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2 I2NSF Working Group J. Jeong
3 Internet-Draft Sungkyunkwan University
4 Intended status: Informational S. Hyun
5 Expires: March 18, 2020 Myongji University
6 T. Ahn
7 Korea Telecom
8 S. Hares
9 Huawei
10 D. Lopez
11 Telefonica I+D
12 September 15, 2019
14 Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network-
15 Based Security Services
16 draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-18
18 Abstract
20 This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network
21 Security Functions (I2NSF) to network-based security services in
22 Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as
23 firewall, deep packet inspection, or attack mitigation engines.
25 Status of This Memo
27 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
28 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
30 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
31 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
32 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
33 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
35 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
36 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
37 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
38 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
40 This Internet-Draft will expire on March 18, 2020.
42 Copyright Notice
44 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
45 document authors. All rights reserved.
47 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
48 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
49 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
50 publication of this document. Please review these documents
51 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
52 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
53 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
54 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
55 described in the Simplified BSD License.
57 Table of Contents
59 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
60 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
61 3. I2NSF Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
62 4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service . . . . . . . . . . 8
63 5. Intent-based Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
64 6. I2NSF Framework with SFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
65 7. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
66 7.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 19
67 7.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security
68 System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
69 7.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation
70 System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
71 8. I2NSF Framework with NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
72 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
73 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
74 11. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
75 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
76 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
77 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
78 Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-17 . . . 28
79 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
81 1. Introduction
83 Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defines a framework
84 and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions
85 (NSFs). Note that an NSF is defined as software that provides a set
86 of security-related services, such as (i) detecting unwanted
87 activity, (ii) blocking or mitigating the effect of such unwanted
88 activity in order to fulfill service requirements, and (iii)
89 supporting communication stream integrity and confidentiality
90 [i2nsf-terminology].
92 The I2NSF framework allows heterogeneous NSFs developed by different
93 security solution vendors to be used in the Network Functions
94 Virtualization (NFV) environment [ETSI-NFV] by utilizing the
95 capabilities of such NSFs through I2NSF interfaces such as Customer-
96 Facing Interface [consumer-facing-inf-dm] and NSF-Facing Interface
98 [nsf-facing-inf-dm]. In the I2NSF framework, each NSF initially
99 registers the profile of its own capabilities with the Security
100 Controller (i.e., network operator management system [RFC8329]) of
101 the I2NSF system via the Registration Interface
102 [registration-inf-dm]. This registration enables an I2NSF User
103 (i.e., network security administrator) to select and use the NSF to
104 enforce a given security policy. Note that Developer's Management
105 System (DMS) is management software that provides a vendor's security
106 service software as a Virtual Network Function (VNF) in an NFV
107 environment (or middlebox in the legacy network) as an NSF, and
108 registers the capabilities of an NSF into Security Controller via
109 Registration Interface for a security service [RFC8329].
111 Security Controller maintains the mapping between a capability and an
112 NSF, so it can perform to translate a high-level security policy
113 received from I2NSF User to a low-level security policy configured
114 and enforced in an NSF [policy-translation]. Security Controller can
115 monitor the states and security attacks in NSFs through NSF
116 monitoring [nsf-monitoring-dm].
118 This document illustrates the applicability of the I2NSF framework
119 with five different scenarios:
121 1. The enforcement of time-dependent web access control.
123 2. The support of intent-based security services through I2NSF and
124 Security Policy Translator [policy-translation].
126 3. The application of I2NSF to a Service Function Chaining (SFC)
127 environment [RFC7665].
129 4. The integration of the I2NSF framework with Software-Defined
130 Networking (SDN) [RFC7149] to provide different security
131 functionality such as firewalls [opsawg-firewalls], Deep Packet
132 Inspection (DPI), and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack
133 mitigation.
135 5. The use of Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) [ETSI-NFV] as a
136 supporting technology.
138 The implementation of I2NSF in these scenarios has allowed us to
139 verify the applicability and effectiveness of the I2NSF framework for
140 a variety of use cases.
142 2. Terminology
144 This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7665], [RFC7149],
145 [ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-SDN-Architecture], [ITU-T.X.800],
146 [NFV-Terminology], [RFC8329], and [i2nsf-terminology]. In addition,
147 the following terms are defined below:
149 o Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator
150 that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into
151 network resources for efficient DDoS-attack mitigation.
153 o Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can
154 establish and distribute policy rules into network resources for
155 efficient firewall management.
157 o Centralized VoIP Security System: A centralized security system
158 that handles the security functions required for VoIP and VoLTE
159 services.
161 o Firewall: A service function at the junction of two network
162 segments that inspects some suspicious packets that attempt to
163 cross the boundary. It also rejects any packet that does not
164 satisfy certain criteria for, for example, disallowed port numbers
165 or IP addresses.
167 o Network Function: A functional block within a network
168 infrastructure that has well-defined external interfaces and well-
169 defined functional behavior [NFV-Terminology].
171 o Network Functions Virtualization (NFV): A principle of separating
172 network functions (or network security functions) from the
173 hardware they run on by using virtual hardware abstraction
174 [NFV-Terminology].
176 o Network Security Function (NSF): Software that provides a set of
177 security-related services. Examples include detecting unwanted
178 activity and blocking or mitigating the effect of such unwanted
179 activity in order to fulfill service requirements. The NSF can
180 also help in supporting communication stream integrity and
181 confidentiality [i2nsf-terminology].
183 o Security Policy Translator (SPT): Software that translates a high-
184 level security policy for the Consumer-Facing Interface into a
185 low-level security policy for the NSF-Facing Interface
186 [policy-translation]. The SPT is a core part of the Security
187 Controller in the I2NSF system.
189 o Service Function Chaining (SFC): The execution of an ordered set
190 of abstract service functions (i.e., network functions) according
191 to ordering constraints that must be applied to packets, frames,
192 and flows selected as a result of classification. The implied
193 order may not be a linear progression as the architecture allows
194 for SFCs that copy to more than one branch, and also allows for
195 cases where there is flexibility in the order in which service
196 functions need to be applied [RFC7665].
198 o Software-Defined Networking (SDN): A set of techniques that
199 enables to directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage
200 network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and
201 operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner
202 [ITU-T.Y.3300].
204 +------------+
205 | I2NSF User |
206 +------------+
207 ^
208 | Consumer-Facing Interface
209 v
210 +-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+
211 |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System|
212 +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+
213 ^
214 | NSF-Facing Interface
215 v
216 +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
217 | NSF-1 |-| NSF-2 |...| NSF-n |
218 | (Firewall) | | (Web Filter) | |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)|
219 +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
221 Figure 1: I2NSF Framework
223 3. I2NSF Framework
225 This section summarizes the I2NSF framework as defined in [RFC8329].
226 As shown in Figure 1, an I2NSF User can use security functions by
227 delivering high-level security policies, which specify security
228 requirements that the I2NSF user wants to enforce, to the Security
229 Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface (CFI)
230 [consumer-facing-inf-dm].
232 The Security Controller receives and analyzes the high-level security
233 policies from an I2NSF User, and identifies what types of security
234 capabilities are required to meet these high-level security policies.
235 The Security Controller then identifies NSFs that have the required
236 security capabilities, and generates low-level security policies for
237 each of the NSFs so that the high-level security policies are
238 eventually enforced by those NSFs [policy-translation]. Finally, the
239 Security Controller sends the generated low-level security policies
240 to the NSFs via the NSF-Facing Interface (NFI) [nsf-facing-inf-dm].
242 As shown in Figure 1, with a Developer's Management System (called
243 DMS), developers (or vendors) inform the Security Controller of the
244 capabilities of the NSFs through the Registration Interface (RI)
245 [registration-inf-dm] for registering (or deregistering) the
246 corresponding NSFs. Note that the lifecycle management of NSF code
247 from DMS (e.g., downloading of NSF modules and testing of NSF code)
248 is out of scope for I2NSF.
250 The Consumer-Facing Interface can be implemented with the Consumer-
251 Facing Interface YANG data model [consumer-facing-inf-dm] using
252 RESTCONF [RFC8040] which befits a web-based user interface for an
253 I2NSF User to send a Security Controller a high-level security
254 policy. Data models specified by YANG [RFC6020] describe high-level
255 security policies to be specified by an I2NSF User. The data model
256 defined in [consumer-facing-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF
257 Consumer-Facing Interface. Note that an inside attacker at the I2NSF
258 User can misuse the I2NSF system so that the network system under the
259 I2NSF system is vulnerable to security attacks. To handle this type
260 of threat, the Security Controller needs to monitor the activities of
261 all the I2NSF Users as well as the NSFs through the I2NSF NSF
262 monitoring functionality [nsf-monitoring-dm]. Note that the
263 monitoring of the I2NSF Users is out of scope for I2NSF.
265 The NSF-Facing Interface can be implemented with the NSF-Facing
266 Interface YANG data model [nsf-facing-inf-dm] using NETCONF [RFC6241]
267 which befits a command-line-based remote-procedure call for a
268 Security Controller to configure an NSF with a low-level security
269 policy. Data models specified by YANG [RFC6020] describe low-level
270 security policies for the sake of NSFs, which are translated from the
271 high-level security policies by the Security Controller. The data
272 model defined in [nsf-facing-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF NSF-
273 Facing Interface.
275 The Registration Interface can be implemented with the Registration
276 Interface YANG data model [registration-inf-dm] using NETCONF
277 [RFC6241] which befits a command-line-based remote-procedure call for
278 a DMS to send a Security Controller an NSF's capability information.
279 Data models specified by YANG [RFC6020] describe the registration of
280 an NSF's capabilities to enforce security services at the NSF. The
281 data model defined in [registration-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF
282 Registration Interface.
284 The I2NSF framework can chain multiple NSFs to implement low-level
285 security policies with the SFC architecture [RFC7665].
287 The following sections describe different security service scenarios
288 illustrating the applicability of the I2NSF framework.
290
291
292 block_website
293
294 block_website_during_working_hours
295
296
297 09:00
298 18:00
299
300
301
302
303
304 Staff_Members'_PCs
305
306
307
308
309 SNS_Websites
310
311
312
313
314 drop
315
316
317
319 Figure 2: A High-level Security Policy XML File for Time-based Web
320 Filter
322
323
325
326 block_website
327
328 block_website_during_working_hours
329
330
331 09:00
332 18:00
333
334
335
336
337
338
339 2001:DB8:10:1::10
340 2001:DB8:10:1::20
341 2001:DB8:10:1::30
342
343
344
345
346 example1.com
347 example2.com
348 example3.com
349 example4.com
350
351
352
353
354 drop
355
356
357
358
359
361 Figure 3: A Low-level Security Policy XML File for Time-based Web
362 Filter
364 4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service
366 This service scenario assumes that an enterprise network
367 administrator wants to control the staff members' access to a
368 particular Internet service (e.g., social networking service (SNS))
369 during business hours. The following is an example high-level
370 security policy rule for a web filter that the administrator
371 requests: Block the staff members' access to SNS websites from 9 AM
372 (i.e., 09:00) to 6 PM (i.e., 18:00) by dropping their packets.
373 Figure 2 is a high-level security policy XML code for the web filter
374 that is sent from the I2NSF User to the Security Controller via the
375 Consumer-Facing Interface [consumer-facing-inf-dm].
377 The security policy name is "block_website" with the tag "policy-
378 name", and the security policy rule name is
379 "block_website_during_working_hours" with the tag "rule-name". The
380 filtering event has the time span where the filtering begin time is
381 the time "09:00" (i.e., 9:00AM) with the tag "begin-time", and the
382 filtering end time is the time "18:00" (i.e., 6:00PM) with the tag
383 "end-time". The filtering condition has the source target of
384 "Staff_Members'_PCs" with the tag "src-target", and the destination
385 target of "SNS_Websites" with the tag "dest-target".
387 Assume that "Staff_Members'_PCs" are 2001:DB8:10:1::10,
388 2001:DB8:10:1::20, and 2001:DB8:10:1::30, and that "SNS_Websites" are
389 example1.com, example2.com, example3.com, and example4.com, as shown
390 in Figure 3. Note that Figure 3 is a low-level security policy XML
391 code for the web filter that is sent from the Security Controller to
392 an NSF via the NSF-Facing Interface [nsf-facing-inf-dm].
394 The source target can by translated by the Security Policy Translator
395 (SPT) in the Security Controller to the IP addresses of computers (or
396 mobile devices) used by the staff members. Refer to Section 5 for
397 the detailed description of the SPT. The destination target can also
398 be translated by the SPT to the actual websites corresponding to the
399 symbolic website name "SNS_Websites", and then either each website's
400 URL or the corresponding IP address(es) can be used by both firewall
401 and web filter. The action is to "drop" the packets satisfying the
402 above event and condition with the tag "primary-action".
404 After receiving the high-level security policy, the Security
405 Controller identifies required security capabilities, e.g., IP
406 address and port number inspection capabilities and URL inspection
407 capability. In this scenario, it is assumed that the IP address and
408 port number inspection capabilities are required to check whether a
409 received packet is an HTTP-session packet from a staff member, which
410 is part of an HTTP session generated by the staff member. The URL
411 inspection capability is required to check whether the target URL of
412 a received packet is one of the target websites (i.e., example1.com,
413 example2.com, example3.com, and example4.com) or not.
415 The Security Controller maintains the security capabilities of each
416 active NSF in the I2NSF system, which have been reported by the
417 Developer's Management System via the Registration interface. Based
418 on this information, the Security Controller identifies NSFs that can
419 perform the IP address and port number inspection and URL inspection
420 through the security policy translation in Section 5. In this
421 scenario, it is assumed that a firewall NSF has the IP address and
422 port number inspection capabilities and a web filter NSF has URL
423 inspection capability.
425 The Security Controller generates a low-level security policy for the
426 NSFs to perform IP address and port number inspection, URL
427 inspection, and time checking, which is shown in Figure 3.
428 Specifically, the Security Controller may interoperate with an access
429 control server in the enterprise network in order to retrieve the
430 information (e.g., IP address in use, company identifier (ID), and
431 role) of each employee that is currently using the network. Based on
432 the retrieved information, the Security Controller generates a low-
433 level security policy to check whether the source IP address of a
434 received packet matches any one being used by a staff member.
436 In addition, the low-level security policy's rule (shortly, low-level
437 security rule) should be able to determine that a received packet
438 uses either the HTTP protocol without Transport Layer Security (TLS)
439 [RFC8446] or the HTTP protocol with TLS as HTTPS. The low-level
440 security rule for web filter checks that the target URL field of a
441 received packet is equal to one of the target SNS websites (i.e.,
442 example1.com, example2.com, example3.com, and example4.com), or that
443 the destination IP address of a received packet is an IP address
444 corresponding to one of the SNS websites. Note that if HTTPS is used
445 for an HTTP-session packet, the HTTP protocol header is encrypted, so
446 the URL information may not be seen from the packet for the web
447 filtering. Thus, the IP address(es) corresponding to the target URL
448 needs to be obtained from the certificate in TLS versions prior to
449 1.3 [RFC8446] or the Server Name Indication (SNI) in a TCP-session
450 packet in TLS versions without the encrypted SNI [tls-esni]. Also,
451 to obtain IP address(es) corresponding to a target URL, the DNS name
452 resolution process can be observed through a packet capturing tool
453 because the DNS name resolution will translate the target URL into IP
454 address(es). The IP addresses obtained through either TLS or DNS can
455 be used by both firewall and web filter for whitelisting or
456 blacklisting the TCP five-tuples of HTTP sessions.
458 Finally, the Security Controller sends the low-level security policy
459 of the IP address and port number inspection to the firewall NSF and
460 the low-level security policy for URL inspection to the web filter
461 NSF.
463 The following describes how the time-dependent web access control
464 service is enforced by the NSFs of firewall and web filter.
466 1. A staff member tries to access one of the target SNS websites
467 (i.e., example1.com, example2.com, example3.com, and
468 example4.com) during business hours, e.g., 10 AM.
470 2. The packet is forwarded from the staff member's device to the
471 firewall, and the firewall checks the source IP address and port
472 number. Now the firewall identifies the received packet is an
473 HTTP-session packet from the staff member.
475 3. The firewall triggers the web filter to further inspect the
476 packet, and the packet is forwarded from the firewall to the web
477 filter. The SFC architecture [RFC7665] can be utilized to
478 support such packet forwarding in the I2NSF framework.
480 4. The web filter checks the received packet's target URL field or
481 its destination IP address corresponding to the target URL, and
482 detects that the packet is being sent to the server for
483 example1.com. The web filter then checks that the current time
484 is within business hours. If so, the web filter drops the
485 packet, and consequently the staff member's access to one of the
486 SNS websites (i.e., example1.com, example2.com, example3.com, and
487 example4.com) during business hours is blocked.
489 +------------------------+-------------------------+
490 | |
491 | I2NSF User |
492 | |
493 +------------------------+-------------------------+
494 | Consumer-Facing Interface
495 |
496 High-level Security Policy
497 Security |
498 Controller V
499 +------------------------+-------------------------+
500 | Security Policy | |
501 | Translator | |
502 | +---------------------+----------------------+ |
503 | | | | |
504 | | +-------+--------+ | |
505 | | | Data Extractor | | |
506 | | +-------+--------+ | |
507 | | | Extracted Data from | |
508 | | V High-level Policy | |
509 | | +-------+--------+ +------+ | |
510 | | | Data Converter |<-->|NSF DB| | |
511 | | +-------+--------+ +------+ | |
512 | | | Required Data for | |
513 | | V Target NSFs | |
514 | | +-------+--------+ | |
515 | | |Policy Generator| | |
516 | | +-------+--------+ | |
517 | | | | |
518 | +---------------------+----------------------+ |
519 | | |
520 +------------------------+-------------------------+
521 | NSF-Facing Interface
522 |
523 Low-level Security Policy
524 |
525 V
526 +------------------------+-------------------------+
527 | |
528 | NSF(s) |
529 | |
530 +------------------------+-------------------------+
532 Figure 4: Security Policy Translation and Enforcement in I2NSF System
534 5. Intent-based Security Services
536 I2NSF aims at providing intent-based security services to configure
537 specific security policies into NSFs with customer-friendly secuirty
538 policies at a high level. For example, when an I2NSF User submits a
539 high-level security policy (e.g., web filtering as shown in Figure 2)
540 to the Security Controller, the Security Policy Tranlator (SPT) in
541 the Security Controller will translate it into the correspondong low-
542 level security policy as shown in Figure 3 [policy-translation]. A
543 security administrator using the I2NSF User can describe a security
544 policy without the knowledge of the detailed information about
545 subjects (e.g., source and destination) and objects (e.g., web
546 traffic) of the security policy's rule(s).
548 Figure 4 shows the security policy translation and enforcement in the
549 I2NSF system [policy-translation]. As shown in Figure 4, an I2NSF
550 User delivers a high-level security policy to the Security Controller
551 using the Consumer-Facing Interface (denoted as CFI). The high-level
552 security policy is translated by the SPT in the Security Controller
553 into the corresponding low-level security policy which is
554 understandable by target NSF(s). The Security Controller delivers
555 the low-level security policy to the appropriate NSF(s) to enforce
556 the policy's rules.
558 The SPT consists of three modules for security policy translations
559 such as Data Extractor, Data Converter, and Policy Generator, as
560 shown in Figure 4. The Data Extractor extracts data from a high-
561 level security policy delivered by the I2NSF User. The data
562 correspond to the leaf nodes in the YANG data model for the Consumer-
563 Facing Interface. In the high-level policy in Figure 2, the data are
564 the tag values of policy-name, rule-name, begin-time, end-time, src-
565 target, dest-target, and primary-action. That is, the tag values are
566 "block_website", "block_website_during_working_hours", "09:00",
567 "18:00", "Staff_Members'_PCs", "SNS_Websites", and "drop."
569 The Data Converter converts the extracted high-level policy data
570 received from the Data Extractor into the corresponding low-level
571 policy data. The low-level policy data have the capability
572 information of NSFs to be selected as target NSFs for the required
573 security service enforcement specified by the high-level security
574 policy. The tag values in the extracted high-level policy data are
575 replaced with the tag values in the low-level policy data, which are
576 the leaf nodes of the YANG data model for the NSF-Facing Interface
577 (denoted as NFI). The value of each leaf node in CFI is translated
578 into the value of the corresponding leaf node in NFI. For example,
579 "block_website" of policy-name in CFI (in Figure 2) is translated
580 into "block_website" of system-policy-name in NFI (in Figure 3). The
581 tag values of rule-name, begin-time, end-time, and primary-action in
582 CFI are mapped into the same values of rule-name, begin-time, end-
583 time, and egress-action in NFI. However, the tag values of src-
584 target and dest-target in CFI are translated into IP addresses and
585 URLs, respectively, for the sake of NFI. That is,
586 "Staff_Members'_PCs" of CFI is translated into three IPv6 addresses
587 such as "2001:DB8:10:1::10", "2001:DB8:10:1::20", and
588 "2001:DB8:10:1::30" for the sake of NFI. Also, "SNS_Websites" of CFI
589 is translated into four URLs such as "example1.com", "example2.com",
590 "example3.com", and "example4.com" for the sake of NFI. In addition
591 to the data conversion, the Data Converter searches for appropriate
592 NSFs having capabilities corresponding to the leaf nodes of the YANG
593 data model for NFI. For the data conversion and NSF search, an NSF
594 database (denoted as NSF DB) can be consulted, as shown in Figure 4,
595 because the NSF DB has the capability information of NSFs that the
596 DMS(s) registered with the Security Controller using the Registration
597 Interface.
599 The Policy Generator generates a low-level security policy
600 corresponding to the low-level policy data made by the Data Converter
601 per a target NSF. That is, the Policy Generator can build such a
602 low-level security policy XML file like Figure 3 with the NSF DB
603 because the NSF DB has the mapping information between the CFI YANG
604 data model and the NFI YANG data model.
606 Therefore, by allowing the I2NSF User to express its security policy
607 without knowing the detailed information of entities for security
608 policies, the I2NSF can efficiently support the intent-based security
609 services with the help of the security policy translator along with
610 the NSF DB.
612 +------------+
613 | I2NSF User |
614 +------------+
615 ^
616 | Consumer-Facing Interface
617 v
618 +-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+
619 |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System|
620 +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+
621 ^ ^
622 | | NSF-Facing Interface
623 | |-------------------------
624 | |
625 | NSF-Facing Interface |
626 +-----v-----------+ +------v-------+
627 | +-----------+ | ------>| NSF-1 |
628 | |Classifier | | | | (Firewall) |
629 | +-----------+ | | +--------------+
630 | +-----+ |<-----| +--------------+
631 | | SFF | | |----->| NSF-2 |
632 | +-----+ | | | (DPI) |
633 +-----------------+ | +--------------+
634 | .
635 | .
636 | .
637 | +-----------------------+
638 ------>| NSF-n |
639 |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)|
640 +-----------------------+
642 Figure 5: An I2NSF Framework with SFC
644 6. I2NSF Framework with SFC
646 In the I2NSF architecture, an NSF can trigger an advanced security
647 action (e.g., DPI or DDoS attack mitigation) on a packet based on the
648 result of its own security inspection of the packet. For example, a
649 firewall triggers further inspection of a suspicious packet with DPI.
650 For this advanced security action to be fulfilled, the suspicious
651 packet should be forwarded from the current NSF to the successor NSF.
652 SFC [RFC7665] is a technology that enables this advanced security
653 action by steering a packet with multiple service functions (e.g.,
654 NSFs), and this technology can be utilized by the I2NSF architecture
655 to support the advanced security action.
657 Figure 5 shows an I2NSF framework with the support of SFC. As shown
658 in the figure, SFC generally requires classifiers and service
659 function forwarders (SFFs); classifiers are responsible for
660 determining which service function path (SFP) (i.e., an ordered
661 sequence of service functions) a given packet should pass through,
662 according to pre-configured classification rules, and SFFs perform
663 forwarding the given packet to the next service function (e.g., NSF)
664 on the SFP of the packet by referring to their forwarding tables. In
665 the I2NSF architecture with SFC, the Security Controller can take
666 responsibilities of generating classification rules for classifiers
667 and forwarding tables for SFFs. By analyzing high-level security
668 policies from I2NSF users, the Security Controller can construct SFPs
669 that are required to meet the high-level security policies, generates
670 classification rules of the SFPs, and then configures classifiers
671 with the classification rules over NSF-Facing Interface so that
672 relevant traffic packets can follow the SFPs. Also, based on the
673 global view of NSF instances available in the system, the Security
674 Controller constructs forwarding tables, which are required for SFFs
675 to forward a given packet to the next NSF over the SFP, and
676 configures SFFs with those forwarding tables over NSF-Facing
677 Interface.
679 To trigger an advanced security action in the I2NSF architecture, the
680 current NSF appends metadata describing the security capability
681 required to the suspicious packet via a network service header (NSH)
682 [RFC8300]. It then sends the packet to the classifier. Based on the
683 metadata information, the classifier searches an SFP which includes
684 an NSF with the required security capability, changes the SFP-related
685 information (e.g., service path identifier and service index
686 [RFC8300]) of the packet with the new SFP that has been found, and
687 then forwards the packet to the SFF. When receiving the packet, the
688 SFF checks the SFP-related information such as the service path
689 identifier and service index contained in the packet and forwards the
690 packet to the next NSF on the SFP of the packet, according to its
691 forwarding table.
693 +------------+
694 | I2NSF User |
695 +------------+
696 ^
697 | Consumer-Facing Interface
698 v
699 +-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+
700 |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System|
701 +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+
702 ^ ^
703 | | NSF-Facing Interface
704 | v
705 | +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
706 | | NSF-1 |-| NSF-2 |...| NSF-n |
707 | | (Firewall) | | (DPI) | |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)|
708 | +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
709 |
710 |
711 | SDN Network
712 +--|----------------------------------------------------------------+
713 | V NSF-Facing Interface |
714 | +----------------+ |
715 | | SDN Controller | |
716 | +----------------+ |
717 | ^ |
718 | | SDN Southbound Interface |
719 | v |
720 | +--------+ +------------+ +--------+ +--------+ |
721 | |Switch-1|-| Switch-2 |-|Switch-3|.......|Switch-m| |
722 | | | |(Classifier)| | (SFF) | | | |
723 | +--------+ +------------+ +--------+ +--------+ |
724 +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
726 Figure 6: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network
728 7. I2NSF Framework with SDN
730 This section describes an I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF
731 applicability and use cases, such as firewall, deep packet
732 inspection, and DDoS-attack mitigation functions. SDN enables some
733 packet filtering rules to be enforced in network forwarding elements
734 (e.g., switch) by controlling their packet forwarding rules. By
735 taking advantage of this capability of SDN, it is possible to
736 optimize the process of security service enforcement in the I2NSF
737 system. For example, for efficient firewall services, simple packet
738 filtering can be performed by SDN forwarding elements (e.g.,
739 switches), and complicated packet filtering based on packet payloads
740 can be performed by a firewall NSF. This optimized firewall using
741 both SDN forwarding elements and a firewall NSF is more efficient
742 than a firewall where SDN forwarding elements forward all the packets
743 to a firewall NSF for packet filtering. This is because packets to
744 be filtered out can be early dropped by SDN forwarding elements
745 without consuming further network bandwidth due to the forwarding of
746 the packets to the firewall NSF.
748 Figure 6 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to
749 support network-based security services. In this system, the
750 enforcement of security policy rules is divided into the SDN
751 forwarding elements (e.g., a switch running as either a hardware
752 middle box or a software virtual switch) and NSFs (e.g., a firewall
753 running in a form of a VNF [ETSI-NFV]). Note that NSFs are created
754 or removed by the NFV Management and Orchestration (MANO)
755 [ETSI-NFV-MANO], performing the lifecycle management of NSFs as VNFs.
756 Refer to Section 8 for the detailed discussion of the NSF lifecycle
757 management in the NFV MANO for I2NSF. For security policy
758 enforcement (e.g., packet filtering), the Security Controller
759 instructs the SDN Controller via NSF-Facing Interface so that SDN
760 forwarding elements can perform the required security services with
761 flow tables under the supervision of the SDN Controller.
763 As an example, let us consider two different types of security rules:
764 Rule A is a simple packet filtering rule that checks only the IP
765 address and port number of a given packet, whereas rule B is a time-
766 consuming packet inspection rule for analyzing whether an attached
767 file being transmitted over a flow of packets contains malware. Rule
768 A can be translated into packet forwarding rules of SDN forwarding
769 elements and thus be enforced by these elements. In contrast, rule B
770 cannot be enforced by forwarding elements, but it has to be enforced
771 by NSFs with anti-malware capability. Specifically, a flow of
772 packets is forwarded to and reassembled by an NSF to reconstruct the
773 attached file stored in the flow of packets. The NSF then analyzes
774 the file to check the existence of malware. If the file contains
775 malware, the NSF drops the packets.
777 In an I2NSF framework with SDN, the Security Controller can analyze
778 given security policy rules and automatically determine which of the
779 given security policy rules should be enforced by SDN forwarding
780 elements and which should be enforced by NSFs. If some of the given
781 rules requires security capabilities that can be provided by SDN
782 forwarding elements, then the Security Controller instructs the SDN
783 Controller via NSF-Facing Interface so that SDN forwarding elements
784 can enforce those security policy rules with flow tables under the
785 supervision of the SDN Controller. Or if some rules require security
786 capabilities that cannot be provided by SDN forwarding elements but
787 by NSFs, then the Security Controller instructs relevant NSFs to
788 enforce those rules.
790 The distinction between software-based SDN forwarding elements and
791 NSFs, which can both run as VNFs, may be necessary for some
792 management purposes in this system. Note that an SDN forwarding
793 element (i.e., switch) is a specific type of VNF rather than an NSF
794 because an NSF is for security services rather than for packet
795 forwarding. For this distinction, we can take advantage of the NFV
796 MANO where there is a subsystem that maintains the descriptions of
797 the capabilities each VNF can offer [ETSI-NFV-MANO]. This subsystem
798 can determine whether a given software element (VNF instance) is an
799 NSF or a virtualized SDN switch. For example, if a VNF instance has
800 anti-malware capability according to the description of the VNF, it
801 could be considered as an NSF. A VNF onboarding system
802 [VNF-ONBOARDING] can be used as such a subsystem that maintains the
803 descriptions of each VNF to tell whether a VNF instance is for an NSF
804 or for a virtualized SDN switch.
806 For the support of SFC in the I2NSF framework with SDN, as shown in
807 Figure 6, network forwarding elements (e.g., switch) can play the
808 role of either SFC Classifier or SFF, which are explained in
809 Section 6. Classifier and SFF have an NSF-Facing Interface with
810 Security Controller. This interface is used to update security
811 service function chaining information for traffic flows. For
812 example, when it needs to update an SFP for a traffic flow in an SDN
813 network, as shown in Figure 6, SFF (denoted as Switch-3) asks
814 Security Controller to update the SFP for the traffic flow (needing
815 another security service as an NSF) via NSF-Facing Interface. This
816 update lets Security Controller ask Classifier (denoted as Switch-2)
817 to update the mapping between the traffic flow and SFP in Classifier
818 via NSF-Facing Interface.
820 The following subsections introduce three use cases from [RFC8192]
821 for cloud-based security services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep
822 packet inspection system, and (iii) attack mitigation system.
824 7.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System
826 A centralized network firewall can manage each network resource and
827 apply common rules to individual network elements (e.g., switch).
828 The centralized network firewall controls each forwarding element,
829 and firewall rules can be added or deleted dynamically.
831 A time-based firewall can be enforced with packet filtering rules and
832 a time span (e.g., work hours). With this time-based firewall, a
833 time-based security policy can be enforced, as explained in
834 Section 4. For example, employees at a company are allowed to access
835 social networking service websites during lunch time or after work
836 hours.
838 7.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System
840 A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE
841 flow and manage VoIP/VoLTE security rules, according to the
842 configuration of a VoIP/VoLTE security service called VoIP Intrusion
843 Prevention System (IPS). This centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system
844 controls each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow management by
845 manipulating the rules that can be added, deleted or modified
846 dynamically.
848 The centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can cooperate with a
849 network firewall to realize VoIP/VoLTE security service.
850 Specifically, a network firewall performs the basic security check of
851 an unknown flow's packet observed by a switch. If the network
852 firewall detects that the packet is an unknown VoIP call flow's
853 packet that exhibits some suspicious patterns, then it triggers the
854 VoIP/VoLTE security system for more specialized security analysis of
855 the suspicious VoIP call packet.
857 7.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System
859 A centralized DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource
860 and configure rules to each switch for DDoS-attack mitigation (called
861 DDoS-attack Mitigator) on a common server. The centralized DDoS-
862 attack mitigation system defends servers against DDoS attacks outside
863 the private network, that is, from public networks
864 [RFC8612][dots-architecture].
866 Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers)
867 and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack
868 mitigation, the forwarding of traffic flows in switches can be
869 dynamically configured such that malicious traffic flows are handled
870 by the paths separated from normal traffic flows in order to minimize
871 the impact of those malicious traffic on the servers. This flow path
872 separation can be done by a flow forwarding path management scheme
873 [dots-architecture][AVANT-GUARD]. This management should consider
874 the load balance among the switches for the defense against DDoS
875 attacks.
877 So far this section has described the three use cases for network-
878 based security services using the I2NSF framework with SDN networks.
879 To support these use cases in the proposed data-driven security
880 service framework, YANG data models described in
881 [consumer-facing-inf-dm], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], and
882 [registration-inf-dm] can be used as Consumer-Facing Interface, NSF-
883 Facing Interface, and Registration Interface, respectively, along
884 with RESTCONF [RFC8040] and NETCONF [RFC6241].
886 +--------------------+
887 +-------------------------------------------+ | ---------------- |
888 | I2NSF User (OSS/BSS) | | | NFV | |
889 +------+------------------------------------+ | | Orchestrator +-+ |
890 | Consumer-Facing Interface | -----+---------- | |
891 +------|------------------------------------+ | | | |
892 | -----+---------- (a) ----------------- | | ----+----- | |
893 | | Security +-------+ Developer's | | | | | | |
894 | |Controller(EM)| |Mgmt System(EM)| +-(b)-+ VNFM(s)| | |
895 | -----+---------- ----------------- | | | | | |
896 | | NSF-Facing Interface | | ----+----- | |
897 | ----+----- ----+----- ----+----- | | | | |
898 | |NSF(VNF)| |NSF(VNF)| |NSF(VNF)| | | | | |
899 | ----+----- ----+----- ----+----- | | | | |
900 | | | | | | | | |
901 +------|-------------|-------------|--------+ | | | |
902 | | | | | | |
903 +------+-------------+-------------+--------+ | | | |
904 | NFV Infrastructure (NFVI) | | | | |
905 | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | | |
906 | | Virtual | | Virtual | | Virtual | | | | | |
907 | | Compute | | Storage | | Network | | | | | |
908 | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | ----+----- | |
909 | +---------------------------------------+ | | | | | |
910 | | Virtualization Layer | +-----+ VIM(s) +------+ |
911 | +---------------------------------------+ | | | | |
912 | +---------------------------------------+ | | ---------- |
913 | | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | |
914 | | | Compute | | Storage | | Network | | | | |
915 | | | Hardware| | Hardware| | Hardware| | | | |
916 | | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | |
917 | | Hardware Resources | | | NFV Management |
918 | +---------------------------------------+ | | and Orchestration |
919 | | | (MANO) |
920 +-------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+
921 (a) = Registration Interface
922 (b) = Ve-Vnfm Interface
924 Figure 7: I2NSF Framework Implementation with respect to the NFV
925 Reference Architectural Framework
927 8. I2NSF Framework with NFV
929 This section discusses the implementation of the I2NSF framework
930 using Network Functions Virtualization (NFV).
932 NFV is a promising technology for improving the elasticity and
933 efficiency of network resource utilization. In NFV environments,
934 NSFs can be deployed in the forms of software-based virtual instances
935 rather than physical appliances. Virtualizing NSFs makes it possible
936 to rapidly and flexibly respond to the amount of service requests by
937 dynamically increasing or decreasing the number of NSF instances.
938 Moreover, NFV technology facilitates flexibly including or excluding
939 NSFs from multiple security solution vendors according to the changes
940 on security requirements. In order to take advantages of the NFV
941 technology, the I2NSF framework can be implemented on top of an NFV
942 infrastructure as show in Figure 7.
944 Figure 7 shows an I2NSF framework implementation based on the NFV
945 reference architecture that the European Telecommunications Standards
946 Institute (ETSI) defines [ETSI-NFV]. The NSFs are deployed as VNFs
947 in Figure 7. The Developer's Management System (DMS) in the I2NSF
948 framework is responsible for registering capability information of
949 NSFs into the Security Controller. However, those NSFs are created
950 or removed by a virtual network function manager (VNFM) in the NFV
951 MANO that performs the lifecycle management of VNFs. Note that the
952 lifecycle management of VNFs is out of scope for I2NSF. The Security
953 Controller controls and monitors the configurations (e.g., function
954 parameters and security policy rules) of VNFs via the NSF-Facing
955 Interface along with the NSF monitoring capability
956 [nsf-facing-inf-dm][nsf-monitoring-dm]. Both the DMS and Security
957 Controller can be implemented as the Element Managements (EMs) in the
958 NFV architecture. Finally, the I2NSF User can be implemented as OSS/
959 BSS (Operational Support Systems/Business Support Systems) in the NFV
960 architecture that provides interfaces for users in the NFV system.
962 The operation procedure in the I2NSF framework based on the NFV
963 architecture is as follows:
965 1. The VNFM has a set of virtual machine (VM) images of NSFs, and
966 each VM image can be used to create an NSF instance that provides
967 a set of security capabilities. The DMS initially registers a
968 mapping table of the ID of each VM image and the set of
969 capabilities that can be provided by an NSF instance created from
970 the VM image into the Security Controller.
972 2. If the Security Controller does not have any instantiated NSF
973 that has the set of capabilities required to meet the security
974 requirements from users, it searches the mapping table
975 (registered by the DMS) for the VM image ID corresponding to the
976 required set of capabilities.
978 3. The Security Controller requests the DMS to instantiate an NSF
979 with the VM image ID via VNFM.
981 4. When receiving the instantiation request, the VNFM first asks the
982 NFV orchestrator for the permission required to create the NSF
983 instance, requests the VIM to allocate resources for the NSF
984 instance, and finally creates the NSF instance based on the
985 allocated resources.
987 5. Once the NSF instance has been created by the VNFM, the DMS
988 performs the initial configurations of the NSF instance and then
989 notifies the Security Controller of the NSF instance.
991 6. After being notified of the created NSF instance, the Security
992 Controller delivers low-level security policy rules to the NSF
993 instance for policy enforcement.
995 We can conclude that the I2NSF framework can be implemented based on
996 the NFV architecture framework. Note that the registration of the
997 capabilities of NSFs is performed through the Registration Interface
998 and the lifecycle management for NSFs (VNFs) is performed through the
999 Ve-Vnfm interface between the DMS and VNFM, as shown in Figure 7.
1001 9. Security Considerations
1003 The same security considerations for the I2NSF framework [RFC8329]
1004 are applicable to this document.
1006 This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are
1007 specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300].
1009 The role of the DMS is to provide an I2NSF system with the software
1010 packages or images for NSF execution. The DMS must not access NSFs
1011 in activated status. An inside attacker or a supply chain attacker
1012 at the DMS can seriously weaken the I2NSF system's security. A
1013 malicious DMS is relevant to an insider attack, and a compromised DMS
1014 is relevant to a supply chain attack. A malicious (or compromised)
1015 DMS could register an NSF of its choice in response to a capability
1016 request by the Security Controller. As a result, a malicious DMS can
1017 attack the I2NSF system by providing malicious NSFs with arbitrary
1018 capabilities to include potentially controlling those NSFs in real
1019 time. An unwitting DMS could be compromised and the infrastructure
1020 of the DMS could be coerced into distributing modified NSFs as well.
1022 To deal with these types of threats, an I2NSF system should not use
1023 NSFs from an untrusted DMS or without prior testing. The practices
1024 by which these packages are downloaded and loaded into the system are
1025 out of scope for I2NSF.
1027 I2NSF system operators should audit and monitor interactions with
1028 DMSs. Additionally, the operators should monitor the running NSFs
1029 through the I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface [nsf-monitoring-dm] as
1030 part of the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface. Note that the mechanics for
1031 monitoring the DMSs are out of scope for I2NSF.
1033 10. Acknowledgments
1035 This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications
1036 Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea
1037 MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based
1038 Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized
1039 Security Service Provisioning).
1041 This work has been partially supported by the European Commission
1042 under Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 700199 "Securing against
1043 intruders and other threats through a NFV-enabled environment
1044 (SHIELD)". This support does not imply endorsement.
1046 11. Contributors
1048 I2NSF is a group effort. I2NSF has had a number of contributing
1049 authors. The following are considered co-authors:
1051 o Hyoungshick Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)
1053 o Jinyong Tim Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)
1055 o Hyunsik Yang (Soongsil University)
1057 o Younghan Kim (Soongsil University)
1059 o Jung-Soo Park (ETRI)
1061 o Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom)
1063 o Mohamed Boucadair (Orange)
1065 12. References
1067 12.1. Normative References
1069 [AVANT-GUARD]
1070 Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and G. Gu, "AVANT-
1071 GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant Switch Flow Management in
1072 Software-Defined Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013.
1074 [consumer-facing-inf-dm]
1075 Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and S. Hares,
1076 "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", draft-
1077 ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-06 (work in
1078 progress), July 2019.
1080 [dots-architecture]
1081 Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., Andreasen, F., Teague, N., and
1082 R. Compton, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat
1083 Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots-
1084 architecture-14 (work in progress), May 2019.
1086 [ETSI-NFV]
1087 "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Architectural
1088 Framework", Available:
1089 https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/
1090 nfv/001_099/002/01.01.01_60/gs_nfv002v010101p.pdf, October
1091 2013.
1093 [ITU-T.Y.3300]
1094 "Framework of Software-Defined Networking",
1095 Available: https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-Y.3300-201406-I,
1096 June 2014.
1098 [NFV-Terminology]
1099 "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Terminology for
1100 Main Concepts in NFV", Available:
1101 https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/
1102 NFV/001_099/003/01.02.01_60/gs_nfv003v010201p.pdf,
1103 December 2014.
1105 [nsf-facing-inf-dm]
1106 Kim, J., Jeong, J., Park, J., Hares, S., and Q. Lin,
1107 "I2NSF Network Security Function-Facing Interface YANG
1108 Data Model", draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-07
1109 (work in progress), July 2019.
1111 [nsf-monitoring-dm]
1112 Jeong, J., Chung, C., Hares, S., Xia, L., and H. Birkholz,
1113 "I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model", draft-ietf-i2nsf-
1114 nsf-monitoring-data-model-01 (work in progress), July
1115 2019.
1117 [ONF-SDN-Architecture]
1118 "SDN Architecture (Issue 1.1)", Available:
1119 https://www.opennetworking.org/wp-
1120 content/uploads/2014/10/TR-
1121 521_SDN_Architecture_issue_1.1.pdf, June 2016.
1123 [registration-inf-dm]
1124 Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF
1125 Registration Interface YANG Data Model", draft-ietf-i2nsf-
1126 registration-interface-dm-05 (work in progress), July
1127 2019.
1129 [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the
1130 Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
1131 October 2010.
1133 [RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.
1134 Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)",
1135 RFC 6241, June 2011.
1137 [RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-Defined
1138 Networking: A Perspective from within a Service Provider
1139 Environment", RFC 7149, March 2014.
1141 [RFC7665] Halpern, J. and C. Pignataro, "Service Function Chaining
1142 (SFC) Architecture", RFC 7665, October 2015.
1144 [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
1145 Protocol", RFC 8040, January 2017.
1147 [RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R.,
1148 and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions
1149 (I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192, July
1150 2017.
1152 [RFC8300] Quinn, P., Elzur, U., and C. Pignataro, "Network Service
1153 Header (NSH)", RFC 8300, January 2018.
1155 [RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
1156 Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
1157 Functions", RFC 8329, February 2018.
1159 [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
1160 Version 1.3", RFC 8446, August 2018.
1162 [RFC8612] Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open
1163 Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612, May 2019.
1165 12.2. Informative References
1167 [ETSI-NFV-MANO]
1168 "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Management and
1169 Orchestration", Available:
1170 https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/nfv-
1171 man/001_099/001/01.01.01_60/gs_nfv-man001v010101p.pdf,
1172 December 2014.
1174 [i2nsf-terminology]
1175 Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia, L., and H.
1176 Birkholz, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF)
1177 Terminology", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-08 (work in
1178 progress), July 2019.
1180 [ITU-T.X.800]
1181 "Security Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection
1182 for CCITT Applications", March 1991.
1184 [opsawg-firewalls]
1185 Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in Internet
1186 Security", draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in
1187 progress), October 2012.
1189 [policy-translation]
1190 Jeong, J., Yang, J., Chung, C., and J. Kim, "Security
1191 Policy Translation in Interface to Network Security
1192 Functions", draft-yang-i2nsf-security-policy-
1193 translation-04 (work in progress), July 2019.
1195 [tls-esni]
1196 Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. Wood,
1197 "Encrypted Server Name Indication for TLS 1.3", draft-
1198 ietf-tls-esni-04 (work in progress), July 2019.
1200 [VNF-ONBOARDING]
1201 "VNF Onboarding", Available:
1202 https://wiki.opnfv.org/display/mano/VNF+Onboarding,
1203 November 2016.
1205 Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-17
1207 The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-
1208 applicability-17:
1210 o In Section 4, a high-level security policy XML file in Figure 2
1211 and the corresponding low-level security policy XML file Figure 3
1212 are constructed using the Consumer-Facing Interface data model and
1213 the NSF-Facing data model, respectively.
1215 o For the applicability of I2NSF to the real world, Section 5 is
1216 added to support the Intent-based Security Services using I2NSF.
1217 This section explains the security policy translation based on an
1218 I2NSF User's intents on the required security services. Figure 4
1219 shows the archiecture and procedure of the I2NSF security policy
1220 translator.
1222 Authors' Addresses
1224 Jaehoon Paul Jeong
1225 Department of Computer Science and Engineering
1226 Sungkyunkwan University
1227 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
1228 Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
1229 Republic of Korea
1231 Phone: +82 31 299 4957
1232 Fax: +82 31 290 7996
1233 EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu
1234 URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
1236 Sangwon Hyun
1237 Department of Computer Engineering
1238 Myongji University
1239 116 Myongji-ro, Cheoin-gu
1240 Yongin 17058
1241 Republic of Korea
1243 Phone: +82 62 230 7473
1244 EMail: shyun@chosun.ac.kr
1245 Tae-Jin Ahn
1246 Korea Telecom
1247 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
1248 Daejeon 305-811
1249 Republic of Korea
1251 Phone: +82 42 870 8409
1252 EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com
1254 Susan Hares
1255 Huawei
1256 7453 Hickory Hill
1257 Saline, MI 48176
1258 USA
1260 Phone: +1-734-604-0332
1261 EMail: shares@ndzh.com
1263 Diego R. Lopez
1264 Telefonica I+D
1265 Jose Manuel Lara, 9
1266 Seville 41013
1267 Spain
1269 Phone: +34 682 051 091
1270 EMail: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com