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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ & Arrcus 4 Intended status: Standards Track M. Candela 5 Expires: November 22, 2021 NTT 6 W. Kumari 7 Google 8 R. Housley 9 Vigil Security 10 May 21, 2021 12 Finding and Using Geofeed Data 13 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-14 15 Abstract 17 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 18 Specification Language inetnum: class to refer specifically to 19 geofeed data CSV files, and describes an optional scheme to use the 20 Routing Public Key Infrastructure to authenticate the geofeed data 21 CSV files. 23 Status of This Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 22, 2021. 40 Copyright Notice 42 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 43 document authors. All rights reserved. 45 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 46 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 47 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 48 publication of this document. Please review these documents 49 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 50 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 51 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 52 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 53 described in the Simplified BSD License. 55 Table of Contents 57 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 58 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 2. Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 3. inetnum: Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 61 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 63 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 64 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 65 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 66 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 67 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 68 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 70 Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 71 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 73 1. Introduction 75 Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to 76 customize those services based on the geographic location of the user 77 of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used 78 to contact the service. Also, infrastructure and other services 79 might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] 80 defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP 81 addresses. But it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed 82 data given an IP address. 84 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 85 Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2725] inetnum: class to refer 86 specifically to geofeed data CSV files, and how to prudently use 87 them. In all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be 88 assumed [RFC4012]. 90 The reader may find [INETNUM] and [INET6NUM] informative, and 91 certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database 92 classes. 94 An optional, utterly awesome but slightly complex means for 95 authenticating geofeed data is also defined. 97 1.1. Requirements Language 99 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 100 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 101 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 102 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 103 capitals, as shown here. 105 2. Geofeed Files 107 Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility 108 for an IP address resource 'owner' to associate those IP addresses to 109 geographic locales. 111 Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address 112 to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In 113 Section 3, this document specifies how to find the relevant [RFC8805] 114 geofeed file given an IP address. 116 Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale 117 and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be 118 even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many 119 prefixes, dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc. 121 Geofeed data do have privacy considerations, see Section 6; and this 122 process makes bulk access to those data easier. 124 This document also suggests an optional signature to strongly 125 authenticate the data in the geofeed files. 127 3. inetnum: Class 129 The original RPSL specifications starting with [RIPE81], [RIPE181], 130 and a trail of subsequent documents were done by the RIPE community. 131 The IETF standardized RPSL in [RFC2725] and [RFC4012]. Since then, 132 it has been modified and extensively enhanced in the Regional 133 Internet Registry (RIR) community, mostly by RIPE, [RIPE-DB]. 134 Currently, change control effectively lies in the operator community. 136 The Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL), and [RFC2725] and 137 [RFC4012] used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) specifies 138 the inetnum: database class. Each of these objects describes an IP 139 address range and its attributes. The inetnum: objects form a 140 hierarchy ordered on the address space. 142 Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: 143 attribute in the inetnum: class. Until such time, this document 144 defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute which contains an 145 HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format of the inetnum: geofeed 146 remarks: attribute MUST be as in this example, "remarks: Geofeed ", 147 where the token "Geofeed" MUST be case-sensitive, followed by a URL 148 which will vary, but MUST refer only to a single [RFC8805] geofeed 149 file. 151 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 152 remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv 154 While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant 155 parties, we specify that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: 156 class MUST be "geofeed: ", and MUST be followed by a single URL which 157 will vary, but MUST refer only to a single [RFC8805] geofeed file. 159 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 160 geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv 162 Registries MAY, for the interim, provide a mix of the remarks: 163 attribute form and the geofeed: attribute form. 165 The URL uses HTTPS, so the WebPKI provides authentication, integrity, 166 and confidentiality for the fetched geofeed file. However, the 167 WebPKI can not provide authentication of IP address space assignment. 168 In contrast, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI, see 169 [RFC6481]) can be used to authenticate IP space assignment; see 170 optional authentication in Section 4. 172 Until all producers of inetnum:s, i.e. the RIRs, state that they have 173 migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at 174 inetnum:s to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the 175 remarks: and geofeed: forms. The migration not only implies that the 176 RIRs support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have 177 migrated any inetnum:s from remarks: use to geofeed:s. 179 Any particular inetnum: object MUST have at most, one geofeed 180 reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when it 181 is implemented. If there is more than one, all are ignored. 183 If a geofeed CSV file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP 184 address space, there are likely to be geofeed references from 185 multiple inetnum: objects. Files with geofeed references from 186 multiple inetnum: objects are not compatible with the signing 187 procedure in Section 4. 189 When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects 190 which have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on 191 the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be 192 preferred. 194 As inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, Geofeed references SHOULD be at 195 the lowest applicable inetnum: object covering the relevant prefixes 196 in the referenced geofeed file. When fetching, the most specific 197 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 199 It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than 200 the inetnum: which refers to them. For example an INETNUM object for 201 a prefix P could refer to a geofeed file in which P has been sub- 202 divided into one or more longer prefixes. 204 Currently, the registry data published by ARIN is not the same RPSL 205 as that of the other registries (see [RFC7485] for a survey of the 206 whois Tower of Babel); therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP 207 [RFC0959], whois [RFC3912], RDAP [RFC7482], or whatever, the 208 "NetRange" attribute/key MUST be treated as "inetnum" and the 209 "Comment" attribute MUST be treated as "remarks". 211 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data 213 The question arises whether a particular [RFC8805] geofeed data set 214 is valid, i.e. is authorized by the 'owner' of the IP address space 215 and is authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: which points to the 216 [RFC8805] geofeed file provides some assurance. Unfortunately, the 217 RPSL in many repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An 218 approach where RPSL was signed a la [RFC7909] would be good, except 219 it would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a 220 fair number of them. 222 A single optional authenticator MAY be appended to a [RFC8805] 223 geofeed file. It is a digest of the main body of the file signed by 224 the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for the covering 225 address range. One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI 226 certificate with the signature of the geofeed text. 228 The canonicalization procedure converts the data from its internal 229 character representation to the UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding, 230 and the sequence MUST be used to denote the end of a line of 231 text. A blank line is represented solely by the sequence. 232 For robustness, any non-printable characters MUST NOT be changed by 233 canonicalization. Trailing blank lines MUST NOT appear at the end of 234 the file. That is, the file must not end with multiple consecutive 235 sequences. Any end-of-file marker used by an operating system 236 is not considered to be part of the file content. When present, such 237 end-of-file markers MUST NOT be processed by the digital signature 238 algorithm. 240 Should the authenticator be syntactically incorrect per the above, 241 the authenticator is invalid. 243 Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after file 244 canonicalization, the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] 245 would be used to create a detached DER encoded signature which is 246 then padded BASE64 encoded (as per [RFC4648] Section 4), and line 247 wrapped to 72 or fewer characters. The same digest algorithm MUST be 248 used for calculating the message digest on content being signed, 249 which is the geofeed file, and calculating the message digest on the 250 SignerInfo SignedAttributes [RFC8933]. The message digest algorithm 251 identifier MUST appear in both the SigenedData 252 DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers and the SignerInfo 253 DigestAlgorithmIdentifier [RFC5652]. 255 The address range of the signing certificate MUST cover all prefixes 256 in the geofeed file it signs; and therefore must be covered by the 257 range of the inetnum:. 259 An address range A 'covers' address range B if the range of B is 260 identical to or a subset of A. 'Address range' is used here because 261 inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on CIDR prefix 262 boundaries, while those of the CSV lines in the geofeed file do. 264 As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the 265 signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's 266 address range is included in the [RFC5652] CMS SignedData 267 certificates field. 269 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 270 getting the department that controls the private key (which might be 271 trapped in a Hardware Security Module, HSM) to sign the CMS blob is 272 left as an exercise for the implementor. On the other hand, 273 verifying the signature requires no complexity; the certificate, 274 which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the needed public key. 275 The trust anchors for the RIRs are expected to already be available 276 to the party performing signature validation. Validation of the CMS 277 signature on the geofeed file involves: 279 1. Obtain the signer's certificate from the CMS SignedData 280 CertificateSet [RFC5652]. The certificate SubjectKeyIdentifier 281 extension [RFC5280] MUST match the SubjectKeyIdentifier in the 282 CMS SignerInfo SignerIdentifier [RFC5652]. If the key 283 identifiers do not match, then validation MUST fail. 285 2. Construct the certification path for the signer's certificate. 286 All of the needed certificates are expected to be readily 287 available in the RPKI Repository. The certification path MUST be 288 valid according to the validation algorithm in [RFC5280] and the 289 additional checks specified in [RFC3779] associated with the IP 290 Address Delegation certificate extension and the Autonomous 291 System Identifier Delegation certificate extension. If 292 certification path validation is unsuccessful, then validation 293 MUST fail. 295 3. Validate the CMS SignedData as specified in [RFC5652] using the 296 public key from the validated signer's certificate. If the 297 signature validation is unsuccessful, then validation MUST fail. 299 4. Verify that the IP Address Delegation certificate extension 300 [RFC3779] covers all of the address ranges of the geofeed file. 301 If all of the address ranges are not covered, then validation 302 MUST fail. 304 5. Validation of the signer's certificate MUST ensure that it is 305 part of the current [RFC6486] manifest and that the resources are 306 covered by the RPKI certificate. 308 All of these steps MUST be successful to consider the geofeed file 309 signature as valid. 311 As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the 312 signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's 313 address range is included in the [RFC5652] CMS SignedData 314 certificates field. 316 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 317 getting the department with the Hardware Security Module (HSM) to 318 sign the CMS blob is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the 319 other hand, verifying the signature requires no complexity; the 320 certificate, which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the 321 needed public key. 323 The appendix MUST be 'hidden' as a series of "#" comments at the end 324 of the geofeed file. The following is a cryptographically incorrect, 325 albeit simple example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A. 327 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 328 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 329 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 330 ... 331 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 332 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 333 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 335 The signature does not cover the signature lines. 337 The bracketing "# RPKI Signature:" and "# End Signature:" MUST be 338 present following the model as shown. Their IP address range MUST 339 match that of the inetnum: URL followed to the file. 341 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] describes and provides code for a 342 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile for a general purpose 343 listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use with the Resource 344 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). It provides usable, albeit 345 complex, code to sign geofeed files. 347 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] describes a Cryptographic Message Syntax 348 (CMS) profile for a general purpose Resource Tagged Attestation (RTA) 349 based on the RPKI. While this is expected to become applicable in 350 the long run, for the purposes of this document, a self-signed root 351 trust anchor is used. 353 5. Operational Considerations 355 To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to 356 register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with 357 their RIR/NIR and/or any provider LIR which has assigned prefixes to 358 them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain 359 inetnum: objects. They also provide means of [sub-]assigning IP 360 address resources and allowing the assignee to create whois data, 361 including inetnum: objects, and thereby referring to geofeed files. 363 The geofeed files MUST be published via and fetched using HTTPS 364 [RFC2818]. 366 When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside the 367 referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range. 369 If and only if the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then 370 multiple inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the 371 consumer MUST use only lines in the geofeed file where the prefix is 372 covered by the address range of the inetnum: object's URL it has 373 followed. 375 If the geofeed file is signed, and the signer's certificate changes, 376 the signature in the geofeed file MUST be updated. 378 It is good key hygiene to use a given key for only one purpose. To 379 dedicate a signing private key for signing a geofeed file, an RPKI CA 380 may issue a subordinate certificate exclusively for the purpose as 381 shown in Appendix A. 383 To minimize the load on RIR whois [RFC3912] services, use of the 384 RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be used for large scale access to 385 gather geofeed URLs. This also provides bulk access instead of 386 fetching by brute force search through the IP space. 388 Currently, geolocation providers have bulk whois data access at all 389 the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for 390 all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for 391 users without such authorization, the same result can be achieved 392 with extra RDAP effort. There is open source code to pass over such 393 data across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process 394 them [geofeed-finder]. 396 To prevent undue load on RPSL and geofeed servers, an entity fetching 397 geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do frequent real-time 398 look-ups. [RFC8805] Section 3.4 suggests use of the [RFC7234] HTTP 399 Expires Caching Header to signal when geofeed data should be 400 refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of 401 such an HTTP Header signal, collectors SHOULD NOT fetch more 402 frequently than weekly. It would be polite not to fetch at magic 403 times such as midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too 404 many others are likely to do the same. 406 6. Privacy Considerations 408 [RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP 409 address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an 410 individual user. Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy 411 guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this 412 exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as 413 described in this document, the operator should be aware of this 414 exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy 415 considerations of [RFC8805] Section 4 apply to this document. 417 Where [RFC8805] provided the ability to publish location data, this 418 document makes bulk access to those data readily available. This is 419 a goal, not an accident. 421 7. Security Considerations 423 It is generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also use 424 other sources to cross-validate the data. All the Security 425 Considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well. 427 As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak if any 428 authentication. This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to 429 malicious geofeed files. Section 4 suggests an unfortunately complex 430 method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI. 432 For example, if an inetnum: for a wide prefix (e.g. a /16) points to 433 an RPKI-signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish an 434 unsigned equal or narrower (e.g. a /24) inetnum: in a whois registry 435 which has weak authorization, abusing the rule that the most-specific 436 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 438 If signatures were mandatory, the above attack would be stymied. But 439 of course that is not happening anytime soon. 441 The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers 442 due to too-frequent queries. Usually they throttle by the querying 443 IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be 444 deployed by geofeed file servers. 446 8. IANA Considerations 448 IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in 449 the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 450 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows: 452 Description OID Specification 453 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 454 id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD] 456 9. Acknowledgments 458 Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue. George 459 Michaelson for the first and substantial external review, Erik Kline 460 who was too shy to agree to co-authorship. Additionally, we express 461 our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno Schepers, Flavio 462 Luciani, Eric Dugas, Job Snijders who provided running code, and 463 Kevin Pack. Also, to geolocation providers that are consuming 464 geofeeds with this described solution, Jonathan Kosgei (ipdata.co), 465 Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io), and Pol Nisenblat (bigdatacloud.com). For 466 an amazing number of helpful reviews we thank Adrian Farrel, Antonio 467 Prado, Francesca Palombini, Jean-Michel Combes (INTDIR), John 468 Scudder, Kyle Rose (SECDIR), Martin Duke, Murray Kucherawy, Paul 469 Kyzivat (GENART), Rob Wilton, and Roman Danyliw. The authors also 470 thank George Michaelson, the awesome document shepherd. 472 10. References 474 10.1. Normative References 476 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 477 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 478 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 479 . 481 [RFC2725] Villamizar, C., Alaettinoglu, C., Meyer, D., and S. 482 Murphy, "Routing Policy System Security", RFC 2725, 483 DOI 10.17487/RFC2725, December 1999, 484 . 486 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, 487 DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, 488 . 490 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 491 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 492 2003, . 494 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 495 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, 496 DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, 497 . 499 [RFC4012] Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky, 500 "Routing Policy Specification Language next generation 501 (RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005, 502 . 504 [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data 505 Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, 506 . 508 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 509 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 510 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 511 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, 512 . 514 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 515 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 516 . 518 [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 519 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, 520 DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012, 521 . 523 [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, 524 "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 525 (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012, 526 . 528 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 529 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 530 May 2017, . 532 [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. 533 Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation 534 Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, 535 . 537 [RFC8933] Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax 538 (CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933, 539 DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020, 540 . 542 10.2. Informative References 544 [geofeed-finder] 545 Massimo Candela, "geofeed-finder", 546 . 548 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] 549 Michaelson, G. G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, 550 T., and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged 551 Attestations (RTAs)", draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00 (work 552 in progress), January 2021. 554 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] 555 Snijders, J., "RPKI Signed Checklists", draft-spaghetti- 556 sidrops-rpki-rsc-03 (work in progress), February 2021. 558 [INET6NUM] 559 RIPE, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", 560 . 565 [INETNUM] RIPE, "Description of the INETNUM Object", 566 . 571 [RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", 572 STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985, 573 . 575 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 576 DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004, 577 . 579 [RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft 580 Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009, 581 . 583 [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, 584 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", 585 RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, 586 . 588 [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 589 Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, 590 DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, 591 . 593 [RFC7485] Zhou, L., Kong, N., Shen, S., Sheng, S., and A. Servin, 594 "Inventory and Analysis of WHOIS Registration Objects", 595 RFC 7485, DOI 10.17487/RFC7485, March 2015, 596 . 598 [RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy 599 Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public 600 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909, 601 DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016, 602 . 604 [RIPE-DB] RIPE, "RIPE Database Documentation", 605 . 609 [RIPE181] RIPE, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In A Routing 610 Registry", 611 . 613 [RIPE81] RIPE, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In The RIPE 614 Database", 615 . 617 Appendix A. Example 619 This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CA 620 certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity 621 certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a 622 detached signature. 624 The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As 625 usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 626 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers. 628 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 629 MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 630 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5 631 MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB 632 AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ 633 0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH 634 XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe 635 g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb 636 O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq 637 jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd 638 BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU 639 GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw 640 GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI 641 KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 642 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u 643 ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 644 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD 645 AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN 646 BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe 647 xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH 648 cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM 649 Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA 650 rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a 651 x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA== 652 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 654 The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate 655 grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two 656 AS numbers (64496 and 64497). 658 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 659 MIIFBzCCA++gAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 660 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTAyMTlaFw0yMTA5 661 MDMxOTAyMTlaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG 662 QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc 663 zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 664 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo 665 j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ 666 liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n 667 YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE 668 TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIvMIICKzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 669 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYD 670 VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr 671 BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u 672 ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz 673 Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v 674 cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr 675 BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu 676 bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz 677 Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF 678 hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH 679 AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA 680 +/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnLu+d1ZsUTiX3YWGueTHIalW4ad0 681 Kupi7pYMV2nXbxNGmdJMol9BkzVz9tj55ReMghUU4YLm/ICYe4fz5e0T8o9s/vIm 682 cGS29+WoGuiznMitpvbS/379gaMezk6KpqjH6Brw6meMqy09phmcmvm3x3WTmx09 683 mLlQneMptwk8qSYcnMUmGLJs+cVqmkOa3sWRdw8WrGu6QqYtQz3HFZQojF06YzEq 684 V/dBdCFdEOwTfVl2n2XqhoJl/oEBdC4uu2G0qRk3+WVs+uwVHP0Ttsbt7TzFgZfY 685 yxqvOg6QoldxZVZmHHncKmETu/BqCDGJot9may31ukrx34Bu+XFMVihm0w== 686 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 688 The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate 689 grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). 690 Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data 691 signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate. 693 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 694 MIIEpTCCA42gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZuQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 695 BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC 696 Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMTA1MjAxNjA1NDVaFw0yMjAzMTYxNjA1NDVaMDMxMTAvBgNV 697 BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi 698 MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW 699 yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c 700 K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm 701 BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp 702 tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog 703 qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB 704 AAGjggGvMIIBqzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j 705 BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8B 706 Af8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFag 707 VKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF 708 RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcB 709 AQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBv 710 c2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIu 711 Y2VyMBkGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BAowCDAGBAIAAQUAMEUGCCsGAQUFBwELBDkwNzA1 712 BggrBgEFBQcwDYYpaHR0cHM6Ly9ycmRwLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L25vdGlmaWNhdGlv 713 bi54bWwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAEjC98gVp0Mb7uiKaHylP0453mtJ+AkN 714 07fsK/qGw/e90DJv7cp1hvjj4uy3sgf7PJQ7cKNGrgybq/lE0jce+ARgVjbi2Brz 715 ZsWAnB846Snwsktw6cenaif6Aww6q00NspAepMBd2Vg/9sKFvOwJFVOgNcqiQiXP 716 5rGJPWBcOMv52a/7adjfXwpnOijiTOgMloQGmC2TPZpydZKjlxEATdFEQssa33xD 717 nlpp+/r9xuNVYRtRcC36oWraVA3jzN6F6rDE8r8xs3ylISVz6JeCQ4YRYwbMsjjc 718 /tiJLM7ZYxIe5IrYz1ZtN6n/SEssJAswRIgps2EhCt/HS2xAmGCOhgU= 719 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 721 The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For 722 brevity, the other two certificates are not. 724 0 1189: SEQUENCE { 725 4 909: SEQUENCE { 726 8 3: [0] { 727 10 1: INTEGER 2 728 : } 729 13 20: INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E4 730 35 13: SEQUENCE { 731 37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 732 : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 733 48 0: NULL 734 : } 735 50 51: SEQUENCE { 736 52 49: SET { 737 54 47: SEQUENCE { 738 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 739 61 40: PrintableString 740 : '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642' 741 : } 742 : } 743 : } 744 103 30: SEQUENCE { 745 105 13: UTCTime 20/05/2021 16:05:45 GMT 746 120 13: UTCTime 16/03/2022 16:05:45 GMT 747 : } 748 135 51: SEQUENCE { 749 137 49: SET { 750 139 47: SEQUENCE { 751 141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 752 146 40: PrintableString 753 : '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187' 754 : } 755 : } 756 : } 757 188 290: SEQUENCE { 758 192 13: SEQUENCE { 759 194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption 760 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 761 205 0: NULL 762 : } 763 207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 764 212 266: SEQUENCE { 765 216 257: INTEGER 766 : 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8 767 : 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65 768 : B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE 769 : 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13 770 : 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37 771 : 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE 772 : E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED 773 : 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89 774 : F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E 775 : 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19 776 : BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65 777 : 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28 778 : 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9 779 : 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A 780 : 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41 781 : FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C 782 : EB 783 477 3: INTEGER 65537 784 : } 785 : } 786 : } 787 482 431: [3] { 788 486 427: SEQUENCE { 789 490 29: SEQUENCE { 790 492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 791 497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 792 499 20: OCTET STRING 793 : 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB 794 : F0 53 A1 87 795 : } 796 : } 797 521 31: SEQUENCE { 798 523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 799 528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 800 530 22: SEQUENCE { 801 532 20: [0] 802 : 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97 803 : B3 77 86 42 804 : } 805 : } 806 : } 807 554 12: SEQUENCE { 808 556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) 809 561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 810 564 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 811 566 0: SEQUENCE {} 812 : } 813 : } 814 568 14: SEQUENCE { 815 570 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 816 575 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 817 578 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 818 580 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits 819 : '1'B (bit 0) 820 : } 821 : } 822 584 24: SEQUENCE { 823 586 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 824 591 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 825 594 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 826 596 12: SEQUENCE { 827 598 10: SEQUENCE { 828 600 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 829 : resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2) 830 : } 831 : } 832 : } 833 : } 834 610 97: SEQUENCE { 835 612 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 836 617 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 837 619 88: SEQUENCE { 838 621 86: SEQUENCE { 839 623 84: [0] { 840 625 82: [0] { 841 627 80: [6] 842 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 843 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl' 844 : } 845 : } 846 : } 847 : } 848 : } 849 : } 850 709 108: SEQUENCE { 851 711 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess 852 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 853 721 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 854 723 94: SEQUENCE { 855 725 92: SEQUENCE { 856 727 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2) 857 737 80: [6] 858 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 859 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer' 860 : } 861 : } 862 : } 863 : } 864 819 25: SEQUENCE { 865 821 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7) 866 831 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 867 834 10: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 868 836 8: SEQUENCE { 869 838 6: SEQUENCE { 870 840 2: OCTET STRING 00 01 871 844 0: NULL 872 : } 873 : } 874 : } 875 : } 876 846 69: SEQUENCE { 877 848 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess 878 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11) 879 858 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 880 860 55: SEQUENCE { 881 862 53: SEQUENCE { 882 864 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13' 883 874 41: [6] 884 : 'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml' 885 : } 886 : } 887 : } 888 : } 889 : } 890 : } 891 : } 892 917 13: SEQUENCE { 893 919 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption 894 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 895 930 0: NULL 896 : } 897 932 257: BIT STRING 898 : 48 C2 F7 C8 15 A7 43 1B EE E8 8A 68 7C A5 3F 4E 899 : 39 DE 6B 49 F8 09 0D D3 B7 EC 2B FA 86 C3 F7 BD 900 : D0 32 6F ED CA 75 86 F8 E3 E2 EC B7 B2 07 FB 3C 901 : 94 3B 70 A3 46 AE 0C 9B AB F9 44 D2 37 1E F8 04 902 : 60 56 36 E2 D8 1A F3 66 C5 80 9C 1F 38 E9 29 F0 903 : B2 4B 70 E9 C7 A7 6A 27 FA 03 0C 3A AB 4D 0D B2 904 : 90 1E A4 C0 5D D9 58 3F F6 C2 85 BC EC 09 15 53 905 : A0 35 CA A2 42 25 CF E6 B1 89 3D 60 5C 38 CB F9 906 : D9 AF FB 69 D8 DF 5F 0A 67 3A 28 E2 4C E8 0C 96 907 : 84 06 98 2D 93 3D 9A 72 75 92 A3 97 11 00 4D D1 908 : 44 42 CB 1A DF 7C 43 9E 5A 69 FB FA FD C6 E3 55 909 : 61 1B 51 70 2D FA A1 6A DA 54 0D E3 CC DE 85 EA 910 : B0 C4 F2 BF 31 B3 7C A5 21 25 73 E8 97 82 43 86 911 : 11 63 06 CC B2 38 DC FE D8 89 2C CE D9 63 12 1E 912 : E4 8A D8 CF 56 6D 37 A9 FF 48 4B 2C 24 0B 30 44 913 : 88 29 B3 61 21 0A DF C7 4B 6C 40 98 60 8E 86 05 914 : } 916 To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity 917 private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are 918 not. 920 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 921 MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW 922 /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP 923 Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 924 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ 925 eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm 926 gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 927 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio 928 pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z 929 ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ 930 mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 931 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF 932 t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt 933 MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M 934 Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 935 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l 936 nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm 937 FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 938 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo 939 Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz 940 vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc 941 DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf 942 taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc 943 PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ 944 E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV 945 iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= 946 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 948 Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), 949 yields the following detached CMS signature. 951 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 952 # MIIGjwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGgDCCBnwCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 953 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSpMIIEpTCCA42gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 954 # QwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR 955 # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMTA1MjAxNjA1NDVaFw0yMjAzMTYx 956 # NjA1NDVaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM 957 # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT 958 # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg 959 # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm 960 # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha 961 # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG 962 # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ 963 # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggGvMIIBqzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R 964 # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI 965 # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg 966 # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ 967 # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5 968 # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5 969 # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0 970 # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMBkGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BAowC 971 # DAGBAIAAQUAMEUGCCsGAQUFBwELBDkwNzA1BggrBgEFBQcwDYYpaHR0cHM6Ly9y 972 # cmRwLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L25vdGlmaWNhdGlvbi54bWwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQA 973 # DggEBAEjC98gVp0Mb7uiKaHylP0453mtJ+AkN07fsK/qGw/e90DJv7cp1hvjj4u 974 # y3sgf7PJQ7cKNGrgybq/lE0jce+ARgVjbi2BrzZsWAnB846Snwsktw6cenaif6A 975 # ww6q00NspAepMBd2Vg/9sKFvOwJFVOgNcqiQiXP5rGJPWBcOMv52a/7adjfXwpn 976 # OijiTOgMloQGmC2TPZpydZKjlxEATdFEQssa33xDnlpp+/r9xuNVYRtRcC36oWr 977 # aVA3jzN6F6rDE8r8xs3ylISVz6JeCQ4YRYwbMsjjc/tiJLM7ZYxIe5IrYz1ZtN6 978 # n/SEssJAswRIgps2EhCt/HS2xAmGCOhgUxggGqMIIBpgIBA4AUkUZSo71RwUQmA 979 # ZiIn1xFq/BToYcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGswGgYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQ0GCyqGSIb3 980 # DQEJEAEvMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTA1MjAxNjI4MzlaMC8GCSqGSIb3DQE 981 # JBDEiBCAr4vKeUvHJINsE0YQwUMxoo48qrOU+iPuFbQR8qX3BFjANBgkqhkiG9w 982 # 0BAQEFAASCAQB85HsCBrU3EcVOcf4nC6Z3jrOjT+fVlyTDAObF6GTNWgrxe7jSA 983 # Inyf51UzuIGqhVY3sQiiXbdWcVYtPb4118KvyeXh8A/HLp4eeAJntl9D3igt38M 984 # o84q5pf9pTQXx3hbsm51ilpOip/TKVMqzE42s6OPox3M0+6eKH3/vBKnw1s1ayM 985 # 0MUnPDTBfZL3JJEGPWfIZHEcrypevbqR7Jjsz5vp0qyF2D9v+w+nyhZOPmuePm7 986 # YqLyOw/E99PVBs9uI+hmBiCz/BK2Z3VRjrrlrUU+49eldSTkZ2sJyhCbbV2Ufgi 987 # S2FOquAgJzjilyN3BDQLV8Rp9cGh0PpVslKH2na 988 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 990 Authors' Addresses 992 Randy Bush 993 IIJ & Arrcus 994 5147 Crystal Springs 995 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 996 United States of America 998 Email: randy@psg.com 999 Massimo Candela 1000 NTT 1001 Siriusdreef 70-72 1002 Hoofddorp 2132 WT 1003 Netherlands 1005 Email: massimo@ntt.net 1007 Warren Kumari 1008 Google 1009 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 1010 Mountain View, CA 94043 1011 US 1013 Email: warren@kumari.net 1015 Russ Housley 1016 Vigil Security, LLC 1017 516 Dranesville Road 1018 Herndon, VA 20170 1019 USA 1021 Email: housley@vigilsec.com