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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ & Arrcus 4 Intended status: Standards Track M. Candela 5 Expires: November 16, 2021 NTT 6 W. Kumari 7 Google 8 R. Housley 9 Vigil Security 10 May 15, 2021 12 Finding and Using Geofeed Data 13 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-09 15 Abstract 17 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 18 Specification Language inetnum: class to refer specifically to 19 geofeed data CSV files, and describes an optional scheme to use the 20 Routing Public Key Intrastructure to authenticate the geofeed data 21 CSV files. 23 Status of This Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 16, 2021. 40 Copyright Notice 42 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 43 document authors. All rights reserved. 45 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 46 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 47 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 48 publication of this document. Please review these documents 49 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 50 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 51 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 52 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 53 described in the Simplified BSD License. 55 Table of Contents 57 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 58 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 2. Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 3. inetnum: Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 61 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 66 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 67 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 68 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 69 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 71 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 73 1. Introduction 75 Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to 76 customize those services based on the geographic location of the user 77 of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used 78 to contact the service. Also, infrastructure and other services 79 might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] 80 defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP 81 addresses. But it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed 82 data given an IP address. 84 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 85 Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2622] inetnum: class to refer 86 specifically to geofeed data CSV files, and how to prudently use 87 them. In all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be 88 assumed [RFC4012]. 90 The reader may find [INETNUM] and [INET6NUM] informative, and 91 certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database 92 classes. 94 An optional, utterly awesome but slightly complex means for 95 authenticating geofeed data is also defined. 97 1.1. Requirements Language 99 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 100 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 101 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 102 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 103 capitals, as shown here. 105 2. Geofeed Files 107 Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility 108 for an IP address resource 'owner' to associate those IP addresses to 109 geographic locales. 111 Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address 112 to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In 113 Section 3, this document specifies how to find the relevant [RFC8805] 114 geofeed file given an IP address. 116 Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale 117 and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be 118 even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many 119 prefixes, dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc. 121 Geofeed data do have privacy considerations, see Section 6. 123 This document also suggests optional signature, which authenticates 124 the data when present, for geofeed files to provide stronger 125 authenticity to the data. 127 3. inetnum: Class 129 The Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL), and [RFC2622] and 130 [RFC4012] used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) specifies 131 the inetnum: database class. Each of these objects describes an IP 132 address range and its attributes. The inetnum: objects form a 133 hierarchy ordered on the address space. 135 Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: 136 attribute in the inetnum: class. Until such time, this document 137 defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute which contains an 138 HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format of the inetnum: geofeed 139 remarks: attribute MUST be as in this example, "remarks: Geofeed ", 140 where the token "Geofeed" MUST be case-sensitive, followed by a URL 141 which will vary, but MUST refer only to a single [RFC8805] geofeed 142 file. 144 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 145 remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv 147 While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant 148 parties, we specify that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: 149 class MUST be "geofeed: ", and MUST be followed by a single URL which 150 will vary, but MUST refer only to a single [RFC8805] geofeed file. 152 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 153 geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv 155 Registries MAY, for the interim, provide a mix of the remarks: 156 attribute form and the geofeed: attribute form. 158 The URL's use of the web PKI can not provide authentication of IP 159 address space ownership. It is only used to authenticate a pointer 160 to the geofeed file and transport integrity of the data. In 161 contrast, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI, see 162 [RFC6481]) can be used to authenticate IP space ownership; see 163 optional authentication in Section 4. 165 Until all producers of inetnum:s, i.e. the RIRs, state that they have 166 migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at 167 inetnum:s to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the 168 remarks: and geofeed: forms. This not only implies that the RIRs 169 support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have 170 migrated any inetnum:s from remarks: use to geofeed:s. 172 Any particular inetnum: object MUST have at most, one geofeed 173 reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when it 174 is implemented. If there is more than one, all are ignored. 176 If a geofeed CSV file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP 177 address space, there are likely to be geofeed references from 178 multiple inetnum: objects. 180 As inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, Geofeed references SHOULD be at 181 the lowest applicable inetnum: object covering the relevant prefixes 182 in the referenced geofeed file. When fetching, the most specific 183 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 185 When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects 186 which have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on 187 the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be 188 preferred. 190 It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than 191 the inetnum: which refers to them. For example an INETNUM object for 192 a prefix P could refer to a geofeed file in which P has been sub- 193 divided into one or more longer prefixes. 195 Currently, the registry data published by ARIN is not the same RPSL 196 as that of the other registries (see [RFC7485] for a survery of the 197 whois Tower of Babel); therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP 198 [RFC0959], whois [RFC3912], RDAP [RFC7482], or whatever, the 199 "NetRange" attribute/key MUST be treated as "inetnum" and the 200 "Comment" attribute MUST be treated as "remarks". 202 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data 204 The question arises whether a particular [RFC8805] geofeed data set 205 is valid, i.e. is authorized by the 'owner' of the IP address space 206 and is authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: which points to the 207 [RFC8805] geofeed file provides some assurance. Unfortunately, the 208 RPSL in many repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An 209 approach where RPSL was signed a la [RFC7909] would be good, except 210 it would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a 211 fair number of them. 213 An optional authenticator MAY be appended to a [RFC8805] geofeed 214 file. It is a digest of the main body of the file signed by the 215 private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for the covering address 216 range. One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI certificate 217 with the signature and the digest of the geofeed text. 219 The canonicalization procedure converts the data from its internal 220 character representation to the UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding, 221 and the sequence MUST be used to denote the end of a line of 222 text. Trailing space characters MUST NOT appear on a line of text. 223 That is, the space or tab characters must not be followed by the 224 sequence. Thus, a blank line is represented solely by the 225 sequence. Other nonprintable characters, such as backspace, 226 are not expected. For robustness, any nonprintable characters MUST 227 NOT be changed by canonicalization. Trailing blank lines MUST NOT 228 appear at the end of the file. That is, the file must not end with 229 multiple consecutive sequences. Any end-of-file marker used 230 by an operating system is not considered to be part of the file 231 content. When present, such end-of-file markers MUST NOT be 232 processed by the digital signature algorithm. 234 Should the authenticator be syntactically incorrect per the above, 235 the authenticator is invalid. 237 Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after file 238 canonicalization, the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] 239 would be used to create a detached DER encoded signature which is 240 then BASE64 encoded and line wrapped to 72 or fewer characters. 242 The address range of the signing certificate MUST cover all prefixes 243 in the geofeed file it signs; and therefore must be covered by the 244 range of the inetnum:. 246 An address range A 'covers' address range B if the range of B is 247 identical to or a subset of A. 'Address range' is used here because 248 inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on CIDR prefix 249 boundaries, while those of the CSV lines in the geofeed file do. 251 Validation of the signing certificate needs to ensure that it is part 252 of the current manifest and that the resources are covered by the 253 RPKI certificate. 255 As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the 256 signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's 257 address range is included in the [RFC5652] CMS SignedData 258 certificates field. 260 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 261 getting the department with the Hardware Security Module (HSM) to 262 sign the CMS blob is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the 263 other hand, verifying the signature requires no complexity; the 264 certificate, which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the 265 needed public key. 267 The appendix MUST be 'hidden' as a series of "#" comments at the end 268 of the geofeed file. The following is a cryptographically incorrect, 269 albeit simple example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A. 271 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 272 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 273 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 274 ... 275 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 276 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 277 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 279 The signature does not cover the signature lines. 281 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] describes and provides code for a 282 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile for a general purpose 283 listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use with the Resource 284 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). It provides usable, albeit 285 complex, code to sign geofeed files. 287 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] describes a Cryptographic Message Syntax 288 (CMS) profile for a general purpose Resource Tagged Attestation (RTA) 289 based on the RPKI. While this is expected to become applicable in 290 the long run, for the purposes of this document, a self-signed root 291 trust anchor is used. 293 5. Operational Considerations 295 To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to 296 register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with 297 their RIR/NIR and/or any provider LIR which has assigned prefixes to 298 them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain 299 inetnum: objects. They also provide means of [sub-]assigning IP 300 address resources and allowing the assignee to create whois data, 301 including inetnum: objects, and thereby referring to geofeed files. 303 The geofeed files MUST be published via and fetched using https 304 [RFC2818]. 306 When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside the 307 referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range. 309 If and only if the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then 310 multiple inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the 311 consumer MUST use only geofeed lines where the prefix is covered by 312 the address range of the inetnum: object they have followed. 314 To minimize the load on RIR whois [RFC3912] services, use of the 315 RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be the preferred access. This 316 also provides bulk access instead of fetching with tweezers. 318 Currently, geolocation providers have bulk whois data access at all 319 the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for 320 all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for 321 users without such authorization, the same result can be achieved 322 with extra RDAP effort. There is open source code to pass over such 323 data across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process 324 them [geofeed-finder]. 326 An entity fetching geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do 327 frequent real-time look-ups to prevent load on RPSL and geofeed 328 servers. [RFC8805] Section 3.4 suggests use of the [RFC7234] HTTP 329 Expires Caching Header to signal when geofeed data should be 330 refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of 331 such an HTTP Header signal, collectors SHOULD NOT fetch more 332 frequently than weekly. It would be polite not to fetch at magic 333 times such as midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too 334 many others are likely to do the same. 336 6. Privacy Considerations 338 [RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP 339 address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an 340 individual user. Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy 341 guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this 342 exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as 343 described in this document, the operator should be aware of this 344 exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy 345 considerations of [RFC8805] Section 4 apply to this document. 347 7. Security Considerations 349 It is generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also use 350 other sources to cross-validate the data. All the Security 351 Considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well. 353 As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak if any 354 authentication. This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to 355 malicious geofeed files. Section 4 suggests an unfortunately complex 356 method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI. 358 If an inetnum: for a wide prefix (e.g. a /16) points to an RPKI- 359 signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish an unsigned 360 equal or narrower (e.g. a /24) inetnum: in a whois registry which has 361 weak authorization. 363 The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers 364 due to too-frequent queries. Usually they throttle by the querying 365 IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be 366 deployed by geofeed file servers. 368 8. IANA Considerations 370 IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in 371 the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 372 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows: 374 Description OID Specification 375 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 376 id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD] 378 9. Acknowledgments 380 Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue. George 381 Michaelson for the first and substantial external review, Erik Kline 382 who was too shy to agree to co-authorship. Additionally, we express 383 our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno Schepers, Flavio 384 Luciani, Eric Dugas, Job Snijders who provided running code, and 385 Kevin Pack. Also, to geolocation providers that are consuming 386 geofeeds with this described solution, Jonathan Kosgei (ipdata.co), 387 Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io), and Pol Nisenblat (bigdatacloud.com). For 388 helpful reviews we thank Adrian Farrel, Antonio Prado, Rob Wilton, 389 George Michaelson, the document shepherd, Kyle Rose for a probing 390 SECDIR review, Paul Kyzivat for a helpful GENART directorate review, 391 and Jean-Michel Combes for an INTDIR review. 393 10. References 395 10.1. Normative References 397 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 398 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 399 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 400 . 402 [RFC2622] Alaettinoglu, C., Villamizar, C., Gerich, E., Kessens, D., 403 Meyer, D., Bates, T., Karrenberg, D., and M. Terpstra, 404 "Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)", RFC 2622, 405 DOI 10.17487/RFC2622, June 1999, 406 . 408 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, 409 DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, 410 . 412 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 413 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 414 2003, . 416 [RFC4012] Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky, 417 "Routing Policy Specification Language next generation 418 (RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005, 419 . 421 [RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft 422 Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009, 423 . 425 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 426 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 427 . 429 [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 430 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, 431 DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012, 432 . 434 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 435 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 436 May 2017, . 438 [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. 439 Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation 440 Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, 441 . 443 10.2. Informative References 445 [geofeed-finder] 446 Massimo Candela, "geofeed-finder", 447 . 449 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] 450 Michaelson, G. G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, 451 T., and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged 452 Attestations (RTAs)", draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00 (work 453 in progress), January 2021. 455 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] 456 Snijders, J., "RPKI Signed Checklists", draft-spaghetti- 457 sidrops-rpki-rsc-03 (work in progress), February 2021. 459 [INET6NUM] 460 RIPE, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", 461 . 466 [INETNUM] RIPE, "Description of the INETNUM Object", 467 . 472 [RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", 473 STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985, 474 . 476 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 477 DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004, 478 . 480 [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, 481 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", 482 RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, 483 . 485 [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 486 Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, 487 DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, 488 . 490 [RFC7485] Zhou, L., Kong, N., Shen, S., Sheng, S., and A. Servin, 491 "Inventory and Analysis of WHOIS Registration Objects", 492 RFC 7485, DOI 10.17487/RFC7485, March 2015, 493 . 495 [RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy 496 Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public 497 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909, 498 DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016, 499 . 501 Appendix A. Example 503 This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CA 504 certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity 505 certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a 506 detached signature. 508 The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As 509 usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 510 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers. 512 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 513 MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 514 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5 515 MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB 516 AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ 517 0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH 518 XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe 519 g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb 520 O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq 521 jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd 522 BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU 523 GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw 524 GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI 525 KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 526 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u 527 ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 528 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD 529 AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN 530 BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe 531 xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH 532 cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM 533 Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA 534 rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a 535 x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA== 536 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 538 The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate 539 grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two 540 AS numbers (64496 and 64497). 542 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 543 MIIFBzCCA++gAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 544 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTAyMTlaFw0yMTA5 545 MDMxOTAyMTlaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG 546 QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc 547 zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 548 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo 549 j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ 550 liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n 551 YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE 552 TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIvMIICKzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 553 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYD 554 VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr 555 BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u 556 ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz 557 Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v 558 cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr 559 BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu 560 bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz 561 Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF 562 hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH 563 AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA 564 +/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnLu+d1ZsUTiX3YWGueTHIalW4ad0 565 Kupi7pYMV2nXbxNGmdJMol9BkzVz9tj55ReMghUU4YLm/ICYe4fz5e0T8o9s/vIm 566 cGS29+WoGuiznMitpvbS/379gaMezk6KpqjH6Brw6meMqy09phmcmvm3x3WTmx09 567 mLlQneMptwk8qSYcnMUmGLJs+cVqmkOa3sWRdw8WrGu6QqYtQz3HFZQojF06YzEq 568 V/dBdCFdEOwTfVl2n2XqhoJl/oEBdC4uu2G0qRk3+WVs+uwVHP0Ttsbt7TzFgZfY 569 yxqvOg6QoldxZVZmHHncKmETu/BqCDGJot9may31ukrx34Bu+XFMVihm0w== 570 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 572 The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate 573 grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). 574 Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data 575 signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate. 577 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 578 MIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZuMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 579 BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC 580 Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAxOTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNV 581 BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi 582 MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW 583 yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c 584 K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm 585 BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp 586 tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog 587 qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB 588 AAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j 589 BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8B 590 Af8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFag 591 VKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF 592 RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcB 593 AQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBv 594 c2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIu 595 Y2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwEDAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUH 596 AQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90 597 aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHP 598 TArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYiblMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh 599 6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b 600 +YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8adS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1ar 601 Kelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aaaEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfO 602 MkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztcOxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh4 603 5Q== 604 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 606 The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For 607 brevity, the other two certificates are not. 609 0 1197: SEQUENCE { 610 4 917: SEQUENCE { 611 8 3: [0] { 612 10 1: INTEGER 2 613 : } 614 13 20: INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E3 615 35 13: SEQUENCE { 616 37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 617 : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 618 48 0: NULL 619 : } 620 50 51: SEQUENCE { 621 52 49: SET { 622 54 47: SEQUENCE { 623 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 624 61 40: PrintableString 625 : '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642' 626 : } 627 : } 628 : } 629 103 30: SEQUENCE { 630 105 13: UTCTime 03/09/2020 19:05:17 GMT 631 120 13: UTCTime 30/06/2021 19:05:17 GMT 632 : } 633 135 51: SEQUENCE { 634 137 49: SET { 635 139 47: SEQUENCE { 636 141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 637 146 40: PrintableString 638 : '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187' 639 : } 640 : } 641 : } 642 188 290: SEQUENCE { 643 192 13: SEQUENCE { 644 194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption 645 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 646 205 0: NULL 647 : } 648 207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 649 212 266: SEQUENCE { 650 216 257: INTEGER 651 : 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8 652 : 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65 653 : B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE 654 : 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13 655 : 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37 656 : 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE 657 : E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED 658 : 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89 659 : F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E 660 : 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19 661 : BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65 662 : 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28 663 : 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9 664 : 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A 665 : 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41 666 : FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C 667 : EB 668 477 3: INTEGER 65537 669 : } 670 : } 671 : } 672 482 439: [3] { 673 486 435: SEQUENCE { 674 490 29: SEQUENCE { 675 492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 676 497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 677 499 20: OCTET STRING 678 : 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB 679 : F0 53 A1 87 680 : } 681 : } 682 521 31: SEQUENCE { 683 523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 684 528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 685 530 22: SEQUENCE { 686 532 20: [0] 687 : 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97 688 : B3 77 86 42 689 : } 690 : } 691 : } 692 554 12: SEQUENCE { 693 556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) 694 561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 695 564 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 696 566 0: SEQUENCE {} 697 : } 698 : } 699 568 14: SEQUENCE { 700 570 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 701 575 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 702 578 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 703 580 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits 704 : '1'B (bit 0) 705 : } 706 : } 707 584 24: SEQUENCE { 708 586 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 709 591 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 710 594 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 711 596 12: SEQUENCE { 712 598 10: SEQUENCE { 713 600 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 714 : resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2) 715 : } 716 : } 717 : } 718 : } 719 610 97: SEQUENCE { 720 612 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 721 617 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 722 619 88: SEQUENCE { 723 621 86: SEQUENCE { 724 623 84: [0] { 725 625 82: [0] { 726 627 80: [6] 727 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 728 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl' 729 : } 730 : } 731 : } 732 : } 733 : } 734 : } 735 709 108: SEQUENCE { 736 711 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess 737 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 738 721 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 739 723 94: SEQUENCE { 740 725 92: SEQUENCE { 741 727 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2) 742 737 80: [6] 743 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 744 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer' 745 : } 746 : } 747 : } 748 : } 749 819 33: SEQUENCE { 750 821 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7) 751 831 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 752 834 18: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 753 836 16: SEQUENCE { 754 838 6: SEQUENCE { 755 840 2: OCTET STRING 00 01 756 844 0: NULL 757 : } 758 846 6: SEQUENCE { 759 848 2: OCTET STRING 00 02 760 852 0: NULL 761 : } 762 : } 763 : } 764 : } 765 854 69: SEQUENCE { 766 856 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess 767 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11) 768 866 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 769 868 55: SEQUENCE { 770 870 53: SEQUENCE { 771 872 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13' 772 882 41: [6] 773 : 'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml' 774 : } 775 : } 776 : } 777 : } 778 : } 779 : } 780 : } 781 925 13: SEQUENCE { 782 927 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption 783 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 784 938 0: NULL 785 : } 786 940 257: BIT STRING 787 : 05 1D 93 D2 A4 F6 57 56 65 B1 98 E3 FB 21 CF 4C 788 : 0A C8 54 11 02 64 54 82 74 FF 9B 25 3B 1E F3 94 789 : EA 62 26 E5 32 C3 52 F7 21 2E D9 23 5B 69 93 0D 790 : 2E E4 92 88 07 DF 62 8A 21 E2 72 18 AB F4 61 EB 791 : EC 46 B3 59 F8 DB B2 59 52 89 28 78 BB 58 D1 45 792 : 1B D9 F2 2C B9 AF 49 16 8F 18 19 39 E9 A8 33 06 793 : 7B EC 67 A5 B2 74 48 24 A8 06 52 42 22 3F 9B F9 794 : 84 BC 59 78 C4 1E DD 8A 5B AC 32 03 F0 5C 35 2F 795 : 1A 75 2D A9 11 4C 02 D9 CB 3F 59 CC 33 81 BB 6D 796 : 9E 47 27 1B BF F0 92 B4 37 A2 AC E9 0B 56 AB 29 797 : E9 72 CF B3 C6 20 85 C9 1B 2F 67 17 C0 B7 FD A6 798 : 9A 12 91 DD ED 48 08 CA F5 D8 B8 26 3F 96 A5 93 799 : 9B DE E3 0F 18 06 21 81 82 EF AE B4 9A D7 CE 32 800 : 40 7C 60 5E A4 51 4F AD 77 67 43 42 C3 33 B5 C3 801 : B1 6F 3A A2 1A 78 9C 99 E2 5F 07 01 B6 96 2E 8E 802 : D2 FA 2B 5B 87 79 88 83 93 2A 94 32 A9 F8 78 E5 803 : } 805 To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity 806 private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are 807 not. 809 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 810 MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW 811 /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP 812 Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 813 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ 814 eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm 815 gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 816 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio 817 pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z 818 ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ 819 mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 820 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF 821 t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt 822 MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M 823 Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 824 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l 825 nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm 826 FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 827 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo 828 Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz 829 vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc 830 DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf 831 taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc 832 PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ 833 E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV 834 iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= 835 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 837 Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), 838 yields the following detached CMS signature. 840 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 841 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 842 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 843 # MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR 844 # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAx 845 # OTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM 846 # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT 847 # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg 848 # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm 849 # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha 850 # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG 851 # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ 852 # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R 853 # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI 854 # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg 855 # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ 856 # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5 857 # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5 858 # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0 859 # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwE 860 # DAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilo 861 # dHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhki 862 # G9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHPTArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYi 863 # blMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2 864 # fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b+YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8a 865 # dS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1arKelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aa 866 # aEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfOMkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztc 867 # OxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh45TGCAaowggGmAgEDgBSRR 868 # lKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMx 869 # DQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIwMDkxMzE4NDUxMFowLwY 870 # JKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4VtBHypfcEWMA 871 # 0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAHUrA4PaJG42BD3hpF8U0usnV3Dg5NQh97SfyKTk7 872 # YHhhwu/936gkmAew8ODRTCddMvMObWkjj7/XeR+WKffaTF1EAdZ1L6REV+GlV91 873 # cYnFkT9ldn4wHQnNNncfAehk5PClYUUQ0gqjdJT1hdaolT83b3ttekyYIiwPmHE 874 # xRaNkSvKenlNqcriaaf3rbQy9dc2d1KxrL2429n134ICqjKeRnHkXXrCWDmyv/3 875 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 876 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 877 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 879 Authors' Addresses 881 Randy Bush 882 IIJ & Arrcus 883 5147 Crystal Springs 884 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 885 United States of America 887 Email: randy@psg.com 888 Massimo Candela 889 NTT 890 Siriusdreef 70-72 891 Hoofddorp 2132 WT 892 Netherlands 894 Email: massimo@ntt.net 896 Warren Kumari 897 Google 898 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 899 Mountain View, CA 94043 900 US 902 Email: warren@kumari.net 904 Russ Housley 905 Vigil Security, LLC 906 516 Dranesville Road 907 Herndon, VA 20170 908 USA 910 Email: housley@vigilsec.com