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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ & Arrcus 4 Intended status: Standards Track M. Candela 5 Expires: November 18, 2021 NTT 6 W. Kumari 7 Google 8 R. Housley 9 Vigil Security 10 May 17, 2021 12 Finding and Using Geofeed Data 13 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-10 15 Abstract 17 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 18 Specification Language inetnum: class to refer specifically to 19 geofeed data CSV files, and describes an optional scheme to use the 20 Routing Public Key Intrastructure to authenticate the geofeed data 21 CSV files. 23 Status of This Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 18, 2021. 40 Copyright Notice 42 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 43 document authors. All rights reserved. 45 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 46 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 47 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 48 publication of this document. Please review these documents 49 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 50 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 51 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 52 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 53 described in the Simplified BSD License. 55 Table of Contents 57 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 58 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 2. Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 3. inetnum: Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 61 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 66 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 68 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 69 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 71 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 73 1. Introduction 75 Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to 76 customize those services based on the geographic location of the user 77 of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used 78 to contact the service. Also, infrastructure and other services 79 might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] 80 defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP 81 addresses. But it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed 82 data given an IP address. 84 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 85 Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2622] inetnum: class to refer 86 specifically to geofeed data CSV files, and how to prudently use 87 them. In all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be 88 assumed [RFC4012]. 90 The reader may find [INETNUM] and [INET6NUM] informative, and 91 certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database 92 classes. 94 An optional, utterly awesome but slightly complex means for 95 authenticating geofeed data is also defined. 97 1.1. Requirements Language 99 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 100 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 101 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 102 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 103 capitals, as shown here. 105 2. Geofeed Files 107 Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility 108 for an IP address resource 'owner' to associate those IP addresses to 109 geographic locales. 111 Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address 112 to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In 113 Section 3, this document specifies how to find the relevant [RFC8805] 114 geofeed file given an IP address. 116 Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale 117 and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be 118 even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many 119 prefixes, dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc. 121 Geofeed data do have privacy considerations, see Section 6. 123 This document also suggests optional signature, which authenticates 124 the data when present, for geofeed files to provide stronger 125 authenticity to the data. 127 3. inetnum: Class 129 The original RPSL specifications starting with [RIPE81], [RIPE181], 130 and a trail of subsequent documents were done by the RIPE community. 131 The IETF standardardized RPSL in [RFC2622] and [RFC4012]. Since 132 then, it has been modified and extensively enhanced in the RIR 133 community, mostly by RIPE, [RIPE-DB]. Currently, change contol 134 effectively lies in the operator community. 136 The Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL), and [RFC2622] and 137 [RFC4012] used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) specifies 138 the inetnum: database class. Each of these objects describes an IP 139 address range and its attributes. The inetnum: objects form a 140 hierarchy ordered on the address space. 142 Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: 143 attribute in the inetnum: class. Until such time, this document 144 defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute which contains an 145 HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format of the inetnum: geofeed 146 remarks: attribute MUST be as in this example, "remarks: Geofeed ", 147 where the token "Geofeed" MUST be case-sensitive, followed by a URL 148 which will vary, but MUST refer only to a single [RFC8805] geofeed 149 file. 151 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 152 remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv 154 While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant 155 parties, we specify that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: 156 class MUST be "geofeed: ", and MUST be followed by a single URL which 157 will vary, but MUST refer only to a single [RFC8805] geofeed file. 159 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 160 geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv 162 Registries MAY, for the interim, provide a mix of the remarks: 163 attribute form and the geofeed: attribute form. 165 The URL's use of the web PKI can not provide authentication of IP 166 address space ownership. It is only used to authenticate a pointer 167 to the geofeed file and transport integrity of the data. In 168 contrast, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI, see 169 [RFC6481]) can be used to authenticate IP space ownership; see 170 optional authentication in Section 4. 172 Until all producers of inetnum:s, i.e. the RIRs, state that they have 173 migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at 174 inetnum:s to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the 175 remarks: and geofeed: forms. This not only implies that the RIRs 176 support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have 177 migrated any inetnum:s from remarks: use to geofeed:s. 179 Any particular inetnum: object MUST have at most, one geofeed 180 reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when it 181 is implemented. If there is more than one, all are ignored. 183 If a geofeed CSV file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP 184 address space, there are likely to be geofeed references from 185 multiple inetnum: objects. 187 As inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, Geofeed references SHOULD be at 188 the lowest applicable inetnum: object covering the relevant prefixes 189 in the referenced geofeed file. When fetching, the most specific 190 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 192 When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects 193 which have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on 194 the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be 195 preferred. 197 It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than 198 the inetnum: which refers to them. For example an INETNUM object for 199 a prefix P could refer to a geofeed file in which P has been sub- 200 divided into one or more longer prefixes. 202 Currently, the registry data published by ARIN is not the same RPSL 203 as that of the other registries (see [RFC7485] for a survery of the 204 whois Tower of Babel); therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP 205 [RFC0959], whois [RFC3912], RDAP [RFC7482], or whatever, the 206 "NetRange" attribute/key MUST be treated as "inetnum" and the 207 "Comment" attribute MUST be treated as "remarks". 209 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data 211 The question arises whether a particular [RFC8805] geofeed data set 212 is valid, i.e. is authorized by the 'owner' of the IP address space 213 and is authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: which points to the 214 [RFC8805] geofeed file provides some assurance. Unfortunately, the 215 RPSL in many repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An 216 approach where RPSL was signed a la [RFC7909] would be good, except 217 it would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a 218 fair number of them. 220 An optional authenticator MAY be appended to a [RFC8805] geofeed 221 file. It is a digest of the main body of the file signed by the 222 private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for the covering address 223 range. One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI certificate 224 with the signature and the digest of the geofeed text. 226 The canonicalization procedure converts the data from its internal 227 character representation to the UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding, 228 and the sequence MUST be used to denote the end of a line of 229 text. Trailing space characters MUST NOT appear on a line of text. 230 That is, the space or tab characters must not be followed by the 231 sequence. Thus, a blank line is represented solely by the 232 sequence. Other nonprintable characters, such as backspace, 233 are not expected. For robustness, any nonprintable characters MUST 234 NOT be changed by canonicalization. Trailing blank lines MUST NOT 235 appear at the end of the file. That is, the file must not end with 236 multiple consecutive sequences. Any end-of-file marker used 237 by an operating system is not considered to be part of the file 238 content. When present, such end-of-file markers MUST NOT be 239 processed by the digital signature algorithm. 241 Should the authenticator be syntactically incorrect per the above, 242 the authenticator is invalid. 244 Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after file 245 canonicalization, the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] 246 would be used to create a detached DER encoded signature which is 247 then BASE64 encoded and line wrapped to 72 or fewer characters. 249 The address range of the signing certificate MUST cover all prefixes 250 in the geofeed file it signs; and therefore must be covered by the 251 range of the inetnum:. 253 An address range A 'covers' address range B if the range of B is 254 identical to or a subset of A. 'Address range' is used here because 255 inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on CIDR prefix 256 boundaries, while those of the CSV lines in the geofeed file do. 258 Validation of the signing certificate needs to ensure that it is part 259 of the current manifest and that the resources are covered by the 260 RPKI certificate. 262 As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the 263 signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's 264 address range is included in the [RFC5652] CMS SignedData 265 certificates field. 267 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 268 getting the department with the Hardware Security Module (HSM) to 269 sign the CMS blob is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the 270 other hand, verifying the signature requires no complexity; the 271 certificate, which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the 272 needed public key. 274 The appendix MUST be 'hidden' as a series of "#" comments at the end 275 of the geofeed file. The following is a cryptographically incorrect, 276 albeit simple example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A. 278 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 279 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 280 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 281 ... 282 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 283 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 284 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 286 The signature does not cover the signature lines. 288 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] describes and provides code for a 289 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile for a general purpose 290 listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use with the Resource 291 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). It provides usable, albeit 292 complex, code to sign geofeed files. 294 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] describes a Cryptographic Message Syntax 295 (CMS) profile for a general purpose Resource Tagged Attestation (RTA) 296 based on the RPKI. While this is expected to become applicable in 297 the long run, for the purposes of this document, a self-signed root 298 trust anchor is used. 300 5. Operational Considerations 302 To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to 303 register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with 304 their RIR/NIR and/or any provider LIR which has assigned prefixes to 305 them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain 306 inetnum: objects. They also provide means of [sub-]assigning IP 307 address resources and allowing the assignee to create whois data, 308 including inetnum: objects, and thereby referring to geofeed files. 310 The geofeed files MUST be published via and fetched using https 311 [RFC2818]. 313 When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside the 314 referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range. 316 If and only if the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then 317 multiple inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the 318 consumer MUST use only geofeed lines where the prefix is covered by 319 the address range of the inetnum: object they have followed. 321 To minimize the load on RIR whois [RFC3912] services, use of the 322 RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be the preferred access. This 323 also provides bulk access instead of fetching with tweezers. 325 Currently, geolocation providers have bulk whois data access at all 326 the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for 327 all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for 328 users without such authorization, the same result can be achieved 329 with extra RDAP effort. There is open source code to pass over such 330 data across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process 331 them [geofeed-finder]. 333 An entity fetching geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do 334 frequent real-time look-ups to prevent load on RPSL and geofeed 335 servers. [RFC8805] Section 3.4 suggests use of the [RFC7234] HTTP 336 Expires Caching Header to signal when geofeed data should be 337 refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of 338 such an HTTP Header signal, collectors SHOULD NOT fetch more 339 frequently than weekly. It would be polite not to fetch at magic 340 times such as midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too 341 many others are likely to do the same. 343 6. Privacy Considerations 345 [RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP 346 address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an 347 individual user. Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy 348 guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this 349 exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as 350 described in this document, the operator should be aware of this 351 exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy 352 considerations of [RFC8805] Section 4 apply to this document. 354 7. Security Considerations 356 It is generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also use 357 other sources to cross-validate the data. All the Security 358 Considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well. 360 As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak if any 361 authentication. This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to 362 malicious geofeed files. Section 4 suggests an unfortunately complex 363 method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI. 365 If an inetnum: for a wide prefix (e.g. a /16) points to an RPKI- 366 signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish an unsigned 367 equal or narrower (e.g. a /24) inetnum: in a whois registry which has 368 weak authorization. 370 The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers 371 due to too-frequent queries. Usually they throttle by the querying 372 IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be 373 deployed by geofeed file servers. 375 8. IANA Considerations 377 IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in 378 the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 379 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows: 381 Description OID Specification 382 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 383 id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD] 385 9. Acknowledgments 387 Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue. George 388 Michaelson for the first and substantial external review, Erik Kline 389 who was too shy to agree to co-authorship. Additionally, we express 390 our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno Schepers, Flavio 391 Luciani, Eric Dugas, Job Snijders who provided running code, and 392 Kevin Pack. Also, to geolocation providers that are consuming 393 geofeeds with this described solution, Jonathan Kosgei (ipdata.co), 394 Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io), and Pol Nisenblat (bigdatacloud.com). For 395 helpful reviews we thank Adrian Farrel, Antonio Prado, Rob Wilton, 396 George Michaelson, the document shepherd, Kyle Rose for a probing 397 SECDIR review, Paul Kyzivat for a helpful GENART directorate review, 398 and Jean-Michel Combes for an INTDIR review. 400 10. References 402 10.1. Normative References 404 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 405 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 406 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 407 . 409 [RFC2622] Alaettinoglu, C., Villamizar, C., Gerich, E., Kessens, D., 410 Meyer, D., Bates, T., Karrenberg, D., and M. Terpstra, 411 "Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)", RFC 2622, 412 DOI 10.17487/RFC2622, June 1999, 413 . 415 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, 416 DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, 417 . 419 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 420 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 421 2003, . 423 [RFC4012] Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky, 424 "Routing Policy Specification Language next generation 425 (RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005, 426 . 428 [RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft 429 Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009, 430 . 432 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 433 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 434 . 436 [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 437 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, 438 DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012, 439 . 441 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 442 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 443 May 2017, . 445 [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. 446 Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation 447 Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, 448 . 450 10.2. Informative References 452 [geofeed-finder] 453 Massimo Candela, "geofeed-finder", 454 . 456 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] 457 Michaelson, G. G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, 458 T., and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged 459 Attestations (RTAs)", draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00 (work 460 in progress), January 2021. 462 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] 463 Snijders, J., "RPKI Signed Checklists", draft-spaghetti- 464 sidrops-rpki-rsc-03 (work in progress), February 2021. 466 [INET6NUM] 467 RIPE, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", 468 . 473 [INETNUM] RIPE, "Description of the INETNUM Object", 474 . 479 [RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", 480 STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985, 481 . 483 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 484 DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004, 485 . 487 [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, 488 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", 489 RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, 490 . 492 [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 493 Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, 494 DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, 495 . 497 [RFC7485] Zhou, L., Kong, N., Shen, S., Sheng, S., and A. Servin, 498 "Inventory and Analysis of WHOIS Registration Objects", 499 RFC 7485, DOI 10.17487/RFC7485, March 2015, 500 . 502 [RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy 503 Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public 504 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909, 505 DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016, 506 . 508 [RIPE-DB] RIPE, "RIPE Database Documentation", 509 . 513 [RIPE181] RIPE, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In A Routing 514 Registry", 515 . 517 [RIPE81] RIPE, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In The RIPE 518 Database", 519 . 521 Appendix A. Example 523 This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CA 524 certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity 525 certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a 526 detached signature. 528 The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As 529 usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 530 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers. 532 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 533 MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 534 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5 535 MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB 536 AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ 537 0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH 538 XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe 539 g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb 540 O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq 541 jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd 542 BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU 543 GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw 544 GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI 545 KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 546 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u 547 ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 548 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD 549 AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN 550 BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe 551 xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH 552 cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM 553 Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA 554 rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a 555 x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA== 556 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 558 The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate 559 grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two 560 AS numbers (64496 and 64497). 562 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 563 MIIFBzCCA++gAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 564 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTAyMTlaFw0yMTA5 565 MDMxOTAyMTlaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG 566 QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc 567 zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 568 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo 569 j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ 570 liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n 571 YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE 572 TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIvMIICKzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 573 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYD 574 VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr 575 BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u 576 ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz 577 Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v 578 cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr 579 BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu 580 bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz 581 Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF 582 hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH 583 AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA 584 +/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnLu+d1ZsUTiX3YWGueTHIalW4ad0 585 Kupi7pYMV2nXbxNGmdJMol9BkzVz9tj55ReMghUU4YLm/ICYe4fz5e0T8o9s/vIm 586 cGS29+WoGuiznMitpvbS/379gaMezk6KpqjH6Brw6meMqy09phmcmvm3x3WTmx09 587 mLlQneMptwk8qSYcnMUmGLJs+cVqmkOa3sWRdw8WrGu6QqYtQz3HFZQojF06YzEq 588 V/dBdCFdEOwTfVl2n2XqhoJl/oEBdC4uu2G0qRk3+WVs+uwVHP0Ttsbt7TzFgZfY 589 yxqvOg6QoldxZVZmHHncKmETu/BqCDGJot9may31ukrx34Bu+XFMVihm0w== 590 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 592 The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate 593 grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). 594 Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data 595 signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate. 597 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 598 MIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZuMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 599 BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC 600 Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAxOTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNV 601 BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi 602 MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW 603 yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c 604 K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm 605 BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp 606 tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog 607 qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB 608 AAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j 609 BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8B 610 Af8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFag 611 VKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF 612 RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcB 613 AQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBv 614 c2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIu 615 Y2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwEDAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUH 616 AQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90 617 aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHP 618 TArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYiblMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh 619 6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b 620 +YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8adS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1ar 621 Kelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aaaEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfO 622 MkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztcOxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh4 623 5Q== 624 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 626 The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For 627 brevity, the other two certificates are not. 629 0 1197: SEQUENCE { 630 4 917: SEQUENCE { 631 8 3: [0] { 632 10 1: INTEGER 2 633 : } 634 13 20: INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E3 635 35 13: SEQUENCE { 636 37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 637 : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 638 48 0: NULL 639 : } 640 50 51: SEQUENCE { 641 52 49: SET { 642 54 47: SEQUENCE { 643 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 644 61 40: PrintableString 645 : '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642' 646 : } 647 : } 648 : } 649 103 30: SEQUENCE { 650 105 13: UTCTime 03/09/2020 19:05:17 GMT 651 120 13: UTCTime 30/06/2021 19:05:17 GMT 652 : } 653 135 51: SEQUENCE { 654 137 49: SET { 655 139 47: SEQUENCE { 656 141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 657 146 40: PrintableString 658 : '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187' 659 : } 660 : } 661 : } 662 188 290: SEQUENCE { 663 192 13: SEQUENCE { 664 194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption 665 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 666 205 0: NULL 667 : } 668 207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 669 212 266: SEQUENCE { 670 216 257: INTEGER 671 : 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8 672 : 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65 673 : B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE 674 : 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13 675 : 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37 676 : 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE 677 : E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED 678 : 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89 679 : F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E 680 : 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19 681 : BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65 682 : 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28 683 : 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9 684 : 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A 685 : 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41 686 : FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C 687 : EB 688 477 3: INTEGER 65537 689 : } 690 : } 691 : } 692 482 439: [3] { 693 486 435: SEQUENCE { 694 490 29: SEQUENCE { 695 492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 696 497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 697 499 20: OCTET STRING 698 : 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB 699 : F0 53 A1 87 700 : } 701 : } 702 521 31: SEQUENCE { 703 523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 704 528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 705 530 22: SEQUENCE { 706 532 20: [0] 707 : 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97 708 : B3 77 86 42 709 : } 710 : } 711 : } 712 554 12: SEQUENCE { 713 556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) 714 561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 715 564 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 716 566 0: SEQUENCE {} 717 : } 718 : } 719 568 14: SEQUENCE { 720 570 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 721 575 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 722 578 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 723 580 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits 724 : '1'B (bit 0) 725 : } 726 : } 727 584 24: SEQUENCE { 728 586 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 729 591 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 730 594 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 731 596 12: SEQUENCE { 732 598 10: SEQUENCE { 733 600 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 734 : resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2) 735 : } 736 : } 737 : } 738 : } 739 610 97: SEQUENCE { 740 612 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 741 617 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 742 619 88: SEQUENCE { 743 621 86: SEQUENCE { 744 623 84: [0] { 745 625 82: [0] { 746 627 80: [6] 747 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 748 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl' 749 : } 750 : } 751 : } 752 : } 753 : } 754 : } 755 709 108: SEQUENCE { 756 711 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess 757 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 758 721 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 759 723 94: SEQUENCE { 760 725 92: SEQUENCE { 761 727 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2) 762 737 80: [6] 763 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 764 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer' 765 : } 766 : } 767 : } 768 : } 769 819 33: SEQUENCE { 770 821 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7) 771 831 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 772 834 18: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 773 836 16: SEQUENCE { 774 838 6: SEQUENCE { 775 840 2: OCTET STRING 00 01 776 844 0: NULL 777 : } 778 846 6: SEQUENCE { 779 848 2: OCTET STRING 00 02 780 852 0: NULL 781 : } 782 : } 783 : } 784 : } 785 854 69: SEQUENCE { 786 856 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess 787 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11) 788 866 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 789 868 55: SEQUENCE { 790 870 53: SEQUENCE { 791 872 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13' 792 882 41: [6] 793 : 'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml' 794 : } 795 : } 796 : } 797 : } 798 : } 799 : } 800 : } 801 925 13: SEQUENCE { 802 927 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption 803 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 804 938 0: NULL 805 : } 806 940 257: BIT STRING 807 : 05 1D 93 D2 A4 F6 57 56 65 B1 98 E3 FB 21 CF 4C 808 : 0A C8 54 11 02 64 54 82 74 FF 9B 25 3B 1E F3 94 809 : EA 62 26 E5 32 C3 52 F7 21 2E D9 23 5B 69 93 0D 810 : 2E E4 92 88 07 DF 62 8A 21 E2 72 18 AB F4 61 EB 811 : EC 46 B3 59 F8 DB B2 59 52 89 28 78 BB 58 D1 45 812 : 1B D9 F2 2C B9 AF 49 16 8F 18 19 39 E9 A8 33 06 813 : 7B EC 67 A5 B2 74 48 24 A8 06 52 42 22 3F 9B F9 814 : 84 BC 59 78 C4 1E DD 8A 5B AC 32 03 F0 5C 35 2F 815 : 1A 75 2D A9 11 4C 02 D9 CB 3F 59 CC 33 81 BB 6D 816 : 9E 47 27 1B BF F0 92 B4 37 A2 AC E9 0B 56 AB 29 817 : E9 72 CF B3 C6 20 85 C9 1B 2F 67 17 C0 B7 FD A6 818 : 9A 12 91 DD ED 48 08 CA F5 D8 B8 26 3F 96 A5 93 819 : 9B DE E3 0F 18 06 21 81 82 EF AE B4 9A D7 CE 32 820 : 40 7C 60 5E A4 51 4F AD 77 67 43 42 C3 33 B5 C3 821 : B1 6F 3A A2 1A 78 9C 99 E2 5F 07 01 B6 96 2E 8E 822 : D2 FA 2B 5B 87 79 88 83 93 2A 94 32 A9 F8 78 E5 823 : } 825 To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity 826 private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are 827 not. 829 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 830 MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW 831 /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP 832 Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 833 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ 834 eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm 835 gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 836 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio 837 pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z 838 ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ 839 mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 840 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF 841 t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt 842 MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M 843 Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 844 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l 845 nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm 846 FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 847 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo 848 Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz 849 vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc 850 DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf 851 taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc 852 PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ 853 E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV 854 iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= 855 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 857 Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), 858 yields the following detached CMS signature. 860 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 861 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 862 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 863 # MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR 864 # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAx 865 # OTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM 866 # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT 867 # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg 868 # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm 869 # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha 870 # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG 871 # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ 872 # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R 873 # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI 874 # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg 875 # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ 876 # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5 877 # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5 878 # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0 879 # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwE 880 # DAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilo 881 # dHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhki 882 # G9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHPTArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYi 883 # blMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2 884 # fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b+YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8a 885 # dS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1arKelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aa 886 # aEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfOMkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztc 887 # OxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh45TGCAaowggGmAgEDgBSRR 888 # lKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMx 889 # DQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIwMDkxMzE4NDUxMFowLwY 890 # JKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4VtBHypfcEWMA 891 # 0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAHUrA4PaJG42BD3hpF8U0usnV3Dg5NQh97SfyKTk7 892 # YHhhwu/936gkmAew8ODRTCddMvMObWkjj7/XeR+WKffaTF1EAdZ1L6REV+GlV91 893 # cYnFkT9ldn4wHQnNNncfAehk5PClYUUQ0gqjdJT1hdaolT83b3ttekyYIiwPmHE 894 # xRaNkSvKenlNqcriaaf3rbQy9dc2d1KxrL2429n134ICqjKeRnHkXXrCWDmyv/3 895 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 896 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 897 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 899 Authors' Addresses 901 Randy Bush 902 IIJ & Arrcus 903 5147 Crystal Springs 904 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 905 United States of America 907 Email: randy@psg.com 908 Massimo Candela 909 NTT 910 Siriusdreef 70-72 911 Hoofddorp 2132 WT 912 Netherlands 914 Email: massimo@ntt.net 916 Warren Kumari 917 Google 918 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 919 Mountain View, CA 94043 920 US 922 Email: warren@kumari.net 924 Russ Housley 925 Vigil Security, LLC 926 516 Dranesville Road 927 Herndon, VA 20170 928 USA 930 Email: housley@vigilsec.com