a signature, the verifier verifies (among 823 other things) the certificate containing the public key of the 824 signer. However, once a CA is allowed to update its key there are a 825 range of new possibilities. These are shown in the table below. 827 Repository contains NEW Repository contains only OLD 828 and OLD public keys public key (due to, e.g., 829 delay in publication) 831 PSE PSE Contains PSE Contains PSE Contains 832 Contains OLD public NEW public OLD public 833 NEW public key key key 834 key 836 Signer's Case 1: Case 3: Case 5: Case 7: 837 certifi- This is In this case Although the In this case 838 cate is the the verifier CA operator the CA 839 protected standard must access has not operator has 840 using NEW case where the updated the not updated 841 public the repository in repository the the repository 842 key verifier order to get verifier can and so the 843 can the value of verify the verification 844 directly the NEW certificate will FAIL 845 verify the public key directly - 846 certificate this is thus 847 without the same as 848 using the case 1. 849 repository 851 Signer's Case 2: Case 4: Case 6: Case 8: 852 certifi- In this In this case The verifier Although the 853 cate is case the the verifier thinks this CA operator 854 protected verifier can directly is the has not 855 using OLD must verify the situation of updated the 856 public access the certificate case 2 and repository the 857 key repository without will access verifier can 858 in order using the the verify the 859 to get the repository repository; certificate 860 value of however, the directly - 861 the OLD verification this is thus 862 public key will FAIL the same as 863 case 4. 865 2.4.2.1 Verification in cases 1, 4, 5 and 8. 867 In these cases the verifier has a local copy of the CA public key 868 which can be used to verify the certificate directly. This is the 869 same as the situation where no key change has occurred. 871 Note that case 8 may arise between the time when the CA operator has 872 generated the new key pair and the time when the CA operator stores 873 the updated attributes in the repository. Case 5 can only arise if the 874 CA operator has issued both the signer's and verifier's certificates 875 during this "gap" (the CA operator SHOULD avoid this as it leads to 876 the failure cases described below). 878 2.4.2.2 Verification in case 2. 880 In case 2 the verifier must get access to the old public key of the 881 CA. The verifier does the following: 883 1. Look up the caCertificate attribute in the repository and pick 884 the OldWithNew certificate (determined based on validity 885 periods; note that the subject and issuer fields must match); 886 2. Verify that this is correct using the new CA key (which the 887 verifier has locally); 888 3. If correct, check the signer's certificate using the old CA 889 key. 891 Case 2 will arise when the CA operator has issued the signer's 892 certificate, then changed key and then issued the verifier's 893 certificate, so it is quite a typical case. 895 2.4.2.3 Verification in case 3. 897 In case 3 the verifier must get access to the new public key of the 898 CA. The verifier does the following: 900 1. Look up the CACertificate attribute in the repository and pick 901 the NewWithOld certificate (determined based on validity 902 periods; note that the subject and issuer fields must match); 903 2. Verify that this is correct using the old CA key (which the 904 verifier has stored locally); 905 3. If correct, check the signer's certificate using the new CA 906 key. 908 Case 3 will arise when the CA operator has issued the verifier's 909 certificate, then changed key and then issued the signer's 910 certificate, so it is also quite a typical case. 912 2.4.2.4 Failure of verification in case 6. 914 In this case the CA has issued the verifier's PSE containing the new 915 key without updating the repository attributes. This means that the 916 verifier has no means to get a trustworthy version of the CA's old 917 key and so verification fails. 919 Note that the failure is the CA operator's fault. 921 2.4.2.5 Failure of verification in case 7. 923 In this case the CA has issued the signer's certificate protected 924 with the new key without updating the repository attributes. This 925 means that the verifier has no means to get a trustworthy version of 926 the CA's new key and so verification fails. 928 Note that the failure is again the CA operator's fault. 930 2.4.3 Revocation - Change of CA key 932 As we saw above the verification of a certificate becomes more 933 complex once the CA is allowed to change its key. This is also true 934 for revocation checks as the CA may have signed the CRL using a newer 935 private key than the one that is within the user's PSE. 937 The analysis of the alternatives is as for certificate verification. 939 3. Data Structures 941 This section contains descriptions of the data structures required 942 for PKI management messages. Section 4 describes constraints on their 943 values and the sequence of events for each of the various PKI 944 management operations. 946 3.1 Overall PKI Message 948 All of the messages used in this specification for the purposes of 949 PKI management use the following structure: 951 PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 952 header PKIHeader, 953 body PKIBody, 954 protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, 955 extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate OPTIONAL 956 } 958 PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage 960 The PKIHeader contains information which is common to many PKI 961 messages. 963 The PKIBody contains message-specific information. 965 The PKIProtection, when used, contains bits that protect the PKI 966 message. 968 The extraCerts field can contain certificates that may be useful to 969 the recipient. For example, this can be used by a CA or RA to present 970 an end entity with certificates that it needs to verify its own new 971 certificate (if, for example, the CA that issued the end entity's 972 certificate is not a root CA for the end entity). Note that this 973 field does not necessarily contain a certification path - the 974 recipient may have to sort, select from, or otherwise process the 975 extra certificates in order to use them. 977 3.1.1 PKI Message Header 979 All PKI messages require some header information for addressing and 980 transaction identification. Some of this information will also be 981 present in a transport-specific envelope; however, if the PKI message 982 is protected then this information is also protected (i.e., we make 983 no assumption about secure transport). 985 The following data structure is used to contain this information: 987 PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { 988 pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2) }, 989 sender GeneralName, 990 -- identifies the sender 991 recipient GeneralName, 992 -- identifies the intended recipient 993 messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, 994 -- time of production of this message (used when sender 995 -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e., 996 -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt) 997 protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 998 -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits 999 senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, 1000 recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, 1001 -- to identify specific keys used for protection 1002 transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 1003 -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in 1004 -- corresponding request, response and confirmation messages 1005 senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 1006 recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 1007 -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce 1009 -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce 1010 -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by 1011 -- the intended recipient of this message 1012 freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, 1013 -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions 1014 -- (this field is intended for human consumption) 1015 generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 1016 InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL 1017 -- this may be used to convey context-specific information 1018 -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) 1019 } 1021 PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String 1022 -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC2279] (note: each UTF8String 1023 -- MAY include an RFC 1766/RFC 3066 language tag to indicate the 1024 -- language of the contained text -- see [RFC2482] for details) 1026 The pvno field is fixed (at 2) for this version of this 1027 specification. 1029 The sender field contains the name of the sender of the PKIMessage. 1030 This name (in conjunction with senderKID, if supplied) should be 1031 sufficient to indicate the key to use to verify the protection on the 1032 message. If nothing about the sender is known to the sending entity 1033 (e.g., in the init. req. message, where the end entity may not know 1034 its own Distinguished Name (DN), e-mail name, IP address, etc.), then 1035 the "sender" field MUST contain a "NULL" value; that is, the 1036 SEQUENCE OF relative distinguished names is of zero length. In such a 1037 case the senderKID field MUST hold an identifier (i.e., a reference 1038 number) which indicates to the receiver the appropriate shared secret 1039 information to use to verify the message. 1041 The recipient field contains the name of the recipient of the 1042 PKIMessage. This name (in conjunction with recipKID, if supplied) 1043 should be usable to verify the protection on the message. 1045 The protectionAlg field specifies the algorithm used to protect the 1046 message. If no protection bits are supplied (note that PKIProtection 1047 is OPTIONAL) then this field MUST be omitted; if protection bits are 1048 supplied then this field MUST be supplied. 1050 senderKID and recipKID are usable to indicate which keys have been 1051 used to protect the message (recipKID will normally only be required 1052 where protection of the message uses Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys). 1053 These fields MUST be used if required to uniquely identify a key 1054 (e.g., if more than one key is associated with a given sender name) 1055 and SHOULD be omitted otherwise. 1057 The transactionID field within the message header is to be used to 1058 allow the recipient of a message to correlate this with an ongoing 1059 transaction. This is needed for all transactions that consist of 1060 more than just a single request/response pair. For transactions that 1061 consist of a single request/response pair the rules are as follows. 1062 A client MAY populate the transactionID field of the request. If a 1063 server receives such a request which has the transactionID field set, 1064 then it MUST set the transactionID field of the response to the same 1065 value; if a server receives such request with a missing transactionID 1066 field then it MAY set transactionID field of the response. 1068 For transactions that consist of more than just a single 1069 request/response pair the rules are as follows. Clients SHOULD 1070 generate a transactionID for the first request. If a server receives 1071 such a request which has the transactionID field set, then it MUST set 1072 the transactionID field of the response to the same value; if a server 1073 receives such request with a missing transactionID field then it MUST 1074 populate transactionID field of the response with a server-generated 1075 ID. Subsequent requests and responses MUST all set the transactionID 1076 field to the thus established value. In all cases where a 1077 transactionID is being used, a given client MUST NOT have more than 1078 one transaction with the same transactionID in progress at any time 1079 (to a given server). Servers are free to require uniqueness of the 1080 transactionID or not, as long as they are able to correctly associate 1081 messages with the corresponding transaction. Typically this means 1082 that a server will require the {client, transactionID} tuple to be 1083 unique, or even the transactionID alone to be unique if it cannot 1084 distinguish clients based on transport level information. A server 1085 receiving the first message of a transaction (which requires more than 1086 a single request/response pair) that contains a transactionID that 1087 does not allow it to meet the above constraints (typically because 1088 the transactionID is already in use) MUST send back an 1089 ErrorMsgContent with a PKIFailureInfo of transactionIdInUse. It is 1090 RECOMMENDED that the clients fill the transactionID field with 128 bits 1091 of (pseudo-) random data for the start of a transaction to reduce the 1092 probability of having the transactionID in use at the server. 1094 The senderNonce and recipNonce fields protect the PKIMessage against 1095 replay attacks. The senderNonce will typically be 128 bits of 1096 (pseudo-) random data generated by the sender, whereas the recipNonce 1097 is copied from the senderNonce of the previous message in the 1098 transaction. 1100 The messageTime field contains the time at which the sender created 1101 the message. This may be useful to allow end entities to correct/check 1102 their local time for consistency with the time on a central system. 1104 The freeText field may be used to send a human-readable message to 1105 the recipient (in any number of languages). The first language used 1106 in this sequence indicates the desired language for replies. 1108 The generalInfo field may be used to send machine-processable 1109 additional data to the recipient. The following generalInfo extensions 1110 are defined and MAY be supported. 1112 3.1.1.1 ImplicitConfirm 1114 This is used by the EE to inform the CA that it does not wish to send 1115 a certificate confirmation for issued certificates. 1117 implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} 1118 ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL 1120 If the CA grants the request to the EE, it MUST put the same extension 1121 in the PKIHeader of the response. If the EE does not find the 1122 extension in the response, it MUST send the certificate confirmation. 1124 3.1.1.2 ConfirmWaitTime 1126 This is used by the CA to inform the EE how long it intends to wait for 1127 the certificate confirmation before revoking the certificate and 1128 deleting the transaction. 1130 confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} 1131 ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- time CA will wait until 1133 3.1.2 PKI Message Body 1135 PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements & Section ref 1136 ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Req (3.3.1) 1137 ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Resp (3.3.2) 1138 cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Req (3.3.3) 1139 cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Resp (3.3.4) 1140 p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --PKCS #10 Cert. Req. [PKCS10] 1141 -- the PKCS #10 certification request (see [PKCS10]) 1142 popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent --pop Challenge (3.2.8) 1143 popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response (3.2.8) 1144 kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request (3.3.5) 1145 kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response (3.3.6) 1146 krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Req (3.3.7) 1147 krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Resp (3.3.8) 1148 rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request (3.3.9) 1149 rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response (3.3.10) 1150 ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request (3.3.11) 1151 ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Resp (3.3.12) 1152 ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann. (3.3.13) 1153 cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann. (3.3.14) 1154 rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann. (3.3.15) 1155 crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement (3.3.16) 1156 pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation (3.3.17) 1157 nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message (3.1.3) 1158 genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message (3.3.19) 1159 genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response (3.3.20) 1160 error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message (3.3.21) 1161 certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm (3.3.18) 1162 pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request (3.3.22) 1163 pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response (3.3.22) 1164 } 1166 The specific types are described in Section 3.3 below. 1168 3.1.3 PKI Message Protection 1170 Some PKI messages will be protected for integrity. (Note that if an 1171 asymmetric algorithm is used to protect a message and the relevant 1172 public component has been certified already, then the origin of the 1173 message can also be authenticated. On the other hand, if the public 1174 component is uncertified then the message origin cannot be 1175 automatically authenticated, but may be authenticated via out-of-band 1176 means.) 1178 When protection is applied the following structure is used: 1180 PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING 1182 The input to the calculation of PKIProtection is the DER encoding of 1183 the following data structure: 1185 ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { 1186 header PKIHeader, 1187 body PKIBody 1188 } 1190 There MAY be cases in which the PKIProtection BIT STRING is 1191 deliberately not used to protect a message (i.e., this OPTIONAL field 1192 is omitted) because other protection, external to PKIX, will instead 1193 be applied. Such a choice is explicitly allowed in this 1194 specification. Examples of such external protection include PKCS #7 1195 [PKCS7] and Security Multiparts [RFC1847] encapsulation of the 1196 PKIMessage (or simply the PKIBody (omitting the CHOICE tag), if the 1197 relevant PKIHeader information is securely carried in the external 1198 mechanism). It is noted, however, that many 1199 such external mechanisms require that the end entity already 1200 possesses a public-key certificate, and/or a unique Distinguished 1201 Name, and/or other such infrastructure-related information. Thus, 1202 they may not be appropriate for initial registration, key-recovery, 1203 or any other process with "boot-strapping" characteristics. For 1204 those cases it may be necessary that the PKIProtection parameter be 1205 used. In the future, if/when external mechanisms are modified to 1206 accommodate boot-strapping scenarios, the use of PKIProtection may 1207 become rare or non-existent. 1209 Depending on the circumstances the PKIProtection bits may contain a 1210 Message Authentication Code (MAC) or signature. Only the following 1211 cases can occur: 1213 - shared secret information 1215 In this case the sender and recipient share secret information 1216 (established via out-of-band means or from a previous PKI management 1217 operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC value and the 1218 protectionAlg will be the following (see also Appendix B2): 1220 id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13} 1221 PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { 1222 salt OCTET STRING, 1223 owf AlgorithmIdentifier, 1224 -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) 1225 iterationCount INTEGER, 1226 -- number of times the OWF is applied 1227 mac AlgorithmIdentifier 1228 -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], 1229 } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) 1231 In the above protectionAlg the salt value is appended to the shared 1232 secret input. The OWF is then applied iterationCount times, where the 1233 salted secret is the input to the first iteration and, for each 1234 successive iteration, the input is set to be the output of the 1235 previous iteration. The output of the final iteration (called 1236 "BASEKEY" for ease of reference, with a size of "H") is what is used 1237 to form the symmetric key. If the MAC algorithm requires a K-bit key 1238 and K <= H, then the most significant K bits of BASEKEY are used. If 1239 K > H, then all of BASEKEY is used for the most significant H bits of 1240 the key, OWF("1" || BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H 1241 bits of the key, OWF("2" || BASEKEY) is used for the next most 1242 significant H bits of the key, and so on, until all K bits have been 1243 derived. [Here "N" is the ASCII byte encoding the number N and "||" 1244 represents concatenation.] 1246 Note: it is RECOMMENDED that the fields of PBMParameter remain 1247 constant throughout the messages of a single transaction (e.g., 1248 ir/ip/certConf/pkiConf) in order to reduce the overhead associated 1249 with PasswordBasedMac computation). 1251 - DH key pairs 1253 Where the sender and receiver possess Diffie-Hellman certificates 1254 with compatible DH parameters, then in order to protect the message 1255 the end entity must generate a symmetric key based on its private DH 1256 key value and the DH public key of the recipient of the PKI message. 1257 PKIProtection will contain a MAC value keyed with this derived 1258 symmetric key and the protectionAlg will be the following: 1260 id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30} 1262 DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { 1263 owf AlgorithmIdentifier, 1264 -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) 1265 mac AlgorithmIdentifier 1266 -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], 1267 } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) 1269 In the above protectionAlg OWF is applied to the result of the 1270 Diffie-Hellman computation. The OWF output (called "BASEKEY" for ease 1271 of reference, with a size of "H") is what is used to form the 1272 symmetric key. If the MAC algorithm requires a K-bit key and K <= H, 1273 then the most significant K bits of BASEKEY are used. If K > H, then 1274 all of BASEKEY is used for the most significant H bits of the key, 1275 OWF("1" || BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H bits of 1276 the key, OWF("2" || BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H 1277 bits of the key, and so on, until all K bits have been derived. [Here 1278 "N" is the ASCII byte encoding the number N and "||" represents 1279 concatenation.] 1281 - signature 1283 In this case the sender possesses a signature key pair and simply signs 1284 the PKI message. PKIProtection will contain the signature value and 1285 the protectionAlg will be an AlgorithmIdentifier for a digital 1286 signature (e.g., md5WithRSAEncryption or dsaWithSha-1). 1288 - multiple protection 1290 In cases where an end entity sends a protected PKI message to an RA, 1291 the RA MAY forward that message to a CA, attaching its own protection 1292 (which MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and 1293 certificates shared between the RA and the CA). This is accomplished 1294 by nesting the entire message sent by the end entity within a new PKI 1295 message. The structure used is as follows. 1297 NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages 1299 (The use of PKIMessages, a SEQUENCE OF PKIMessage, lets the RA batch 1300 the requests of several EEs in a single new message. For simplicity, 1301 all messages in the batch MUST be of the same type (e.g., ir)). 1302 If the RA wishes to modify the message(s) in some way (e.g., add 1303 particular field values or new extensions), then it MAY create its own 1304 desired PKIBody. The original PKIMessage from the EE MAY be included 1305 in the generalInfo field of PKIHeader (to accommodate, for example, 1306 cases in which the CA wishes to check POP or other information on the 1307 original EE message). The infoType to be used in this situation is 1308 {id-it 15} (see Section 3.3.19 for the value of id-it) and the 1309 infoValue is PKIMessages (contents MUST be in the same order as the 1310 requests in PKIBody). 1312 3.2 Common Data Structures 1313 Before specifying the specific types that may be placed in a PKIBody 1314 we define some data structures that are used in more than one case. 1316 3.2.1 Requested Certificate Contents 1318 Various PKI management messages require that the originator of the 1319 message indicate some of the fields that are required to be present 1320 in a certificate. The CertTemplate structure allows an end entity or 1321 RA to specify as much as it wishes about the certificate it requires. 1322 CertTemplate is identical to a Certificate but with all fields 1323 optional. 1325 Note that even if the originator completely specifies the contents of 1326 a certificate it requires, a CA is free to modify fields within the 1327 certificate actually issued. If the modified certificate is 1328 unacceptable to the requester, the requester MUST send back a certConf 1329 message which either does not include this certificate (via a 1330 CertHash), or does include this certificate (via a CertHash) along with 1331 a status of "rejected". See Section 3.3.18 for the definition and use 1332 of CertHash and the certConf message. 1334 See Appendix D and [rfc2511bis] for CertTemplate syntax. 1336 3.2.2 Encrypted Values 1338 Where encrypted values (restricted, in this specification, to be 1339 either private keys or certificates) are sent in PKI messages the 1340 EncryptedValue data structure is used. 1342 See [rfc2511bis] for EncryptedValue syntax. 1344 Use of this data structure requires that the creator and intended 1345 recipient respectively be able to encrypt and decrypt. Typically, 1346 this will mean that the sender and recipient have, or are able to 1347 generate, a shared secret key. 1349 If the recipient of the PKIMessage already possesses a private key 1350 usable for decryption, then the encSymmKey field MAY contain a 1351 session key encrypted using the recipient's public key. 1353 3.2.3 Status codes and Failure Information for PKI messages 1355 All response messages will include some status information. The 1356 following values are defined. 1358 PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { 1359 accepted (0), 1360 -- you got exactly what you asked for 1361 grantedWithMods (1), 1362 -- you got something like what you asked for; the 1363 -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences 1364 rejection (2), 1365 -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message 1367 waiting (3), 1368 -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to 1369 -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status response 1370 -- MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified in Section 1371 -- 3.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying transport 1372 -- layer MAY have some utility in this regard) 1373 revocationWarning (4), 1374 -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is 1375 -- imminent 1376 revocationNotification (5), 1377 -- notification that a revocation has occurred 1378 keyUpdateWarning (6) 1379 -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in 1380 -- the key update request message 1381 } 1383 Responders may use the following syntax to provide more information 1384 about failure cases. 1386 PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { 1387 -- since we can fail in more than one way! 1388 -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required. 1389 badAlg (0), 1390 -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier 1391 badMessageCheck (1), 1392 -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify) 1393 badRequest (2), 1394 -- transaction not permitted or supported 1395 badTime (3), 1396 -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, 1397 -- as defined by local policy 1398 badCertId (4), 1399 -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria 1400 badDataFormat (5), 1401 -- the data submitted has the wrong format 1402 wrongAuthority (6), 1403 -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the 1404 -- one creating the response token 1405 incorrectData (7), 1406 -- the requester's data is incorrect (used for notary services) 1407 missingTimeStamp (8), 1408 -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there (by policy) 1409 badPOP (9), 1410 -- the proof-of-possession failed 1411 certRevoked (10), 1412 -- the certificate has already been revoked 1413 certConfirmed (11), 1414 -- the certificate has already been confirmed 1415 wrongIntegrity (12), 1416 -- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or 1417 -- vice versa 1418 badRecipientNonce (13), 1419 -- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value 1421 timeNotAvailable (14), 1422 -- the TSA's time source is not available 1423 unacceptedPolicy (15), 1424 -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA. 1425 unacceptedExtension (16), 1426 -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA. 1427 addInfoNotAvailable (17), 1428 -- the additional information requested could not be understood 1429 -- or is not available 1430 badSenderNonce (18), 1431 -- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size 1432 badCertTemplate (19), 1433 -- invalid certificate template or missing mandatory information 1434 signerNotTrusted (20), 1435 -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted 1436 transactionIdInUse (21), 1437 -- the transaction identifier is already in use 1438 unsupportedVersion (22), 1439 -- the version of the message is not supported 1440 notAuthorized (23), 1441 -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding request 1442 -- or perform the preceding action 1443 systemUnavail (24), 1444 -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability 1445 systemFailure (25), 1446 -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure 1447 duplicateCertReq (26) 1448 -- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate certificate 1449 -- already exists 1450 } 1452 PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1453 status PKIStatus, 1454 statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, 1455 failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL 1456 } 1458 3.2.4 Certificate Identification 1460 In order to identify particular certificates the CertId data 1461 structure is used. 1463 See [rfc2511bis] for CertId syntax. 1465 3.2.5 "Out-of-band" root CA public key 1467 Each root CA must be able to publish its current public key via some 1468 "out-of-band" means. While such mechanisms are beyond the scope of 1469 this document, we define data structures which can support such 1470 mechanisms. 1472 There are generally two methods available: either the CA directly 1473 publishes its self-signed certificate; or this information is 1474 available via the Directory (or equivalent) and the CA publishes a 1475 hash of this value to allow verification of its integrity before use. 1477 OOBCert ::= Certificate 1479 The fields within this certificate are restricted as follows: 1481 - The certificate MUST be self-signed (i.e., the signature must be 1482 verifiable using the SubjectPublicKeyInfo field); 1483 - The subject and issuer fields MUST be identical; 1484 - If the subject field is NULL then both subjectAltNames and 1485 issuerAltNames extensions MUST be present and have exactly the same 1486 value; 1487 - The values of all other extensions must be suitable for a self- 1488 signed certificate (e.g., key identifiers for subject and issuer 1489 must be the same). 1491 OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE { 1492 hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 1493 certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL, 1494 hashVal BIT STRING 1495 -- hashVal is calculated over the self-signed 1496 -- certificate with the identifier certID. 1497 } 1499 The intention of the hash value is that anyone who has securely 1500 received the hash value (via the out-of-band means) can verify a 1501 self-signed certificate for that CA. 1503 3.2.6 Archive Options 1505 Requesters may indicate that they wish the PKI to archive a private 1506 key value using the PKIArchiveOptions structure 1508 See [rfc2511bis] for PKIArchiveOptions syntax. 1510 3.2.7 Publication Information 1512 Requesters may indicate that they wish the PKI to publish a 1513 certificate using the PKIPublicationInfo structure. 1515 See [rfc2511bis] for PKIPublicationInfo syntax. 1517 3.2.8 Proof-of-Possession Structures 1519 If the certification request is for a signing key pair (i.e., a 1520 request for a verification certificate), then the proof of possession 1521 of the private signing key is demonstrated through use of the 1522 POPOSigningKey structure. 1524 See Appendix D and [rfc2511bis] for POPOSigningKey syntax, but note 1525 that POPOSigningKeyInput has the following semantic stipulations in 1526 this specification. 1528 POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE { 1529 authInfo CHOICE { 1530 sender [0] GeneralName, 1531 -- from PKIHeader (used only if an authenticated identity 1532 -- has been established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a 1533 -- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate)) 1534 publicKeyMAC PKMACValue 1535 -- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for 1536 -- the sender; publicKeyMAC contains a password-based MAC 1537 -- (using the protectionAlg AlgId from PKIHeader) on the 1538 -- DER-encoded value of publicKey 1539 }, 1540 publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo -- from CertTemplate 1541 } 1543 On the other hand, if the certification request is for an encryption 1544 key pair (i.e., a request for an encryption certificate), then the 1545 proof of possession of the private decryption key may be demonstrated 1546 in one of three ways. 1548 1) By the inclusion of the private key (encrypted) in the 1549 CertRequest (in the thisMessage field of POPOPrivKey (see 1550 Appendix D) or in the PKIArchiveOptions control structure, 1551 depending upon whether or not archival of the private key 1552 is also desired). 1554 2) By having the CA return not the certificate, but an encrypted 1555 certificate (i.e., the certificate encrypted under a randomly- 1556 generated symmetric key, and the symmetric key encrypted under 1557 the public key for which the certification request is being 1558 made) -- this is the "indirect" method mentioned previously in 1559 Section 2.3.2. The end entity proves knowledge of the private 1560 decryption key to the CA by providing the correct CertHash for 1561 this certificate in the certConf message. This demonstrates POP 1562 because the EE can only compute the correct CertHash if it is 1563 able to recover the certificate, and it can only recover the 1564 certificate if it is able to decrypt the symmetric key using the 1565 required private key. Clearly, for this to work, the CA MUST NOT 1566 publish the certificate until the certConf message arrives (when 1567 certHash is to be used to demonstrate POP). See Section 3.3.18 1568 for further details. 1570 3) By having the end entity engage in a challenge-response 1571 protocol (using the messages POPODecKeyChall and 1572 POPODecKeyResp; see below) between CertReqMessages and 1573 CertRepMessage -- this is the "direct" method mentioned 1574 previously in Section 2.3.2. [This method would typically be 1575 used in an environment in which an RA verifies POP and then 1576 makes a certification request to the CA on behalf of the end 1577 entity. In such a scenario, the CA trusts the RA to have done 1578 POP correctly before the RA requests a certificate for the end 1579 entity.] The complete protocol then looks as follows (note 1580 that req' does not necessarily encapsulate req as a nested 1581 message): 1583 EE RA CA 1584 ---- req ----> 1585 <--- chall --- 1586 ---- resp ---> 1587 ---- req' ---> 1588 <--- rep ----- 1589 ---- conf ---> 1590 <--- ack ----- 1591 <--- rep ----- 1592 ---- conf ---> 1593 <--- ack ----- 1595 This protocol is obviously much longer than the 3-way exchange given 1596 in choice (2) above, but allows a local Registration Authority to be 1597 involved and has the property that the certificate itself is not 1598 actually created until the proof of possession is complete. In some 1599 environments a different order of the above messages may be required, 1600 such as the following (this may be determined by policy): 1602 EE RA CA 1603 ---- req ----> 1604 <--- chall --- 1605 ---- resp ---> 1606 ---- req' ---> 1607 <--- rep ----- 1608 <--- rep ----- 1609 ---- conf ---> 1610 ---- conf ---> 1611 <--- ack ----- 1612 <--- ack ----- 1614 If the cert. request is for a key agreement key (KAK) pair, then the 1615 POP can use any of the 3 ways described above for enc. key pairs, 1616 with the following changes: (1) the parenthetical text of bullet 2) 1617 is replaced with "(i.e., the certificate encrypted under the 1618 symmetric key derived from the CA's private KAK and the public key 1619 for which the certification request is being made)"; (2) the first 1620 parenthetical text of the challenge field of "Challenge" below is 1621 replaced with "(using PreferredSymmAlg (see Section 3.3.19.4 and 1622 Appendix C5) and a symmetric key derived from the CA's private KAK 1623 and the public key for which the certification request is being 1624 made)". Alternatively, the POP can use the POPOSigningKey structure 1625 given in [rfc2511bis] (where the alg field is DHBasedMAC and the 1626 signature field is the MAC) as a fourth alternative for demonstrating 1627 POP if the CA already has a D-H certificate that is known to the EE. 1629 The challenge-response messages for proof of possession of a private 1630 decryption key are specified as follows (see [MvOV97, p.404] for 1631 details). Note that this challenge-response exchange is associated 1632 with the preceding cert. request message (and subsequent cert. 1633 response and confirmation messages) by the transactionID used in the 1634 PKIHeader and by the protection (MACing or signing) applied to the 1635 PKIMessage. 1637 POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge 1638 -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the 1639 -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). 1641 Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { 1642 owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 1643 -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in any 1644 -- subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if omitted, 1645 -- then the owf used in the immediately preceding Challenge is 1646 -- to be used). 1647 witness OCTET STRING, 1648 -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a 1649 -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different 1650 -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.] 1651 challenge OCTET STRING 1652 -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. 1653 -- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as 1654 -- Rand ::= SEQUENCE { 1655 -- int INTEGER, 1656 -- - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above) 1657 -- sender GeneralName 1658 -- - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) 1659 -- } 1660 } 1662 Note that the size of Rand needs to be appropriate for encryption 1663 under the public key of the requester. Given that "int" will 1664 typically not be longer than 64 bits, this leaves well over 100 bytes 1665 of room for the "sender" field when the modulus is 1024 bits. If, in 1666 some environment, names are so long that they cannot fit (e.g., very 1667 long DNs), then whatever portion will fit should be used (as long as 1668 it includes at least the common name, and as long as the receiver is 1669 able to deal meaningfully with the abbreviation). 1671 POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER 1672 -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the 1673 -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The 1674 -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the 1675 -- corresponding Challenge. 1677 The text in this section provides several options with respect to POP 1678 techniques. Using "SK" for "signing key", "EK" for "encryption key", 1679 and "KAK" for "key agreement key", the techniques may be summarized as 1680 follows: 1682 RAVerified; 1683 SKPOP; 1684 EKPOPThisMessage; 1685 KAKPOPThisMessage; 1686 KAKPOPThisMessageDHMAC; 1687 EKPOPEncryptedCert; 1688 KAKPOPEncryptedCert; 1689 EKPOPChallengeResp; and 1690 KAKPOPChallengeResp. 1692 Given this array of options, it is natural to ask how an end entity 1693 can know what is supported by the CA/RA (i.e., which options it may 1694 use when requesting certificates). The following guidelines should 1695 clarify this situation for EE implementers. 1697 RAVerified. This is not an EE decision; the RA uses this if and only 1698 if it has verified POP before forwarding the request on to the CA, so 1699 it is not possible for the EE to choose this technique. 1701 SKPOP. If the EE has a signing key pair, this is the only POP method 1702 specified for use in the request for a corresponding certificate. 1704 EKPOPThisMessage and KAKPOPThisMessage. It is an EE decision whether 1705 or not to give up its private key to the CA/RA. If the EE decides to 1706 reveal its key, then these are the only POP methods available in this 1707 specification to achieve this (and the key pair type will determine 1708 which of these two methods to use). 1710 KAKPOPThisMessageDHMAC. The EE can only use this method if (1) the CA 1711 has a DH certificate available for this purpose, and (2) the EE already 1712 has a copy of this certificate. If both these conditions hold, then 1713 this technique is clearly supported and may be used by the EE, if 1714 desired. 1716 EKPOPEncryptedCert, KAKPOPEncryptedCert, EKPOPChallengeResp, 1717 KAKPOPChallengeResp. The EE picks one of these (in the 1718 subsequentMessage field) in the request message, depending upon 1719 preference and key pair type. The EE is not doing POP at this point; 1720 it is simply indicating which method it wants to use. Therefore, if the 1721 CA/RA replies with a "badPOP" error, the EE can re-request using the 1722 other POP method chosen in subsequentMessage. Note, however, that this 1723 specification encourages the use of the EncryptedCert choice and, 1724 furthermore, says that the challenge-response would typically be used 1725 when an RA is involved and doing POP verification. Thus, the EE should 1726 be able to make an intelligent decision regarding which of these POP 1727 methods to choose in the request message. 1729 3.3 Operation-Specific Data Structures 1731 3.3.1 Initialization Request 1733 An Initialization request message contains as the PKIBody a 1734 CertReqMessages data structure which specifies the requested 1735 certificate(s). Typically, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, KeyId, and Validity 1736 are the template fields which may be supplied for each certificate 1737 requested (see Appendix B profiles for further information). This 1738 message is intended to be used for entities first initializing into 1739 the PKI. 1741 See Appendix D and [rfc2511bis] for CertReqMessages syntax. 1743 3.3.2 Initialization Response 1745 An Initialization response message contains as the PKIBody an 1746 CertRepMessage data structure which has for each certificate 1747 requested a PKIStatusInfo field, a subject certificate, and possibly 1748 a private key (normally encrypted with a session key, which is itself 1749 encrypted with the protocolEncrKey). 1751 See Section 3.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax. Note that if the PKI 1752 Message Protection is "shared secret information" (see Section 1753 3.1.3), then any certificate transported in the caPubs field may be 1754 directly trusted as a root CA certificate by the initiator. 1756 3.3.3 Certification Request 1758 A Certification request message contains as the PKIBody 1759 a CertReqMessages data structure which specifies the requested 1760 certificates. This message is intended to be used for existing PKI 1761 entities who wish to obtain additional certificates. 1763 See Appendix D and [rfc2511bis] for CertReqMessages syntax. 1765 Alternatively, the PKIBody MAY be a CertificationRequest (this 1766 structure is fully specified by the ASN.1 structure 1767 CertificationRequest given in [PKCS10]). This structure may be 1768 required for certificate requests for signing key pairs when 1769 interoperation with legacy systems is desired, but its use is 1770 strongly discouraged whenever not absolutely necessary. 1772 3.3.4 Certification Response 1774 A Certification response message contains as the PKIBody a 1775 CertRepMessage data structure which has a status value for each 1776 certificate requested, and optionally has a CA public key, failure 1777 information, a subject certificate, and an encrypted private key. 1779 CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 1780 caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate OPTIONAL, 1781 response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse 1782 } 1784 CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { 1785 certReqId INTEGER, 1786 -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value 1787 -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the 1788 -- corresponding request) 1789 status PKIStatusInfo, 1790 certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, 1791 rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL 1792 -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined 1793 -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [rfc2511bis] 1794 } 1796 CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { 1797 certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, 1798 privateKey [0] EncryptedValue OPTIONAL, 1799 -- see [rfc2511bis] for comment on encoding 1800 publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL 1801 } 1803 CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { 1804 certificate [0] Certificate, 1805 encryptedCert [1] EncryptedValue 1806 } 1808 Only one of the failInfo (in PKIStatusInfo) and certificate (in 1809 CertifiedKeyPair) fields can be present in each CertResponse 1810 (depending on the status). For some status values (e.g., waiting) 1811 neither of the optional fields will be present. 1813 Given an EncryptedCert and the relevant decryption key the 1814 certificate may be obtained. The purpose of this is to allow a CA to 1815 return the value of a certificate, but with the constraint that only 1816 the intended recipient can obtain the actual certificate. The benefit 1817 of this approach is that a CA may reply with a certificate even in 1818 the absence of a proof that the requester is the end entity which can 1819 use the relevant private key (note that the proof is not obtained 1821 until the certConf message is received by the CA). Thus the CA will 1822 not have to revoke that certificate in the event that something goes 1823 wrong with the proof of possession (but MAY do so anyway, depending 1824 upon policy). 1826 3.3.5 Key update request content 1828 For key update requests the CertReqMessages syntax is used. 1829 Typically, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, KeyId, and Validity are the template 1830 fields which may be supplied for each key to be updated. This 1831 message is intended to be used to request updates to existing (non- 1832 revoked and non-expired) certificates (therefore, it is sometimes 1833 referred to as a "Certificate Update" operation). An update is a 1834 replacement certificate containing either a new subject public key or 1835 the current subject public key (although the latter practice may not 1836 be appropriate for some environments). 1838 See Appendix D and [rfc2511bis] for CertReqMessages syntax. 1840 3.3.6 Key Update response content 1842 For key update responses the CertRepMessage syntax is used. The 1843 response is identical to the initialization response. 1845 See Section 3.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax. 1847 3.3.7 Key Recovery Request content 1849 For key recovery requests the syntax used is identical to the 1850 initialization request CertReqMessages. Typically, 1851 SubjectPublicKeyInfo and KeyId are the template fields which may be 1852 used to supply a signature public key for which a certificate is 1853 required (see Appendix B profiles for further information). 1855 See Appendix D and [rfc2511bis] for CertReqMessages syntax. Note that 1856 if a key history is required, the requester must supply a Protocol 1857 Encryption Key control in the request message. 1859 3.3.8 Key recovery response content 1861 For key recovery responses the following syntax is used. For some 1862 status values (e.g., waiting) none of the optional fields will be 1863 present. 1865 KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 1866 status PKIStatusInfo, 1867 newSigCert [0] Certificate OPTIONAL, 1868 caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 1869 Certificate OPTIONAL, 1870 keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 1871 CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL 1872 } 1874 3.3.9 Revocation Request Content 1876 When requesting revocation of a certificate (or several certificates) 1877 the following data structure is used. The name of the requester is 1878 present in the PKIHeader structure. 1880 RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails 1882 RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { 1883 certDetails CertTemplate, 1884 -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about 1885 -- the cert. for which revocation is requested 1886 -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available) 1887 crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL 1888 -- requested crlEntryExtensions 1889 } 1891 3.3.10 Revocation Response Content 1893 The response to the above message. If produced, this is sent to the 1894 requester of the revocation. (A separate revocation announcement 1895 message MAY be sent to the subject of the certificate for which 1896 revocation was requested.) 1898 RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 1899 status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo, 1900 -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent 1901 revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL, 1902 -- IDs for which revocation was requested (same order as status) 1903 crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL 1904 -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) 1905 } 1907 3.3.11 Cross certification request content 1909 Cross certification requests use the same syntax (CertReqMessages) as 1910 for normal certification requests with the restriction that the key 1911 pair MUST have been generated by the requesting CA and the private 1912 key MUST NOT be sent to the responding CA. This request MAY also be 1913 used by subordinate CAs to get their certificates signed by the parent 1914 CA. 1916 See Appendix D and [rfc2511bis] for CertReqMessages syntax. 1918 3.3.12 Cross certification response content 1920 Cross certification responses use the same syntax (CertRepMessage) as 1921 for normal certification responses with the restriction that no 1922 encrypted private key can be sent. 1924 See Section 3.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax. 1926 3.3.13 CA Key Update Announcement content 1928 When a CA updates its own key pair the following data structure MAY 1929 be used to announce this event. 1931 CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { 1932 oldWithNew Certificate, -- old pub signed with new priv 1933 newWithOld Certificate, -- new pub signed with old priv 1934 newWithNew Certificate -- new pub signed with new priv 1935 } 1937 3.3.14 Certificate Announcement 1939 This structure MAY be used to announce the existence of certificates. 1941 Note that this message is intended to be used for those cases (if 1942 any) where there is no pre-existing method for publication of 1943 certificates; it is not intended to be used where, for example, X.500 1944 is the method for publication of certificates. 1946 CertAnnContent ::= Certificate 1948 3.3.15 Revocation Announcement 1950 When a CA has revoked, or is about to revoke, a particular 1951 certificate it MAY issue an announcement of this (possibly upcoming) 1952 event. 1954 RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { 1955 status PKIStatus, 1956 certId CertId, 1957 willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime, 1958 badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, 1959 crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL 1960 -- extra CRL details(e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) 1961 } 1963 A CA MAY use such an announcement to warn (or notify) a subject that 1964 its certificate is about to be (or has been) revoked. This would 1965 typically be used where the request for revocation did not come from 1966 the subject concerned. 1968 The willBeRevokedAt field contains the time at which a new entry will 1969 be added to the relevant CRLs. 1971 3.3.16 CRL Announcement 1973 When a CA issues a new CRL (or set of CRLs) the following data 1974 structure MAY be used to announce this event. 1976 CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList 1978 3.3.17 PKI Confirmation content 1980 This data structure is used in the protocol exchange as the final 1981 PKIMessage. Its content is the same in all cases - actually there is 1982 no content since the PKIHeader carries all the required information. 1984 PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL 1986 Use of this message for certificate confirmation is NOT RECOMMENDED; 1987 certConf SHOULD be used instead. The recipient on receiving a 1988 PKIConfirm for a certificate response MAY treat it as a certConf 1989 with all certificates being accepted. 1991 3.3.18 Certificate Confirmation content 1993 This data structure is used by the client to send a confirmation to the 1994 CA/RA to accept or reject certificates. 1996 CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus 1998 CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { 1999 certHash OCTET STRING, 2000 -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm 2001 -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature 2002 certReqId INTEGER, 2003 -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep 2004 statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL 2005 } 2007 For any particular CertStatus, omission of the statusInfo field 2008 indicates ACCEPTANCE of the specified certificate. Alternatively, 2009 explicit status details (with respect to acceptance or rejection) MAY 2010 be provided in the statusInfo field, perhaps for auditing purposes at 2011 the CA/RA. 2013 Within CertConfirmContent, omission of a CertStatus structure 2014 corresponding to a certificate supplied in the previous response 2015 message indicates REJECTION of the certificate. Thus, an empty 2016 CertConfirmContent (a zero-length SEQUENCE) MAY be used to indicate 2017 rejection of all supplied certificates. See Section 3.2.8, item (2), 2018 for a discussion of the certHash field with respect to 2019 proof-of-possession. 2021 3.3.19 PKI General Message content 2023 InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { 2024 infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 2025 infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL 2026 } 2027 -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited to 2028 -- the following (see subsequent subsections for further details and 2029 -- Appendix F for exact syntax): 2030 -- 2031 -- { CAProtEncCert = {id-it 1}, Certificate } 2032 -- { SignKeyPairTypes = {id-it 2}, SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier } 2033 -- { EncKeyPairTypes = {id-it 3}, SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier } 2034 -- { PreferredSymmAlg = {id-it 4}, AlgorithmIdentifier } 2035 -- { CAKeyUpdateInfo = {id-it 5}, CAKeyUpdAnnContent } 2036 -- { CurrentCRL = {id-it 6}, CertificateList } 2037 -- 2038 -- where {id-it} = {id-pkix 4} = {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4} 2039 -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate 2040 -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general- 2041 -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for 2042 -- specific environments. 2044 GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue 2045 -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content). 2046 -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will typically 2047 -- be omitted in GenMsg for some of the examples given above (i.e., it 2048 -- will be used only in the corresponding GenRep message). The receiver 2049 -- is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it does not recognize. 2050 -- If sent from EE to CA, the empty set indicates that the CA may send 2051 -- any/all information that it wishes. 2053 3.3.19.1 CA Protocol Encryption Certificate 2055 This MAY be used by the EE to get from the CA a certificate to use to 2056 protect sensitive information during the protocol. 2058 GenMsg: {id-it 1}, 2060 GenRep: {id-it 1}, Certificate | 2062 EEs MUST ensure that the correct certificate is used for this purpose. 2064 3.3.19.2 Signing Key Pair Types 2066 This MAY be used by the EE to get the list of signature algorithms 2067 (e.g., RSA, DSA) whose subject public key values the CA is willing to 2068 certify. Note that for the purposes of this exchange, rsaEncryption 2069 and rsaWithSHA1, for example, are considered to be equivalent; the 2070 question being asked is, "Is the CA willing to certify an RSA public 2071 key?" 2073 GenMsg: {id-it 2}, 2075 GenRep: {id-it 2}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AlgorithmIdentifier 2077 3.3.19.3 Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types 2079 This MAY be used by the client to get the list of encryption/key 2080 agreement algorithms whose subject public key values the CA is willing 2081 to certify. 2083 GenMsg: {id-it 3}, 2085 GenRep: {id-it 3}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AlgorithmIdentifier 2087 3.3.19.4 Preferred Symmetric Algorithm 2089 This MAY be used by the client to get the CA-preferred symmetric 2090 encryption algorithm for any confidential information that needs to 2091 be exchanged between the EE and the CA (for example, if the EE wants 2092 to send its private decryption key to the CA for archival purposes). 2094 GenMsg: {id-it 4}, 2096 GenRep: {id-it 4}, AlgorithmIdentifier 2098 3.3.19.5 Updated CA Key Pair 2100 This MAY be used by the CA to announce a CA key update event. 2102 GenMsg: {id-it 5}, CAKeyUpdAnnContent 2104 3.3.19.6 CRL 2105 This MAY be used by the client to get a copy of the latest CRL. 2107 GenMsg: {id-it 6}, 2108 GenRep: {id-it 6}, CertificateList 2110 3.3.19.7 Unsupported Object Identifiers 2111 This is used by the server to return a list of object identifiers that 2112 it does not recognize or support from the list submitted by the client. 2114 GenRep: {id-it 7}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2116 3.3.19.8 Key Pair Parameters 2117 This MAY be used by the EE to request the domain parameters to use 2118 for generating the key pair for certain public-key algorithms. It can 2119 be used, for example, to request the appropriate P, Q and G to generate 2120 the DH/DSA key, or to request a set of well-known elliptic curves. 2122 GenMsg: {id-it 10}, OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- (Algorithm object-id) 2123 GenRep: {id-it 11}, AlgorithmIdentifier | 2125 An absent infoValue in the GenRep indicates that the algorithm 2126 specified in GenMsg is not supported. 2128 EEs MUST ensure that the parameters are acceptable to it and that the 2129 GenRep message is authenticated (to avoid substitution attacks). 2131 3.3.19.9 Revocation Passphrase 2132 This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the 2133 purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case that 2134 the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to 2135 authenticate the request). See Appendix E for further details on the 2136 use of this mechanism. 2138 GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedValue 2139 GenRep: {id-it 12}, 2141 3.3.19.10 ImplicitConfirm 2142 See Section 3.1.1.1 for the definition and use of {id-it 13}. 2144 3.3.19.11 ConfirmWaitTime 2145 See Section 3.1.1.2 for the definition and use of {id-it 14}. 2147 3.3.19.12 Original PKIMessage 2148 See Section 3.1.3 for the definition and use of {id-it 15}. 2150 3.3.19.13 Supported Lanuage Tags 2151 This MAY be used to determine the appropriate language tag to use in 2152 subsequent messages. The sender sends its list of supported languages 2153 (in order, most preferred to least); the receiver returns the one it 2154 wishes to use. (Note: each UTF8String MUST include a language tag.) 2155 If none of the offered tags are supported, an error MUST be returned. 2157 GenMsg: {id-it 16}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String 2158 GenRep: {id-it 16}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1) OF UTF8String 2160 3.3.20 PKI General Response content 2162 GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue 2163 -- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not recognize. 2165 Example GenRep that MAY be supported include those listed in the 2166 subsections of 3.3.19. 2168 3.3.21 Error Message content 2170 This data structure MAY be used by EE, CA, or RA to convey error info. 2172 ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE { 2173 pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, 2174 errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, 2175 -- implementation-specific error codes 2176 errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL 2177 -- implementation-specific error details 2178 } 2180 This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction. 2181 If the client sends this request the server MUST respond with a 2182 PKIConfirm response, or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header 2183 is not valid. Both sides MUST treat this message as the end of the 2184 transaction (if a transaction is in progress). 2186 If protection is desired on the message, the client MUST protect it 2187 using the same technique (i.e., signature or MAC) as the starting 2188 message of the transaction. The CA MUST always sign it with a 2189 signature key. 2191 3.3.22 Polling Request and Response 2193 This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the 2194 client needs to poll the server in order to determine the status of an 2195 outstanding ir, cr, or kur transaction (i.e., when the "waiting" 2196 PKIStatus has been received). 2198 PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { 2199 certReqId INTEGER } 2201 PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { 2202 certReqId INTEGER, 2203 checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds 2204 reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL } 2206 The following clauses describe when polling messages are used, and how 2207 they are used. It is assumed that multiple certConf messages can be 2208 sent during transactions. There will be one sent in response to each 2209 ip, cp, or kup containing a CertStatus for an approved certificate. 2211 1. In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a certConf 2212 for all approved certificates and, following the ack, a pollReq for all 2213 pending certificates. 2215 2. In respose to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if 2216 one or more of the pending certificates is ready; otherwise, it will 2217 return a pollRep. 2219 3. If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least as long as 2220 the checkAfter value before sending another pollReq. 2222 4. If an ip, cp, or kup is received in response to a pollReq, then it 2223 will be treated in the same way as the initial response. 2225 START 2226 | 2227 | 2228 \/ 2229 Send ir 2230 | 2231 | ip 2232 | 2233 \/ 2234 Check status 2235 of returned <-----------------------------+ 2236 certs | 2237 | | 2238 +----------------------------->|<-----------------------+ | 2239 | | | | 2240 | | | | 2241 | (approved) \/ (waiting) | | 2242 Add to <---------------- Check CertResponse -----------> Add to | 2243 conf list for each certificate pending list | 2244 /\ | 2245 / \ | 2246 (conf list) / \ (empty conf list) | 2247 / \ ip | 2248 / \ +----------------------+ 2249 / \ | 2250 (empty pending list) / \ | pRep 2251 END <--------- Send certConf Send pReq------------>Wait 2252 | /\ /\ | 2253 | | | | 2254 +-----------------+ +---------------+ 2255 (pending list) 2257 In the following exchange, the end entity is enrolling for two 2258 certificates in one request. 2260 Step End Entity PKI 2261 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 2262 1 Format ir 2263 2 -> ir -> 2264 3 Handle ir 2265 4 Manual intervention is 2266 required for both certs. 2267 5 <- ip <- 2269 6 Process ip 2270 7 Format pReq 2271 8 -> pReq -> 2272 9 Check status of cert requests 2273 10 Certificates not ready 2274 11 Format pRep 2275 12 <- pRep <- 2276 13 Wait 2277 14 Format pReq 2278 15 -> pReq -> 2279 16 Check status of cert requests 2280 17 One certificate is ready 2281 18 Format ip 2282 19 <- ip <- 2283 20 Handle ip 2284 21 Format certConf 2285 22 -> certConf -> 2286 23 Handle certConf 2287 24 Format ack 2288 25 <- pkiConf <- 2289 26 Format pReq 2290 27 -> pReq -> 2291 28 Check status of certificate 2292 29 Certificate is ready 2293 30 Format ip 2294 31 <- ip <- 2295 31 Handle ip 2296 32 Format certConf 2297 33 -> certConf -> 2298 34 Handle certConf 2299 35 Format ack 2300 36 <- pkiConf <- 2302 4. Mandatory PKI Management functions 2304 Some of the PKI management functions outlined in Section 1 above are 2305 described in this section. 2307 This section deals with functions that are "mandatory" in the sense 2308 that all end entity and CA/RA implementations MUST be able to provide 2309 the functionality described. This part is effectively the 2310 profile of the PKI management functionality that MUST be supported. 2311 Note, however, that the management functions described in this section 2312 do not need to be accomplished using the PKI messages defined in 2313 Section 3 if alternate means are suitable for a given environment (see 2314 Appendix B for profiles of the PKIMessages that MUST be supported). 2316 4.1 Root CA initialization 2318 [See Section 1.2.2 for this document's definition of "root CA".] 2320 A newly created root CA must produce a "self-certificate" which is a 2321 Certificate structure with the profile defined for the "newWithNew" 2322 certificate issued following a root CA key update. 2324 In order to make the CA's self certificate useful to end entities 2325 that do not acquire the self certificate via "out-of-band" means, the 2326 CA must also produce a fingerprint for its public key. End entities 2327 that acquire this fingerprint securely via some "out-of-band" means 2328 can then verify the CA's self-certificate and hence the other 2329 attributes contained therein. 2331 The data structure used to carry the fingerprint is the OOBCertHash. 2333 4.2 Root CA key update 2335 CA keys (as all other keys) have a finite lifetime and will have to 2336 be updated on a periodic basis. The certificates NewWithNew, 2337 NewWithOld, and OldWithNew (see Section 2.4.1) MAY be issued by the CA 2338 to aid existing end entities who hold the current self-signed CA 2339 certificate (OldWithOld) to transition securely to the new self- 2340 signed CA certificate (NewWithNew), and to aid new end entities who 2341 will hold NewWithNew to acquire OldWithOld securely for verification 2342 of existing data. 2344 4.3 Subordinate CA initialization 2346 [See Section 1.2.2 for this document's definition of "subordinate 2347 CA".] 2349 From the perspective of PKI management protocols the initialization 2350 of a subordinate CA is the same as the initialization of an end 2351 entity. The only difference is that the subordinate CA must also 2352 produce an initial revocation list. 2354 4.4 CRL production 2356 Before issuing any certificates a newly established CA (which issues 2357 CRLs) must produce "empty" versions of each CRL which is to be 2358 periodically produced. 2360 4.5 PKI information request 2362 When a PKI entity (CA, RA, or EE) wishes to acquire information about 2363 the current status of a CA it MAY send that CA a request for such 2364 information. 2366 The CA must respond to the request by providing (at least) all of the 2367 information requested by the requester. If some of the information 2368 cannot be provided then an error must be conveyed to the requester. 2370 If PKIMessages are used to request and supply this PKI information, 2371 then the request MUST be the GenMsg message, the response MUST be the 2372 GenRep message, and the error MUST be the Error message. These 2373 messages are protected using a MAC based on shared secret information 2374 (i.e., PasswordBasedMAC) or any other authenticated means (if the end 2375 entity has an existing certificate). 2377 4.6 Cross certification 2379 The requester CA is the CA that will become the subject of the 2380 cross-certificate; the responder CA will become the issuer of the 2381 cross-certificate. 2383 The requester CA must be "up and running" before initiating the 2384 cross-certification operation. 2386 4.6.1 One-way request-response scheme: 2388 The cross-certification scheme is essentially a one way operation; 2389 that is, when successful, this operation results in the creation of 2390 one new cross-certificate. If the requirement is that cross- 2391 certificates be created in "both directions" then each CA in turn 2392 must initiate a cross-certification operation (or use another 2393 scheme). 2395 This scheme is suitable where the two CAs in question can already 2396 verify each other's signatures (they have some common points of 2397 trust) or where there is an out-of-band verification of the origin of 2398 the certification request. 2400 Detailed Description: 2402 Cross certification is initiated at one CA known as the responder. 2403 The CA administrator for the responder identifies the CA it wants to 2404 cross certify and the responder CA equipment generates an 2405 authorization code. The responder CA administrator passes this 2406 authorization code by out-of-band means to the requester CA 2407 administrator. The requester CA administrator enters the 2408 authorization code at the requester CA in order to initiate the on- 2409 line exchange. 2411 The authorization code is used for authentication and integrity 2412 purposes. This is done by generating a symmetric key based on the 2413 authorization code and using the symmetric key for generating Message 2414 Authentication Codes (MACs) on all messages exchanged. (Authentication 2415 may alternatively be done using signatures instead of MACs, if the CAs 2416 are able to retrieve and validate the required public keys by some 2417 means, such as an out-of-band hash comparison.) 2419 The requester CA initiates the exchange by generating a cross- 2420 certification request (ccr) with a fresh random number(requester random 2421 number). The requester CA then sends to the responder CA the ccr 2422 message. The fields in this message are protected from modification 2423 with a MAC based on the authorization code. 2425 Upon receipt of the ccr message, the responder CA validates the message 2426 and the MAC, saves the requester random number, and generates its own 2427 random number (responder random number). It then 2429 generates (and archives, if desired) a new requester certificate that 2430 contains the requester CA public key and is signed with the responder 2431 CA signature private key. The responder CA responds with the cross 2432 certification response (ccp) message. The fields in this message are 2433 protected from modification with a MAC based on the authorization code. 2435 Upon receipt of the ccp message, the requester CA validates the message 2436 (including the received random numbers) and the MAC. The requester CA 2437 responds with the certConf message. The fields in this message are 2438 protected from modification with a MAC based on the authorization 2439 code. The requester CA MAY write the requester certificate to the 2440 Repository as an aid to later certificate path construction. 2442 Upon receipt of the certConf message, the responder CA validates the 2443 message and the MAC, and sends back an acknowledgment using the 2444 PKIConfirm message. It MAY also publish the requester certificate as 2445 an aid to later path construction. 2447 Notes: 2449 1. The ccr message must contain a "complete" certification request, 2450 that is, all fields except the serial number (including, e.g., a 2451 BasicConstraints extension) must be specified by the requester CA. 2452 2. The ccp message SHOULD contain the verification certificate of the 2453 responder CA - if present, the requester CA must then verify this 2454 certificate (for example, via the "out-of-band" mechanism). 2456 (A simpler, non-interactive model of cross-certification may also be 2457 envisioned, in which the issuing CA acquires the subject CA's public 2458 key from some repository, verifies it via some out-of-band mechanism, 2459 and creates and publishes the cross-certificate without the subject 2460 CA's explicit involvement. This model may be perfectly legitimate for 2461 many environments, but since it does not require any protocol message 2462 exchanges, its detailed description is outside the scope of this 2463 specification.) 2465 4.7 End entity initialization 2467 As with CAs, end entities must be initialized. Initialization of end 2468 entities requires at least two steps: 2470 - acquisition of PKI information 2471 - out-of-band verification of one root-CA public key 2473 (other possible steps include the retrieval of trust condition 2474 information and/or out-of-band verification of other CA public keys). 2476 4.7.1 Acquisition of PKI information 2478 The information REQUIRED is: 2480 - the current root-CA public key 2481 - (if the certifying CA is not a root-CA) the certification path 2482 from the root CA to the certifying CA together with appropriate 2483 revocation lists 2484 - the algorithms and algorithm parameters which the certifying CA 2485 supports for each relevant usage 2487 Additional information could be required (e.g., supported extensions 2488 or CA policy information) in order to produce a certification request 2489 which will be successful. However, for simplicity we do not mandate 2490 that the end entity acquires this information via the PKI messages. 2491 The end result is simply that some certification requests may fail 2492 (e.g., if the end entity wants to generate its own encryption key but 2493 the CA doesn't allow that). 2495 The required information MAY be acquired as described in Section 4.5. 2497 4.7.2 Out-of-Band Verification of Root-CA Key 2499 An end entity must securely possess the public key of its root CA. 2500 One method to achieve this is to provide the end entity with the CA's 2501 self-certificate fingerprint via some secure "out-of-band" means. The 2502 end entity can then securely use the CA's self-certificate. 2504 See Section 4.1 for further details. 2506 4.8 Certificate Request 2508 An initialized end entity MAY request an additional certificate at any 2509 time (for any purpose). This request will be made using the 2510 certification request (cr) message. If the end entity already 2511 possesses a signing key pair (with a corresponding verification 2512 certificate), then this cr message will typically be protected by the 2513 entity's digital signature. The CA returns the new certificate (if 2514 the request is successful) in a CertRepMessage. 2516 4.9 Key Update 2518 When a key pair is due to expire the relevant end entity MAY request 2519 a key update - that is, it MAY request that the CA issue a new 2520 certificate for a new key pair (or, in certain circumstances, a new 2521 certificate for the same key pair). The request is made using a key 2522 update request (kur) message (referred to, in some environments, as a 2523 "Certificate Update" operation). If the end entity already possesses 2524 a signing key pair (with a corresponding verification certificate), 2525 then this message will typically be protected by the entity's digital 2526 signature. The CA returns the new certificate (if the request is 2527 successful) in a key update response (kup) message, which is 2528 syntactically identical to a CertRepMessage. 2530 5. Version Negotiation 2532 This section defines version negotiation used to support older 2533 protocols between client and servers. 2535 If a client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the server 2536 (e.g. from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-band 2537 means) then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest version 2538 supported by both it and the server. If a client does not know what 2539 version(s) the server supports then it MUST send a PKIMessage using 2540 the highest version it supports. 2542 If a server receives a message with a version that it supports, then 2543 the version of the response message MUST be the same as the received 2544 version. If a server receives a message with a version higher or 2545 lower than it supports, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsg 2546 with the unsupportedVersion bit set (in the failureInfo field of the 2547 pKIStatusInfo). If the received version is higher than the highest 2548 supported version then the version in the error message MUST be the 2549 highest version the server supports; if the received version is lower 2550 than the lowest supported version then the version in the error 2551 message MUST be the lowest version the server supports. 2553 If a client gets back an ErrorMsgContent with the unsupportedVersion 2554 bit set and a version it supports, then it MAY retry the request with 2555 that version. 2557 5.1 Supporting RFC 2510 implementations 2559 RFC 2510 did not specify the behaviour of implementations receiving 2560 versions they did not understand since there was only one version in 2561 existence. With the introduction of the present revision of the 2562 specification, the following versioning behaviour is recommended. 2564 5.1.1 Clients talking to RFC 2510 servers 2566 If, after sending a cmp2000 message, a client receives an 2567 ErrorMsgContent with a version of cmp1999 then it MUST abort the 2568 current transaction. It MAY subsequently retry the transaction 2569 using version cmp1999 messages. 2571 If client receives a non-error PKIMessage with a version of cmp1999 2572 then it MAY decide to continue the transaction (if the transaction 2573 hasn't finished) using RFC 2510 semantics. If it does not choose to 2574 do so and the transaction is not finished, then it MUST abort the 2575 transaction and send an ErrorMsgContent with a version of cmp1999. 2577 5.1.2 Servers receiving version cmp1999 PKIMessages 2579 If a server receives a version cmp1999 message it MAY revert to RFC 2580 2510 behaviour and respond with version cmp1999 messages. If it does 2581 not choose to do so, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsgContent as 2582 described above in Section 5. 2584 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 2586 This entire memo is about security mechanisms. 2588 Some cryptographic considerations are worth explicitly spelling out. In 2589 the protocols specified above, when an end entity is required to 2590 prove possession of a decryption key, it is effectively challenged to 2591 decrypt something (its own certificate). This scheme (and many 2592 others!) could be vulnerable to an attack if the possessor of the 2593 decryption key in question could be fooled into decrypting an 2594 arbitrary challenge and returning the cleartext to an attacker. 2595 Although in this specification a number of other failures in security 2596 are required in order for this attack to succeed, it is conceivable 2597 that some future services (e.g., notary, trusted time) could 2598 potentially be vulnerable to such attacks. For this reason we re- 2599 iterate the general rule that implementations should be very careful 2600 about decrypting arbitrary "ciphertext" and revealing recovered 2601 "plaintext" since such a practice can lead to serious security 2602 vulnerabilities. 2604 Note also that exposing a private key to the CA/RA as a proof-of- 2605 possession technique can carry some security risks (depending upon 2606 whether or not the CA/RA can be trusted to handle such material 2607 appropriately). Implementers are advised to exercise caution in 2608 selecting and using this particular POP mechanism. 2610 A small subgroup attack during a Diffie-Hellman key exchange may be 2611 carried out as follows. A malicious end entity may deliberately 2612 choose D-H parameters that enable him/her to derive (a significant 2613 number of bits of) the D-H private key of the CA during a key 2614 archival or key recovery operation. Armed with this knowledge, the 2615 EE would then be able to retrieve the decryption private key of 2616 another unsuspecting end entity, EE2, during EE2's legitimate key 2617 archival or key recovery operation with that CA. In order to avoid 2618 the possibility of such an attack, two courses of action are 2619 available. (1) The CA may generate a fresh D-H key pair to be used 2620 as a protocol encryption key pair for each EE with which it 2621 interacts. (2) The CA may enter into a key validation protocol (not 2622 specified in this document) with each requesting end entity to ensure 2623 that the EE's protocol encryption key pair will not facilitate this 2624 attack. Option (1) is clearly simpler (requiring no extra protocol 2625 exchanges from either party) and is therefore RECOMMENDED. 2627 References 2629 [COR95] ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 21, Technical Corrigendum 2 to ISO/IEC 2630 9594-8: 1990 & 1993 (1995:E), July 1995. 2632 [MvOV97] A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, S. Vanstone, "Handbook of 2633 Applied Cryptography", CRC Press, 1997. 2635 [PKCS7] RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards 2636 (PKCS)", RSA Data Security Inc., Redwood City, California, 2637 November 1993 Release. 2639 [PKCS10] RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards 2640 (PKCS)", RSA Data Security Inc., Redwood City, California, 2641 November 1993 Release. 2643 [PKCS11] RSA Laboratories, The Public-Key Cryptography Standards - 2644 "PKCS #11 v2.10: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard", 2645 RSA Security Inc., December 1999. 2647 [RFC1766] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of Languages", 2648 RFC 1766, March 1995. 2650 [RFC1847] Galvin, J., Murphy, S. Crocker, S. and N. Freed, "Security 2651 Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and Multipart/ 2652 Encrypted", RFC 1847, October 1995. 2654 [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed 2655 Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 2656 1997. 2658 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 2659 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 2661 [RFC2202] Cheng, P. and R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC- 2662 SHA-1", RFC 2202, September 1997. 2664 [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, A Transformation Format of ISO 10646", 2665 RFC 2279, January 1998. 2667 [RFC2482] Whistler, K., Adams, G., "Language Tagging in Unicode 2668 Plain Text", RFC 2482, January 1999. 2670 [rfc2511bis] Myers, M., Adams, C., Solo, D. and D. Kemp, "Certificate 2671 Request Message Format", Internet Draft, work in progress 2672 (see also Appendix D in this specification for some 2673 behavioral clarifications to the rfc2511bis ASN.1 module 2674 definition). 2676 [RFC2559] Boeyen, S., Howes, T., Richard, P., "Internet X.509 2677 Public Key Infrastructure, Operational Protocols: LDAPv2", 2678 RFC 2559, April 1999. 2680 [RFC2585] Housley, R., Hoffman, P., "Internet X.509 Public Key 2681 Infrastructure, Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP", 2682 RFC 2585, May 1999. 2684 [RFC3066] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of Languages", 2685 RFC 3066, January, 2001. 2687 [X509-AM] ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 21, Draft Amendments DAM 4 to ISO/IEC 2688 9594-2, DAM 2 to ISO/IEC 9594-6, DAM 1 to ISO/IEC 9594-7, 2689 and DAM 1 to ISO/IEC 9594-8 on Certificate Extensions, 1 2690 December, 1996. 2692 Acknowledgements 2694 The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of various 2695 members of the IETF PKIX Working Group and the ICSA CA-talk mailing 2696 list (a list solely devoted to discussing CMP interoperability 2697 efforts). Many of these contributions significantly clarified and 2698 improved the utility of this specification. 2700 Authors' Addresses 2702 Carlisle Adams 2703 Entrust, Inc. 2704 1000 Innovation Drive, 2705 Ottawa, Ontario 2706 Canada K2K 3E7 2708 EMail: cadams@entrust.com 2710 Stephen Farrell 2711 Baltimore Technologies 2712 39 Parkgate Street 2713 Dublin 8 2714 IRELAND 2716 EMail: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie 2718 APPENDIX A: Reasons for the presence of RAs 2720 The reasons which justify the presence of an RA can be split into 2721 those which are due to technical factors and those which are 2722 organizational in nature. Technical reasons include the following. 2724 -If hardware tokens are in use, then not all end entities will have 2725 the equipment needed to initialize these; the RA equipment can 2726 include the necessary functionality (this may also be a matter of 2727 policy). 2729 -Some end entities may not have the capability to publish 2730 certificates; again, the RA may be suitably placed for this. 2732 -The RA will be able to issue signed revocation requests on behalf 2733 of end entities associated with it, whereas the end entity may not 2734 be able to do this (if the key pair is completely lost). 2736 Some of the organizational reasons which argue for the presence of an 2737 RA are the following. 2739 -It may be more cost effective to concentrate functionality in the 2740 RA equipment than to supply functionality to all end entities 2741 (especially if special token initialization equipment is to be 2742 used). 2744 -Establishing RAs within an organization can reduce the number of 2745 CAs required, which is sometimes desirable. 2747 -RAs may be better placed to identify people with their 2748 "electronic" names, especially if the CA is physically remote from 2749 the end entity. 2751 -For many applications there will already be in place some 2752 administrative structure so that candidates for the role of RA are 2753 easy to find (which may not be true of the CA). 2755 Appendix B. PKI Management Message Profiles (REQUIRED). 2757 This appendix contains detailed profiles for those PKIMessages which 2758 MUST be supported by conforming implementations (see Section 4). 2760 Profiles for the PKIMessages used in the following PKI management 2761 operations are provided: 2763 - initial registration/certification 2764 - basic authenticated scheme 2765 - certificate request 2766 - key update 2768 B1. General Rules for interpretation of these profiles. 2770 1. Where OPTIONAL or DEFAULT fields are not mentioned in individual 2771 profiles, they SHOULD be absent from the relevant message (i.e., a 2772 receiver can validly reject a message containing such fields as 2773 being syntactically incorrect). 2774 Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value 2775 (e.g., in this version of the specification, pvno is always 2). 2776 2. Where structures occur in more than one message, they are 2777 separately profiled as appropriate. 2778 3. The algorithmIdentifiers from PKIMessage structures are profiled 2779 separately. 2780 4. A "special" X.500 DN is called the "NULL-DN"; this means a DN 2781 containing a zero-length SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedNames 2782 (its DER encoding is then '3000'H). 2783 5. Where a GeneralName is required for a field but no suitable 2784 value is available (e.g., an end entity produces a request before 2785 knowing its name) then the GeneralName is to be an X.500 NULL-DN 2786 (i.e., the Name field of the CHOICE is to contain a NULL-DN). 2787 This special value can be called a "NULL-GeneralName". 2788 6. Where a profile omits to specify the value for a GeneralName 2789 then the NULL-GeneralName value is to be present in the relevant 2790 PKIMessage field. This occurs with the sender field of the 2791 PKIHeader for some messages. 2792 7. Where any ambiguity arises due to naming of fields, the profile 2793 names these using a "dot" notation (e.g., "certTemplate.subject" 2794 means the subject field within a field called certTemplate). 2795 8. Where a "SEQUENCE OF types" is part of a message, a zero-based 2796 array notation is used to describe fields within the SEQUENCE OF 2797 (e.g., crm[0].certReq.certTemplate.subject refers to a 2798 subfield of the first CertReqMsg contained in a request message). 2799 9. All PKI message exchanges in Sections B4-B6 require a certConf 2800 message to be sent by the initiating entity and a PKIConfirm to be 2801 sent by the responding entity. The PKIConfirm is not included in 2802 some of the profiles given since its body is NULL and its header 2803 contents are clear from the context. Any authenticated means can 2804 be used for the protectionAlg (e.g., password-based MAC, if shared 2805 secret information is known, or signature). 2807 B2. Algorithm Use Profile 2809 The following table contains definitions of algorithm uses within PKI 2810 management protocols. The columns in the table are: 2812 Name: an identifier used for message profiles 2813 Use: description of where and for what the algorithm is used 2814 Mandatory: an AlgorithmIdentifier which MUST be supported by 2815 conforming implementations 2816 Others: alternatives to the mandatory AlgorithmIdentifier 2818 Name Use Mandatory Others 2820 MSG_SIG_ALG Protection of PKI DSA/SHA-1 RSA/MD5, 2821 messages using signature ECDSA, ... 2822 MSG_MAC_ALG protection of PKI PasswordBasedMac HMAC, 2823 messages using MACing X9.9... 2824 SYM_PENC_ALG symmetric encryption of 3-DES (3-key- RC5, 2825 an end entity's private EDE, CBC mode) CAST-128... 2826 key where symmetric 2827 key is distributed 2828 out-of-band 2829 PROT_ENC_ALG asymmetric algorithm D-H RSA, 2830 used for encryption of ECDH, ... 2831 (symmetric keys for 2832 encryption of) private 2833 keys transported in 2834 PKIMessages 2835 PROT_SYM_ALG symmetric encryption 3-DES (3-key- RC5, 2836 algorithm used for EDE, CBC mode) CAST-128... 2837 encryption of private 2838 key bits (a key of this 2839 type is encrypted using 2840 PROT_ENC_ALG) 2842 Mandatory AlgorithmIdentifiers and Specifications: 2844 DSA/SHA-1: 2845 AlgId: {1 2 840 10040 4 3}; 2846 NIST, FIPS PUB 186: Digital Signature Standard, 1994; 2847 Public Modulus size: 1024 bits. 2849 PasswordBasedMac: 2850 {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}, with SHA-1 {1 3 14 3 2 26} as the owf 2851 parameter and HMAC-SHA1 {1 3 6 1 5 5 8 1 2} as the mac parameter; 2852 (this specification), along with 2853 NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure Hash Standard, April 1995; 2854 H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message 2855 Authentication", Internet Request for Comments 2104, February 1997. 2856 HMAC key size: 160 bits (i.e., "K" = "H" in Section 3.1.3, "Shared 2857 secret information") 2859 3-DES: 2860 {1 2 840 113549 3 7}; 2861 (used in RSA's BSAFE and in S/MIME). 2863 D-H: 2864 AlgId: {1 2 840 10046 2 1}; 2865 ANSI X9.42; 2866 Public Modulus Size: 1024 bits. 2867 DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE { 2868 p INTEGER, -- odd prime, p=jq +1 2869 g INTEGER, -- generator, g^q = 1 mod p 2870 q INTEGER, -- prime factor of p-1 2871 j INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- cofactor, j>=2 2872 validationParms ValidationParms OPTIONAL 2873 } 2875 ValidationParms ::= SEQUENCE { 2876 seed BIT STRING, -- seed for prime generation 2877 pGenCounter INTEGER -- parameter verification 2878 } 2880 B3. Proof of Possession Profile 2882 POP fields for use (in signature field of pop field of 2883 ProofOfPossession structure) when proving possession of a private 2884 signing key which corresponds to a public verification key for which 2885 a certificate has been requested. 2887 Field Value Comment 2889 algorithmIdentifier MSG_SIG_ALG only signature protection is 2890 allowed for this proof 2891 signature present bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG 2893 <> 2898 Not every CA/RA will do Proof-of-Possession (of signing key, 2899 decryption key, or key agreement key) in the PKIX-CMP in-band 2900 certification request protocol (how POP is done MAY ultimately be a 2901 policy issue which is made explicit for any given CA in its 2902 publicized Policy OID and Certification Practice Statement). 2903 However, this specification MANDATES that CA/RA entities MUST do POP 2904 (by some means) as part of the certification process. All end 2905 entities MUST be prepared to provide POP (i.e., these components of 2906 the PKIX-CMP protocol MUST be supported). 2908 B4. Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated Scheme) 2910 An (uninitialized) end entity requests a (first) certificate from a 2911 CA. When the CA responds with a message containing a certificate, the 2912 end entity replies with a certificate confirmation. The CA sends a 2913 PKIConfirm back, closing the transaction. All messages are 2914 authenticated. 2916 This scheme allows the end entity to request certification of a 2917 locally-generated public key (typically a signature key). The end 2918 entity MAY also choose to request the centralized generation and 2919 certification of another key pair (typically an encryption key pair). 2921 Certification may only be requested for one locally generated public 2922 key (for more, use separate PKIMessages). 2924 The end entity MUST support proof-of-possession of the private key 2925 associated with the locally-generated public key. 2927 Preconditions: 2929 1. The end entity can authenticate the CA's signature based on 2930 out-of-band means 2931 2. The end entity and the CA share a symmetric MACing key 2933 Message flow: 2934 Step# End entity PKI 2935 1 format ir 2936 2 -> ir -> 2937 3 handle ir 2938 4 format ip 2939 5 <- ip <- 2940 6 handle ip 2941 7 format certConf 2942 8 -> certConf -> 2943 9 handle certConf 2944 10 format PKIConf 2945 11 <- PKIConf <- 2946 12 handle PKIConf 2948 For this profile, we mandate that the end entity MUST include all 2949 (i.e., one or two) CertReqMsg in a single PKIMessage and that the PKI 2950 (CA) MUST produce a single response PKIMessage which contains the 2951 complete response (i.e., including the OPTIONAL second key pair, if 2952 it was requested and if centralized key generation is supported). For 2953 simplicity, we also mandate that this message MUST be the final one 2954 (i.e., no use of "waiting" status value). 2956 The end entity has an out of band interaction with the CA/RA. This 2957 transaction established the shared secret, the referenceNumber and 2958 OPTIONALLY the distinguished name used for both sender and subject 2959 name in the certificate template. It is RECOMMENDED that the shared 2960 secret be at least 12 characters long. 2962 ir: 2963 Field Value 2965 recipient CA name 2966 -- the name of the CA who is being asked to produce a certificate 2967 protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG 2968 -- only MAC protection is allowed for this request, based on 2969 -- initial authentication key 2970 senderKID referenceNum 2971 -- the reference number which the CA has previously issued to 2972 -- the end entity (together with the MACing key) 2973 transactionID present 2974 -- implementation-specific value, meaningful to end entity. 2975 -- [If already in use at the CA then a rejection message MUST be 2976 -- produced by the CA] 2977 senderNonce present 2978 -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits 2979 freeText any valid value 2981 body ir (CertReqMessages) 2982 only one or two CertReqMsg 2983 are allowed 2984 -- if more certificates are required requests MUST be packaged in 2985 -- separate PKIMessages 2986 CertReqMsg one or two present 2987 -- see below for details, note: crm[0] means the first (which MUST 2988 -- be present), crm[1] means the second (which is OPTIONAL, and used 2989 -- to ask for a centrally-generated key) 2991 crm[0].certReq. fixed value of zero 2992 certReqId 2993 -- this is the index of the template within the message 2994 crm[0].certReq present 2995 certTemplate 2996 -- MUST include subject public key value, otherwise unconstrained 2997 crm[0].pop... optionally present if public key 2998 POPOSigningKey from crm[0].certReq.certTemplate is 2999 a signing key 3000 -- proof of possession MAY be required in this exchange (see Section 3001 -- B3 for details) 3002 crm[0].certReq. optionally present 3003 controls.archiveOptions 3004 -- the end entity MAY request that the locally-generated private key 3005 -- be archived 3006 crm[0].certReq. optionally present 3007 controls.publicationInfo 3008 -- the end entity MAY ask for publication of resulting cert. 3010 crm[1].certReq fixed value of one 3011 certReqId 3012 -- the index of the template within the message 3013 crm[1].certReq present 3014 certTemplate 3015 -- MUST NOT include actual public key bits, otherwise unconstrained 3016 -- (e.g., the names need not be the same as in crm[0]). Note that 3017 -- subjectPublicKeyInfo MAY be present and contain an 3018 -- AlgorithmIdentifier followed by a zero-length BIT STRING for the 3019 -- subjectPublicKey if it is desired to inform the CA/RA of algorithm 3020 -- and parameter preferences regarding the to-be-generated key pair. 3021 crm[1].certReq. present [object identifier MUST be PROT_ENC_ALG] 3022 controls.protocolEncrKey 3023 -- if centralized key generation is supported by this CA, this 3024 -- short-term asymmetric encryption key (generated by the end entity) 3025 -- will be used by the CA to encrypt (a symmetric key used to encrypt) 3026 -- a private key generated by the CA on behalf of the end entity 3027 crm[1].certReq. optionally present 3028 controls.archiveOptions 3029 crm[1].certReq. optionally present 3030 controls.publicationInfo 3031 protection present 3032 -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG 3034 ip: 3035 Field Value 3037 sender CA name 3038 -- the name of the CA who produced the message 3039 messageTime present 3040 -- time at which CA produced message 3041 protectionAlg MS_MAC_ALG 3042 -- only MAC protection is allowed for this response 3043 senderKID referenceNum 3044 -- the reference number which the CA has previously issued to the 3045 -- end entity (together with the MACing key) 3046 transactionID present 3047 -- value from corresponding ir message 3048 senderNonce present 3049 -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits 3050 recipNonce present 3051 -- value from senderNonce in corresponding ir message 3052 freeText any valid value 3053 body ip (CertRepMessage) 3054 contains exactly one response 3055 for each request 3056 -- The PKI (CA) responds to either one or two requests as appropriate. 3057 -- crc[0] denotes the first (always present); crc[1] denotes the 3058 -- second (only present if the ir message contained two requests and 3059 -- if the CA supports centralized key generation). 3060 crc[0]. fixed value of zero 3061 certReqId 3062 -- MUST contain the response to the first request in the corresponding 3063 -- ir message 3064 crc[0].status. present, positive values allowed: 3065 status "accepted", "grantedWithMods" 3066 negative values allowed: 3067 "rejection" 3068 crc[0].status. present if and only if 3069 failInfo crc[0].status.status is "rejection" 3070 crc[0]. present if and only if 3071 certifiedKeyPair crc[0].status.status is 3072 "accepted" or "grantedWithMods" 3073 certificate present unless end entity's public 3074 key is an encryption key and POP 3075 is done in this in-band exchange 3076 encryptedCert present if and only if end entity's 3077 public key is an encryption key and 3078 POP done in this in-band exchange 3079 publicationInfo optionally present 3080 -- indicates where certificate has been published (present at 3081 -- discretion of CA) 3083 crc[1]. fixed value of one 3084 certReqId 3085 -- MUST contain the response to the second request in the 3086 -- corresponding ir message 3087 crc[1].status. present, positive values allowed: 3088 status "accepted", "grantedWithMods" 3089 negative values allowed: 3090 "rejection" 3091 crc[1].status. present if and only if 3092 failInfo crc[0].status.status is "rejection" 3093 crc[1]. present if and only if 3094 certifiedKeyPair crc[0].status.status is "accepted" 3095 or "grantedWithMods" 3096 certificate present 3097 privateKey present (see Appendix D) 3098 publicationInfo optionally present 3099 -- indicates where certificate has been published (present at 3100 -- discretion of CA) 3101 protection present 3102 -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG 3103 extraCerts optionally present 3104 -- the CA MAY provide additional certificates to the end entity 3106 certConf: 3107 Field Value 3109 sender present 3110 -- same as in ir 3111 recipient CA name 3112 -- the name of the CA who was asked to produce a certificate 3113 transactionID present 3114 -- value from corresponding ir and ip messages 3115 senderNonce present 3116 -- 128 (pseudo-) random bits 3117 recipNonce present 3118 -- value from senderNonce in corresponding ip message 3119 protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG 3120 -- only MAC protection is allowed for this message. The MAC is 3121 -- based on the initial auth'n key shared between the EE and the CA. 3122 senderKID referenceNum 3123 -- the reference number which the CA has previously issued to the 3124 -- end entity (together with the MACing key) 3125 body certConf 3126 -- see Section 3.3.18 for the contents of the certConf fields 3127 -- Note: two CertStatus structures are required if both an 3128 -- encryption and a signing certificate were sent. 3129 protection present 3130 -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG 3132 PKIConf: 3133 Field Value 3135 sender present 3136 -- same as in ip 3137 recipient present 3138 -- sender name from certConf 3139 transactionID present 3140 -- value from certConf message 3141 senderNonce present 3142 -- 128 (pseudo-) random bits 3143 recipNonce present 3144 -- value from senderNonce from certConf message 3145 protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG 3146 -- only MAC protection is allowed for this message. 3147 senderKID referenceNum 3148 body PKIConf 3149 protection present 3150 -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG 3152 B5. Certificate Request 3154 An (initialized) end entity requests a certificate from a CA (for any 3155 reason). When the CA responds with a message containing a 3156 certificate, the end entity replies with a certificate confirmation. 3157 The CA replies with a PKIConfirm, to close the transaction. All 3158 messages are authenticated. 3160 The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in Section 3161 B4 with the following exceptions: 3163 - sender name SHOULD be present 3164 - protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY 3165 also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm and 3166 PKIConfirm messages; 3167 - senderKID and recipKID are only present if required for message 3168 verification; 3169 - body is cr or cp; 3170 - body may contain one or two CertReqMsg structures, but either 3171 CertReqMsg may be used to request certification of a locally- 3172 generated public key or a centrally-generated public key (i.e., 3173 the position-dependence requirement of Section B4 is removed); 3174 - protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg 3175 field. 3177 B6. Key Update Request 3179 An (initialized) end entity requests a certificate from a CA (to 3180 update the key pair and/or corresponding certificate that it already 3181 possesses). When the CA responds with a message containing a 3182 certificate, the end entity replies with a certificate confirmation. 3183 The CA replies with a PKIConfirm, to close the transaction. All 3184 messages are authenticated. 3186 The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in Section 3187 B4 with the following exceptions: 3189 - sender name SHOULD be present 3190 - protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY 3191 also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm and 3192 PKIConfirm messages; 3193 - senderKID and recipKID are only present if required for message 3194 verification; 3195 - body is kur or kup; 3196 - body may contain one or two CertReqMsg structures, but either 3197 CertReqMsg may be used to request certification of a locally- 3198 generated public key or a centrally-generated public key (i.e., 3199 the position-dependence requirement of Section B4 is removed); 3200 - protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg 3201 field; 3202 - regCtrl OldCertId SHOULD be used (unless it is clear to both 3203 sender and receiver - by means not specified in this document - 3204 that it is not needed). 3206 Appendix C. PKI Management Message Profiles (OPTIONAL). 3208 This appendix contains detailed profiles for those PKIMessages which 3209 MAY be supported by implementations (in addition to the messages which 3210 MUST be supported - see Section 4 and Appendix B). 3212 Profiles for the PKIMessages used in the following PKI management 3213 operations are provided: 3215 - root CA key update 3216 - information request/response 3217 - cross-certification request/response (1-way) 3218 - in-band initialization using external identity certificate 3220 <> 3224 - revocation request 3225 - certificate publication 3226 - CRL publication 3228 C1. General Rules for interpretation of these profiles. 3230 (Identical to Appendix B1.) 3232 C2. Algorithm Use Profile 3234 (Identical to Appendix B2.) 3236 C3. "Self-signed" certificates 3238 Profile of how a Certificate structure may be "self-signed". These 3239 structures are used for distribution of "root" CA public keys. This 3240 can occur in one of three ways (see Section 2.4 above for a 3241 description of the use of these structures): 3243 Type Function 3245 newWithNew a true "self-signed" certificate; the contained public 3246 key MUST be usable to verify the signature (though this 3247 provides only integrity and no authentication whatsoever) 3248 oldWithNew previous root CA public key signed with new private key 3249 newWithOld new root CA public key signed with previous private key 3251 <> 3256 C4. Root CA Key Update 3258 A root CA updates its key pair. It then produces a CA key update 3259 announcement message which can be made available (via some 3260 transport mechanism) to the relevant end entities. A confirmation 3261 message is NOT REQUIRED from the end entities. 3263 ckuann message: 3265 Field Value Comment 3267 sender CA name CA name 3268 body ckuann(CAKeyUpdAnnContent) 3269 oldWithNew present see Section C3 above 3270 newWithOld present see Section C3 above 3271 newWithNew present see Section C3 above 3272 extraCerts optionally present can be used to "publish" 3273 certificates (e.g., 3274 certificates signed using 3275 the new private key) 3277 C5. PKI Information request/response 3279 The end entity sends general message to the PKI requesting details 3280 which will be required for later PKI management operations. RA/CA 3281 responds with general response. If an RA generates the response then 3282 it will simply forward the equivalent message which it previously 3283 received from the CA, with the possible addition of certificates 3284 to the extraCerts fields of the PKIMessage. A confirmation message is 3285 NOT REQUIRED from the end entity. 3287 Message Flows: 3289 Step# End entity PKI 3291 1 format genm 3292 2 -> genm -> 3293 3 handle genm 3294 4 produce genp 3295 5 <- genp <- 3296 6 handle genp 3298 genM: 3300 Field Value 3302 recipient CA name 3303 -- the name of the CA as contained in issuerAltName extensions or 3304 -- issuer fields within certificates 3305 protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG 3306 -- any authenticated protection alg. 3307 SenderKID present if required 3308 -- must be present if required for verification of message protection 3309 freeText any valid value 3310 body genr (GenReqContent) 3311 GenMsgContent empty SEQUENCE 3312 -- all relevant information requested 3313 protection present 3314 -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG 3316 genP: 3318 Field Value 3320 sender CA name 3321 -- name of the CA which produced the message 3322 protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG 3323 -- any authenticated protection alg. 3324 senderKID present if required 3325 -- must be present if required for verification of message protection 3326 body genp (GenRepContent) 3327 CAProtEncCert present (object identifier one 3328 of PROT_ENC_ALG), with relevant 3329 value 3330 -- to be used if end entity needs to encrypt information for the CA 3331 -- (e.g., private key for recovery purposes) 3332 SignKeyPairTypes present, with relevant value 3333 -- the set of signature algorithm identifiers which this CA will 3334 -- certify for subject public keys 3335 EncKeyPairTypes present, with relevant value 3336 -- the set of encryption/key agreement algorithm identifiers which 3337 -- this CA will certify for subject public keys 3338 PreferredSymmAlg present (object identifier one 3339 of PROT_SYM_ALG) , with relevant 3340 value 3341 -- the symmetric algorithm which this CA expects to be used in later 3342 -- PKI messages (for encryption) 3343 CAKeyUpdateInfo optionally present, with 3344 relevant value 3345 -- the CA MAY provide information about a relevant root CA key pair 3346 -- using this field (note that this does not imply that the responding 3347 -- CA is the root CA in question) 3349 CurrentCRL optionally present, with relevant value 3350 -- the CA MAY provide a copy of a complete CRL (i.e., fullest possible 3351 -- one) 3352 protection present 3353 -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG 3354 extraCerts optionally present 3355 -- can be used to send some certificates to the end entity. An RA MAY 3356 -- add its certificate here. 3358 C6. Cross certification request/response (1-way) 3360 Creation of a single cross-certificate (i.e., not two at once). The 3361 requesting CA MAY choose who is responsible for publication of the 3362 cross-certificate created by the responding CA through use of the 3363 PKIPublicationInfo control. 3365 Preconditions: 3367 1. Responding CA can verify the origin of the request (possibly 3368 requiring out-of-band means) before processing the request. 3369 2. Requesting CA can authenticate the authenticity of the origin of 3370 the response (possibly requiring out-of-band means) before 3371 processing the response 3373 The use of certificate confirmation and the corresponding server 3374 confirmation is determined by the generalInfo field in the PKIHeader 3375 (see Section 3.1.1). The following profile does not mandate support 3376 for either confirmation. 3378 Message Flows: 3380 Step# Requesting CA Responding CA 3381 1 format ccr 3382 2 -> ccr -> 3383 3 handle ccr 3384 4 produce ccp 3385 5 <- ccp <- 3386 6 handle ccp 3388 ccr: 3389 Field Value 3391 sender Requesting CA name 3392 -- the name of the CA who produced the message 3393 recipient Responding CA name 3394 -- the name of the CA who is being asked to produce a certificate 3395 messageTime time of production of message 3396 -- current time at requesting CA 3397 protectionAlg MSG_SIG_ALG 3398 -- only signature protection is allowed for this request 3399 senderKID present if required 3400 -- must be present if required for verification of message protection 3401 recipKID present if required 3402 -- must be present if required for verification of message protection 3403 transactionID present 3404 -- implementation-specific value, meaningful to requesting CA. 3405 -- [If already in use at responding CA then a rejection message 3406 -- MUST be produced by responding CA] 3407 senderNonce present 3408 -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits 3409 freeText any valid value 3410 body ccr (CertReqMessages) 3411 only one CertReqMsg 3412 allowed 3413 -- if multiple cross certificates are required they MUST be packaged 3414 -- in separate PKIMessages 3415 certTemplate present 3416 -- details follow 3417 version v1 or v3 3418 -- <> 3419 signingAlg present 3420 -- the requesting CA must know in advance with which algorithm it 3421 -- wishes the certificate to be signed 3422 subject present 3423 -- may be NULL-DN only if subjectAltNames extension value proposed 3424 validity present 3425 -- MUST be completely specified (i.e., both fields present) 3426 issuer present 3427 -- may be NULL-DN only if issuerAltNames extension value proposed 3428 publicKey present 3429 -- the key to be certified (which must be for a signing algorithm) 3430 extensions optionally present 3431 -- a requesting CA must propose values for all extensions which it 3432 -- requires to be in the cross-certificate 3433 POPOSigningKey present 3434 -- see "Proof of possession profile" (Section B3) 3435 protection present 3436 -- bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG 3437 extraCerts optionally present 3438 -- MAY contain any additional certificates that requester wishes 3439 -- to include 3441 ccp: 3442 Field Value 3444 sender Responding CA name 3445 -- the name of the CA who produced the message 3446 recipient Requesting CA name 3447 -- the name of the CA who asked for production of a certificate 3448 messageTime time of production of message 3449 -- current time at responding CA 3450 protectionAlg MSG_SIG_ALG 3451 -- only signature protection is allowed for this message 3452 senderKID present if required 3453 -- must be present if required for verification of message 3454 -- protection 3455 recipKID present if required 3456 transactionID present 3457 -- value from corresponding ccr message 3458 senderNonce present 3459 -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits 3460 recipNonce present 3461 -- senderNonce from corresponding ccr message 3462 freeText any valid value 3463 body ccp (CertRepMessage) 3464 only one CertResponse allowed 3465 -- if multiple cross certificates are required they MUST be packaged 3466 -- in separate PKIMessages 3467 response present 3468 status present 3469 PKIStatusInfo.status present 3470 -- if PKIStatusInfo.status is one of: 3471 -- accepted, or 3472 -- grantedWithMods, 3473 -- then certifiedKeyPair MUST be present and failInfo MUST be absent 3474 failInfo present depending on 3475 PKIStatusInfo.status 3476 -- if PKIStatusInfo.status is: 3477 -- rejection 3478 -- then certifiedKeyPair MUST be absent and failInfo MUST be present 3479 -- and contain appropriate bit settings 3481 certifiedKeyPair present depending on 3482 PKIStatusInfo.status 3483 certificate present depending on 3484 certifiedKeyPair 3485 -- content of actual certificate must be examined by requesting CA 3486 -- before publication 3487 protection present 3488 -- bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG 3489 extraCerts optionally present 3490 -- MAY contain any additional certificates that responder wishes 3491 -- to include 3493 C7. In-band initialization using external identity certificate 3495 An (uninitialized) end entity wishes to initialize into the PKI with 3496 a CA, CA-1. It uses, for authentication purposes, a pre-existing 3497 identity certificate issued by another (external) CA, CA-X. A trust 3498 relationship must already have been established between CA-1 and CA-X 3499 so that CA-1 can validate the EE identity certificate signed by CA-X. 3500 Furthermore, some mechanism must already have been established within 3501 the Personal Security Environment (PSE) of the EE that would allow it 3502 to authenticate and verify PKIMessages signed by CA-1 (as one example, 3503 the PSE may contain a certificate issued for the public key of CA-1, 3504 signed by another CA that the EE trusts on the basis of out-of-band 3505 authentication techniques). 3507 The EE sends an initialization request to start the transaction. 3508 When CA-1 responds with a message containing the new certificate, the 3509 end entity replies with a certificate confirmation. CA-1 replies with 3510 a PKIConfirm to close the transaction. All messages are signed (the EE 3511 messages are signed using the private key corresponding to the public 3512 key in its external identity certificate; the CA-1 messages are signed 3513 using the private key corresponding to the public key in a certificate 3514 that can be chained to a trust anchor in the EE's PSE). 3516 The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in Section 3517 B4 with the following exceptions: 3519 - the EE and CA-1 do not share a symmetric MACing key (i.e., there is 3520 no out-of-band shared secret information between these entities); 3521 - sender name in ir MUST be present (and identical to the subject 3522 name present in the external identity certificate); 3523 - protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be used in all messages; 3524 - external identity cert. MUST be carried in ir extraCerts field 3525 - senderKID and recipKID are not used; 3526 - body is ir or ip; 3527 - protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg 3528 field. 3530 Appendix D: Request Message Behavioral Clarifications 3532 The following definitions are from rfc2511bis. They are included here 3533 in order to codify behavioral clarifications to that request 3534 message; otherwise, all syntax and semantics are identical to rfc2511bis. 3536 CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { 3537 certReqId INTEGER, 3538 certTemplate CertTemplate, 3539 controls Controls OPTIONAL } 3540 -- If certTemplate is an empty SEQUENCE (i.e., all fields omitted), then 3541 -- controls MAY contain the id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate control, specifying 3542 -- a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3 public-key 3543 -- certificate. Conversely, if certTemplate is not empty (i.e., at least 3544 -- one field is present), then controls MUST NOT contain id-regCtrl- 3545 -- altCertTemplate. The new control is defined as follows: 3546 id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-regCtrl 7} 3547 AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue 3549 POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE { 3550 poposkInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL, 3551 algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier, 3552 signature BIT STRING } 3553 -- ********** 3554 -- * For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment given 3555 -- * in rfc2511bis pertains not only to certTemplate, but also to 3556 -- * the altCertTemplate control. That is, 3557 -- ********** 3558 -- * The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the DER-encoded 3559 -- * value of poposkInput (i.e., the "value" OCTETs of the 3560 -- * POPOSigningKeyInput DER). NOTE: If CertReqMsg certReq certTemplate 3561 -- * (or the altCertTemplate control) contains the subject and publicKey 3562 -- * values, then poposkInput MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be 3563 -- * computed on the DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq (or the DER- 3564 -- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate). If certTemplate/altCertTemplate 3565 -- * does not contain both the subject and public key values (i.e., if 3566 -- * it contains only one of these, or neither), then poposkInput MUST 3567 -- * be present and MUST be signed. 3568 -- ********** 3570 POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE { 3571 thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, 3572 -- ********** 3573 -- * the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in 3574 -- * rfc2511bis; it should be "EncryptedValue" (in accordance with 3575 -- * Section 3.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this document makes 3576 -- * the behavioral clarification of specifying that the contents of 3577 -- * "thisMessage" MUST be encoded as an EncryptedValue and then wrapped 3578 -- * in a BIT STRING. This allows the necessary conveyance and protection 3579 -- * of the private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility 3580 -- * with rfc2511bis. 3581 -- ********** 3582 subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage, 3583 dhMAC [2] BIT STRING } 3585 Appendix E: The Use of "Revocation Passphrase" 3587 A revocation request must incorporate suitable security mechanisms, 3588 including proper authentication, in order to reduce the probability of 3589 successful denial-of-service attacks. A digital signature on the request 3590 - MANDATORY to support within this specification if revocation requests 3591 are supported - can provide the authentication required, but there are 3592 circumstances under which an alternative mechanism may be desirable (e.g., 3593 when the private key is no longer accessible and the entity wishes to 3594 request a revocation prior to re-certification of another key pair). In 3595 order to accommodate such circumstances, a PasswordBasedMAC on the 3596 request is also MANDATORY to support within this specification (subject 3597 to local security policy for a given environment) if revocation requests 3598 are supported and if shared secret information can be established 3599 between the requester and the responder prior to the need for revocation. 3601 A mechanism that has seen use in some environments is "revocation 3602 passphrase", in which a value of sufficient entropy (i.e., a relatively 3603 long passphrase rather than a short password) is shared between (only) 3604 the entity and the CA/RA at some point prior to revocation, and this 3605 value is later used to authenticate the revocation request. 3607 In this specification, the following technique to establish shared secret 3608 information (i.e., a revocation passphrase) is OPTIONAL to support. Its 3609 precise use in CMP messages is as follows. 3611 - The OID and value specified in Section 3.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a 3612 GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo field 3613 of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In particular, the 3614 EncryptedValue may be sent in the header of the certConf message that 3615 confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization 3616 request or certificate request message.) This conveys a revocation 3617 passphrase chosen by the entity (i.e., the decrypted bytes of the 3618 encValue field) to the relevant CA/RA; furthermore, the transfer is 3619 accomplished with appropriate confidentiality characteristics (since 3620 the passphrase is encrypted under the CA/RA's protocolEncryptionKey). 3622 - If a CA/RA receives the revocation passphrase (OID and value specified 3623 in Section 3.3.19.9) in a GenMsg, it MUST construct and send a GenRep 3624 message which includes the OID (with absent value) specified in 3625 Section 3.3.19.9. If the CA/RA receives the revocation passphrase 3626 in the generalInfo field of a PKIHeader of any PKIMessage, it MUST 3627 include the OID (with absent value) in the generalInfo field of the 3628 PKIHeader of the corresponding response PKIMessage. If the CA/RA is 3629 unable to return the appropriate response message for any 3630 reason, it MUST send an error message with a status of "rejection" 3631 and, optionally, a failInfo reason set. 3633 - The valueHint field of EncryptedValue MAY contain a key identifier 3634 (chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase itself) to assist 3635 in later retrieval of the correct passphrase (e.g., when the 3636 revocation request is constructed by the entity and received by the 3637 CA/RA). 3639 - The revocation request message is protected by a PasswordBasedMAC, 3640 with the revocation passphrase as the key. If appropriate, the 3641 senderKID field in the PKIHeader MAY contain the value previously 3642 transmitted in valueHint. 3644 Using the technique specified above, the revocation passphrase may be 3645 initially established and updated at any time without requiring extra 3646 messages or out-of-band exchanges. For example, the revocation request 3647 message itself (protected and authenticated through a MAC that uses the 3648 revocation passphrase as a key) may contain in the PKIHeader a new 3649 revocation passphrase to be used for authenticating future revocation 3650 requests for any of the entity's other certificates. In some 3651 environments this may be preferable to mechanisms that reveal the 3652 passphrase in the revocation request message, since this can allow a 3653 denial-of-service attack in which the revealed passphrase is used by 3654 an unauthorized third party to authenticate revocation requests on the 3655 entity's other certificates. However, because the passphrase is not 3656 revealed in the request message, there is no requirement that the 3657 passphrase must always be updated when a revocation request is made 3658 (that is, the same passphrase MAY be used by an entity to authenticate 3659 revocation requests for different certificates at different times). 3661 Furthermore, the above technique can provide strong cryptographic 3662 protection over the entire revocation request message even when a 3663 digital signature is not used. Techniques that do authentication of 3664 the revocation request by simply revealing the revocation passphrase 3665 typically do not provide cryptographic protection over the fields of 3666 the request message (so that a request for revocation of one certificate 3667 may be modified by an unauthorized third party to a request for 3668 revocation of another certificate for that entity). 3670 Appendix F: "Compilable" ASN.1 Module using 1988 Syntax 3672 PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 3673 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2000(16)} 3675 DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= 3677 BEGIN 3679 -- EXPORTS ALL -- 3681 IMPORTS 3683 Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, AlgorithmIdentifier, 3684 UTF8String -- if required; otherwise, comment out 3685 FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) 3686 dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 3687 id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)} 3689 GeneralName, KeyIdentifier 3690 FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) 3691 dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 3692 id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)} 3694 CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedValue, CertId, 3695 CertReqMessages 3696 FROM PKIXCRMF {iso(1) identified-organization(3) 3697 dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 3698 id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf(5)} 3699 -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in 3700 -- Appendix D of this specification 3702 CertificationRequest 3703 FROM PKCS-10 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 3704 pkcs(1) pkcs-10(10) modules(1) pkcs-10(1)} 3705 -- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT 3706 -- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include 3707 -- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module 3709 ; 3711 -- the rest of the module contains locally-defined OIDs and constructs -- 3713 CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { 3714 x509v3PKCert Certificate 3715 } 3717 -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the standard 3718 -- X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the possibility of future 3719 -- certificate types (such as X.509 attribute certificates, WAP WTLS 3720 -- certificates, or other kinds of certificates) within this 3721 -- certificate management protocol, should a need ever arise to support 3722 -- such generality. Those implementations that do not foresee a need to 3723 -- ever support other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out 3724 -- the above structure and "un-comment" the following one prior to 3725 -- compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that interoperability with 3726 -- implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by this change.) 3728 -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate 3730 PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 3731 header PKIHeader, 3732 body PKIBody, 3733 protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, 3734 extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL 3735 } 3737 PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage 3739 PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { 3740 pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2) }, 3741 sender GeneralName, 3742 -- identifies the sender 3743 recipient GeneralName, 3744 -- identifies the intended recipient 3746 messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, 3747 -- time of production of this message (used when sender 3748 -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e., 3749 -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt) 3750 protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 3751 -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits 3752 senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, 3753 recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, 3754 -- to identify specific keys used for protection 3755 transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 3756 -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in 3757 -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf messages 3758 senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 3759 recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 3760 -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce 3761 -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce 3762 -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by 3763 -- the intended recipient of this message 3764 freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, 3765 -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions 3766 -- (this field is intended for human consumption) 3767 generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 3768 InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL 3769 -- this may be used to convey context-specific information 3770 -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) 3771 } 3773 PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String 3774 -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC2279] (note: each UTF8String 3775 -- MAY include an RFC 1766/RFC 3066 language tag to indicate the 3776 -- language of the contained text - see [RFC2482] for details) 3778 PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements 3779 ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request 3780 ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response 3781 cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request 3782 cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response 3783 p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [PKCS10] 3784 popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge 3785 popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response 3786 kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request 3787 kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response 3788 krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request 3789 krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response 3790 rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request 3791 rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response 3793 ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request 3794 ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response 3795 ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann. 3796 cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann. 3797 rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann. 3798 crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement 3799 pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation 3800 nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message 3801 genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message 3802 genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response 3803 error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message 3804 certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm 3805 pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request 3806 pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response 3807 } 3809 PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING 3811 ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { 3812 header PKIHeader, 3813 body PKIBody 3814 } 3816 id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13} 3817 PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { 3818 salt OCTET STRING, 3819 -- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes 3820 -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment 3821 -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks 3822 owf AlgorithmIdentifier, 3823 -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) 3824 iterationCount INTEGER, 3825 -- number of times the OWF is applied 3826 -- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes 3827 -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment 3828 -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks 3829 mac AlgorithmIdentifier 3830 -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], 3831 } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) 3833 id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30} 3834 DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { 3835 owf AlgorithmIdentifier, 3836 -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) 3837 mac AlgorithmIdentifier 3838 -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], 3839 } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) 3841 NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages 3843 PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { 3844 accepted (0), 3845 -- you got exactly what you asked for 3846 grantedWithMods (1), 3848 -- you got something like what you asked for; the 3849 -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences 3850 rejection (2), 3851 -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message 3852 waiting (3), 3853 -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to hear 3854 -- more later (note: proper handling of this status response MAY 3855 -- use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified in Section 3.3.22; 3856 -- alternatively, polling in the underlying transport layer MAY 3857 -- have some utility in this regard) 3858 revocationWarning (4), 3859 -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is 3860 -- imminent 3861 revocationNotification (5), 3862 -- notification that a revocation has occurred 3863 keyUpdateWarning (6) 3864 -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in 3865 -- CertReqMsg 3866 } 3868 PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { 3869 -- since we can fail in more than one way! 3870 -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required. 3871 badAlg (0), 3872 -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier 3873 badMessageCheck (1), 3874 -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify) 3875 badRequest (2), 3876 -- transaction not permitted or supported 3877 badTime (3), 3878 -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, 3879 -- as defined by local policy 3880 badCertId (4), 3881 -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria 3882 badDataFormat (5), 3883 -- the data submitted has the wrong format 3884 wrongAuthority (6), 3885 -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the 3886 -- one creating the response token 3887 incorrectData (7), 3888 -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services) 3889 missingTimeStamp (8), 3890 -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there (by policy) 3891 badPOP (9), 3892 -- the proof-of-possession failed 3893 certRevoked (10), 3894 -- the certificate has already been revoked 3895 certConfirmed (11), 3896 -- the certificate has already been confirmed 3897 wrongIntegrity (12), 3898 -- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or 3899 -- vice versa 3900 badRecipientNonce (13), 3901 -- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value 3903 timeNotAvailable (14), 3904 -- the TSA's time source is not available 3905 unacceptedPolicy (15), 3906 -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA. 3907 unacceptedExtension (16), 3908 -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA. 3909 addInfoNotAvailable (17), 3910 -- the additional information requested could not be understood 3911 -- or is not available 3912 badSenderNonce (18), 3913 -- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size 3914 badCertTemplate (19), 3915 -- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information 3916 signerNotTrusted (20), 3917 -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted 3918 transactionIdInUse (21), 3919 -- the transaction identifier is already in use 3920 unsupportedVersion (22), 3921 -- the version of the message is not supported 3922 notAuthorized (23), 3923 -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding request 3924 -- or perform the preceding action 3925 systemUnavail (24), 3926 -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability 3927 systemFailure (25), 3928 -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure 3929 duplicateCertReq (26) 3930 -- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate certificate 3931 -- already exists 3932 } 3934 PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 3935 status PKIStatus, 3936 statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, 3937 failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL 3938 } 3940 OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate 3942 OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE { 3943 hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 3944 certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL, 3945 hashVal BIT STRING 3946 -- hashVal is calculated over DER encoding of the 3947 -- subjectPublicKey field of the corresponding cert. 3948 } 3950 POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge 3951 -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the 3952 -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). 3954 Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { 3955 owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 3956 -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in any 3957 -- subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if omitted, 3958 -- then the owf used in the immediately preceding Challenge is 3959 -- to be used). 3960 witness OCTET STRING, 3961 -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a 3962 -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different 3963 -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.] 3964 challenge OCTET STRING 3965 -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. 3966 -- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as 3967 -- Rand ::= SEQUENCE { 3968 -- int INTEGER, 3969 -- - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above) 3970 -- sender GeneralName 3971 -- - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) 3972 -- } 3973 } 3975 POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER 3976 -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the 3977 -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The 3978 -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the 3979 -- corresponding Challenge. 3981 CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 3982 caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, 3983 response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse 3984 } 3986 CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { 3987 certReqId INTEGER, 3988 -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value 3989 -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the 3990 -- corresponding request) 3991 status PKIStatusInfo, 3992 certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, 3993 rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL 3994 -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined 3995 -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [rfc2511bis] 3996 } 3998 CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { 3999 certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, 4000 privateKey [0] EncryptedValue OPTIONAL, 4001 -- see [rfc2511bis] for comment on encoding 4002 publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL 4003 } 4005 CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { 4006 certificate [0] CMPCertificate, 4007 encryptedCert [1] EncryptedValue 4008 } 4010 KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 4011 status PKIStatusInfo, 4012 newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, 4013 caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 4014 CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, 4015 keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 4016 CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL 4017 } 4019 RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails 4021 RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { 4022 certDetails CertTemplate, 4023 -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about 4024 -- the cert. for which revocation is requested 4025 -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available) 4026 crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL 4027 -- requested crlEntryExtensions 4028 } 4030 RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 4032 status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo, 4033 -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent 4034 revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL, 4035 -- IDs for which revocation was requested (same order as status) 4036 crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL 4037 -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) 4038 } 4040 CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { 4041 oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv 4042 newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv 4043 newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv 4044 } 4046 CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate 4048 RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { 4049 status PKIStatus, 4050 certId CertId, 4051 willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime, 4052 badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, 4053 crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL 4054 -- extra CRL details(e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) 4055 } 4057 CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList 4059 CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus 4061 CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { 4062 certHash OCTET STRING, 4063 -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm 4064 -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature 4065 certReqId INTEGER, 4066 -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep 4067 statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL 4068 } 4070 PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL 4072 InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { 4073 infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 4074 infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL 4075 } 4076 -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited to, 4077 -- the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as 4078 -- appropriate for a given environment): 4079 -- 4080 -- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1} 4081 -- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate 4082 -- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2} 4083 -- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier 4084 -- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3} 4085 -- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier 4086 -- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4} 4087 -- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 4088 -- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5} 4089 -- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent 4090 -- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6} 4091 -- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList 4092 -- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7} 4093 -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER 4094 -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10} 4095 -- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER 4096 -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11} 4097 -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifer 4098 -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} 4099 -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedValue 4100 -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} 4101 -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL 4102 -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} 4103 -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime 4104 -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} 4105 -- OrigPkiMessageValue ::= PKIMessages 4106 -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} 4107 -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String 4108 -- 4109 -- where 4110 -- 4111 -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) identified-organization(3) 4112 -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} 4113 -- and 4114 -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} 4115 -- 4116 -- 4117 -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate 4118 -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general- 4119 -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for 4120 -- specific environments. 4122 GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue 4124 -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content). 4125 -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will typically 4126 -- be omitted for some of the examples given above. The receiver is 4127 -- free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it does not recognize. 4128 -- If sent from EE to CA, the empty set indicates that the CA may send 4129 -- any/all information that it wishes. 4131 GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue 4132 -- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not recognize. 4134 ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE { 4135 pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, 4136 errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, 4137 -- implementation-specific error codes 4138 errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL 4139 -- implementation-specific error details 4140 } 4142 PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { 4143 certReqId INTEGER 4144 } 4146 PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { 4147 certReqId INTEGER, 4148 checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds 4149 reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL 4150 } 4152 END -- of CMP module 4154 Appendix G: Registration of MIME Type for E-Mail or HTTP use 4156 To: ietf-types@iana.org 4157 Subject: Registration of MIME media type application/pkixcmp 4159 MIME media type name: application 4161 MIME subtype name: pkixcmp 4163 Required parameters: - 4165 Optional parameters: - 4167 Encoding considerations: 4168 Content may contain arbitrary octet values (the ASN.1 DER encoding of 4169 a PKI message, as defined in the IETF PKIX Working Group 4170 specifications). base64 encoding is required for MIME e-mail; no 4171 encoding is necessary for HTTP. 4173 Security considerations: 4174 This MIME type may be used to transport Public-Key Infrastructure 4175 (PKI) messages between PKI entities. These messages are defined by 4176 the IETF PKIX Working Group and are used to establish and maintain an 4177 Internet X.509 PKI. There is no requirement for specific security 4178 mechanisms to be applied at this level if the PKI messages themselves 4179 are protected as defined in the PKIX specifications. 4181 Interoperability considerations: - 4183 Published specification: this document 4185 Applications which use this media type: 4186 Applications using certificate management, operational, or ancillary 4187 protocols (as defined by the IETF PKIX Working Group) to send PKI 4188 messages via E-Mail or HTTP. 4190 Additional information: 4192 Magic number (s): - 4193 File extension (s): ".PKI" 4194 Macintosh File Type Code (s): - 4196 Person and email address to contact for further information: 4197 Carlisle Adams, cadams@entrust.com 4199 Intended usage: COMMON 4201 Author/Change controller: Carlisle Adams 4203 Full Copyright Statement 4205 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved. 4207 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to 4208 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it 4209 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published 4210 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any 4211 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are 4212 included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this 4213 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing 4214 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other 4215 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of 4216 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for 4217 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be 4218 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than 4219 English. 4221 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be 4222 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. 4224 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an 4225 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING 4226 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING 4227 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION 4228 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 4229 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.