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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ & Arrcus 4 Intended status: Standards Track M. Candela 5 Expires: November 21, 2021 NTT 6 W. Kumari 7 Google 8 R. Housley 9 Vigil Security 10 May 20, 2021 12 Finding and Using Geofeed Data 13 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-13 15 Abstract 17 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 18 Specification Language inetnum: class to refer specifically to 19 geofeed data CSV files, and describes an optional scheme to use the 20 Routing Public Key Infrastructure to authenticate the geofeed data 21 CSV files. 23 Status of This Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 21, 2021. 40 Copyright Notice 42 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 43 document authors. All rights reserved. 45 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 46 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 47 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 48 publication of this document. Please review these documents 49 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 50 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 51 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 52 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 53 described in the Simplified BSD License. 55 Table of Contents 57 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 58 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 2. Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 3. inetnum: Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 61 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 63 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 64 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 65 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 66 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 67 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 68 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 70 Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 71 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 73 1. Introduction 75 Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to 76 customize those services based on the geographic location of the user 77 of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used 78 to contact the service. Also, infrastructure and other services 79 might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] 80 defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP 81 addresses. But it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed 82 data given an IP address. 84 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 85 Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2725] inetnum: class to refer 86 specifically to geofeed data CSV files, and how to prudently use 87 them. In all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be 88 assumed [RFC4012]. 90 The reader may find [INETNUM] and [INET6NUM] informative, and 91 certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database 92 classes. 94 An optional, utterly awesome but slightly complex means for 95 authenticating geofeed data is also defined. 97 1.1. Requirements Language 99 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 100 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 101 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 102 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 103 capitals, as shown here. 105 2. Geofeed Files 107 Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility 108 for an IP address resource 'owner' to associate those IP addresses to 109 geographic locales. 111 Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address 112 to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In 113 Section 3, this document specifies how to find the relevant [RFC8805] 114 geofeed file given an IP address. 116 Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale 117 and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be 118 even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many 119 prefixes, dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc. 121 Geofeed data do have privacy considerations, see Section 6; and this 122 process makes bulk access to those data easier. 124 This document also suggests an optional signature to strongly 125 authenticate the data in the geofeed files. 127 3. inetnum: Class 129 The original RPSL specifications starting with [RIPE81], [RIPE181], 130 and a trail of subsequent documents were done by the RIPE community. 131 The IETF standardized RPSL in [RFC2725] and [RFC4012]. Since then, 132 it has been modified and extensively enhanced in the Regional 133 Internet Registry (RIR) community, mostly by RIPE, [RIPE-DB]. 134 Currently, change control effectively lies in the operator community. 136 The Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL), and [RFC2725] and 137 [RFC4012] used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) specifies 138 the inetnum: database class. Each of these objects describes an IP 139 address range and its attributes. The inetnum: objects form a 140 hierarchy ordered on the address space. 142 Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: 143 attribute in the inetnum: class. Until such time, this document 144 defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute which contains an 145 HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format of the inetnum: geofeed 146 remarks: attribute MUST be as in this example, "remarks: Geofeed ", 147 where the token "Geofeed" MUST be case-sensitive, followed by a URL 148 which will vary, but MUST refer only to a single [RFC8805] geofeed 149 file. 151 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 152 remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv 154 While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant 155 parties, we specify that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: 156 class MUST be "geofeed: ", and MUST be followed by a single URL which 157 will vary, but MUST refer only to a single [RFC8805] geofeed file. 159 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 160 geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv 162 Registries MAY, for the interim, provide a mix of the remarks: 163 attribute form and the geofeed: attribute form. 165 The URL uses HTTPS, so the WebPKI provides authentication, integrity, 166 and confidentiality for the fetched geofeed file. However, the 167 WebPKI can not provide authentication of IP address space assignment. 168 In contrast, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI, see 169 [RFC6481]) can be used to authenticate IP space assignment; see 170 optional authentication in Section 4. 172 Until all producers of inetnum:s, i.e. the RIRs, state that they have 173 migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at 174 inetnum:s to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the 175 remarks: and geofeed: forms. The migration not only implies that the 176 RIRs support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have 177 migrated any inetnum:s from remarks: use to geofeed:s. 179 Any particular inetnum: object MUST have at most, one geofeed 180 reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when it 181 is implemented. If there is more than one, all are ignored. 183 If a geofeed CSV file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP 184 address space, there are likely to be geofeed references from 185 multiple inetnum: objects. Files with geofeed references from 186 multiple inetnum: objects are not compatible with the signing 187 procedure in Section 4. 189 When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects 190 which have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on 191 the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be 192 preferred. 194 As inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, Geofeed references SHOULD be at 195 the lowest applicable inetnum: object covering the relevant prefixes 196 in the referenced geofeed file. When fetching, the most specific 197 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 199 It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than 200 the inetnum: which refers to them. For example an INETNUM object for 201 a prefix P could refer to a geofeed file in which P has been sub- 202 divided into one or more longer prefixes. 204 Currently, the registry data published by ARIN is not the same RPSL 205 as that of the other registries (see [RFC7485] for a survey of the 206 whois Tower of Babel); therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP 207 [RFC0959], whois [RFC3912], RDAP [RFC7482], or whatever, the 208 "NetRange" attribute/key MUST be treated as "inetnum" and the 209 "Comment" attribute MUST be treated as "remarks". 211 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data 213 The question arises whether a particular [RFC8805] geofeed data set 214 is valid, i.e. is authorized by the 'owner' of the IP address space 215 and is authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: which points to the 216 [RFC8805] geofeed file provides some assurance. Unfortunately, the 217 RPSL in many repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An 218 approach where RPSL was signed a la [RFC7909] would be good, except 219 it would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a 220 fair number of them. 222 A single optional authenticator MAY be appended to a [RFC8805] 223 geofeed file. It is a digest of the main body of the file signed by 224 the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for the covering 225 address range. One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI 226 certificate with the signature of the geofeed text. 228 The canonicalization procedure converts the data from its internal 229 character representation to the UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding, 230 and the sequence MUST be used to denote the end of a line of 231 text. Trailing space characters MUST NOT appear on a line of text. 232 That is, space or tab characters must not immediately preceed a 233 sequence. Thus, a blank line is represented solely by the 234 sequence. Other non-printable characters, such as backspace, 235 are not expected. For robustness, any non-printable characters MUST 236 NOT be changed by canonicalization. Trailing blank lines MUST NOT 237 appear at the end of the file. That is, the file must not end with 238 multiple consecutive sequences. Any end-of-file marker used 239 by an operating system is not considered to be part of the file 240 content. When present, such end-of-file markers MUST NOT be 241 processed by the digital signature algorithm. 243 Should the authenticator be syntactically incorrect per the above, 244 the authenticator is invalid. 246 Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after file 247 canonicalization, the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] 248 would be used to create a detached DER encoded signature which is 249 then padded BASE64 encoded (as per [RFC4648]) Section 4, and line 250 wrapped to 72 or fewer characters. The same digest algorithm MUST be 251 used for calculating the message digest on content being signed, 252 which is the geofeed file, and calculating the message digest on the 253 SignerInfo SignedAttributes [RFC8933]. The message digest algorithm 254 identifier MUST appear in both the SigenedData 255 DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers and the SignerInfo 256 DigestAlgorithmIdentifier [RFC5652]. 258 The address range of the signing certificate MUST cover all prefixes 259 in the geofeed file it signs; and therefore must be covered by the 260 range of the inetnum:. 262 An address range A 'covers' address range B if the range of B is 263 identical to or a subset of A. 'Address range' is used here because 264 inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on CIDR prefix 265 boundaries, while those of the CSV lines in the geofeed file do. 267 As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the 268 signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's 269 address range is included in the [RFC5652] CMS SignedData 270 certificates field. 272 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 273 getting the department that controls the private key (which might be 274 trapped in a Hardware Security Module, HSM) to sign the CMS blob is 275 left as an exercise for the implementor. On the other hand, 276 verifying the signature requires no complexity; the certificate, 277 which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the needed public key. 278 The trust anchors for the RIRs are expected to already be available 279 to the party performing signature validation. Validation of the CMS 280 signature on the geofeed file involves: 282 1. Obtain the signer's certificate from the CMS SignedData 283 CertificateSet [RFC5652]. The certificate SubjectKeyIdentifier 284 extension [RFC5280] MUST match the SubjectKeyIdentifier in the 285 CMS SignerInfo SignerIdentifier [RFC5652]. If the key 286 identifiers do not match, then validation MUST fail. 288 2. Construct the certification path for the signer's certificate. 289 All of the needed certificates are expected to be readily 290 available in the RPKI Repository. The certification path MUST be 291 valid according to the validation algorithm in [RFC5280] and the 292 additional checks specified in [RFC3779] associated with the IP 293 Address Delegation certificate extension and the Autonomous 294 System Identifier Delegation certificate extension. If 295 certification path validation is unsuccessful, then validation 296 MUST fail. 298 3. Validate the CMS SignedData as specified in [RFC5652] using the 299 public key from the validated signer's certificate. If the 300 signature validation is unsuccessful, then validation MUST fail. 302 4. Verify that the IP Address Delegation certificate extension 303 [RFC3779] covers all of the address ranges of the geofeed file. 304 If all of the address ranges are not covered, then validation 305 MUST fail. 307 5. Validation of the signer's certificate MUST ensure that it is 308 part of the current [RFC6486] manifest and that the resources are 309 covered by the RPKI certificate. 311 All of these steps MUST be successful to consider the geofeed file 312 signature as valid. 314 As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the 315 signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's 316 address range is included in the [RFC5652] CMS SignedData 317 certificates field. 319 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 320 getting the department with the Hardware Security Module (HSM) to 321 sign the CMS blob is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the 322 other hand, verifying the signature requires no complexity; the 323 certificate, which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the 324 needed public key. 326 The appendix MUST be 'hidden' as a series of "#" comments at the end 327 of the geofeed file. The following is a cryptographically incorrect, 328 albeit simple example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A. 330 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 331 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 332 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 333 ... 334 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 335 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 336 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 338 The signature does not cover the signature lines. 340 The bracketing "# RPKI Signature:" and "# End Signature:" MUST be 341 present following the model as shown. The IP address range MUST 342 match that of the signer's certificate. 344 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] describes and provides code for a 345 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile for a general purpose 346 listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use with the Resource 347 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). It provides usable, albeit 348 complex, code to sign geofeed files. 350 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] describes a Cryptographic Message Syntax 351 (CMS) profile for a general purpose Resource Tagged Attestation (RTA) 352 based on the RPKI. While this is expected to become applicable in 353 the long run, for the purposes of this document, a self-signed root 354 trust anchor is used. 356 5. Operational Considerations 358 To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to 359 register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with 360 their RIR/NIR and/or any provider LIR which has assigned prefixes to 361 them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain 362 inetnum: objects. They also provide means of [sub-]assigning IP 363 address resources and allowing the assignee to create whois data, 364 including inetnum: objects, and thereby referring to geofeed files. 366 The geofeed files MUST be published via and fetched using HTTPS 367 [RFC2818]. 369 When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside the 370 referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range. 372 If and only if the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then 373 multiple inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the 374 consumer MUST use only lines in the geofeed file where the prefix is 375 covered by the address range of the inetnum: object they have 376 followed. 378 If the geofeed file is signed, and the signer's certificate changes, 379 the signature in the geofeed file MUST be updated. 381 It is good key hygiene to use a given key for only one purpose. To 382 dedicate a signing private key for signing a geofeed file, an RPKI CA 383 may issue a subordinate certificate exclusively for the purpose as 384 shown in Appendix A. 386 To minimize the load on RIR whois [RFC3912] services, use of the 387 RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be used for large scale access to 388 gather geofeed URLs. This also provides bulk access instead of 389 fetching by brute force search through the IP space. 391 Currently, geolocation providers have bulk whois data access at all 392 the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for 393 all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for 394 users without such authorization, the same result can be achieved 395 with extra RDAP effort. There is open source code to pass over such 396 data across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process 397 them [geofeed-finder]. 399 To prevent undue load on RPSL and geofeed servers, an entity fetching 400 geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do frequent real-time 401 look-ups. [RFC8805] Section 3.4 suggests use of the [RFC7234] HTTP 402 Expires Caching Header to signal when geofeed data should be 403 refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of 404 such an HTTP Header signal, collectors SHOULD NOT fetch more 405 frequently than weekly. It would be polite not to fetch at magic 406 times such as midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too 407 many others are likely to do the same. 409 6. Privacy Considerations 411 [RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP 412 address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an 413 individual user. Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy 414 guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this 415 exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as 416 described in this document, the operator should be aware of this 417 exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy 418 considerations of [RFC8805] Section 4 apply to this document. 420 Where [RFC8805] provided the ability to publish location data, this 421 document makes bulk access to those data readily available. 423 7. Security Considerations 425 It is generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also use 426 other sources to cross-validate the data. All the Security 427 Considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well. 429 As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak if any 430 authentication. This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to 431 malicious geofeed files. Section 4 suggests an unfortunately complex 432 method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI. 434 For example, if an inetnum: for a wide prefix (e.g. a /16) points to 435 an RPKI-signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish an 436 unsigned equal or narrower (e.g. a /24) inetnum: in a whois registry 437 which has weak authorization abusing the rule that the most-specific 438 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 440 If signatures were mandatory, the above attack would be stymied. But 441 of course that is not happening anytime soon. 443 The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers 444 due to too-frequent queries. Usually they throttle by the querying 445 IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be 446 deployed by geofeed file servers. 448 8. IANA Considerations 450 IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in 451 the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 452 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows: 454 Description OID Specification 455 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 456 id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD] 458 9. Acknowledgments 460 Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue. George 461 Michaelson for the first and substantial external review, Erik Kline 462 who was too shy to agree to co-authorship. Additionally, we express 463 our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno Schepers, Flavio 464 Luciani, Eric Dugas, Job Snijders who provided running code, and 465 Kevin Pack. Also, to geolocation providers that are consuming 466 geofeeds with this described solution, Jonathan Kosgei (ipdata.co), 467 Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io), and Pol Nisenblat (bigdatacloud.com). For 468 an amazing number of helpful reviews we thank Adrian Farrel, Antonio 469 Prado, Francesca Palombini, Jean-Michel Combes (INTDIR), John 470 Scudder, Kyle Rose (SECDIR), Martin Duke, Murray Kucherawy, Paul 471 Kyzivat (GENART), Rob Wilton, and Roman Danyliw. The authors also 472 thank George Michaelson, the awesome document shepherd. 474 10. References 476 10.1. Normative References 478 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 479 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 480 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 481 . 483 [RFC2725] Villamizar, C., Alaettinoglu, C., Meyer, D., and S. 484 Murphy, "Routing Policy System Security", RFC 2725, 485 DOI 10.17487/RFC2725, December 1999, 486 . 488 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, 489 DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, 490 . 492 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 493 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 494 2003, . 496 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 497 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, 498 DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, 499 . 501 [RFC4012] Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky, 502 "Routing Policy Specification Language next generation 503 (RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005, 504 . 506 [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data 507 Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, 508 . 510 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 511 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 512 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 513 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, 514 . 516 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 517 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 518 . 520 [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 521 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, 522 DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012, 523 . 525 [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, 526 "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 527 (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012, 528 . 530 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 531 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 532 May 2017, . 534 [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. 535 Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation 536 Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, 537 . 539 [RFC8933] Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax 540 (CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933, 541 DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020, 542 . 544 10.2. Informative References 546 [geofeed-finder] 547 Massimo Candela, "geofeed-finder", 548 . 550 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] 551 Michaelson, G. G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, 552 T., and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged 553 Attestations (RTAs)", draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00 (work 554 in progress), January 2021. 556 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] 557 Snijders, J., "RPKI Signed Checklists", draft-spaghetti- 558 sidrops-rpki-rsc-03 (work in progress), February 2021. 560 [INET6NUM] 561 RIPE, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", 562 . 567 [INETNUM] RIPE, "Description of the INETNUM Object", 568 . 573 [RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", 574 STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985, 575 . 577 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 578 DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004, 579 . 581 [RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft 582 Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009, 583 . 585 [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, 586 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", 587 RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, 588 . 590 [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 591 Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, 592 DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, 593 . 595 [RFC7485] Zhou, L., Kong, N., Shen, S., Sheng, S., and A. Servin, 596 "Inventory and Analysis of WHOIS Registration Objects", 597 RFC 7485, DOI 10.17487/RFC7485, March 2015, 598 . 600 [RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy 601 Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public 602 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909, 603 DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016, 604 . 606 [RIPE-DB] RIPE, "RIPE Database Documentation", 607 . 611 [RIPE181] RIPE, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In A Routing 612 Registry", 613 . 615 [RIPE81] RIPE, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In The RIPE 616 Database", 617 . 619 Appendix A. Example 621 This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CA 622 certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity 623 certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a 624 detached signature. 626 The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As 627 usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 628 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers. 630 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 631 MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 632 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5 633 MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB 634 AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ 635 0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH 636 XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe 637 g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb 638 O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq 639 jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd 640 BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU 641 GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw 642 GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI 643 KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 644 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u 645 ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 646 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD 647 AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN 648 BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe 649 xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH 650 cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM 651 Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA 652 rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a 653 x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA== 654 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 656 The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate 657 grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two 658 AS numbers (64496 and 64497). 660 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 661 MIIFBzCCA++gAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 662 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTAyMTlaFw0yMTA5 663 MDMxOTAyMTlaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG 664 QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc 665 zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 666 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo 667 j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ 668 liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n 669 YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE 670 TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIvMIICKzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 671 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYD 672 VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr 673 BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u 674 ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz 675 Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v 676 cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr 677 BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu 678 bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz 679 Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF 680 hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH 681 AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA 682 +/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnLu+d1ZsUTiX3YWGueTHIalW4ad0 683 Kupi7pYMV2nXbxNGmdJMol9BkzVz9tj55ReMghUU4YLm/ICYe4fz5e0T8o9s/vIm 684 cGS29+WoGuiznMitpvbS/379gaMezk6KpqjH6Brw6meMqy09phmcmvm3x3WTmx09 685 mLlQneMptwk8qSYcnMUmGLJs+cVqmkOa3sWRdw8WrGu6QqYtQz3HFZQojF06YzEq 686 V/dBdCFdEOwTfVl2n2XqhoJl/oEBdC4uu2G0qRk3+WVs+uwVHP0Ttsbt7TzFgZfY 687 yxqvOg6QoldxZVZmHHncKmETu/BqCDGJot9may31ukrx34Bu+XFMVihm0w== 688 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 690 The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate 691 grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). 692 Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data 693 signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate. 695 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 696 MIIEpTCCA42gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZuQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 697 BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC 698 Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMTA1MjAxNjA1NDVaFw0yMjAzMTYxNjA1NDVaMDMxMTAvBgNV 699 BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi 700 MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW 701 yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c 702 K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm 703 BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp 704 tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog 705 qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB 706 AAGjggGvMIIBqzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j 707 BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8B 708 Af8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFag 709 VKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF 710 RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcB 711 AQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBv 712 c2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIu 713 Y2VyMBkGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BAowCDAGBAIAAQUAMEUGCCsGAQUFBwELBDkwNzA1 714 BggrBgEFBQcwDYYpaHR0cHM6Ly9ycmRwLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L25vdGlmaWNhdGlv 715 bi54bWwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAEjC98gVp0Mb7uiKaHylP0453mtJ+AkN 716 07fsK/qGw/e90DJv7cp1hvjj4uy3sgf7PJQ7cKNGrgybq/lE0jce+ARgVjbi2Brz 717 ZsWAnB846Snwsktw6cenaif6Aww6q00NspAepMBd2Vg/9sKFvOwJFVOgNcqiQiXP 718 5rGJPWBcOMv52a/7adjfXwpnOijiTOgMloQGmC2TPZpydZKjlxEATdFEQssa33xD 719 nlpp+/r9xuNVYRtRcC36oWraVA3jzN6F6rDE8r8xs3ylISVz6JeCQ4YRYwbMsjjc 720 /tiJLM7ZYxIe5IrYz1ZtN6n/SEssJAswRIgps2EhCt/HS2xAmGCOhgU= 721 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 723 The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For 724 brevity, the other two certificates are not. 726 0 1189: SEQUENCE { 727 4 909: SEQUENCE { 728 8 3: [0] { 729 10 1: INTEGER 2 730 : } 731 13 20: INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E4 732 35 13: SEQUENCE { 733 37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 734 : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 735 48 0: NULL 736 : } 737 50 51: SEQUENCE { 738 52 49: SET { 739 54 47: SEQUENCE { 740 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 741 61 40: PrintableString 742 : '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642' 743 : } 744 : } 745 : } 746 103 30: SEQUENCE { 747 105 13: UTCTime 20/05/2021 16:05:45 GMT 748 120 13: UTCTime 16/03/2022 16:05:45 GMT 749 : } 750 135 51: SEQUENCE { 751 137 49: SET { 752 139 47: SEQUENCE { 753 141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 754 146 40: PrintableString 755 : '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187' 756 : } 757 : } 758 : } 759 188 290: SEQUENCE { 760 192 13: SEQUENCE { 761 194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption 762 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 763 205 0: NULL 764 : } 765 207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 766 212 266: SEQUENCE { 767 216 257: INTEGER 768 : 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8 769 : 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65 770 : B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE 771 : 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13 772 : 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37 773 : 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE 774 : E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED 775 : 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89 776 : F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E 777 : 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19 778 : BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65 779 : 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28 780 : 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9 781 : 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A 782 : 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41 783 : FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C 784 : EB 785 477 3: INTEGER 65537 786 : } 787 : } 788 : } 789 482 431: [3] { 790 486 427: SEQUENCE { 791 490 29: SEQUENCE { 792 492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 793 497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 794 499 20: OCTET STRING 795 : 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB 796 : F0 53 A1 87 797 : } 798 : } 799 521 31: SEQUENCE { 800 523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 801 528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 802 530 22: SEQUENCE { 803 532 20: [0] 804 : 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97 805 : B3 77 86 42 806 : } 807 : } 808 : } 809 554 12: SEQUENCE { 810 556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) 811 561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 812 564 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 813 566 0: SEQUENCE {} 814 : } 815 : } 816 568 14: SEQUENCE { 817 570 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 818 575 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 819 578 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 820 580 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits 821 : '1'B (bit 0) 822 : } 823 : } 824 584 24: SEQUENCE { 825 586 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 826 591 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 827 594 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 828 596 12: SEQUENCE { 829 598 10: SEQUENCE { 830 600 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 831 : resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2) 832 : } 833 : } 834 : } 835 : } 836 610 97: SEQUENCE { 837 612 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 838 617 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 839 619 88: SEQUENCE { 840 621 86: SEQUENCE { 841 623 84: [0] { 842 625 82: [0] { 843 627 80: [6] 844 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 845 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl' 846 : } 847 : } 848 : } 849 : } 850 : } 851 : } 852 709 108: SEQUENCE { 853 711 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess 854 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 855 721 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 856 723 94: SEQUENCE { 857 725 92: SEQUENCE { 858 727 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2) 859 737 80: [6] 860 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 861 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer' 862 : } 863 : } 864 : } 865 : } 866 819 25: SEQUENCE { 867 821 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7) 868 831 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 869 834 10: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 870 836 8: SEQUENCE { 871 838 6: SEQUENCE { 872 840 2: OCTET STRING 00 01 873 844 0: NULL 874 : } 875 : } 876 : } 877 : } 878 846 69: SEQUENCE { 879 848 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess 880 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11) 881 858 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 882 860 55: SEQUENCE { 883 862 53: SEQUENCE { 884 864 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13' 885 874 41: [6] 886 : 'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml' 887 : } 888 : } 889 : } 890 : } 891 : } 892 : } 893 : } 894 917 13: SEQUENCE { 895 919 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption 896 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 897 930 0: NULL 898 : } 899 932 257: BIT STRING 900 : 48 C2 F7 C8 15 A7 43 1B EE E8 8A 68 7C A5 3F 4E 901 : 39 DE 6B 49 F8 09 0D D3 B7 EC 2B FA 86 C3 F7 BD 902 : D0 32 6F ED CA 75 86 F8 E3 E2 EC B7 B2 07 FB 3C 903 : 94 3B 70 A3 46 AE 0C 9B AB F9 44 D2 37 1E F8 04 904 : 60 56 36 E2 D8 1A F3 66 C5 80 9C 1F 38 E9 29 F0 905 : B2 4B 70 E9 C7 A7 6A 27 FA 03 0C 3A AB 4D 0D B2 906 : 90 1E A4 C0 5D D9 58 3F F6 C2 85 BC EC 09 15 53 907 : A0 35 CA A2 42 25 CF E6 B1 89 3D 60 5C 38 CB F9 908 : D9 AF FB 69 D8 DF 5F 0A 67 3A 28 E2 4C E8 0C 96 909 : 84 06 98 2D 93 3D 9A 72 75 92 A3 97 11 00 4D D1 910 : 44 42 CB 1A DF 7C 43 9E 5A 69 FB FA FD C6 E3 55 911 : 61 1B 51 70 2D FA A1 6A DA 54 0D E3 CC DE 85 EA 912 : B0 C4 F2 BF 31 B3 7C A5 21 25 73 E8 97 82 43 86 913 : 11 63 06 CC B2 38 DC FE D8 89 2C CE D9 63 12 1E 914 : E4 8A D8 CF 56 6D 37 A9 FF 48 4B 2C 24 0B 30 44 915 : 88 29 B3 61 21 0A DF C7 4B 6C 40 98 60 8E 86 05 916 : } 918 To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity 919 private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are 920 not. 922 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 923 MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW 924 /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP 925 Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 926 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ 927 eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm 928 gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 929 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio 930 pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z 931 ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ 932 mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 933 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF 934 t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt 935 MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M 936 Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 937 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l 938 nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm 939 FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 940 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo 941 Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz 942 vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc 943 DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf 944 taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc 945 PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ 946 E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV 947 iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= 948 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 950 Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), 951 yields the following detached CMS signature. 953 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 954 # MIIGjwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGgDCCBnwCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 955 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSpMIIEpTCCA42gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 956 # QwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR 957 # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMTA1MjAxNjA1NDVaFw0yMjAzMTYx 958 # NjA1NDVaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM 959 # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT 960 # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg 961 # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm 962 # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha 963 # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG 964 # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ 965 # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggGvMIIBqzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R 966 # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI 967 # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg 968 # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ 969 # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5 970 # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5 971 # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0 972 # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMBkGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BAowC 973 # DAGBAIAAQUAMEUGCCsGAQUFBwELBDkwNzA1BggrBgEFBQcwDYYpaHR0cHM6Ly9y 974 # cmRwLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L25vdGlmaWNhdGlvbi54bWwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQA 975 # DggEBAEjC98gVp0Mb7uiKaHylP0453mtJ+AkN07fsK/qGw/e90DJv7cp1hvjj4u 976 # y3sgf7PJQ7cKNGrgybq/lE0jce+ARgVjbi2BrzZsWAnB846Snwsktw6cenaif6A 977 # ww6q00NspAepMBd2Vg/9sKFvOwJFVOgNcqiQiXP5rGJPWBcOMv52a/7adjfXwpn 978 # OijiTOgMloQGmC2TPZpydZKjlxEATdFEQssa33xDnlpp+/r9xuNVYRtRcC36oWr 979 # aVA3jzN6F6rDE8r8xs3ylISVz6JeCQ4YRYwbMsjjc/tiJLM7ZYxIe5IrYz1ZtN6 980 # n/SEssJAswRIgps2EhCt/HS2xAmGCOhgUxggGqMIIBpgIBA4AUkUZSo71RwUQmA 981 # ZiIn1xFq/BToYcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGswGgYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQ0GCyqGSIb3 982 # DQEJEAEvMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTA1MjAxNjI4MzlaMC8GCSqGSIb3DQE 983 # JBDEiBCAr4vKeUvHJINsE0YQwUMxoo48qrOU+iPuFbQR8qX3BFjANBgkqhkiG9w 984 # 0BAQEFAASCAQB85HsCBrU3EcVOcf4nC6Z3jrOjT+fVlyTDAObF6GTNWgrxe7jSA 985 # Inyf51UzuIGqhVY3sQiiXbdWcVYtPb4118KvyeXh8A/HLp4eeAJntl9D3igt38M 986 # o84q5pf9pTQXx3hbsm51ilpOip/TKVMqzE42s6OPox3M0+6eKH3/vBKnw1s1ayM 987 # 0MUnPDTBfZL3JJEGPWfIZHEcrypevbqR7Jjsz5vp0qyF2D9v+w+nyhZOPmuePm7 988 # YqLyOw/E99PVBs9uI+hmBiCz/BK2Z3VRjrrlrUU+49eldSTkZ2sJyhCbbV2Ufgi 989 # S2FOquAgJzjilyN3BDQLV8Rp9cGh0PpVslKH2na 990 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 992 Authors' Addresses 994 Randy Bush 995 IIJ & Arrcus 996 5147 Crystal Springs 997 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 998 United States of America 1000 Email: randy@psg.com 1001 Massimo Candela 1002 NTT 1003 Siriusdreef 70-72 1004 Hoofddorp 2132 WT 1005 Netherlands 1007 Email: massimo@ntt.net 1009 Warren Kumari 1010 Google 1011 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 1012 Mountain View, CA 94043 1013 US 1015 Email: warren@kumari.net 1017 Russ Housley 1018 Vigil Security, LLC 1019 516 Dranesville Road 1020 Herndon, VA 20170 1021 USA 1023 Email: housley@vigilsec.com