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'INET6NUM' -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'INETNUM' ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2818 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3852 (Obsoleted by RFC 5652) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 5485 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 8805 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 7482 (Obsoleted by RFC 9082) Summary: 4 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 9 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ & Arrcus 4 Intended status: Standards Track M. Candela 5 Expires: August 12, 2021 NTT 6 W. Kumari 7 Google 8 R. Housley 9 Vigil Security 10 February 8, 2021 12 Finding and Using Geofeed Data 13 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-02 15 Abstract 17 This document describes how to find and authenticate geofeed data. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 12, 2021. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 55 2. Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. inetnum: Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 63 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 65 Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 68 1. Introduction 70 Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to 71 customize those services based on the geographic location of the user 72 of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used 73 to contact the service. Also, infrastructure and other services 74 might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] 75 defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP 76 addresses. But it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed 77 data given an IP address. 79 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 80 Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC4012] inetnum: class [INETNUM] to 81 refer to geofeed data, and how to prudently use them. In all places 82 inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed [INET6NUM]. 84 An optional, but utterly awesome, means for authenticating geofeed 85 data is also defined. 87 1.1. Requirements Language 89 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 90 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 91 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 92 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 93 capitals, as shown here. 95 2. Geofeed Files 97 Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility 98 for an IP address resource 'owner' to associate those IP addresses to 99 geographic locale(s). 101 Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address 102 to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In 103 Section 3 this document specifies how to find the relevant geofeed 104 file given an IP address. 106 Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale 107 and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be 108 even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many 109 prefixes, as may be likely if the location data are maintained by a 110 different department than address management, dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces 111 are represented, etc. 113 [RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP 114 address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an 115 individual user. Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy 116 guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this 117 exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as 118 described in this document the operator should be aware of this 119 exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy 120 considerations of [RFC8805] Section 4 apply to this document. 122 This document also suggests optional data for geofeed files to 123 provide stronger authenticity to the data. 125 3. inetnum: Class 127 RPSL, [RFC4012], as used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), 128 has been augmented with the inetnum: [INETNUM] and the inet6num: 129 [INET6NUM] classes; each of which describes an IP address range and 130 its attributes. 132 Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: 133 attribute in the inetnum: class. Until such time, this document 134 defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute which contains an 135 HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format MUST be as in this example, 136 "remarks: Geofeed " followed by a URL which will vary. 138 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 139 remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv 141 While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant 142 parties, we suggest that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: 143 class be simply "geofeed: " followed by a URL which will vary. 145 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 146 geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv 148 Until all producers of inetnum:s, i.e. the RIRs, state that they have 149 migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at 150 inetnum:s to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the 151 remarks: and geofeed: forms. This not only implies that the RIRs 152 support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have 153 migrated any inetnum:s from remarks: use to geofeed:s. 155 Any particular inetnum: object MAY have, at most, one geofeed 156 reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when one 157 is defined. 159 inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, see [INETNUM] Section 4.2.4.1, 160 Hierarchy of INETNUM Objects. Geofeed references SHOULD be at the 161 lowest applicable inetnum: object. When fetching, the most specific 162 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 164 When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects 165 which have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on 166 the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be 167 preferred. 169 It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than 170 the inetnum: which refers to them. 172 Currently, the registry data published by ARIN is not the same RPSL 173 as the other registries; therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP 174 [RFC0959], whois [RFC3912], RDAP [RFC7482], or whatever, the 175 "NetRange" attribute/key must be treated as "inetnum" and the 176 "Comment" attribute must be treated as "remarks". 178 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data 180 The question arises of whether a particular geofeed data set is 181 valid, i.e. authorized by the 'owner' of the IP address space and is 182 authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: which points to the 183 geofeed file provides some assurance. Unfortunately the RPSL in many 184 repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An approach where RPSL 185 was signed a la [RFC7909] would be good, except it would have to be 186 deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a fair number of them. 188 An optional authenticator MAY be appended to a geofeed file. It 189 would be essentially a digest of the main body of the file signed by 190 the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for the covering 191 address range. One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI 192 certificate with the signature and the digest of the geofeed text. 194 [I-D.michaelson-rpki-rta] describes a Cryptographic Message Syntax 195 (CMS) profile for a general purpose Resource Tagged Attestation (RTA) 196 based on the RPKI. While this is expected to become applicable in 197 the long run, for the purposes of this document, a self-signed root 198 trust anchor is used. 200 Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after text file 201 canonicalization (Sec 2.2), the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 202 [RFC3852] would be used to create a detached DER encoded signature 203 which is then BASE64 encoded and line wrapped to 72 or fewer 204 characters. 206 Both the address ranges of the signing certificate and of the 207 inetnum: MUST cover all prefixes in the geofeed file; and the address 208 range of the signing certificate must cover that of the inetnum:. 210 An address range A 'covers' address range B if the range of B is 211 identical to or a subset of A. 'Address range' is used here because 212 inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on CIDR prefix 213 boundaries, while those of geofeed lines must. 215 As the signer would need to specify the covered RPKI resources 216 relevant to the signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: 217 object's address range would be included in the [RFC3852] CMS 218 SignedData certificates field. 220 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 221 getting the department with the HSM to sign the CMS blob is left as 222 an exercise for the implementor. On the other hand, verifying the 223 signature requires no complexity; the certificate, which can be 224 validated in the public RPKI, has the needed public key. 226 Until [RFC8805] is updated to formally define such an appendix, it 227 MUST be 'hidden' as a series of "#" comments at the end of the 228 geofeed file. This is a cryptographically incorrect, albeit simple 229 example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A. 231 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 232 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 233 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 234 ... 235 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 236 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 237 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 239 5. Operational Considerations 241 To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to 242 register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with 243 their RIR/NIR and/or any provider LIR which has assigned prefixes to 244 them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain 245 inetnum: objects. They also provide means of [sub-]assigning IP 246 address resources and allowing the assignee to create whois data, 247 including inetnum: objects, and thereby referring to geofeed files. 249 The geofeed files SHOULD be published over and fetched using https 250 [RFC2818]. 252 When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside of 253 the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range. 255 Iff the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then multiple 256 inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the consumer 257 MUST use only geofeed lines where the prefix is covered by the 258 address range of the inetnum: object they have followed. 260 To minimize the load on RIR whois [RFC3912] services, use of the 261 RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be the preferred access. This 262 also provides bulk access instead of fetching with a tweezers. 264 Currently, geolocation providers have bulk whois data access at all 265 the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for 266 all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for 267 users without such authorization the same result can be achieved with 268 extra RDAP effort. There is open source code to pass over such data 269 across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them 270 [geofeed-finder]. 272 An entity fetching geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do 273 frequent real-time look-ups to prevent load on RPSL and geofeed 274 servers. [RFC8805] Section 3.4 suggests use of the [RFC7234] HTTP 275 Expires Caching Header to signal when geofeed data should be 276 refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of 277 such an HTTP Header signal, collectors MUST NOT fetch more frequently 278 than weekly. It would be wise not to fetch at magic times such as 279 midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others 280 are likely to do the same. 282 6. Security Considerations 284 It would be generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also 285 use other sources to cross-validate the data. All of the Security 286 Considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well. 288 As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak if any 289 authentication. This would allow spoofing of inetnum: objects 290 pointing to malicious geofeed files. Section 4 suggests an 291 unfortunately complex method for stronger authentication based on the 292 RPKI. 294 If an inetnum: for a wide prefix (e.g. a /16) points to an RPKI- 295 signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish an unsigned 296 equal or narrower (e.g. a /24) inetnum: in a whois registry which has 297 weak authorization. 299 The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers 300 due to too-frequent queries. Usually they throttle by the querying 301 IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be 302 deployed by geofeed file servers. 304 7. IANA Considerations 306 IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in 307 the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 308 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows: 310 Description OID Specification 311 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 312 id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD] 314 8. Acknowledgements 316 Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue. George 317 Michaelson for the first, and a substantial, external review. Erik 318 Kline who was too shy to agree to co-authorship. Additionally, we 319 express our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno 320 Schepers, Flavio Luciani, Eric Dugas, Job Snijders who provided a CLI 321 demo, and Kevin Pack. Also to geolocation providers that are 322 consuming geofeeds with this described solution, Jonathan Kosgei 323 (ipdata.co), and Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io). For reviews, we thank 324 Antonio Prado. 326 9. References 328 9.1. Normative References 330 [INET6NUM] 331 RIPE, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", 332 . 337 [INETNUM] RIPE, "Description of the INETNUM Object", 338 . 343 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 344 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 345 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 346 . 348 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, 349 DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, 350 . 352 [RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", 353 RFC 3852, DOI 10.17487/RFC3852, July 2004, 354 . 356 [RFC4012] Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky, 357 "Routing Policy Specification Language next generation 358 (RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005, 359 . 361 [RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft 362 Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009, 363 . 365 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 366 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 367 May 2017, . 369 [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. 370 Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation 371 Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, 372 . 374 9.2. Informative References 376 [geofeed-finder] 377 Massimo Candela, "geofeed-finder", 378 . 380 [I-D.michaelson-rpki-rta] 381 Michaelson, G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, T., 382 and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged 383 Attestations (RTAs)", draft-michaelson-rpki-rta-02 (work 384 in progress), November 2020. 386 [RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", 387 STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985, 388 . 390 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 391 DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004, 392 . 394 [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, 395 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", 396 RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, 397 . 399 [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 400 Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, 401 DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, 402 . 404 [RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy 405 Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public 406 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909, 407 DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016, 408 . 410 Appendix A. Example 412 This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CA 413 certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity 414 certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a 415 detached signature. 417 The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As 418 usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 419 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers. 421 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 422 MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 423 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5 424 MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB 425 AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ 426 0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH 427 XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe 428 g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb 429 O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq 430 jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd 431 BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU 432 GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw 433 GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI 434 KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 435 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u 436 ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 437 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD 438 AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN 439 BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe 440 xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH 441 cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM 442 Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA 443 rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a 444 x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA== 445 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 447 The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate 448 grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two 449 AS numbers (64496 and 64497). 451 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 452 MIIFBzCCA++gAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 453 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTAyMTlaFw0yMTA5 454 MDMxOTAyMTlaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG 455 QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc 456 zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 457 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo 458 j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ 459 liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n 460 YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE 461 TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIvMIICKzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 462 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYD 463 VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr 464 BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u 465 ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz 466 Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v 467 cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr 468 BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu 469 bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz 470 Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF 471 hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH 472 AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA 473 +/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnLu+d1ZsUTiX3YWGueTHIalW4ad0 474 Kupi7pYMV2nXbxNGmdJMol9BkzVz9tj55ReMghUU4YLm/ICYe4fz5e0T8o9s/vIm 475 cGS29+WoGuiznMitpvbS/379gaMezk6KpqjH6Brw6meMqy09phmcmvm3x3WTmx09 476 mLlQneMptwk8qSYcnMUmGLJs+cVqmkOa3sWRdw8WrGu6QqYtQz3HFZQojF06YzEq 477 V/dBdCFdEOwTfVl2n2XqhoJl/oEBdC4uu2G0qRk3+WVs+uwVHP0Ttsbt7TzFgZfY 478 yxqvOg6QoldxZVZmHHncKmETu/BqCDGJot9may31ukrx34Bu+XFMVihm0w== 479 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 481 The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate 482 grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). 483 Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data 484 signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate. 486 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 487 MIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZuMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 488 BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC 489 Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAxOTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNV 490 BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi 491 MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW 492 yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c 493 K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm 494 BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp 495 tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog 496 qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB 497 AAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j 498 BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8B 499 Af8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFag 500 VKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF 501 RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcB 502 AQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBv 503 c2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIu 504 Y2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwEDAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUH 505 AQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90 506 aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHP 507 TArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYiblMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh 508 6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b 509 +YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8adS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1ar 510 Kelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aaaEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfO 511 MkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztcOxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh4 512 5Q== 513 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 515 The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For 516 brevity, the other two certificates are not. 518 0 1197: SEQUENCE { 519 4 917: SEQUENCE { 520 8 3: [0] { 521 10 1: INTEGER 2 522 : } 523 13 20: INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E3 524 35 13: SEQUENCE { 525 37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 526 : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 527 48 0: NULL 528 : } 529 50 51: SEQUENCE { 530 52 49: SET { 531 54 47: SEQUENCE { 532 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 533 61 40: PrintableString 534 : '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642' 535 : } 536 : } 537 : } 538 103 30: SEQUENCE { 539 105 13: UTCTime 03/09/2020 19:05:17 GMT 540 120 13: UTCTime 30/06/2021 19:05:17 GMT 541 : } 542 135 51: SEQUENCE { 543 137 49: SET { 544 139 47: SEQUENCE { 545 141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 546 146 40: PrintableString 547 : '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187' 548 : } 549 : } 550 : } 551 188 290: SEQUENCE { 552 192 13: SEQUENCE { 553 194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption 554 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 555 205 0: NULL 556 : } 557 207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 558 212 266: SEQUENCE { 559 216 257: INTEGER 560 : 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8 561 : 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65 562 : B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE 563 : 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13 564 : 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37 565 : 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE 566 : E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED 567 : 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89 568 : F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E 569 : 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19 570 : BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65 571 : 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28 572 : 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9 573 : 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A 574 : 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41 575 : FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C 576 : EB 577 477 3: INTEGER 65537 578 : } 579 : } 580 : } 581 482 439: [3] { 582 486 435: SEQUENCE { 583 490 29: SEQUENCE { 584 492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 585 497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 586 499 20: OCTET STRING 587 : 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB 588 : F0 53 A1 87 589 : } 590 : } 591 521 31: SEQUENCE { 592 523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 593 528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 594 530 22: SEQUENCE { 595 532 20: [0] 596 : 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97 597 : B3 77 86 42 598 : } 599 : } 600 : } 601 554 12: SEQUENCE { 602 556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) 603 561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 604 564 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 605 566 0: SEQUENCE {} 606 : } 607 : } 608 568 14: SEQUENCE { 609 570 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 610 575 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 611 578 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 612 580 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits 613 : '1'B (bit 0) 614 : } 615 : } 616 584 24: SEQUENCE { 617 586 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 618 591 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 619 594 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 620 596 12: SEQUENCE { 621 598 10: SEQUENCE { 622 600 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 623 : resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2) 624 : } 625 : } 626 : } 627 : } 628 610 97: SEQUENCE { 629 612 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 630 617 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 631 619 88: SEQUENCE { 632 621 86: SEQUENCE { 633 623 84: [0] { 634 625 82: [0] { 635 627 80: [6] 636 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 637 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl' 638 : } 639 : } 640 : } 641 : } 642 : } 643 : } 644 709 108: SEQUENCE { 645 711 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess 646 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 647 721 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 648 723 94: SEQUENCE { 649 725 92: SEQUENCE { 650 727 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2) 651 737 80: [6] 652 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 653 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer' 654 : } 655 : } 656 : } 657 : } 658 819 33: SEQUENCE { 659 821 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7) 660 831 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 661 834 18: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 662 836 16: SEQUENCE { 663 838 6: SEQUENCE { 664 840 2: OCTET STRING 00 01 665 844 0: NULL 666 : } 667 846 6: SEQUENCE { 668 848 2: OCTET STRING 00 02 669 852 0: NULL 670 : } 671 : } 672 : } 673 : } 674 854 69: SEQUENCE { 675 856 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess 676 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11) 677 866 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 678 868 55: SEQUENCE { 679 870 53: SEQUENCE { 680 872 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13' 681 882 41: [6] 682 : 'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml' 683 : } 684 : } 685 : } 686 : } 687 : } 688 : } 689 : } 690 925 13: SEQUENCE { 691 927 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption 692 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 693 938 0: NULL 694 : } 695 940 257: BIT STRING 696 : 05 1D 93 D2 A4 F6 57 56 65 B1 98 E3 FB 21 CF 4C 697 : 0A C8 54 11 02 64 54 82 74 FF 9B 25 3B 1E F3 94 698 : EA 62 26 E5 32 C3 52 F7 21 2E D9 23 5B 69 93 0D 699 : 2E E4 92 88 07 DF 62 8A 21 E2 72 18 AB F4 61 EB 700 : EC 46 B3 59 F8 DB B2 59 52 89 28 78 BB 58 D1 45 701 : 1B D9 F2 2C B9 AF 49 16 8F 18 19 39 E9 A8 33 06 702 : 7B EC 67 A5 B2 74 48 24 A8 06 52 42 22 3F 9B F9 703 : 84 BC 59 78 C4 1E DD 8A 5B AC 32 03 F0 5C 35 2F 704 : 1A 75 2D A9 11 4C 02 D9 CB 3F 59 CC 33 81 BB 6D 705 : 9E 47 27 1B BF F0 92 B4 37 A2 AC E9 0B 56 AB 29 706 : E9 72 CF B3 C6 20 85 C9 1B 2F 67 17 C0 B7 FD A6 707 : 9A 12 91 DD ED 48 08 CA F5 D8 B8 26 3F 96 A5 93 708 : 9B DE E3 0F 18 06 21 81 82 EF AE B4 9A D7 CE 32 709 : 40 7C 60 5E A4 51 4F AD 77 67 43 42 C3 33 B5 C3 710 : B1 6F 3A A2 1A 78 9C 99 E2 5F 07 01 B6 96 2E 8E 711 : D2 FA 2B 5B 87 79 88 83 93 2A 94 32 A9 F8 78 E5 712 : } 714 To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity 715 private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are 716 not. 718 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 719 MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW 720 /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP 721 Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 722 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ 723 eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm 724 gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 725 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio 726 pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z 727 ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ 728 mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 729 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF 730 t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt 731 MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M 732 Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 733 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l 734 nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm 735 FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 736 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo 737 Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz 738 vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc 739 DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf 740 taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc 741 PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ 742 E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV 743 iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= 744 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 746 Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), 747 yields the following detached CMS signature. 749 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 750 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 751 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 752 # MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR 753 # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAx 754 # OTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM 755 # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT 756 # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg 757 # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm 758 # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha 759 # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG 760 # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ 761 # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R 762 # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI 763 # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg 764 # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ 765 # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5 766 # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5 767 # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0 768 # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwE 769 # DAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilo 770 # dHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhki 771 # G9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHPTArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYi 772 # blMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2 773 # fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b+YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8a 774 # dS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1arKelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aa 775 # aEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfOMkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztc 776 # OxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh45TGCAaowggGmAgEDgBSRR 777 # lKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMx 778 # DQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIwMDkxMzE4NDUxMFowLwY 779 # JKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4VtBHypfcEWMA 780 # 0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAHUrA4PaJG42BD3hpF8U0usnV3Dg5NQh97SfyKTk7 781 # YHhhwu/936gkmAew8ODRTCddMvMObWkjj7/XeR+WKffaTF1EAdZ1L6REV+GlV91 782 # cYnFkT9ldn4wHQnNNncfAehk5PClYUUQ0gqjdJT1hdaolT83b3ttekyYIiwPmHE 783 # xRaNkSvKenlNqcriaaf3rbQy9dc2d1KxrL2429n134ICqjKeRnHkXXrCWDmyv/3 784 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 785 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 786 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 788 Authors' Addresses 790 Randy Bush 791 IIJ & Arrcus 792 5147 Crystal Springs 793 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 794 United States of America 796 Email: randy@psg.com 797 Massimo Candela 798 NTT 799 Siriusdreef 70-72 800 Hoofddorp 2132 WT 801 Netherlands 803 Email: massimo@ntt.net 805 Warren Kumari 806 Google 807 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 808 Mountain View, CA 94043 809 US 811 Email: warren@kumari.net 813 Russ Housley 814 Vigil Security, LLC 815 516 Dranesville Road 816 Herndon, VA 20170 817 USA 819 Email: housley@vigilsec.com