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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ & Arrcus 4 Intended status: Standards Track M. Candela 5 Expires: August 20, 2021 NTT 6 W. Kumari 7 Google 8 R. Housley 9 Vigil Security 10 February 16, 2021 12 Finding and Using Geofeed Data 13 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-03 15 Abstract 17 This document describes how to find and authenticate geofeed data. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 20, 2021. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 55 2. Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. inetnum: Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 63 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 68 1. Introduction 70 Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to 71 customize those services based on the geographic location of the user 72 of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used 73 to contact the service. Also, infrastructure and other services 74 might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] 75 defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP 76 addresses. But it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed 77 data given an IP address. 79 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 80 Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC4012] inetnum: class [RFC2725] and 81 [INETNUM] to refer to geofeed data, and how to prudently use them. 82 In all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed 83 [RFC4012] and [INET6NUM]. 85 An optional, but utterly awesome, means for authenticating geofeed 86 data is also defined. 88 1.1. Requirements Language 90 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 91 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 92 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 93 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 94 capitals, as shown here. 96 2. Geofeed Files 98 Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility 99 for an IP address resource 'owner' to associate those IP addresses to 100 geographic locale(s). 102 Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address 103 to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In 104 Section 3 this document specifies how to find the relevant geofeed 105 file given an IP address. 107 Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale 108 and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be 109 even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many 110 prefixes, as may be likely if the location data are maintained by a 111 different department than address management, dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces 112 are represented, etc. 114 [RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP 115 address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an 116 individual user. Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy 117 guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this 118 exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as 119 described in this document the operator should be aware of this 120 exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy 121 considerations of [RFC8805] Section 4 apply to this document. 123 This document also suggests optional data for geofeed files to 124 provide stronger authenticity to the data. 126 3. inetnum: Class 128 RPSL, [RFC4012], as used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), 129 has been augmented with the inetnum: [INETNUM] and the inet6num: 130 [INET6NUM] classes; each of which describes an IP address range and 131 its attributes. 133 Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: 134 attribute in the inetnum: class. Until such time, this document 135 defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute which contains an 136 HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format MUST be as in this example, 137 "remarks: Geofeed " followed by a URL which will vary. 139 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 140 remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv 142 While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant 143 parties, we suggest that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: 144 class be simply "geofeed: " followed by a URL which will vary. 146 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 147 geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv 149 Until all producers of inetnum:s, i.e. the RIRs, state that they have 150 migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at 151 inetnum:s to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the 152 remarks: and geofeed: forms. This not only implies that the RIRs 153 support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have 154 migrated any inetnum:s from remarks: use to geofeed:s. 156 Any particular inetnum: object MAY have, at most, one geofeed 157 reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when one 158 is defined. 160 inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, see [INETNUM] Section 4.2.4.1, 161 Hierarchy of INETNUM Objects. Geofeed references SHOULD be at the 162 lowest applicable inetnum: object. When fetching, the most specific 163 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 165 When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects 166 which have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on 167 the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be 168 preferred. 170 It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than 171 the inetnum: which refers to them. 173 Currently, the registry data published by ARIN is not the same RPSL 174 as the other registries; therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP 175 [RFC0959], whois [RFC3912], RDAP [RFC7482], or whatever, the 176 "NetRange" attribute/key must be treated as "inetnum" and the 177 "Comment" attribute must be treated as "remarks". 179 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data 181 The question arises of whether a particular geofeed data set is 182 valid, i.e. authorized by the 'owner' of the IP address space and is 183 authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: which points to the 184 geofeed file provides some assurance. Unfortunately the RPSL in many 185 repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An approach where RPSL 186 was signed a la [RFC7909] would be good, except it would have to be 187 deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a fair number of them. 189 An optional authenticator MAY be appended to a geofeed file. It 190 would be essentially a digest of the main body of the file signed by 191 the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for the covering 192 address range. One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI 193 certificate with the signature and the digest of the geofeed text. 195 [I-D.michaelson-rpki-rta] describes a Cryptographic Message Syntax 196 (CMS) profile for a general purpose Resource Tagged Attestation (RTA) 197 based on the RPKI. While this is expected to become applicable in 198 the long run, for the purposes of this document, a self-signed root 199 trust anchor is used. 201 Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after text file 202 canonicalization (Sec 2.2), the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 203 [RFC5652] would be used to create a detached DER encoded signature 204 which is then BASE64 encoded and line wrapped to 72 or fewer 205 characters. 207 Both the address ranges of the signing certificate and of the 208 inetnum: MUST cover all prefixes in the geofeed file; and the address 209 range of the signing certificate must cover that of the inetnum:. 211 An address range A 'covers' address range B if the range of B is 212 identical to or a subset of A. 'Address range' is used here because 213 inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on CIDR prefix 214 boundaries, while those of geofeed lines must. 216 As the signer would need to specify the covered RPKI resources 217 relevant to the signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: 218 object's address range would be included in the [RFC5652] CMS 219 SignedData certificates field. 221 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 222 getting the department with the HSM to sign the CMS blob is left as 223 an exercise for the implementor. On the other hand, verifying the 224 signature requires no complexity; the certificate, which can be 225 validated in the public RPKI, has the needed public key. 227 Until [RFC8805] is updated to formally define such an appendix, it 228 MUST be 'hidden' as a series of "#" comments at the end of the 229 geofeed file. This is a cryptographically incorrect, albeit simple 230 example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A. 232 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 233 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 234 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 235 ... 236 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 237 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 238 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 240 5. Operational Considerations 242 To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to 243 register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with 244 their RIR/NIR and/or any provider LIR which has assigned prefixes to 245 them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain 246 inetnum: objects. They also provide means of [sub-]assigning IP 247 address resources and allowing the assignee to create whois data, 248 including inetnum: objects, and thereby referring to geofeed files. 250 The geofeed files SHOULD be published over and fetched using https 251 [RFC8446]. 253 When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside of 254 the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range. 256 Iff the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then multiple 257 inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the consumer 258 MUST use only geofeed lines where the prefix is covered by the 259 address range of the inetnum: object they have followed. 261 To minimize the load on RIR whois [RFC3912] services, use of the 262 RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be the preferred access. This 263 also provides bulk access instead of fetching with a tweezers. 265 Currently, geolocation providers have bulk whois data access at all 266 the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for 267 all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for 268 users without such authorization the same result can be achieved with 269 extra RDAP effort. There is open source code to pass over such data 270 across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them 271 [geofeed-finder]. 273 An entity fetching geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do 274 frequent real-time look-ups to prevent load on RPSL and geofeed 275 servers. [RFC8805] Section 3.4 suggests use of the [RFC7234] HTTP 276 Expires Caching Header to signal when geofeed data should be 277 refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of 278 such an HTTP Header signal, collectors MUST NOT fetch more frequently 279 than weekly. It would be wise not to fetch at magic times such as 280 midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others 281 are likely to do the same. 283 6. Security Considerations 285 It would be generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also 286 use other sources to cross-validate the data. All of the Security 287 Considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well. 289 As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak if any 290 authentication. This would allow spoofing of inetnum: objects 291 pointing to malicious geofeed files. Section 4 suggests an 292 unfortunately complex method for stronger authentication based on the 293 RPKI. 295 If an inetnum: for a wide prefix (e.g. a /16) points to an RPKI- 296 signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish an unsigned 297 equal or narrower (e.g. a /24) inetnum: in a whois registry which has 298 weak authorization. 300 The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers 301 due to too-frequent queries. Usually they throttle by the querying 302 IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be 303 deployed by geofeed file servers. 305 7. IANA Considerations 307 IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in 308 the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 309 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows: 311 Description OID Specification 312 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 313 id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD] 315 8. Acknowledgments 317 Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue. George 318 Michaelson for the first, and a substantial, external review. Erik 319 Kline who was too shy to agree to co-authorship. Additionally, we 320 express our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno 321 Schepers, Flavio Luciani, Eric Dugas, Job Snijders who provided a CLI 322 demo, and Kevin Pack. Also to geolocation providers that are 323 consuming geofeeds with this described solution, Jonathan Kosgei 324 (ipdata.co), Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io), and Pol Nisenblat 325 (bigdatacloud.com). For reviews, we thank Adrian Farrel Antonio 326 Prado, and George Michaelson, the document shepherd. 328 9. References 330 9.1. Normative References 332 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 333 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 334 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 335 . 337 [RFC2725] Villamizar, C., Alaettinoglu, C., Meyer, D., and S. 338 Murphy, "Routing Policy System Security", RFC 2725, 339 DOI 10.17487/RFC2725, December 1999, 340 . 342 [RFC4012] Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky, 343 "Routing Policy Specification Language next generation 344 (RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005, 345 . 347 [RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft 348 Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009, 349 . 351 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 352 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 353 . 355 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 356 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 357 May 2017, . 359 [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 360 Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, 361 . 363 [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. 364 Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation 365 Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, 366 . 368 9.2. Informative References 370 [geofeed-finder] 371 Massimo Candela, "geofeed-finder", 372 . 374 [I-D.michaelson-rpki-rta] 375 Michaelson, G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, T., 376 and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged 377 Attestations (RTAs)", draft-michaelson-rpki-rta-02 (work 378 in progress), November 2020. 380 [INET6NUM] 381 RIPE, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", 382 . 387 [INETNUM] RIPE, "Description of the INETNUM Object", 388 . 393 [RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", 394 STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985, 395 . 397 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 398 DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004, 399 . 401 [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, 402 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", 403 RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, 404 . 406 [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 407 Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, 408 DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, 409 . 411 [RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy 412 Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public 413 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909, 414 DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016, 415 . 417 Appendix A. Example 419 This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CA 420 certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity 421 certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a 422 detached signature. 424 The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As 425 usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 426 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers. 428 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 429 MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 430 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5 431 MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB 432 AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ 433 0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH 434 XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe 435 g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb 436 O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq 437 jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd 438 BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU 439 GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw 440 GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI 441 KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 442 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u 443 ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 444 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD 445 AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN 446 BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe 447 xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH 448 cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM 449 Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA 450 rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a 451 x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA== 452 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 454 The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate 455 grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two 456 AS numbers (64496 and 64497). 458 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 459 MIIFBzCCA++gAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 460 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTAyMTlaFw0yMTA5 461 MDMxOTAyMTlaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG 462 QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc 463 zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 464 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo 465 j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ 466 liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n 467 YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE 468 TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIvMIICKzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 469 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYD 470 VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr 471 BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u 472 ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz 473 Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v 474 cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr 475 BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu 476 bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz 477 Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF 478 hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH 479 AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA 480 +/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnLu+d1ZsUTiX3YWGueTHIalW4ad0 481 Kupi7pYMV2nXbxNGmdJMol9BkzVz9tj55ReMghUU4YLm/ICYe4fz5e0T8o9s/vIm 482 cGS29+WoGuiznMitpvbS/379gaMezk6KpqjH6Brw6meMqy09phmcmvm3x3WTmx09 483 mLlQneMptwk8qSYcnMUmGLJs+cVqmkOa3sWRdw8WrGu6QqYtQz3HFZQojF06YzEq 484 V/dBdCFdEOwTfVl2n2XqhoJl/oEBdC4uu2G0qRk3+WVs+uwVHP0Ttsbt7TzFgZfY 485 yxqvOg6QoldxZVZmHHncKmETu/BqCDGJot9may31ukrx34Bu+XFMVihm0w== 486 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 488 The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate 489 grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). 490 Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data 491 signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate. 493 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 494 MIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZuMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 495 BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC 496 Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAxOTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNV 497 BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi 498 MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW 499 yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c 500 K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm 501 BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp 502 tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog 503 qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB 504 AAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j 505 BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8B 506 Af8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFag 507 VKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF 508 RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcB 509 AQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBv 510 c2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIu 511 Y2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwEDAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUH 512 AQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90 513 aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHP 514 TArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYiblMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh 515 6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b 516 +YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8adS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1ar 517 Kelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aaaEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfO 518 MkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztcOxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh4 519 5Q== 520 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 522 The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For 523 brevity, the other two certificates are not. 525 0 1197: SEQUENCE { 526 4 917: SEQUENCE { 527 8 3: [0] { 528 10 1: INTEGER 2 529 : } 530 13 20: INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E3 531 35 13: SEQUENCE { 532 37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 533 : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 534 48 0: NULL 535 : } 536 50 51: SEQUENCE { 537 52 49: SET { 538 54 47: SEQUENCE { 539 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 540 61 40: PrintableString 541 : '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642' 542 : } 543 : } 544 : } 545 103 30: SEQUENCE { 546 105 13: UTCTime 03/09/2020 19:05:17 GMT 547 120 13: UTCTime 30/06/2021 19:05:17 GMT 548 : } 549 135 51: SEQUENCE { 550 137 49: SET { 551 139 47: SEQUENCE { 552 141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 553 146 40: PrintableString 554 : '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187' 555 : } 556 : } 557 : } 558 188 290: SEQUENCE { 559 192 13: SEQUENCE { 560 194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption 561 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 562 205 0: NULL 563 : } 564 207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 565 212 266: SEQUENCE { 566 216 257: INTEGER 567 : 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8 568 : 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65 569 : B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE 570 : 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13 571 : 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37 572 : 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE 573 : E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED 574 : 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89 575 : F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E 576 : 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19 577 : BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65 578 : 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28 579 : 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9 580 : 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A 581 : 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41 582 : FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C 583 : EB 584 477 3: INTEGER 65537 585 : } 586 : } 587 : } 588 482 439: [3] { 589 486 435: SEQUENCE { 590 490 29: SEQUENCE { 591 492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 592 497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 593 499 20: OCTET STRING 594 : 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB 595 : F0 53 A1 87 596 : } 597 : } 598 521 31: SEQUENCE { 599 523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 600 528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 601 530 22: SEQUENCE { 602 532 20: [0] 603 : 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97 604 : B3 77 86 42 605 : } 606 : } 607 : } 608 554 12: SEQUENCE { 609 556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) 610 561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 611 564 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 612 566 0: SEQUENCE {} 613 : } 614 : } 615 568 14: SEQUENCE { 616 570 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 617 575 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 618 578 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 619 580 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits 620 : '1'B (bit 0) 621 : } 622 : } 623 584 24: SEQUENCE { 624 586 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 625 591 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 626 594 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 627 596 12: SEQUENCE { 628 598 10: SEQUENCE { 629 600 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 630 : resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2) 631 : } 632 : } 633 : } 634 : } 635 610 97: SEQUENCE { 636 612 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 637 617 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 638 619 88: SEQUENCE { 639 621 86: SEQUENCE { 640 623 84: [0] { 641 625 82: [0] { 642 627 80: [6] 643 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 644 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl' 645 : } 646 : } 647 : } 648 : } 649 : } 650 : } 651 709 108: SEQUENCE { 652 711 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess 653 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 654 721 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 655 723 94: SEQUENCE { 656 725 92: SEQUENCE { 657 727 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2) 658 737 80: [6] 659 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 660 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer' 661 : } 662 : } 663 : } 664 : } 665 819 33: SEQUENCE { 666 821 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7) 667 831 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 668 834 18: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 669 836 16: SEQUENCE { 670 838 6: SEQUENCE { 671 840 2: OCTET STRING 00 01 672 844 0: NULL 673 : } 674 846 6: SEQUENCE { 675 848 2: OCTET STRING 00 02 676 852 0: NULL 677 : } 678 : } 679 : } 680 : } 681 854 69: SEQUENCE { 682 856 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess 683 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11) 684 866 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 685 868 55: SEQUENCE { 686 870 53: SEQUENCE { 687 872 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13' 688 882 41: [6] 689 : 'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml' 690 : } 691 : } 692 : } 693 : } 694 : } 695 : } 696 : } 697 925 13: SEQUENCE { 698 927 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption 699 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 700 938 0: NULL 701 : } 702 940 257: BIT STRING 703 : 05 1D 93 D2 A4 F6 57 56 65 B1 98 E3 FB 21 CF 4C 704 : 0A C8 54 11 02 64 54 82 74 FF 9B 25 3B 1E F3 94 705 : EA 62 26 E5 32 C3 52 F7 21 2E D9 23 5B 69 93 0D 706 : 2E E4 92 88 07 DF 62 8A 21 E2 72 18 AB F4 61 EB 707 : EC 46 B3 59 F8 DB B2 59 52 89 28 78 BB 58 D1 45 708 : 1B D9 F2 2C B9 AF 49 16 8F 18 19 39 E9 A8 33 06 709 : 7B EC 67 A5 B2 74 48 24 A8 06 52 42 22 3F 9B F9 710 : 84 BC 59 78 C4 1E DD 8A 5B AC 32 03 F0 5C 35 2F 711 : 1A 75 2D A9 11 4C 02 D9 CB 3F 59 CC 33 81 BB 6D 712 : 9E 47 27 1B BF F0 92 B4 37 A2 AC E9 0B 56 AB 29 713 : E9 72 CF B3 C6 20 85 C9 1B 2F 67 17 C0 B7 FD A6 714 : 9A 12 91 DD ED 48 08 CA F5 D8 B8 26 3F 96 A5 93 715 : 9B DE E3 0F 18 06 21 81 82 EF AE B4 9A D7 CE 32 716 : 40 7C 60 5E A4 51 4F AD 77 67 43 42 C3 33 B5 C3 717 : B1 6F 3A A2 1A 78 9C 99 E2 5F 07 01 B6 96 2E 8E 718 : D2 FA 2B 5B 87 79 88 83 93 2A 94 32 A9 F8 78 E5 719 : } 721 To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity 722 private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are 723 not. 725 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 726 MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW 727 /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP 728 Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 729 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ 730 eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm 731 gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 732 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio 733 pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z 734 ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ 735 mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 736 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF 737 t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt 738 MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M 739 Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 740 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l 741 nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm 742 FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 743 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo 744 Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz 745 vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc 746 DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf 747 taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc 748 PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ 749 E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV 750 iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= 751 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 753 Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), 754 yields the following detached CMS signature. 756 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 757 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 758 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 759 # MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR 760 # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAx 761 # OTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM 762 # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT 763 # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg 764 # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm 765 # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha 766 # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG 767 # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ 768 # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R 769 # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI 770 # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg 771 # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ 772 # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5 773 # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5 774 # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0 775 # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwE 776 # DAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilo 777 # dHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhki 778 # G9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHPTArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYi 779 # blMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2 780 # fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b+YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8a 781 # dS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1arKelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aa 782 # aEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfOMkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztc 783 # OxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh45TGCAaowggGmAgEDgBSRR 784 # lKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMx 785 # DQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIwMDkxMzE4NDUxMFowLwY 786 # JKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4VtBHypfcEWMA 787 # 0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAHUrA4PaJG42BD3hpF8U0usnV3Dg5NQh97SfyKTk7 788 # YHhhwu/936gkmAew8ODRTCddMvMObWkjj7/XeR+WKffaTF1EAdZ1L6REV+GlV91 789 # cYnFkT9ldn4wHQnNNncfAehk5PClYUUQ0gqjdJT1hdaolT83b3ttekyYIiwPmHE 790 # xRaNkSvKenlNqcriaaf3rbQy9dc2d1KxrL2429n134ICqjKeRnHkXXrCWDmyv/3 791 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 792 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 793 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 795 Authors' Addresses 797 Randy Bush 798 IIJ & Arrcus 799 5147 Crystal Springs 800 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 801 United States of America 803 Email: randy@psg.com 804 Massimo Candela 805 NTT 806 Siriusdreef 70-72 807 Hoofddorp 2132 WT 808 Netherlands 810 Email: massimo@ntt.net 812 Warren Kumari 813 Google 814 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 815 Mountain View, CA 94043 816 US 818 Email: warren@kumari.net 820 Russ Housley 821 Vigil Security, LLC 822 516 Dranesville Road 823 Herndon, VA 20170 824 USA 826 Email: housley@vigilsec.com