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'INET6NUM' -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'INETNUM' ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2818 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3852 (Obsoleted by RFC 5652) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 5485 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 8805 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 7482 (Obsoleted by RFC 9082) Summary: 4 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 9 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group M. Candela 3 Internet-Draft NTT 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Bush 5 Expires: May 19, 2021 IIJ & Arrcus 6 W. Kumari 7 Google 8 R. Housley 9 Vigil Security 10 November 15, 2020 12 Finding and Using Geofeed Data 13 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-00 15 Abstract 17 This document describes how to find and authenticate geofeed data. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 19, 2021. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 55 2. Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. inetnum: Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 60 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 64 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 68 1. Introduction 70 Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to 71 customize those services based on the geographic location of the user 72 of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used 73 to contact the service. Also, infrastructure and other services 74 might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] 75 defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP 76 addresses. But it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed 77 data given an IP address. 79 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 80 Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2622] inetnum: class [INETNUM] to 81 refer to geofeed data, and how to prudently use them. In all places 82 inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed [INET6NUM]. 84 An optional, but utterly awesome, means for authenticating geofeed 85 data is also defined. 87 1.1. Requirements Language 89 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 90 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 91 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 92 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 93 capitals, as shown here. 95 2. Geofeed Files 97 Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility 98 for an IP address resource 'owner' to associate those IP addresses to 99 geographic locale(s). 101 Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address 102 to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In 103 Section 3 this document specifies how to find the relevant geofeed 104 file given an IP address. 106 Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale 107 and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be 108 even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many 109 prefixes, as may be likely if the location data are maintained by a 110 different department than address management, dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces 111 are represented, etc. 113 This document also suggests optional data for geofeed files to 114 provide stronger authenticity to the data. 116 3. inetnum: Class 118 RPSL, [RFC2622], as used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), 119 has been augmented with the inetnum: [INETNUM] and the inet6num: 120 [INET6NUM] classes; each of which describes an IP address range and 121 its attributes. 123 Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: 124 attribute in the inetnum: class. Until such time, this document 125 defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute which contains an 126 HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format MUST be as in this example, 127 "remarks: Geofeed " followed by a URL which will vary. 129 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 130 remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv 132 While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant 133 parties, we suggest that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: 134 class be simply "geofeed: " followed by a URL which will vary. 136 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 137 geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv 139 Until all producers of inetnum:s, i.e. the RIRs, state that they have 140 migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at 141 inetnum:s to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the 142 remarks: and geofeed: forms. This not only implies that the RIRs 143 support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have 144 migrated any inetnum:s from remarks: use to geofeed:s. 146 Any particular inetnum: object MAY have, at most, one geofeed 147 reference, whether a remark: or a proper geofeed: attribute when one 148 is defined. 150 inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, see [INETNUM] Section 4.2.4.1, 151 Hierarchy of INETNUM Objects. Geofeed references SHOULD be at the 152 lowest applicable inetnum: object. When fetching, the most specific 153 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 155 When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects 156 which have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on 157 the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be 158 preferred. 160 It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than 161 the inetnum: which refers to them. 163 Currently, the registry data published by ARIN is not the same RPSL 164 as the other registries; therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP 165 [RFC0959], whois [RFC3912], RDAP [RFC7482], or whatever, the 166 "NetRange" attribute/key must be treated as "inetnum" and the 167 "Comment" attribute must be treated as "remarks". 169 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data 171 The question arises of whether a particular geofeed data set is 172 valid, i.e. authorized by the 'owner' of the IP address space and is 173 authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: which points to the 174 geofeed file provides some assurance. Unfortunately the RPSL in many 175 repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An approach where RPSL 176 was signed a la [RFC7909] would be good, except it would have to be 177 deployed by all RPSL registries. 179 An optional authenticator MAY be appended to a geofeed file. It 180 would be essentially a digest of the main body of the file signed by 181 the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for the covering 182 address range. One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI 183 certificate with the signature and the digest of the geofeed text. 185 Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after text file 186 canonicalization (Sec 2.2), the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 187 [RFC3852] would be used to create a detached DER encoded signature 188 which is then BASE64 encoded and line wrapped to 72 or fewer 189 characters. 191 Both the address ranges of the signing certificate and of the 192 inetnum: MUST cover all prefixes in the geofeed file; and the address 193 range of the signing certificate must cover that of the inetnum:. 195 An address range A 'covers' address range B if the range of B is 196 identical to or a subset of A. 'Address range' is used here because 197 inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on CIDR prefix 198 boundaries, while those of geofeed lines must. 200 As the signer would need to specify the covered RPKI resources 201 relevant to the signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: 202 object's address range would be included in the [RFC3852] CMS 203 SignedData certificates field. 205 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 206 getting the department with the HSM to sign the CMS blob is left as 207 an exercise for the implementor. On the other hand, verifying the 208 signature requires no complexity; the certificate, which can be 209 validated in the public RPKI, has the needed public key. 211 Until [RFC8805] is updated to formally define such an appendix, it 212 MUST be 'hidden' as a series of "#" comments at the end of the 213 geofeed file. This is a cryptographically incorrect, albeit simple 214 example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A. 216 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 217 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 218 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 219 ... 220 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 221 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 222 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 224 5. Operational Considerations 226 To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to 227 register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with 228 their RIR/NIR and/or any provider LIR which has assigned prefixes to 229 them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain 230 inetnum: objects. They also provide means of [sub-]assigning IP 231 address resources and allowing the assignee to create whois data, 232 including inetnum: objects, and thereby referring to geofeed files. 234 The geofeed files SHOULD be published over and fetched using https 235 [RFC2818]. 237 When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside of 238 the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range. 240 Iff the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then multiple 241 inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the consumer 242 MUST use only geofeed lines where the prefix is covered by the 243 address range of the inetnum: object they have followed. 245 To minimize the load on RIR whois [RFC3912] services, use of the 246 RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be the preferred access. This 247 also provides bulk access instead of fetching with a tweezers. 249 Currently, geolocation providers have bulk whois data access at all 250 the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for 251 all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for 252 users without such authorization the same result can be achieved with 253 extra RDAP effort. There is open source code to pass over such data 254 across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them 255 [geofeed-finder]. 257 An entity fetching geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do 258 frequent real-time look-ups to prevent load on RPSL and geofeed 259 servers. [RFC8805] Section 3.4 suggests use of the [RFC7234] HTTP 260 Expires Caching Header to signal when geofeed data should be 261 refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of 262 such an HTTP Header signal, collectors MUST NOT fetch more frequently 263 than weekly. It would be wise not to fetch at magic times such as 264 midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others 265 are likely to do the same. 267 6. Security Considerations 269 It would be generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also 270 use other sources to cross-validate the data. All of the Security 271 Considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well. 273 As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak if any 274 authentication. This would allow spoofing of inetnum: objects 275 pointing to malicious geofeed files. Section 4 suggests an 276 unfortunately complex method for stronger authentication based on the 277 RPKI. 279 If an inetnum: for a wide prefix (e.g. a /16) points to an RPKI- 280 signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish a unsigned 281 equal or narrower (e.g. a /24) inetnum: in a whois registry which has 282 weak authorization. 284 The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers 285 due to too-frequent queries. Usually they throttle by the querying 286 IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be 287 deployed by geofeed file servers. 289 7. IANA Considerations 291 IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in 292 the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 293 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows: 295 Description OID Specification 296 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 297 id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD] 299 8. Acknowledgements 301 Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue. George 302 Michaelson for the first, and a substantial, external review. Erik 303 Kline who was too shy to agree to co-authorship. Additionally, we 304 express our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno 305 Schepers, Flavio Luciani, Eric Dugas, and Kevin Pack. Also to 306 geolocation providers that are consuming geofeeds with this described 307 solution, Jonathan Kosgei (ipdata.co), and Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io). 309 9. References 311 9.1. Normative References 313 [INET6NUM] 314 RIPE, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", 315 . 320 [INETNUM] RIPE, "Description of the INETNUM Object", 321 . 326 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 327 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 328 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 329 . 331 [RFC2622] Alaettinoglu, C., Villamizar, C., Gerich, E., Kessens, D., 332 Meyer, D., Bates, T., Karrenberg, D., and M. Terpstra, 333 "Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)", RFC 2622, 334 DOI 10.17487/RFC2622, June 1999, 335 . 337 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, 338 DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, 339 . 341 [RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", 342 RFC 3852, DOI 10.17487/RFC3852, July 2004, 343 . 345 [RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft 346 Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009, 347 . 349 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 350 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 351 May 2017, . 353 [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. 354 Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation 355 Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, 356 . 358 9.2. Informative References 360 [geofeed-finder] 361 Massimo Candela, "geofeed-finder", 362 . 364 [RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", 365 STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985, 366 . 368 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 369 DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004, 370 . 372 [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, 373 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", 374 RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, 375 . 377 [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 378 Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, 379 DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, 380 . 382 [RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy 383 Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public 384 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909, 385 DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016, 386 . 388 Appendix A. Example 390 This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CA 391 certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity 392 certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a 393 detached signature. 395 The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As 396 usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 397 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers. 399 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 400 MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 401 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5 402 MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB 403 AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ 404 0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH 405 XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe 406 g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb 407 O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq 408 jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd 409 BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU 410 GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw 411 GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI 412 KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 413 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u 414 ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 415 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD 416 AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN 417 BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe 418 xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH 419 cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM 420 Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA 421 rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a 422 x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA== 423 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 425 The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate 426 grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two 427 AS numbers (64496 and 64497). 429 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 430 MIIFBzCCA++gAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 431 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTAyMTlaFw0yMTA5 432 MDMxOTAyMTlaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG 433 QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc 434 zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 435 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo 436 j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ 437 liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n 438 YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE 439 TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIvMIICKzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 440 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYD 441 VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr 442 BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u 443 ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz 444 Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v 445 cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr 446 BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu 447 bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz 448 Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF 449 hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH 450 AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA 451 +/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnLu+d1ZsUTiX3YWGueTHIalW4ad0 452 Kupi7pYMV2nXbxNGmdJMol9BkzVz9tj55ReMghUU4YLm/ICYe4fz5e0T8o9s/vIm 453 cGS29+WoGuiznMitpvbS/379gaMezk6KpqjH6Brw6meMqy09phmcmvm3x3WTmx09 454 mLlQneMptwk8qSYcnMUmGLJs+cVqmkOa3sWRdw8WrGu6QqYtQz3HFZQojF06YzEq 455 V/dBdCFdEOwTfVl2n2XqhoJl/oEBdC4uu2G0qRk3+WVs+uwVHP0Ttsbt7TzFgZfY 456 yxqvOg6QoldxZVZmHHncKmETu/BqCDGJot9may31ukrx34Bu+XFMVihm0w== 457 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 459 The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate 460 grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). 461 Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data 462 signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate. 464 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 465 MIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZuMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 466 BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC 467 Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAxOTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNV 468 BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi 469 MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW 470 yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c 471 K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm 472 BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp 473 tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog 474 qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB 475 AAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j 476 BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8B 477 Af8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFag 478 VKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF 479 RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcB 480 AQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBv 481 c2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIu 482 Y2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwEDAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUH 483 AQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90 484 aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHP 485 TArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYiblMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh 486 6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b 487 +YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8adS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1ar 488 Kelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aaaEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfO 489 MkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztcOxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh4 490 5Q== 491 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 493 The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For 494 brevity, the other two certificates are not. 496 0 1197: SEQUENCE { 497 4 917: SEQUENCE { 498 8 3: [0] { 499 10 1: INTEGER 2 500 : } 501 13 20: INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E3 502 35 13: SEQUENCE { 503 37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 504 : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 505 48 0: NULL 506 : } 507 50 51: SEQUENCE { 508 52 49: SET { 509 54 47: SEQUENCE { 510 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 511 61 40: PrintableString 512 : '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642' 513 : } 514 : } 515 : } 516 103 30: SEQUENCE { 517 105 13: UTCTime 03/09/2020 19:05:17 GMT 518 120 13: UTCTime 30/06/2021 19:05:17 GMT 519 : } 520 135 51: SEQUENCE { 521 137 49: SET { 522 139 47: SEQUENCE { 523 141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 524 146 40: PrintableString 525 : '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187' 526 : } 527 : } 528 : } 529 188 290: SEQUENCE { 530 192 13: SEQUENCE { 531 194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption 532 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 533 205 0: NULL 534 : } 535 207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 536 212 266: SEQUENCE { 537 216 257: INTEGER 538 : 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8 539 : 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65 540 : B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE 541 : 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13 542 : 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37 543 : 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE 544 : E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED 545 : 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89 546 : F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E 547 : 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19 548 : BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65 549 : 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28 550 : 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9 551 : 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A 552 : 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41 553 : FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C 554 : EB 555 477 3: INTEGER 65537 556 : } 557 : } 558 : } 559 482 439: [3] { 560 486 435: SEQUENCE { 561 490 29: SEQUENCE { 562 492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 563 497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 564 499 20: OCTET STRING 565 : 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB 566 : F0 53 A1 87 567 : } 568 : } 569 521 31: SEQUENCE { 570 523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 571 528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 572 530 22: SEQUENCE { 573 532 20: [0] 574 : 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97 575 : B3 77 86 42 576 : } 577 : } 578 : } 579 554 12: SEQUENCE { 580 556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) 581 561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 582 564 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 583 566 0: SEQUENCE {} 584 : } 585 : } 586 568 14: SEQUENCE { 587 570 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 588 575 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 589 578 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 590 580 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits 591 : '1'B (bit 0) 592 : } 593 : } 594 584 24: SEQUENCE { 595 586 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 596 591 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 597 594 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 598 596 12: SEQUENCE { 599 598 10: SEQUENCE { 600 600 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 601 : resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2) 602 : } 603 : } 604 : } 605 : } 606 610 97: SEQUENCE { 607 612 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 608 617 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 609 619 88: SEQUENCE { 610 621 86: SEQUENCE { 611 623 84: [0] { 612 625 82: [0] { 613 627 80: [6] 614 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 615 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl' 616 : } 617 : } 618 : } 619 : } 620 : } 621 : } 622 709 108: SEQUENCE { 623 711 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess 624 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 625 721 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 626 723 94: SEQUENCE { 627 725 92: SEQUENCE { 628 727 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2) 629 737 80: [6] 630 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 631 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer' 632 : } 633 : } 634 : } 635 : } 636 819 33: SEQUENCE { 637 821 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7) 638 831 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 639 834 18: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 640 836 16: SEQUENCE { 641 838 6: SEQUENCE { 642 840 2: OCTET STRING 00 01 643 844 0: NULL 644 : } 645 846 6: SEQUENCE { 646 848 2: OCTET STRING 00 02 647 852 0: NULL 648 : } 649 : } 650 : } 651 : } 652 854 69: SEQUENCE { 653 856 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess 654 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11) 655 866 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 656 868 55: SEQUENCE { 657 870 53: SEQUENCE { 658 872 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13' 659 882 41: [6] 660 : 'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml' 661 : } 662 : } 663 : } 664 : } 665 : } 666 : } 667 : } 668 925 13: SEQUENCE { 669 927 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption 670 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 671 938 0: NULL 672 : } 673 940 257: BIT STRING 674 : 05 1D 93 D2 A4 F6 57 56 65 B1 98 E3 FB 21 CF 4C 675 : 0A C8 54 11 02 64 54 82 74 FF 9B 25 3B 1E F3 94 676 : EA 62 26 E5 32 C3 52 F7 21 2E D9 23 5B 69 93 0D 677 : 2E E4 92 88 07 DF 62 8A 21 E2 72 18 AB F4 61 EB 678 : EC 46 B3 59 F8 DB B2 59 52 89 28 78 BB 58 D1 45 679 : 1B D9 F2 2C B9 AF 49 16 8F 18 19 39 E9 A8 33 06 680 : 7B EC 67 A5 B2 74 48 24 A8 06 52 42 22 3F 9B F9 681 : 84 BC 59 78 C4 1E DD 8A 5B AC 32 03 F0 5C 35 2F 682 : 1A 75 2D A9 11 4C 02 D9 CB 3F 59 CC 33 81 BB 6D 683 : 9E 47 27 1B BF F0 92 B4 37 A2 AC E9 0B 56 AB 29 684 : E9 72 CF B3 C6 20 85 C9 1B 2F 67 17 C0 B7 FD A6 685 : 9A 12 91 DD ED 48 08 CA F5 D8 B8 26 3F 96 A5 93 686 : 9B DE E3 0F 18 06 21 81 82 EF AE B4 9A D7 CE 32 687 : 40 7C 60 5E A4 51 4F AD 77 67 43 42 C3 33 B5 C3 688 : B1 6F 3A A2 1A 78 9C 99 E2 5F 07 01 B6 96 2E 8E 689 : D2 FA 2B 5B 87 79 88 83 93 2A 94 32 A9 F8 78 E5 690 : } 692 To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity 693 private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are 694 not. 696 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 697 MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW 698 /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP 699 Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 700 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ 701 eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm 702 gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 703 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio 704 pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z 705 ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ 706 mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 707 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF 708 t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt 709 MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M 710 Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 711 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l 712 nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm 713 FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 714 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo 715 Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz 716 vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc 717 DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf 718 taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc 719 PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ 720 E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV 721 iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= 722 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 724 Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), 725 yields the following detached CMS signature. 727 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 728 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 729 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 730 # MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR 731 # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAx 732 # OTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM 733 # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT 734 # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg 735 # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm 736 # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha 737 # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG 738 # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ 739 # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R 740 # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI 741 # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg 742 # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ 743 # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5 744 # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5 745 # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0 746 # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwE 747 # DAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilo 748 # dHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhki 749 # G9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHPTArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYi 750 # blMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2 751 # fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b+YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8a 752 # dS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1arKelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aa 753 # aEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfOMkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztc 754 # OxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh45TGCAaowggGmAgEDgBSRR 755 # lKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMx 756 # DQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIwMDkxMzE4NDUxMFowLwY 757 # JKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4VtBHypfcEWMA 758 # 0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAHUrA4PaJG42BD3hpF8U0usnV3Dg5NQh97SfyKTk7 759 # YHhhwu/936gkmAew8ODRTCddMvMObWkjj7/XeR+WKffaTF1EAdZ1L6REV+GlV91 760 # cYnFkT9ldn4wHQnNNncfAehk5PClYUUQ0gqjdJT1hdaolT83b3ttekyYIiwPmHE 761 # xRaNkSvKenlNqcriaaf3rbQy9dc2d1KxrL2429n134ICqjKeRnHkXXrCWDmyv/3 762 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 763 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 764 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 766 Authors' Addresses 768 Massimo Candela 769 NTT 770 Siriusdreef 70-72 771 Hoofddorp 2132 WT 772 Netherlands 774 Email: massimo@ntt.net 775 Randy Bush 776 IIJ & Arrcus 777 5147 Crystal Springs 778 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 779 United States of America 781 Email: randy@psg.com 783 Warren Kumari 784 Google 785 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 786 Mountain View, CA 94043 787 US 789 Email: warren@kumari.net 791 Russ Housley 792 Vigil Security, LLC 793 516 Dranesville Road 794 Herndon, VA 20170 795 USA 797 Email: housley@vigilsec.com