idnits 2.17.00 (12 Aug 2021) /tmp/idnits52815/draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-05.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- The document has examples using IPv4 documentation addresses according to RFC6890, but does not use any IPv6 documentation addresses. Maybe there should be IPv6 examples, too? Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document date (April 13, 2021) is 403 days in the past. Is this intentional? -- Found something which looks like a code comment -- if you have code sections in the document, please surround them with '' and '' lines. Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Missing Reference: 'RFC-TBD' is mentioned on line 350, but not defined -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '0' on line 686 -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '3' on line 633 -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '6' on line 733 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 5485 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 8805 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 7482 (Obsoleted by RFC 9082) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 7 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ & Arrcus 4 Intended status: Standards Track M. Candela 5 Expires: October 15, 2021 NTT 6 W. Kumari 7 Google 8 R. Housley 9 Vigil Security 10 April 13, 2021 12 Finding and Using Geofeed Data 13 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-05 15 Abstract 17 This document describes how to find and authenticate geofeed data. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 15, 2021. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2. Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. inetnum: Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 58 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 61 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 62 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 63 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 65 Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 66 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 68 1. Introduction 70 Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to 71 customize those services based on the geographic location of the user 72 of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used 73 to contact the service. Also, infrastructure and other services 74 might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] 75 defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP 76 addresses. But it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed 77 data given an IP address. 79 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 80 Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC4012] inetnum: class to refer 81 specifically to geofeed data CSV files, and how to prudently use 82 them. In all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be 83 assumed [RFC4012]. 85 The reader may find [INETNUM] and [INET6NUM] informative, and 86 certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database 87 classes. 89 An optional, utterly awesome but slightly complex, means for 90 authenticating geofeed data is also defined. 92 1.1. Requirements Language 94 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 95 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 96 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 97 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 98 capitals, as shown here. 100 2. Geofeed Files 102 Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility 103 for an IP address resource 'owner' to associate those IP addresses to 104 geographic locale(s). 106 Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address 107 to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In 108 Section 3 this document specifies how to find the relevant [RFC8805] 109 geofeed file given an IP address. 111 Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale 112 and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be 113 even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many 114 prefixes, dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc. 116 [RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP 117 address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an 118 individual user. Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy 119 guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this 120 exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as 121 described in this document the operator should be aware of this 122 exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy 123 considerations of [RFC8805] Section 4 apply to this document. 125 This document also suggests optional signature, which authenticates 126 the data when present, for geofeed files to provide stronger 127 authenticity to the data. 129 3. inetnum: Class 131 The Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL), [RFC4012] used by 132 the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) specifies inetnum: database 133 classs. Each of these objects describes an IP address range and its 134 attributes. The inetnum: objects form a hierarchy ordered on the 135 address space. 137 Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: 138 attribute in the inetnum: class. Until such time, this document 139 defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute which contains an 140 HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format of the inetnum: geofeed 141 attribute MUST be as in this example, "remarks: Geofeed" followed by 142 a URL which will vary, but MUST refer only to a single [RFC8805] 143 geofeed file. 145 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 146 remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv 148 While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant 149 parties, we specify that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: 150 class be simply "geofeed: " followed by a URL which will vary, but 151 MUST refer only to a [RFC8805] geofeed file. 153 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 154 geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv 156 Until all producers of inetnum:s, i.e. the RIRs, state that they have 157 migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at 158 inetnum:s to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the 159 remarks: and geofeed: forms. This not only implies that the RIRs 160 support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have 161 migrated any inetnum:s from remarks: use to geofeed:s. 163 Any particular inetnum: object MUST have at most, one geofeed 164 reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when it 165 is implemented. If there is more than one, all are ignored. 167 If a geofeed CSV file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP 168 address space, there are likely to be geofeed references from 169 multiple inetnum: objects. 171 As inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, Geofeed references SHOULD be at 172 the lowest applicable inetnum: object covering the relevant prefixes 173 in the referenced geofeed file. When fetching, the most specific 174 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 176 When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects 177 which have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on 178 the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be 179 preferred. 181 It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than 182 the inetnum: which refers to them. I.e. an INETNUM object for a 183 prefix P could refer to a geofeed file in which P has been sub- 184 divided into one or more longer prefixes. 186 Currently, the registry data published by ARIN is not the same RPSL 187 as the other registries; therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP 189 [RFC0959], whois [RFC3912], RDAP [RFC7482], or whatever, the 190 "NetRange" attribute/key MUST be treated as "inetnum" and the 191 "Comment" attribute MUST be treated as "remarks". 193 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data 195 The question arises of whether a particular [RFC8805] geofeed data 196 set is valid, i.e. authorized by the 'owner' of the IP address space 197 and is authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: which points to the 198 [RFC8805] geofeed file provides some assurance. Unfortunately the 199 RPSL in many repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An 200 approach where RPSL was signed a la [RFC7909] would be good, except 201 it would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a 202 fair number of them. 204 An optional authenticator MAY be appended to a [RFC8805] geofeed 205 file. It is a digest of the main body of the file signed by the 206 private key of the relevant Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI, 207 see [RFC6481]) certificate for the covering address range. One needs 208 a format that bundles the relevant RPKI certificate with the 209 signature and the digest of the geofeed text. 211 The canonicalization procedure converts the data from its internal 212 character representation to the UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding, 213 and the sequence MUST be used to denote the end of a line of 214 text. Trailing space characters MUST NOT appear on a line of text. 215 That is, the space or tab characters must not be followed by the 216 sequence. Thus, a blank line is represented solely by the 217 sequence. Other nonprintable characters, such as backspace, 218 are not expected. For robustness, any nonprintable characters MUST 219 NOT be changed by canonicalization. Trailing blank lines MUST NOT 220 appear at the end of the file. That is, the file must not end with 221 multiple consecutive sequences. Any end-of-file marker used 222 by an operating system is not considered to be part of the file 223 content. When present, such end-of-file markers MUST NOT be 224 processed by the digital signature algorithm. Borrowing detached 225 signatures from [RFC5485], after file canonicalization, the 226 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] would be used to create 227 a detached DER encoded signature which is then BASE64 encoded and 228 line wrapped to 72 or fewer characters. 230 The address range of the signing certificate MUST cover all prefixes 231 in the geofeed file it signs; and therefore must be covered by the 232 range of the inetnum:. 234 An address range A 'covers' address range B if the range of B is 235 identical to or a subset of A. 'Address range' is used here because 236 inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on CIDR prefix 237 boundaries, while those of the CSV lines in the geofeed file do. 239 As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the 240 signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's 241 address range is included in the [RFC5652] CMS SignedData 242 certificates field. 244 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 245 getting the department with the Hardware Security Module (HSM) to 246 sign the CMS blob is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the 247 other hand, verifying the signature requires no complexity; the 248 certificate, which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the 249 needed public key. 251 Unless [RFC8805] is modified to formally define such an appendix, it 252 MUST be 'hidden' as a series of "#" comments at the end of the 253 geofeed file. The following is a cryptographically incorrect, albeit 254 simple example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A. 256 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 257 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 258 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 259 ... 260 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 261 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 262 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 264 The signature does not cover the signature lines. 266 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] describes and provides code for a 267 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile for a general purpose 268 listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use with the Resource 269 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). It provides usable, albeit 270 complex, code to sign geofeed files. 272 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] describes a Cryptographic Message Syntax 273 (CMS) profile for a general purpose Resource Tagged Attestation (RTA) 274 based on the RPKI. While this is expected to become applicable in 275 the long run, for the purposes of this document, a self-signed root 276 trust anchor is used. 278 5. Operational Considerations 280 To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to 281 register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with 282 their RIR/NIR and/or any provider LIR which has assigned prefixes to 283 them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain 284 inetnum: objects. They also provide means of [sub-]assigning IP 285 address resources and allowing the assignee to create whois data, 286 including inetnum: objects, and thereby referring to geofeed files. 288 The geofeed files SHOULD be published over and fetched using https 289 [RFC8446]. 291 When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside of 292 the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range. 294 If and only if the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then 295 multiple inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the 296 consumer MUST use only geofeed lines where the prefix is covered by 297 the address range of the inetnum: object they have followed. 299 To minimize the load on RIR whois [RFC3912] services, use of the 300 RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be the preferred access. This 301 also provides bulk access instead of fetching with tweezers. 303 Currently, geolocation providers have bulk whois data access at all 304 the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for 305 all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for 306 users without such authorization the same result can be achieved with 307 extra RDAP effort. There is open source code to pass over such data 308 across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them 309 [geofeed-finder]. 311 An entity fetching geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do 312 frequent real-time look-ups to prevent load on RPSL and geofeed 313 servers. [RFC8805] Section 3.4 suggests use of the [RFC7234] HTTP 314 Expires Caching Header to signal when geofeed data should be 315 refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of 316 such an HTTP Header signal, collectors MUST NOT fetch more frequently 317 than weekly. It would be polite not to fetch at magic times such as 318 midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others 319 are likely to do the same. 321 6. Security Considerations 323 It is generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also use 324 other sources to cross-validate the data. All of the Security 325 Considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well. 327 As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak if any 328 authentication. This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to 329 malicious geofeed files. Section 4 suggests an unfortunately complex 330 method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI. 332 If an inetnum: for a wide prefix (e.g. a /16) points to an RPKI- 333 signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish an unsigned 334 equal or narrower (e.g. a /24) inetnum: in a whois registry which has 335 weak authorization. 337 The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers 338 due to too-frequent queries. Usually they throttle by the querying 339 IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be 340 deployed by geofeed file servers. 342 7. IANA Considerations 344 IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in 345 the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 346 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows: 348 Description OID Specification 349 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 350 id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD] 352 8. Acknowledgments 354 Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue. George 355 Michaelson for the first, and a substantial, external review. Erik 356 Kline who was too shy to agree to co-authorship. Additionally, we 357 express our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno 358 Schepers, Flavio Luciani, Eric Dugas, Job Snijders who provided 359 running code, and Kevin Pack. Also to geolocation providers that are 360 consuming geofeeds with this described solution, Jonathan Kosgei 361 (ipdata.co), Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io), and Pol Nisenblat 362 (bigdatacloud.com). For reviews, we thank Adrian Farrel, Antonio 363 Prado, Rob Wilton, and George Michaelson, the document shepherd. 365 9. References 367 9.1. Normative References 369 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 370 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 371 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 372 . 374 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 375 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 376 2003, . 378 [RFC4012] Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky, 379 "Routing Policy Specification Language next generation 380 (RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005, 381 . 383 [RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft 384 Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009, 385 . 387 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 388 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 389 . 391 [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 392 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, 393 DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012, 394 . 396 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 397 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 398 May 2017, . 400 [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 401 Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, 402 . 404 [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. 405 Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation 406 Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, 407 . 409 9.2. Informative References 411 [geofeed-finder] 412 Massimo Candela, "geofeed-finder", 413 . 415 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] 416 Michaelson, G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, T., 417 and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged 418 Attestations (RTAs)", draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00 (work 419 in progress), January 2021. 421 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] 422 Snijders, J., "RPKI Signed Checklists", draft-spaghetti- 423 sidrops-rpki-rsc-03 (work in progress), February 2021. 425 [INET6NUM] 426 RIPE, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", 427 . 432 [INETNUM] RIPE, "Description of the INETNUM Object", 433 . 438 [RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", 439 STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985, 440 . 442 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 443 DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004, 444 . 446 [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, 447 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", 448 RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, 449 . 451 [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 452 Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, 453 DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, 454 . 456 [RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy 457 Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public 458 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909, 459 DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016, 460 . 462 Appendix A. Example 464 This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CA 465 certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity 466 certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a 467 detached signature. 469 The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As 470 usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 471 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers. 473 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 474 MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 475 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5 476 MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB 477 AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ 478 0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH 479 XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe 480 g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb 481 O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq 482 jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd 483 BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU 484 GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw 485 GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI 486 KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 487 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u 488 ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 489 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD 490 AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN 491 BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe 492 xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH 493 cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM 494 Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA 495 rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a 496 x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA== 497 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 499 The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate 500 grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two 501 AS numbers (64496 and 64497). 503 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 504 MIIFBzCCA++gAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 505 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTAyMTlaFw0yMTA5 506 MDMxOTAyMTlaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG 507 QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc 508 zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 509 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo 510 j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ 511 liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n 512 YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE 513 TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIvMIICKzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 514 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYD 515 VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr 516 BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u 517 ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz 518 Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v 519 cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr 520 BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu 521 bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz 522 Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF 523 hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH 524 AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA 525 +/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnLu+d1ZsUTiX3YWGueTHIalW4ad0 526 Kupi7pYMV2nXbxNGmdJMol9BkzVz9tj55ReMghUU4YLm/ICYe4fz5e0T8o9s/vIm 527 cGS29+WoGuiznMitpvbS/379gaMezk6KpqjH6Brw6meMqy09phmcmvm3x3WTmx09 528 mLlQneMptwk8qSYcnMUmGLJs+cVqmkOa3sWRdw8WrGu6QqYtQz3HFZQojF06YzEq 529 V/dBdCFdEOwTfVl2n2XqhoJl/oEBdC4uu2G0qRk3+WVs+uwVHP0Ttsbt7TzFgZfY 530 yxqvOg6QoldxZVZmHHncKmETu/BqCDGJot9may31ukrx34Bu+XFMVihm0w== 531 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 533 The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate 534 grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). 535 Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data 536 signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate. 538 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 539 MIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZuMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 540 BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC 541 Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAxOTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNV 542 BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi 543 MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW 544 yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c 545 K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm 546 BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp 547 tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog 548 qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB 549 AAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j 550 BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8B 551 Af8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFag 552 VKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF 553 RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcB 554 AQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBv 555 c2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIu 556 Y2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwEDAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUH 557 AQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90 558 aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHP 559 TArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYiblMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh 560 6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b 561 +YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8adS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1ar 562 Kelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aaaEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfO 563 MkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztcOxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh4 564 5Q== 565 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 567 The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For 568 brevity, the other two certificates are not. 570 0 1197: SEQUENCE { 571 4 917: SEQUENCE { 572 8 3: [0] { 573 10 1: INTEGER 2 574 : } 575 13 20: INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E3 576 35 13: SEQUENCE { 577 37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 578 : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 579 48 0: NULL 580 : } 581 50 51: SEQUENCE { 582 52 49: SET { 583 54 47: SEQUENCE { 584 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 585 61 40: PrintableString 586 : '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642' 587 : } 588 : } 589 : } 590 103 30: SEQUENCE { 591 105 13: UTCTime 03/09/2020 19:05:17 GMT 592 120 13: UTCTime 30/06/2021 19:05:17 GMT 593 : } 594 135 51: SEQUENCE { 595 137 49: SET { 596 139 47: SEQUENCE { 597 141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 598 146 40: PrintableString 599 : '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187' 600 : } 601 : } 602 : } 603 188 290: SEQUENCE { 604 192 13: SEQUENCE { 605 194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption 606 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 607 205 0: NULL 608 : } 609 207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 610 212 266: SEQUENCE { 611 216 257: INTEGER 612 : 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8 613 : 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65 614 : B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE 615 : 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13 616 : 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37 617 : 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE 618 : E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED 619 : 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89 620 : F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E 621 : 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19 622 : BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65 623 : 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28 624 : 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9 625 : 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A 626 : 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41 627 : FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C 628 : EB 629 477 3: INTEGER 65537 630 : } 631 : } 632 : } 633 482 439: [3] { 634 486 435: SEQUENCE { 635 490 29: SEQUENCE { 636 492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 637 497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 638 499 20: OCTET STRING 639 : 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB 640 : F0 53 A1 87 641 : } 642 : } 643 521 31: SEQUENCE { 644 523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 645 528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 646 530 22: SEQUENCE { 647 532 20: [0] 648 : 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97 649 : B3 77 86 42 650 : } 651 : } 652 : } 653 554 12: SEQUENCE { 654 556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) 655 561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 656 564 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 657 566 0: SEQUENCE {} 658 : } 659 : } 660 568 14: SEQUENCE { 661 570 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 662 575 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 663 578 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 664 580 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits 665 : '1'B (bit 0) 666 : } 667 : } 668 584 24: SEQUENCE { 669 586 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 670 591 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 671 594 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 672 596 12: SEQUENCE { 673 598 10: SEQUENCE { 674 600 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 675 : resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2) 676 : } 677 : } 678 : } 679 : } 680 610 97: SEQUENCE { 681 612 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 682 617 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 683 619 88: SEQUENCE { 684 621 86: SEQUENCE { 685 623 84: [0] { 686 625 82: [0] { 687 627 80: [6] 688 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 689 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl' 690 : } 691 : } 692 : } 693 : } 694 : } 695 : } 696 709 108: SEQUENCE { 697 711 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess 698 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 699 721 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 700 723 94: SEQUENCE { 701 725 92: SEQUENCE { 702 727 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2) 703 737 80: [6] 704 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 705 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer' 706 : } 707 : } 708 : } 709 : } 710 819 33: SEQUENCE { 711 821 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7) 712 831 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 713 834 18: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 714 836 16: SEQUENCE { 715 838 6: SEQUENCE { 716 840 2: OCTET STRING 00 01 717 844 0: NULL 718 : } 719 846 6: SEQUENCE { 720 848 2: OCTET STRING 00 02 721 852 0: NULL 722 : } 723 : } 724 : } 725 : } 726 854 69: SEQUENCE { 727 856 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess 728 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11) 729 866 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 730 868 55: SEQUENCE { 731 870 53: SEQUENCE { 732 872 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13' 733 882 41: [6] 734 : 'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml' 735 : } 736 : } 737 : } 738 : } 739 : } 740 : } 741 : } 742 925 13: SEQUENCE { 743 927 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption 744 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 745 938 0: NULL 746 : } 747 940 257: BIT STRING 748 : 05 1D 93 D2 A4 F6 57 56 65 B1 98 E3 FB 21 CF 4C 749 : 0A C8 54 11 02 64 54 82 74 FF 9B 25 3B 1E F3 94 750 : EA 62 26 E5 32 C3 52 F7 21 2E D9 23 5B 69 93 0D 751 : 2E E4 92 88 07 DF 62 8A 21 E2 72 18 AB F4 61 EB 752 : EC 46 B3 59 F8 DB B2 59 52 89 28 78 BB 58 D1 45 753 : 1B D9 F2 2C B9 AF 49 16 8F 18 19 39 E9 A8 33 06 754 : 7B EC 67 A5 B2 74 48 24 A8 06 52 42 22 3F 9B F9 755 : 84 BC 59 78 C4 1E DD 8A 5B AC 32 03 F0 5C 35 2F 756 : 1A 75 2D A9 11 4C 02 D9 CB 3F 59 CC 33 81 BB 6D 757 : 9E 47 27 1B BF F0 92 B4 37 A2 AC E9 0B 56 AB 29 758 : E9 72 CF B3 C6 20 85 C9 1B 2F 67 17 C0 B7 FD A6 759 : 9A 12 91 DD ED 48 08 CA F5 D8 B8 26 3F 96 A5 93 760 : 9B DE E3 0F 18 06 21 81 82 EF AE B4 9A D7 CE 32 761 : 40 7C 60 5E A4 51 4F AD 77 67 43 42 C3 33 B5 C3 762 : B1 6F 3A A2 1A 78 9C 99 E2 5F 07 01 B6 96 2E 8E 763 : D2 FA 2B 5B 87 79 88 83 93 2A 94 32 A9 F8 78 E5 764 : } 766 To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity 767 private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are 768 not. 770 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 771 MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW 772 /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP 773 Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 774 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ 775 eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm 776 gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 777 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio 778 pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z 779 ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ 780 mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 781 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF 782 t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt 783 MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M 784 Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 785 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l 786 nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm 787 FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 788 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo 789 Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz 790 vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc 791 DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf 792 taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc 793 PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ 794 E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV 795 iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= 796 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 798 Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), 799 yields the following detached CMS signature. 801 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 802 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 803 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 804 # MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR 805 # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAx 806 # OTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM 807 # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT 808 # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg 809 # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm 810 # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha 811 # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG 812 # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ 813 # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R 814 # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI 815 # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg 816 # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ 817 # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5 818 # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5 819 # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0 820 # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwE 821 # DAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilo 822 # dHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhki 823 # G9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHPTArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYi 824 # blMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2 825 # fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b+YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8a 826 # dS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1arKelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aa 827 # aEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfOMkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztc 828 # OxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh45TGCAaowggGmAgEDgBSRR 829 # lKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMx 830 # DQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIwMDkxMzE4NDUxMFowLwY 831 # JKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4VtBHypfcEWMA 832 # 0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAHUrA4PaJG42BD3hpF8U0usnV3Dg5NQh97SfyKTk7 833 # YHhhwu/936gkmAew8ODRTCddMvMObWkjj7/XeR+WKffaTF1EAdZ1L6REV+GlV91 834 # cYnFkT9ldn4wHQnNNncfAehk5PClYUUQ0gqjdJT1hdaolT83b3ttekyYIiwPmHE 835 # xRaNkSvKenlNqcriaaf3rbQy9dc2d1KxrL2429n134ICqjKeRnHkXXrCWDmyv/3 836 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 837 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 838 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 840 Authors' Addresses 842 Randy Bush 843 IIJ & Arrcus 844 5147 Crystal Springs 845 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 846 United States of America 848 Email: randy@psg.com 849 Massimo Candela 850 NTT 851 Siriusdreef 70-72 852 Hoofddorp 2132 WT 853 Netherlands 855 Email: massimo@ntt.net 857 Warren Kumari 858 Google 859 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 860 Mountain View, CA 94043 861 US 863 Email: warren@kumari.net 865 Russ Housley 866 Vigil Security, LLC 867 516 Dranesville Road 868 Herndon, VA 20170 869 USA 871 Email: housley@vigilsec.com