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'INET6NUM' -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'INETNUM' ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2818 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3852 (Obsoleted by RFC 5652) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 5485 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 8805 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 7482 (Obsoleted by RFC 9082) Summary: 4 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 9 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group M. Candela 3 Internet-Draft NTT 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Bush 5 Expires: July 23, 2021 IIJ & Arrcus 6 W. Kumari 7 Google 8 R. Housley 9 Vigil Security 10 January 19, 2021 12 Finding and Using Geofeed Data 13 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-01 15 Abstract 17 This document describes how to find and authenticate geofeed data. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on July 23, 2021. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 55 2. Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. inetnum: Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 60 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 64 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 68 1. Introduction 70 Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to 71 customize those services based on the geographic location of the user 72 of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used 73 to contact the service. Also, infrastructure and other services 74 might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] 75 defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP 76 addresses. But it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed 77 data given an IP address. 79 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 80 Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2622] inetnum: class [INETNUM] to 81 refer to geofeed data, and how to prudently use them. In all places 82 inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed [INET6NUM]. 84 An optional, but utterly awesome, means for authenticating geofeed 85 data is also defined. 87 1.1. Requirements Language 89 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 90 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 91 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 92 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 93 capitals, as shown here. 95 2. Geofeed Files 97 Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility 98 for an IP address resource 'owner' to associate those IP addresses to 99 geographic locale(s). 101 Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address 102 to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In 103 Section 3 this document specifies how to find the relevant geofeed 104 file given an IP address. 106 Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale 107 and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be 108 even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many 109 prefixes, as may be likely if the location data are maintained by a 110 different department than address management, dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces 111 are represented, etc. 113 This document also suggests optional data for geofeed files to 114 provide stronger authenticity to the data. 116 3. inetnum: Class 118 RPSL, [RFC2622], as used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), 119 has been augmented with the inetnum: [INETNUM] and the inet6num: 120 [INET6NUM] classes; each of which describes an IP address range and 121 its attributes. 123 Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: 124 attribute in the inetnum: class. Until such time, this document 125 defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute which contains an 126 HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format MUST be as in this example, 127 "remarks: Geofeed " followed by a URL which will vary. 129 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 130 remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv 132 While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant 133 parties, we suggest that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: 134 class be simply "geofeed: " followed by a URL which will vary. 136 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 137 geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv 139 Until all producers of inetnum:s, i.e. the RIRs, state that they have 140 migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at 141 inetnum:s to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the 142 remarks: and geofeed: forms. This not only implies that the RIRs 143 support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have 144 migrated any inetnum:s from remarks: use to geofeed:s. 146 Any particular inetnum: object MAY have, at most, one geofeed 147 reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when one 148 is defined. 150 inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, see [INETNUM] Section 4.2.4.1, 151 Hierarchy of INETNUM Objects. Geofeed references SHOULD be at the 152 lowest applicable inetnum: object. When fetching, the most specific 153 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 155 When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects 156 which have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on 157 the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be 158 preferred. 160 It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than 161 the inetnum: which refers to them. 163 Currently, the registry data published by ARIN is not the same RPSL 164 as the other registries; therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP 165 [RFC0959], whois [RFC3912], RDAP [RFC7482], or whatever, the 166 "NetRange" attribute/key must be treated as "inetnum" and the 167 "Comment" attribute must be treated as "remarks". 169 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data 171 The question arises of whether a particular geofeed data set is 172 valid, i.e. authorized by the 'owner' of the IP address space and is 173 authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: which points to the 174 geofeed file provides some assurance. Unfortunately the RPSL in many 175 repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An approach where RPSL 176 was signed a la [RFC7909] would be good, except it would have to be 177 deployed by all RPSL registries, and there are a fair number of them. 179 An optional authenticator MAY be appended to a geofeed file. It 180 would be essentially a digest of the main body of the file signed by 181 the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for the covering 182 address range. One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI 183 certificate with the signature and the digest of the geofeed text. 185 [I-D.michaelson-rpki-rta] describes a Cryptographic Message Syntax 186 (CMS) profile for a general purpose Resource Tagged Attestation (RTA) 187 based on the RPKI. While this is expected to become applicable in 188 the long run, for the purposes of this document, a self-signed root 189 trust anchor is used. 191 Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after text file 192 canonicalization (Sec 2.2), the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 193 [RFC3852] would be used to create a detached DER encoded signature 194 which is then BASE64 encoded and line wrapped to 72 or fewer 195 characters. 197 Both the address ranges of the signing certificate and of the 198 inetnum: MUST cover all prefixes in the geofeed file; and the address 199 range of the signing certificate must cover that of the inetnum:. 201 An address range A 'covers' address range B if the range of B is 202 identical to or a subset of A. 'Address range' is used here because 203 inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on CIDR prefix 204 boundaries, while those of geofeed lines must. 206 As the signer would need to specify the covered RPKI resources 207 relevant to the signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: 208 object's address range would be included in the [RFC3852] CMS 209 SignedData certificates field. 211 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 212 getting the department with the HSM to sign the CMS blob is left as 213 an exercise for the implementor. On the other hand, verifying the 214 signature requires no complexity; the certificate, which can be 215 validated in the public RPKI, has the needed public key. 217 Until [RFC8805] is updated to formally define such an appendix, it 218 MUST be 'hidden' as a series of "#" comments at the end of the 219 geofeed file. This is a cryptographically incorrect, albeit simple 220 example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A. 222 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 223 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 224 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 225 ... 226 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 227 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 228 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 230 5. Operational Considerations 232 To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to 233 register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with 234 their RIR/NIR and/or any provider LIR which has assigned prefixes to 235 them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain 236 inetnum: objects. They also provide means of [sub-]assigning IP 237 address resources and allowing the assignee to create whois data, 238 including inetnum: objects, and thereby referring to geofeed files. 240 The geofeed files SHOULD be published over and fetched using https 241 [RFC2818]. 243 When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside of 244 the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range. 246 Iff the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then multiple 247 inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the consumer 248 MUST use only geofeed lines where the prefix is covered by the 249 address range of the inetnum: object they have followed. 251 To minimize the load on RIR whois [RFC3912] services, use of the 252 RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be the preferred access. This 253 also provides bulk access instead of fetching with a tweezers. 255 Currently, geolocation providers have bulk whois data access at all 256 the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for 257 all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for 258 users without such authorization the same result can be achieved with 259 extra RDAP effort. There is open source code to pass over such data 260 across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them 261 [geofeed-finder]. 263 An entity fetching geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do 264 frequent real-time look-ups to prevent load on RPSL and geofeed 265 servers. [RFC8805] Section 3.4 suggests use of the [RFC7234] HTTP 266 Expires Caching Header to signal when geofeed data should be 267 refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of 268 such an HTTP Header signal, collectors MUST NOT fetch more frequently 269 than weekly. It would be wise not to fetch at magic times such as 270 midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others 271 are likely to do the same. 273 6. Security Considerations 275 It would be generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also 276 use other sources to cross-validate the data. All of the Security 277 Considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well. 279 As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak if any 280 authentication. This would allow spoofing of inetnum: objects 281 pointing to malicious geofeed files. Section 4 suggests an 282 unfortunately complex method for stronger authentication based on the 283 RPKI. 285 If an inetnum: for a wide prefix (e.g. a /16) points to an RPKI- 286 signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish a unsigned 287 equal or narrower (e.g. a /24) inetnum: in a whois registry which has 288 weak authorization. 290 The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers 291 due to too-frequent queries. Usually they throttle by the querying 292 IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be 293 deployed by geofeed file servers. 295 7. IANA Considerations 297 IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in 298 the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 299 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows: 301 Description OID Specification 302 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 303 id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD] 305 8. Acknowledgements 307 Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue. George 308 Michaelson for the first, and a substantial, external review. Erik 309 Kline who was too shy to agree to co-authorship. Additionally, we 310 express our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno 311 Schepers, Flavio Luciani, Eric Dugas, and Kevin Pack. Also to 312 geolocation providers that are consuming geofeeds with this described 313 solution, Jonathan Kosgei (ipdata.co), and Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io). 315 9. References 317 9.1. Normative References 319 [INET6NUM] 320 RIPE, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", 321 . 326 [INETNUM] RIPE, "Description of the INETNUM Object", 327 . 332 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 333 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 334 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 335 . 337 [RFC2622] Alaettinoglu, C., Villamizar, C., Gerich, E., Kessens, D., 338 Meyer, D., Bates, T., Karrenberg, D., and M. Terpstra, 339 "Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)", RFC 2622, 340 DOI 10.17487/RFC2622, June 1999, 341 . 343 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, 344 DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, 345 . 347 [RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", 348 RFC 3852, DOI 10.17487/RFC3852, July 2004, 349 . 351 [RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft 352 Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009, 353 . 355 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 356 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 357 May 2017, . 359 [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. 360 Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation 361 Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, 362 . 364 9.2. Informative References 366 [geofeed-finder] 367 Massimo Candela, "geofeed-finder", 368 . 370 [I-D.michaelson-rpki-rta] 371 Michaelson, G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, T., 372 and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged 373 Attestations (RTAs)", draft-michaelson-rpki-rta-02 (work 374 in progress), November 2020. 376 [RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", 377 STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985, 378 . 380 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 381 DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004, 382 . 384 [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, 385 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", 386 RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, 387 . 389 [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 390 Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, 391 DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, 392 . 394 [RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy 395 Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public 396 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909, 397 DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016, 398 . 400 Appendix A. Example 402 This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CA 403 certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity 404 certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a 405 detached signature. 407 The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As 408 usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 409 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers. 411 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 412 MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 413 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5 414 MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB 415 AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ 416 0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH 417 XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe 418 g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb 419 O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq 420 jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd 421 BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU 422 GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw 423 GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI 424 KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 425 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u 426 ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 427 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD 428 AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN 429 BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe 430 xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH 431 cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM 432 Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA 433 rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a 434 x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA== 435 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 437 The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate 438 grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two 439 AS numbers (64496 and 64497). 441 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 442 MIIFBzCCA++gAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 443 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTAyMTlaFw0yMTA5 444 MDMxOTAyMTlaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG 445 QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc 446 zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 447 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo 448 j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ 449 liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n 450 YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE 451 TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIvMIICKzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 452 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYD 453 VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr 454 BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u 455 ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz 456 Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v 457 cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr 458 BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu 459 bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz 460 Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF 461 hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH 462 AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA 463 +/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnLu+d1ZsUTiX3YWGueTHIalW4ad0 464 Kupi7pYMV2nXbxNGmdJMol9BkzVz9tj55ReMghUU4YLm/ICYe4fz5e0T8o9s/vIm 465 cGS29+WoGuiznMitpvbS/379gaMezk6KpqjH6Brw6meMqy09phmcmvm3x3WTmx09 466 mLlQneMptwk8qSYcnMUmGLJs+cVqmkOa3sWRdw8WrGu6QqYtQz3HFZQojF06YzEq 467 V/dBdCFdEOwTfVl2n2XqhoJl/oEBdC4uu2G0qRk3+WVs+uwVHP0Ttsbt7TzFgZfY 468 yxqvOg6QoldxZVZmHHncKmETu/BqCDGJot9may31ukrx34Bu+XFMVihm0w== 469 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 471 The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate 472 grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). 473 Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data 474 signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate. 476 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 477 MIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZuMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 478 BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC 479 Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAxOTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNV 480 BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi 481 MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW 482 yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c 483 K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm 484 BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp 485 tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog 486 qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB 487 AAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j 488 BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8B 489 Af8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFag 490 VKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF 491 RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcB 492 AQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBv 493 c2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIu 494 Y2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwEDAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUH 495 AQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90 496 aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHP 497 TArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYiblMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh 498 6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b 499 +YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8adS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1ar 500 Kelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aaaEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfO 501 MkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztcOxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh4 502 5Q== 503 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 505 The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For 506 brevity, the other two certificates are not. 508 0 1197: SEQUENCE { 509 4 917: SEQUENCE { 510 8 3: [0] { 511 10 1: INTEGER 2 512 : } 513 13 20: INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E3 514 35 13: SEQUENCE { 515 37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 516 : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 517 48 0: NULL 518 : } 519 50 51: SEQUENCE { 520 52 49: SET { 521 54 47: SEQUENCE { 522 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 523 61 40: PrintableString 524 : '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642' 525 : } 526 : } 527 : } 528 103 30: SEQUENCE { 529 105 13: UTCTime 03/09/2020 19:05:17 GMT 530 120 13: UTCTime 30/06/2021 19:05:17 GMT 531 : } 532 135 51: SEQUENCE { 533 137 49: SET { 534 139 47: SEQUENCE { 535 141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 536 146 40: PrintableString 537 : '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187' 538 : } 539 : } 540 : } 541 188 290: SEQUENCE { 542 192 13: SEQUENCE { 543 194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption 544 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 545 205 0: NULL 546 : } 547 207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 548 212 266: SEQUENCE { 549 216 257: INTEGER 550 : 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8 551 : 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65 552 : B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE 553 : 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13 554 : 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37 555 : 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE 556 : E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED 557 : 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89 558 : F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E 559 : 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19 560 : BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65 561 : 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28 562 : 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9 563 : 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A 564 : 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41 565 : FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C 566 : EB 567 477 3: INTEGER 65537 568 : } 569 : } 570 : } 571 482 439: [3] { 572 486 435: SEQUENCE { 573 490 29: SEQUENCE { 574 492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 575 497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 576 499 20: OCTET STRING 577 : 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB 578 : F0 53 A1 87 579 : } 580 : } 581 521 31: SEQUENCE { 582 523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 583 528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 584 530 22: SEQUENCE { 585 532 20: [0] 586 : 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97 587 : B3 77 86 42 588 : } 589 : } 590 : } 591 554 12: SEQUENCE { 592 556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) 593 561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 594 564 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 595 566 0: SEQUENCE {} 596 : } 597 : } 598 568 14: SEQUENCE { 599 570 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 600 575 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 601 578 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 602 580 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits 603 : '1'B (bit 0) 604 : } 605 : } 606 584 24: SEQUENCE { 607 586 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 608 591 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 609 594 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 610 596 12: SEQUENCE { 611 598 10: SEQUENCE { 612 600 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 613 : resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2) 614 : } 615 : } 616 : } 617 : } 618 610 97: SEQUENCE { 619 612 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 620 617 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 621 619 88: SEQUENCE { 622 621 86: SEQUENCE { 623 623 84: [0] { 624 625 82: [0] { 625 627 80: [6] 626 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 627 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl' 628 : } 629 : } 630 : } 631 : } 632 : } 633 : } 634 709 108: SEQUENCE { 635 711 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess 636 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 637 721 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 638 723 94: SEQUENCE { 639 725 92: SEQUENCE { 640 727 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2) 641 737 80: [6] 642 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 643 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer' 644 : } 645 : } 646 : } 647 : } 648 819 33: SEQUENCE { 649 821 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7) 650 831 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 651 834 18: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 652 836 16: SEQUENCE { 653 838 6: SEQUENCE { 654 840 2: OCTET STRING 00 01 655 844 0: NULL 656 : } 657 846 6: SEQUENCE { 658 848 2: OCTET STRING 00 02 659 852 0: NULL 660 : } 661 : } 662 : } 663 : } 664 854 69: SEQUENCE { 665 856 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess 666 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11) 667 866 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 668 868 55: SEQUENCE { 669 870 53: SEQUENCE { 670 872 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13' 671 882 41: [6] 672 : 'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml' 673 : } 674 : } 675 : } 676 : } 677 : } 678 : } 679 : } 680 925 13: SEQUENCE { 681 927 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption 682 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 683 938 0: NULL 684 : } 685 940 257: BIT STRING 686 : 05 1D 93 D2 A4 F6 57 56 65 B1 98 E3 FB 21 CF 4C 687 : 0A C8 54 11 02 64 54 82 74 FF 9B 25 3B 1E F3 94 688 : EA 62 26 E5 32 C3 52 F7 21 2E D9 23 5B 69 93 0D 689 : 2E E4 92 88 07 DF 62 8A 21 E2 72 18 AB F4 61 EB 690 : EC 46 B3 59 F8 DB B2 59 52 89 28 78 BB 58 D1 45 691 : 1B D9 F2 2C B9 AF 49 16 8F 18 19 39 E9 A8 33 06 692 : 7B EC 67 A5 B2 74 48 24 A8 06 52 42 22 3F 9B F9 693 : 84 BC 59 78 C4 1E DD 8A 5B AC 32 03 F0 5C 35 2F 694 : 1A 75 2D A9 11 4C 02 D9 CB 3F 59 CC 33 81 BB 6D 695 : 9E 47 27 1B BF F0 92 B4 37 A2 AC E9 0B 56 AB 29 696 : E9 72 CF B3 C6 20 85 C9 1B 2F 67 17 C0 B7 FD A6 697 : 9A 12 91 DD ED 48 08 CA F5 D8 B8 26 3F 96 A5 93 698 : 9B DE E3 0F 18 06 21 81 82 EF AE B4 9A D7 CE 32 699 : 40 7C 60 5E A4 51 4F AD 77 67 43 42 C3 33 B5 C3 700 : B1 6F 3A A2 1A 78 9C 99 E2 5F 07 01 B6 96 2E 8E 701 : D2 FA 2B 5B 87 79 88 83 93 2A 94 32 A9 F8 78 E5 702 : } 704 To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity 705 private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are 706 not. 708 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 709 MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW 710 /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP 711 Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 712 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ 713 eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm 714 gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 715 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio 716 pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z 717 ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ 718 mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 719 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF 720 t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt 721 MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M 722 Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 723 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l 724 nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm 725 FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 726 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo 727 Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz 728 vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc 729 DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf 730 taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc 731 PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ 732 E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV 733 iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= 734 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 736 Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), 737 yields the following detached CMS signature. 739 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 740 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 741 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 742 # MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR 743 # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAx 744 # OTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM 745 # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT 746 # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg 747 # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm 748 # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha 749 # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG 750 # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ 751 # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R 752 # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI 753 # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg 754 # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ 755 # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5 756 # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5 757 # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0 758 # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwE 759 # DAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilo 760 # dHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhki 761 # G9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHPTArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYi 762 # blMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2 763 # fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b+YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8a 764 # dS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1arKelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aa 765 # aEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfOMkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztc 766 # OxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh45TGCAaowggGmAgEDgBSRR 767 # lKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMx 768 # DQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIwMDkxMzE4NDUxMFowLwY 769 # JKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4VtBHypfcEWMA 770 # 0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAHUrA4PaJG42BD3hpF8U0usnV3Dg5NQh97SfyKTk7 771 # YHhhwu/936gkmAew8ODRTCddMvMObWkjj7/XeR+WKffaTF1EAdZ1L6REV+GlV91 772 # cYnFkT9ldn4wHQnNNncfAehk5PClYUUQ0gqjdJT1hdaolT83b3ttekyYIiwPmHE 773 # xRaNkSvKenlNqcriaaf3rbQy9dc2d1KxrL2429n134ICqjKeRnHkXXrCWDmyv/3 774 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 775 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 776 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 778 Authors' Addresses 780 Massimo Candela 781 NTT 782 Siriusdreef 70-72 783 Hoofddorp 2132 WT 784 Netherlands 786 Email: massimo@ntt.net 787 Randy Bush 788 IIJ & Arrcus 789 5147 Crystal Springs 790 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 791 United States of America 793 Email: randy@psg.com 795 Warren Kumari 796 Google 797 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 798 Mountain View, CA 94043 799 US 801 Email: warren@kumari.net 803 Russ Housley 804 Vigil Security, LLC 805 516 Dranesville Road 806 Herndon, VA 20170 807 USA 809 Email: housley@vigilsec.com