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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) -- No information found for draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp - is the name correct? -- Possible downref: Normative reference to a draft: ref. 'I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp' -- No information found for draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics - is the name correct? -- Possible downref: Normative reference to a draft: ref. 'I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics' Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 5 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Open Authentication Protocol T. Lodderstedt, Ed. 3 Internet-Draft yes.com AG 4 Intended status: Standards Track V. Dzhuvinov 5 Expires: 8 March 2022 Connect2id Ltd. 6 4 September 2021 8 JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection 9 draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-12 11 Abstract 13 This specification proposes an additional JSON Web Token (JWT) 14 secured response for OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection. 16 Status of This Memo 18 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 19 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 21 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 22 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 23 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 24 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 26 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 27 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 28 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 29 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 31 This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 March 2022. 33 Copyright Notice 35 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 36 document authors. All rights reserved. 38 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 39 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ 40 license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. 41 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights 42 and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components 43 extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text 44 as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are 45 provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. 47 Table of Contents 49 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 50 2. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 51 3. Resource Server Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 52 4. Requesting a JWT Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 5. JWT Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 54 6. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 55 7. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 56 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 57 8.1. Cross-JWT Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 58 8.2. Token Data Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 59 9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 60 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 61 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 62 11.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata 63 Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 64 11.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 65 11.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration . . . . 11 66 11.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 67 11.3. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 68 11.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 69 11.4. JWT Claim Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 70 11.4.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 71 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 72 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 73 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 74 Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 75 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 77 1. Introduction 79 OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] specifies a method for a 80 protected resource to query an OAuth 2.0 authorization server to 81 determine the state of an access token and obtain data associated 82 with the access token. This enables deployments to implement opaque 83 access tokens in an interoperable way. 85 The introspection response, as specified in OAuth 2.0 Token 86 Introspection [RFC7662], is a plain JSON object. However, there are 87 use cases where the resource server requires stronger assurance that 88 the authorization server issued the token introspection response for 89 an access token, including cases where the authorization server 90 assumes liability for the content of the token introspection 91 response. An example is a resource server using verified person data 92 to create certificates, which in turn are used to create qualified 93 electronic signatures. 95 In such use cases it may be useful or even required to return a 96 signed JWT [RFC7519] as the introspection response. This 97 specification extends the token introspection endpoint with the 98 capability to return responses as JWTs. 100 2. Requirements Notation and Conventions 102 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 103 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 104 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 105 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 106 capitals, as shown here. 108 3. Resource Server Management 110 The authorization server (AS) and the resource server (RS) maintain a 111 strong two-way trust relationship. The resource server relies on the 112 authorization server to obtain authorization, user and other data as 113 input to its access control decisions and service delivery. The 114 authorization server relies on the resource server to handle the 115 provided data appropriately. 117 In the context of this specification, the token introspection 118 endpoint is used to convey such security data and potentially also 119 privacy sensitive data related to an access token. 121 In order to process the introspection requests in a secure and 122 privacy-preserving manner, the authorization server MUST be able to 123 identify, authenticate and authorize resource servers. 125 The authorization server MAY additionally encrypt the token 126 introspection response JWTs. If encryption is used the authorization 127 server is provisioned with encryption keys and algorithms for the RS. 129 The authorization server MUST be able to determine whether an RS is 130 the audience for a particular access token and what data it is 131 entitled to receive, otherwise the RS is not authorized to obtain 132 data for the access token. The AS has the discretion how to fulfil 133 this requirement. The AS could, for example, maintain a mapping 134 between scope values and resource servers. 136 The requirements given above imply that the authorization server 137 maintains credentials and other configuration data for each RS. 139 One way is by utilizing dynamic client registration [RFC7591] and 140 treating every RS as an OAuth client. In this case, the 141 authorization server is assumed to at least maintain a "client_id" 142 and a "token_endpoint_auth_method" with complementary authentication 143 method metadata, such as "jwks" or "client_secret". In cases where 144 the AS needs to acquire consent to transmit data to a RS, the 145 following client metadata fields are recommended: "client_name", 146 "client_uri", "contacts", "tos_uri", "policy_uri". 148 The AS MUST restrict the use of client credentials by a RS to the 149 calls it requires, e.g. the AS MAY restrict such a client to call the 150 token introspection endpoint only. How the AS implements this 151 restriction is beyond the scope of this specification. 153 This specification further introduces client metadata to manage the 154 configuration options required to sign and encrypt token 155 introspection response JWTs. 157 4. Requesting a JWT Response 159 A resource server requests a JWT introspection response by sending an 160 introspection request with an "Accept" HTTP header field set to 161 "application/token-introspection+jwt". 163 The AS MUST authenticate the caller at the token introspection 164 endpoint. Authentication can utilize client authentication methods 165 or a separate access token issued to the resource server and 166 identifying it as subject. 168 The following is a non-normative example request, with the resource 169 server authenticating with a private key JWT: 171 POST /introspect HTTP/1.1 172 Host: as.example.com 173 Accept: application/token-introspection+jwt 174 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded 176 token=2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA& 177 client_assertion_type= 178 urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Aclient-assertion-type%3Ajwt-bearer& 179 client_assertion=PHNhbWxwOl[...omitted for brevity...]ZT 181 5. JWT Response 183 The introspection endpoint responds with a JWT, setting the "Content- 184 Type" HTTP header field to "application/token-introspection+jwt" and 185 the JWT "typ" ("type") header parameter to "token-introspection+jwt". 187 The JWT MUST include the following top-level claims: 189 iss MUST be set to the issuer URL of the authorization server. 191 aud MUST identify the resource server receiving the token 192 introspection response. 194 iat MUST be set to the time when the introspection response was 195 created by the authorization server. 197 token_introspection A JSON object containing the members of the 198 token introspection response as specified in [RFC7662], 199 section 2.2. The separation of the introspection response 200 members into a dedicated containing JWT claim is intended to 201 prevent conflict and confusion with top-level JWT claims that 202 may bear the same name. 204 If the access token is invalid, expired, revoked, or not 205 intended for the calling resource server (audience), the 206 authorization server MUST set the value of the "active" 207 member in the "token_introspection" claim to "false" and MUST 208 NOT include other members. Otherwise, the "active" member is 209 set to "true". 211 The AS SHOULD narrow down the "scope" value to the scopes 212 relevant to the particular RS. 214 As specified in section 2.2 of [RFC7662], implementations MAY 215 extend the token introspection response with service-specific 216 claims. In the context of this specification, such claims 217 will be added as top-level members of the 218 "token_introspection" claim. 220 Token introspection response parameter names intended to be 221 used across domains MUST be registered in the OAuth Token 222 Introspection Response registry 223 [IANA.OAuth.Token.Introspection] defined by [RFC7662]. 225 When the AS acts as a provider of resource owner identity 226 claims to the RS, the AS determines based on its RS-specific 227 policy what identity claims to return in the token 228 introspection response. The AS MUST ensure the release of 229 any privacy-sensitive data is legally based (see Section 9). 231 Further content of the introspection response is determined 232 by the RS-specific policy at the AS. 234 The JWT MAY include other claims, including those from the "JSON Web 235 Token Claims" registry established by [RFC7519]. The JWT SHOULD NOT 236 include the "sub" and "exp" claims, as an additional prevention 237 against misuse of the JWT as an access token (see Section 8.1). 239 Note: Although the JWT format is widely used as an access token 240 format, the JWT returned in the introspection response is not an 241 alternative representation of the introspected access token and is 242 not intended to be used as an access token. 244 This specification registers the "application/token- 245 introspection+jwt" media type, which is used as value of the "typ" 246 ("type") header parameter of the JWT to indicate that the payload is 247 a token introspection response. 249 The JWT is cryptographically secured as specified in [RFC7519]. 251 Depending on the specific resource server policy the JWT is either 252 signed, or signed and encrypted. If the JWT is signed and encrypted 253 it MUST be a Nested JWT, as defined in JWT [RFC7519]. 255 Note: An AS compliant with this specification MUST refuse to serve 256 introspection requests that don't authenticate the caller, and return 257 an HTTP status code 400. This is done to ensure token data is 258 released to legitimate recipients only and prevent downgrading to 259 [RFC7662] behavior (see Section 8.2). 261 The following is a non-normative example response (with line breaks 262 for display purposes only): 264 HTTP/1.1 200 OK 265 Content-Type: application/token-introspection+jwt 267 eyJraWQiOiJ3RzZEIiwidHlwIjoidG9rZW4taW50cm9zcGVjdGlvbitqd3QiLCJhbGc 268 iOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2FzLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tLyIsImF1ZCI6I 269 mh0dHBzOi8vcnMuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vcmVzb3VyY2UiLCJpYXQiOjE1MTQ3OTc4OTIs 270 InRva2VuX2ludHJvc3BlY3Rpb24iOnsiYWN0aXZlIjp0cnVlLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczo 271 vL2FzLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tLyIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcnMuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vcm 272 Vzb3VyY2UiLCJpYXQiOjE1MTQ3OTc4MjIsImV4cCI6MTUxNDc5Nzk0MiwiY2xpZW50X 273 2lkIjoicGFpQjJnb28wYSIsInNjb3BlIjoicmVhZCB3cml0ZSBkb2xwaGluIiwic3Vi 274 IjoiWjVPM3VwUEM4OFFyQWp4MDBkaXMiLCJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiIxOTgyLTAyLTAxIiw 275 iZ2l2ZW5fbmFtZSI6IkpvaG4iLCJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSI6IkRvZSIsImp0aSI6InQxRm 276 9DQ2FaZDRYdjRPUkpVV1ZVZVRaZnNLaFczMENRQ3JXRERqd1h5NncifX0.przJMU5Gh 277 mNzvwtt1Sr-xa9xTkpiAg5IshbQsRiRVP_7eGR1GHYrNwQh84kxOkHCyje2g5WSRcYo 278 sGEVIiC-eoPJJ-qBwqwSlgx9JEeCDw2W5DjrblOI_N0Jvsq_dUeOyoWVMqlOydOBhKN 279 Y0smBrI4NZvEExucOm9WUJXMuJtvq1gBes-0go5j4TEv9sOP9uu81gqWTr_LOo6pgT0 280 tFFyZfWC4kbXPXiQ2YT6mxCiQRRNM-l9cBdF6Jx6IOrsfFhBuYdYQ_mlL19HgDDOFal 281 eyqmru6lKlASOsaE8dmLSeKcX91FbG79FKN8un24iwIDCbKT9xlUFl54xWVShNDFA 283 The example response JWT header contains the following JSON document: 285 { 286 "typ": "token-introspection+jwt", 287 "alg": "RS256", 288 "kid": "wG6D" 289 } 291 The example response JWT payload contains the following JSON 292 document: 294 { 295 "iss":"https://as.example.com/", 296 "aud":"https://rs.example.com/resource", 297 "iat":1514797892, 298 "token_introspection": 299 { 300 "active":true, 301 "iss":"https://as.example.com/", 302 "aud":"https://rs.example.com/resource", 303 "iat":1514797822, 304 "exp":1514797942, 305 "client_id":"paiB2goo0a", 306 "scope":"read write dolphin", 307 "sub":"Z5O3upPC88QrAjx00dis", 308 "birthdate":"1982-02-01", 309 "given_name":"John", 310 "family_name":"Doe", 311 "jti":"t1FoCCaZd4Xv4ORJUWVUeTZfsKhW30CQCrWDDjwXy6w" 312 } 313 } 315 6. Client Metadata 317 The authorization server determines the algorithm to secure the JWT 318 for a particular introspection response. This decision can be based 319 on registered metadata parameters for the resource server, supplied 320 via dynamic client registration [RFC7591] with the resource server 321 acting as a client, as specified below. 323 The parameter names follow the pattern established by OpenID Connect 324 Dynamic Client Registration [OpenID.Registration] for configuring 325 signing and encryption algorithms for JWT responses at the UserInfo 326 endpoint. 328 The following client metadata parameters are introduced by this 329 specification: 331 introspection_signed_response_alg OPTIONAL. JWS [RFC7515] algorithm 332 ("alg" value) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] for signing 333 introspection responses. If this is specified, the response 334 will be signed using JWS and the configured algorithm. The 335 default, if omitted, is "RS256". 337 introspection_encrypted_response_alg OPTIONAL. JWE [RFC7516] 338 algorithm ("alg" value) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] for 339 content key encryption. If this is specified, the response 340 will be encrypted using JWE and the configured content 341 encryption algorithm 342 ("introspection_encrypted_response_enc"). The default, if 343 omitted, is that no encryption is performed. If both signing 344 and encryption are requested, the response will be signed 345 then encrypted, with the result being a Nested JWT, as 346 defined in JWT [RFC7519]. 348 introspection_encrypted_response_enc OPTIONAL. JWE [RFC7516] 349 algorithm ("enc" value) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] for 350 content encryption of introspection responses. The default, 351 if omitted, is "A128CBC-HS256". Note: This parameter MUST 352 NOT be specified without setting 353 "introspection_encrypted_response_alg". 355 Resource servers may register their public encryption keys using the 356 "jwks_uri" or "jwks" metadata parameters. 358 7. Authorization Server Metadata 360 Authorization servers SHOULD publish the supported algorithms for 361 signing and encrypting the JWT of an introspection response by 362 utilizing OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] 363 parameters. Resource servers use this data to parametrize their 364 client registration requests. 366 The following parameters are introduced by this specification: 368 introspection_signing_alg_values_supported OPTIONAL. JSON array 369 containing a list of the JWS [RFC7515] signing algorithms 370 ("alg" values) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] supported by the 371 introspection endpoint to sign the response. 373 introspection_encryption_alg_values_supported OPTIONAL. JSON array 374 containing a list of the JWE [RFC7516] encryption algorithms 375 ("alg" values) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] supported by the 376 introspection endpoint to encrypt the content encryption key 377 for introspection responses (content key encryption). 379 introspection_encryption_enc_values_supported OPTIONAL. JSON array 380 containing a list of the JWE [RFC7516] encryption algorithms 381 ("enc" values) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] supported by the 382 introspection endpoint to encrypt the response (content 383 encryption). 385 8. Security Considerations 387 8.1. Cross-JWT Confusion 389 The "iss" and potentially the "aud" claim of a token introspection 390 JWT can resemble those of a JWT-encoded access token. An attacker 391 could try to exploit this and pass a JWT token introspection response 392 as an access token to the resource server. The "typ" ("type") JWT 393 header "token-introspection+jwt" and the encapsulation of the token 394 introspection members such as "sub" and "scope" in the 395 "token_introspection" claim is intended to prevent such substitution 396 attacks. Resource servers MUST therefore check the "typ" JWT header 397 value of received JWT-encoded access tokens and ensure all minimally 398 required claims for a valid access token are present. 400 Resource servers MUST additionally apply the countermeasures against 401 replay as described in [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics], section 3.2. 403 JWT Confusion and other attacks involving JWTs are discussed in 404 [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]. 406 8.2. Token Data Leakage 408 The authorization server MUST use Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2 409 (or higher) per BCP 195 [RFC7525] in order to prevent token data 410 leakage. 412 Section 2.1 of [RFC7662] permits requests to the introspection 413 endpoint to be authorized with an access token which doesn't identify 414 the caller. To prevent introspection of tokens by parties that are 415 not the intended consumer the authorization server MUST require all 416 requests to the token introspection endpoint to be authenticated. 418 9. Privacy Considerations 420 The token introspection response can be used to transfer personal 421 identifiable information (PII) from the AS to the RS. The AS MUST 422 conform to legal and jurisdictional constraints for the data transfer 423 before any data is released to a particular RS. The details and 424 determining of these constraints varies by jurisdiction and is 425 outside the scope of this document. 427 A commonly found way to establish the legal basis for releasing PII 428 is by explicit user consent gathered from the resource owner by the 429 AS during the authorization flow. 431 It is also possible that the legal basis is established out of band, 432 for example in an explicit contract or by the client gathering the 433 resource owner's consent. 435 If the AS and the RS belong to the same legal entity (1st party 436 scenario), there is potentially no need for an explicit user consent 437 but the terms of service and policy of the respective service 438 provider MUST be enforced at all times. 440 In any case, the AS MUST ensure that the scope of the legal basis is 441 enforced throughout the whole process. The AS MUST retain the scope 442 of the legal basis with the access token, e.g. in the scope value, it 443 MUST authenticate the RS, and the AS MUST determine the data a 444 resource server is allowed to receive based on the resource server's 445 identity and suitable token data, e.g. the scope value. 447 Implementers should be aware that a token introspection request lets 448 the AS know when the client (and potentially the user) is accessing 449 the RS, which is also an indication of when the user is using the 450 client. If this implication is not acceptable, implementers MUST use 451 other means to relay access token data, for example by directly 452 transferring the data needed by the RS within the access token. 454 10. Acknowledgements 456 We would like to thank Petteri Stenius, Neil Madden, Filip Skokan, 457 Tony Nadalin, Remco Schaar, Justin Richer, Takahiko Kawasaki, 458 Benjamin Kaduk, Robert Wilton and Roman Danyliw for their valuable 459 feedback. 461 11. IANA Considerations 463 11.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration 465 This specification requests registration of the following client 466 metadata definitions in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration 467 Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591]: 469 11.1.1. Registry Contents 471 * Client Metadata Name: "introspection_signed_response_alg" 473 * Client Metadata Description: String value indicating the client's 474 desired introspection response signing algorithm. 476 * Change Controller: IESG 478 * Specification Document(s): Section 6 of [[ this specification ]] 480 * Client Metadata Name: "introspection_encrypted_response_alg" 482 * Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the desired 483 introspection response content key encryption algorithm (alg 484 value). 486 * Change Controller: IESG 488 * Specification Document(s): Section 6 of [[ this specification ]] 490 * Client Metadata Name: "introspection_encrypted_response_enc" 492 * Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the desired 493 introspection response content encryption algorithm (enc value). 495 * Change Controller: IESG 497 * Specification Document(s): Section 6 of [[ this specification ]] 499 11.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration 501 This specification requests registration of the following values in 502 the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry 503 [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC8414]. 505 11.2.1. Registry Contents 507 * Metadata Name: "introspection_signing_alg_values_supported" 509 * Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms 510 supported by the authorization server for introspection response 511 signing. 513 * Change Controller: IESG 515 * Specification Document(s): Section 7 of [[ this specification ]] 517 * Metadata Name: "introspection_encryption_alg_values_supported" 519 * Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms 520 supported by the authorization server for introspection response 521 content key encryption (alg value). 523 * Change Controller: IESG 524 * Specification Document(s): Section 7 of [[ this specification ]] 526 * Metadata Name: "introspection_encryption_enc_values_supported" 528 * Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms 529 supported by the authorization server for introspection response 530 content encryption (enc value). 532 * Change Controller: IESG 534 * Specification Document(s): Section 7 of [[ this specification ]] 536 11.3. Media Type Registration 538 This section registers the "application/token-introspection+jwt" 539 media type in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the 540 manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the 541 content is a token introspection response in JWT format. 543 11.3.1. Registry Contents 545 * Type name: application 547 * Subtype name: token-introspection+jwt 549 * Required parameters: N/A 551 * Optional parameters: N/A 553 * Encoding considerations: binary; A token introspection response is 554 a JWT; JWT values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded 555 values (with trailing '=' characters removed), some of which may 556 be the empty string, separated by period ('.') characters. 558 * Security considerations: See Section 7 of this specification 560 * Interoperability considerations: N/A 562 * Published specification: Section 4 of this specification 564 * Applications that use this media type: Applications that produce 565 and consume OAuth Token Introspection Responses in JWT format 567 * Fragment identifier considerations: N/A 569 * Additional information: 571 - Magic number(s): N/A 572 - File extension(s): N/A 574 - Macintosh file type code(s): N/A 576 * Person & email address to contact for further information: Torsten 577 Lodderstedt, torsten@lodderstedt.net 579 * Intended usage: COMMON 581 * Restrictions on usage: none 583 * Author: Torsten Lodderstedt, torsten@lodderstedt.net 585 * Change controller: IESG 587 * Provisional registration? No 589 11.4. JWT Claim Registration 591 This section registers the "token_introspection" claim in the JSON 592 Web Token (JWT) IANA registry [IANA.JWT] in the manner described in 593 [RFC7519]. 595 11.4.1. Registry Contents 597 * Claim name: token_introspection 599 * Claim description: Token introspection response 601 * Change Controller: IESG 603 * Specification Document(s): Section 5 of [[this specification]] 605 12. References 607 12.1. Normative References 609 [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp] 610 Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best 611 Current Practices", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, 612 draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-06, 7 June 2019, 613 . 616 [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] 617 Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett, 618 "OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in 619 Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security- 620 topics-13, 8 July 2019, . 623 [IANA.JWT] IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT) claims registry", 624 . 626 [IANA.MediaTypes] 627 IANA, "Media Types", 628 . 630 [IANA.OAuth.Token.Introspection] 631 IANA, "OAuth Token Introspection Response registry", 632 . 635 [OpenID.Registration] 636 Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect 637 Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set 638 1", 8 November 2014, . 641 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 642 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 643 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 644 . 646 [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type 647 Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, 648 RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, 649 . 651 [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web 652 Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 653 2015, . 655 [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", 656 RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, 657 . 659 [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, 660 DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, 661 . 663 [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token 664 (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, 665 . 667 [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, 668 "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer 669 Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security 670 (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 671 2015, . 673 [RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and 674 P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol", 675 RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015, 676 . 678 [RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", 679 RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015, 680 . 682 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 683 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 684 May 2017, . 686 [RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 687 Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414, 688 DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018, 689 . 691 12.2. Informative References 693 [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] 694 IANA, "OAuth Parameters", 695 . 697 Appendix A. Document History 699 [[ To be removed from the final specification ]] 701 -12 703 * made registration of response parameters intended for cross domain 704 use a MUST ( in RFC 7662) 706 -11 708 * consistent normative language that the AS must authenticate all 709 callers to the token introspection endpoint when complying with 710 this specification 712 * removes text that claims from the JSON Web Token Claims registry 713 may be included in the token_introspection claim 715 * updates the privacy considerations section 717 * fixes the example BASE64URL encoded JWT payload 719 -10 721 * added requirement to authenticate RS if privacy sensitive data is 722 released 724 * reworked text on claims from different registries 726 * added forward reference to privacy considerations to section 5 728 * added text in privacy considerations regarding client/user 729 tracking 731 -09 733 * changes the Accept and Content-Type HTTP headers from 734 "application/json" to "application/token-introspection+jwt" so 735 they match the registered media type 737 * moves the token introspection response members into a JSON object 738 claim named "token_introspection" to provide isolation from the 739 top-level JWT-specific claims 741 * "iss", "aud" and "iat" MUST be present as top-level JWT claims 743 * the "sub" and "exp" claims SHOULD NOT be used as top-level JWT 744 claims as additional prevention against JWT access token 745 substitution attacks 747 -08 749 * made difference between introspected access token and 750 introspection response clearer 752 * defined semantics of JWT claims overlapping between introspected 753 access token and introspection response as JWT 755 * added section about RS management 757 * added text about user claims including a privacy considerations 758 section 760 * removed registration of OpenID Connect claims to "Token 761 Introspection Response" registry and refer to "JWT Claims" 762 registry instead 764 * added registration of "application/token-introspection+jwt" media 765 type as type identifier of token introspection responses in JWT 766 format 768 * more changed to incorporate IESG review feedback 770 -07 772 * fixed wrong description of "locale" 774 * added references for ISO and ITU specifications 776 -06 778 * replaced reference to RFC 7159 with reference to RFC 8259 780 -05 782 * improved wording for TLS requirement 784 * added RFC 2119 boilerplate 786 * fixed and updated some references 788 -04 790 * reworked definition of parameters in section 4 792 * added text on data minimization to security considerations section 794 * added statement regarding TLS to security considerations section 796 -03 798 * added registration for OpenID Connect Standard Claims to OAuth 799 Token Introspection Response registry 801 -02 803 * updated references 805 -01 806 * adapted wording to preclude any accept header except "application/ 807 jwt" if encrypted responses are required 809 * use registered alg value RS256 for default signing algorithm 811 * added text on claims in the token introspection response 813 -00 815 * initial version of the WG draft 817 * defined default signing algorithm 819 * changed behavior in case resource server is set up for encryption 821 * Added text on token data leakage prevention to the security 822 considerations 824 * moved Security Considerations section forward 826 WG draft 828 -01 830 * fixed typos in client meta data field names 832 * added OAuth Server Metadata parameters to publish algorithms 833 supported for signing and encrypting the introspection response 835 * added registration of new parameters for OAuth Server Metadata and 836 Client Registration 838 * added explicit request for JWT introspection response 840 * made iss and aud claims mandatory in introspection response 842 * Stylistic and clarifying edits, updates references 844 -00 846 * initial version 848 Authors' Addresses 850 Torsten Lodderstedt (editor) 851 yes.com AG 853 Email: torsten@lodderstedt.net 854 Vladimir Dzhuvinov 855 Connect2id Ltd. 857 Email: vladimir@connect2id.com