idnits 2.17.00 (12 Aug 2021) /tmp/idnits26549/draft-ietf-dime-erp-12.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document date (July 31, 2012) is 3581 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Missing Reference: 'ERP-Realm' is mentioned on line 281, but not defined == Outdated reference: draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran has been published as RFC 6734 == Outdated reference: draft-ietf-dime-rfc3588bis has been published as RFC 6733 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3588 (Obsoleted by RFC 6733) -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. '1' Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 4 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group J. Bournelle 3 Internet-Draft L. Morand 4 Intended status: Standards Track Orange Labs 5 Expires: February 1, 2013 S. Decugis 6 INSIDE Secure 7 Q. Wu 8 Huawei 9 G. Zorn 10 Network Zen 11 July 31, 2012 13 Diameter Support for the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) 14 draft-ietf-dime-erp-12.txt 16 Abstract 18 The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) defines extensions to the 19 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to support efficient re- 20 authentication between the peer and an EAP Re-authentication (ER) 21 server through a compatible authenticator. This document specifies 22 Diameter support for ERP. It defines a new Diameter ERP application 23 to transport ERP messages between an ER authenticator and the ER 24 server, and a set of new AVPs that can be used to transport the 25 cryptographic material needed by the re-authentication server. 27 Status of This Memo 29 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 30 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 32 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 33 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 34 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 35 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 37 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 38 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 39 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 40 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 42 This Internet-Draft will expire on February 1, 2013. 44 Copyright Notice 46 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 47 document authors. All rights reserved. 49 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 50 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 51 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 52 publication of this document. Please review these documents 53 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 54 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 55 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 56 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 57 described in the Simplified BSD License. 59 Table of Contents 61 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 62 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 3. Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 4. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 66 5. Bootstrapping the ER Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 5.1. Bootstrapping During the Initial EAP authentication . . . 6 68 5.2. Bootstrapping During the First Re-authentication . . . . . 7 69 6. Re-Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 7. Application Id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 71 8. AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 72 8.1. ERP-RK-Request AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 73 8.2. ERP-Realm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 74 8.3. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 75 8.3.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 76 8.3.2. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 77 8.3.3. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 78 8.3.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 79 9. Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 80 9.1. Permanent Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 81 10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 82 11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 83 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 84 12.1. Diameter Application Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 85 12.2. New AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 86 12.3. New Permanent Failures Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . 14 87 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 88 14. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 90 1. Introduction 92 RFC6696 [RFC6696] defines the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP). 93 It consists of the following steps: 95 Bootstrapping 97 A root key for re-authentication is derived from the Extended 98 Master Session Key (EMSK) created during EAP authentication 99 [RFC5295]. This root key is transported from the EAP server to 100 the ER server. 102 Re-authentication 104 A one-round-trip exchange between the peer and the ER server, 105 resulting in mutual authentication. To support the EAP 106 reauthentication functionality, ERP defines two new EAP codes - 107 EAP-Initiate and EAP-Finish. 109 This document defines how Diameter transports the ERP messages during 110 the re-authentication process. For this purpose, we define a new 111 Application Identifier for ERP, and re-use the Diameter EAP commands 112 (DER/DEA). 114 This document also discusses the distribution of the root key during 115 bootstrapping, in conjunction with either the initial EAP 116 authentication (implicit bootstrapping) or the first ERP exchange 117 (explicit bootstrapping). Security considerations for this key 118 distribution are detailed in RFC 5295 [RFC5295]. 120 2. Terminology 122 This document uses terminology defined in RFC3748 [RFC3748], RFC5295 123 [RFC5295], RFC6696 [RFC6696], and RFC4072 [RFC4072]. 125 "Root key" (RK) or "bootstrapping material" refer to the rRK or rDSRK 126 derived from an EMSK, depending on the location of the ER server in 127 home or foreign domain. 129 We use the notation "ERP/DER" and "ERP/DEA" in this document to refer 130 to Diameter-EAP-Request and Diameter-EAP-Answer commands with the 131 Application Id set to Section 12.1; the 132 same commands are denoted "EAP/DER" and "EAP/DEA" when the 133 Application Id in the message is set to 134 [RFC4072]. 136 2.1. Requirements Language 138 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 139 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 140 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 142 3. Assumptions 144 This document assumes the existence of at most one logical ER server 145 entity in a domain. If several physical servers are deployed for 146 robustness, a replication mechanism must be deployed to synchronize 147 the ERP states (root keys) between these servers. This replication 148 mechanism is out of the scope of this document. If multiple ER 149 servers are deployed in the domain, we assume that they can be used 150 interchangeably. If multiple ER servers are deployed across the 151 domains, we assume only one ER server that is near to the peer is 152 getting involved in the ERP. 154 Also this document assumes the existence of at most one EAP server 155 entity in the home domain. In case of multiple physical home EAP 156 servers in the same domain, if the ER server wants to reach the same 157 home EAP server, the ER server may cache the Destination-Host AVP 158 corresponding to the home EAP server it requests. 160 4. Protocol Overview 162 The following figure shows the components involved in ERP, and their 163 interactions. 165 Diameter +--------+ 166 +-------------+ ERP +-----------+ (*) | Home | 167 Peer <->|Authenticator|<=======>| ER server | <---> | EAP | 168 +-------------+ +-----------+ | server | 169 +--------+ 170 (*) Diameter EAP application, explicit bootstrapping scenario only. 172 Figure 1: Diameter ERP Overview. 174 The ER server is located either in the home domain (same as EAP 175 server) or in the visited domain (same as authenticator, when it 176 differs from the home domain). 178 When the peer initiates an ERP exchange, the authenticator creates a 179 Diameter-EAP-Request (DER) message [RFC4072]. The Application Id of 180 the message is set to that of the Diameter ERP application 181 Section 12.1 in the message. The generation of the ERP/DER message 182 is detailed in Section 6. 184 If there is an ER server in the same domain as the authenticator 185 (i.e., the local domain), Diameter routing MUST be configured so that 186 this ERP/DER message reaches that server, even if the Destination- 187 Realm is not the same as local domain. 189 If there is no local ER server, the message is routed according to 190 its Destination-Realm AVP content, extracted from the realm component 191 of the keyName-NAI attribute. As specified in RFC6696 [RFC6696], 192 this realm is the home domain of the peer in the case of 193 bootstrapping exchange ('B' flag is set in ERP message) or the domain 194 of the bootstrapped ER server otherwise . 196 If no ER server is available in the home domain either, the ERP/DER 197 message cannot be delivered, and an error DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 198 MUST be generated as specified in [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] and 199 returned to the authenticator. The authenticator MAY cache this 200 information (with limited duration) to avoid further attempts to 201 execute ERP with this realm. It MAY also fallback to full EAP 202 authentication to authenticate the peer. 204 When an ER server receives the ERP/DER message, it searches its local 205 database for a valid, unexpired root key matching the keyName part of 206 the User-Name AVP. If such key is found, the ER server processes the 207 ERP message as described in [RFC6696] then creates the ERP/DEA answer 208 as described in Section 6. The rMSK is included in this answer. 210 Finally, the authenticator extracts the rMSK from the ERP/DEA as 211 described in RFC6696 [RFC6696], and forwards the content of the EAP- 212 Payload AVP, the EAP-Finish/Re-Auth message, to the peer. 214 The ER server may or may not possess the root key in its local 215 database. If the EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth message has its 'B' flag set 216 (Bootstrapping exchange) and the ER server possesses the root key, 217 the ER server SHOULD respond directly to the peer that initiated the 218 ERP exchange. Otherwise, the ER server SHOULD act as a proxy and 219 forward the message to the home EAP server after changing its 220 Application Id to Diameter EAP and adding the ERP-RK-Request AVP to 221 request the root key. See Section 5 for more detail on this process. 223 5. Bootstrapping the ER Server 225 The bootstrapping process involves the home EAP server and the ER 226 server, but also impacts the peer and the authenticator. In ERP, the 227 peer must derive the same keying material as the ER server. To 228 achieve this, it must learn the domain name of the ER server. How 229 this information is acquired is outside the scope of this 230 specification, but the authenticator might be configured to advertize 231 this domain name, especially in the case of re-authentication after a 232 handover. 234 The bootstrapping of an ER server with a given root key happens 235 either during the initial EAP authentication of the peer when the 236 EMSK -- from which the root key is derived -- is created, during the 237 first re-authentication, or sometime between those events. We only 238 consider the first two possibilities in this specification, in the 239 following sub-sections. 241 5.1. Bootstrapping During the Initial EAP authentication 243 Bootstrapping the ER server during the initial EAP authentication 244 (also known as implicit bootstrapping) offers the advantage that the 245 server is immediately available for re-authentication of the peer, 246 thus minimizing the re-authentication delay. On the other hand, it 247 is possible that only a small number of peers will use re- 248 authentication in the visited domain. Deriving and caching key 249 material for all the peers (for example, for the peers that do not 250 support ERP) is a waste of resources and should be avoided. 252 To achieve implicit bootstrapping, the ER server acts as a Diameter 253 EAP Proxy , and Diameter routing MUST be configured so that Diameter 254 EAP application messages are routed through this proxy. The figure 255 bellow illustrates this mechanism. 257 ER server & 258 Authenticator EAP Proxy Home EAP server 259 ============= =========== =============== 260 -------------------------> 261 Diameter EAP/DER 262 (EAP-Response) 263 -------------------------> 264 Diameter EAP/DER 265 (EAP-Response) 266 (ERP-RK-Request) 268 <==================================================> 269 Multi-round Diameter EAP exchanges, unmodified 271 <------------------------- 272 Diameter EAP/DEA 273 (EAP-Success) 274 (MSK) 275 (Key AVP (rRK)) 276 <------------------------- 277 Diameter EAP/DEA 278 (EAP-Success) 279 (MSK) 281 [ERP-Realm] 283 Figure 2: ERP Bootstrapping During Full EAP Authentication 285 The authenticator creates the first DER of the full EAP 286 authentication and sends it to the ER server. The ER server proxies 287 the first DER of the full EAP authentication and adds the ERP-RK- 288 Request AVP inside, then forwards the request to the home EAP server. 290 If the home Diameter server does not support the Diameter ERP 291 extensions, it simply ignores the ERP-RK-Request AVP and continues as 292 specified in RFC 4072 [RFC4072]. If the server supports the ERP 293 extensions, it saves the value of the ERP-Realm AVP found inside the 294 ERP-RK-Request AVP, and continues with the EAP authentication. When 295 the authentication completes, if it is successful and the EAP method 296 has generated an EMSK, the server MUST derive the rRK as specified in 297 RFC 6696 [RFC6696], using the saved domain name. It then includes 298 the rRK inside a Key AVP (Section 8.3) with the Key-Type AVP set to 299 rRK, before sending the DEA as usual. 301 When the ER server proxies a Diameter-EAP-Answer message with a 302 Session-Id corresponding to a message to which it added an ERP-RK- 303 Request AVP, and the Result-Code is DIAMETER_SUCCESS, it MUST examine 304 the message and save and remove any Key AVP (Section 8.3) with Key- 305 Type AVP set to rRK. If the message does not contain such Key AVP, 306 the ER server may cache the information that ERP is not possible for 307 this session to avoid possible subsequent attempts. In any case, the 308 information stored in ER server concerning a session should not have 309 a lifetime greater than the EMSK for this session. 311 If the ER server is successfully bootstrapped, it should also add the 312 ERP-Realm AVP after removing the Key AVP with Key-Type of rRK in the 313 EAP/DEA message. This ERP-Realm information can be used by the 314 authenticator to notify the peer that ER server is bootstrapped, and 315 for which domain. How this information can be transmitted to the 316 peer is outside the scope of this document. This information needs 317 to be sent to the peer if both implicit and explicit bootstrapping 318 mechanisms are possible, because the ERP message and the root key 319 used for protecting this message are different in bootstrapping 320 exchanges and non-bootstrapping exchanges. 322 5.2. Bootstrapping During the First Re-authentication 324 Bootstrapping the ER server during the first re-authentication (also 325 known as explicit bootstrapping) is only needed when there is no 326 local ER server in the visited domain and there is an ER server in 327 the home domain. It is less resource-intensive, since the EMSK 328 generated during initial EAP authentication is reused to derive root 329 keys. On the other hand, the first re-authentication requires a one- 330 round-trip exchange with the home EAP server, since the EMSK is 331 generated during the initial EAP authentication and never leaves the 332 home EAP server, which is less efficient than the implicit 333 bootstrapping scenario. 335 The EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message is sent to the home ER server. The 336 home ER server receives the ERP/DER message containing the EAP- 337 Initiate/Re-Auth message with the 'B' flag set. It creates the new 338 EAP/DER message using the received DRP/DER message and performs the 339 following processing: 341 Set the Application Id in the header of the message to [RFC4072] 344 Extract the ERP-RK-Request AVP from the ERP/DER message, which 345 contains the name of the domain where the ER server is located and 346 add it to the newly created ERP/DER message. 348 Then the newly created EAP/DER is sent and routed to the home 349 Diameter EAP application server. 351 If the home Diameter EAP server does not support ERP extensions, EAP 352 packets with an unknown ERP-specific code (EAP-Initiate) will not be 353 understood. In such a case, the home Diameter EAP server MUST send 354 an EAP/DEA with a Result-Code indicating a Permanent Failure (for 355 example, DIAMETER_ERROR_EAP_CODE_UNKNOWN or 356 DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY). The Failed-AVP AVP MUST be included and 357 contain a copy of the EAP-Payload AVP. Otherwise, it processes the 358 DSRK request as described in [RFC6696]. In particular, it includes 359 the Domain- Name TLV attribute with the content from the ERP-Realm 360 AVP. The server creates the EAP/DEA reply message [RFC4072] 361 including an instance of the Key AVP (Section 8.3) with Key-Type AVP 362 set to rRK and an instance of the Domain-Name TLV attribute with the 363 content from the ERP-Realm AVP. 365 The ER server receives this EAP/DEA and proxies it as follows, in 366 addition to standard proxy operations: 368 Set the Application Id back to Diameter ERP Application Id 369 (Section 12.1 ) 371 Extract and cache the content of the Key AVP with Key-Type set to 372 rRK, as described in the implicit scenario (Section 5.1). 374 The ERP/DEA message is then forwarded to the authenticator, that can 375 use the rMSK as described in RFC 6696 [RFC6696]. 377 The figure below captures this proxy behavior: 379 Authenticator ER server Home Diameter server 380 ============= ========= ==================== 381 -----------------------> 382 Diameter ERP/DER 383 (EAP-Initiate) 384 ------------------------> 385 Diameter EAP/DER 386 (EAP-Response) 387 (ERP-RK-Request) 389 <------------------------ 390 Diameter EAP/DEA 391 (EAP-Success) 392 (Key AVP (rRK)) 393 (Key AVP (rMSK)) 394 <---------------------- 395 Diameter ERP/DEA 396 (EAP-Finish) 397 (Key AVP (rMSK)) 399 Figure 3: ERP Explicit Bootstrapping Message Flow 401 6. Re-Authentication 403 This section describes in detail a re-authentication exchange with an 404 ER server that was previously bootstrapped. The following figure 405 summarizes the re-authentication exchange. 407 ER server 408 Peer Authenticator (bootstrapped) 409 ==== ============= ====================== 410 [ <------------------------ ] 411 [optional EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-start,] 412 [ possibly with ERP domain name ] 414 -----------------------> 415 EAP-Initiate/Re-auth 416 ===============================> 417 Diameter ERP, cmd code DER 418 User-Name: Keyname-NAI 419 EAP-Payload: EAP-Initiate/Re-auth 421 <=============================== 422 Diameter ERP, cmd code DEA 423 EAP-Payload: EAP-Finish/Re-auth 424 Key AVP: rMSK 425 <---------------------- 426 EAP-Finish/Re-auth 428 Figure 4: Diameter ERP Re-authentication Exchange 430 The peer sends an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message to the ER server via 431 the authenticator. Alternatively, the authenticator may send an EAP- 432 Initiate/Re-auth-Start message to the peer to trigger the mechanism. 433 In this case, the peer responds with an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message. 435 If the authenticator does not support ERP (pure Diameter EAP 436 [RFC4072] support), it discards the EAP packets with an unknown ERP- 437 specific code (EAP-Initiate). The peer should fallback to full EAP 438 authentication in this case. 440 When the authenticator receives an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message from 441 the peer, the message is processed as described in [RFC6696] with 442 regard to the EAP state machine. It creates a Diameter ERP/DER 443 message following the general process of Diameter EAP [RFC4072], with 444 the following differences: 446 The Application Id in the header is set to (code 447 TBD ). 449 The value in Auth-Application-Id AVP is also set to . 452 The keyName-NAI attribute from the ERP message is used to create 453 the content of the User-Name and Destination-Realm AVPs. 455 The Auth-Request-Type AVP content is set to the appropriate value. 457 The EAP-Payload AVP contains the EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth meassge. 459 Then this ERP/DER message is sent as described in Section 4. 461 The ER server receives and processes this request as described in 462 Section 4. It then creates an ERP/DEA message following the general 463 process described in RFC4072 [RFC4072], with the following 464 differences: 466 The Application Id in the header is set to (code 467 TBD). 469 The value of the Auth-Application-Id AVP is also set to . 472 The EAP-Payload AVP contains the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message. 474 If authentication is successful, an instance of the Key AVP 475 containing the Re-authentication Master Session Key (rMSK) derived 476 by ERP is included. 478 When the authenticator receives this ERP/DEA answer, it processes it 479 as described in Diameter EAP [RFC4072] and RFC 6696 [RFC6696]: the 480 content of the EAP-Payload AVP is forwarded to the peer, and the 481 contents of the Keying-Material AVP [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] is 482 used as a shared secret for a secure association protocol specific to 483 the lower-layer in use. 485 7. Application Id 487 We define a new Diameter application in this document, Diameter ERP 488 Application, with an Application Id value of TBD. Diameter nodes 489 conforming to this specification in the role of ER server MUST 490 advertise support by including an Auth-Application-Id AVP with a 491 value of Diameter ERP in the Capabilities-Exchange-Request and 492 Capabilities-Exchange-Answer commands [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]. 494 The primary use of the Diameter ERP Application Id is to ensure 495 proper routing of the messages, and that the nodes that advertise the 496 support for this application do understand the new AVPs defined in 497 Section 8, although these AVP have the 'M' flag cleared. 499 8. AVPs 501 The following sub-sections discuss the AVPs used by the Diameter ERP 502 application. 504 8.1. ERP-RK-Request AVP 506 The ERP-RK-Request AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type grouped AVP. This 507 AVP is used by the ER server to indicate its willingness to act as ER 508 server for a particular session. 510 This AVP has the M and V bits cleared. 512 ERP-RK-Request ::= < AVP Header: TBD > 513 { ERP-Realm } 514 * [ AVP ] 516 Figure 5: ERP-RK-Request ABNF 518 8.2. ERP-Realm AVP 520 The ERP-Realm AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type DiameterIdentity. It 521 contains the name of the realm in which the ER server is located. 523 This AVP has the M and V bits cleared. 525 8.3. Key AVP 527 The Key AVP [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] is of type "Grouped" and is 528 used to carry the rRK or rMSK and associated attributes. The usage 529 of the Key AVP and its constituent AVPs in this application is 530 specified in the following sub-sections. 532 8.3.1. Key-Type AVP 534 The value of the Key-Type AVP MUST be set to 2 for rRK or 3 for rMSK. 536 8.3.2. Keying-Material AVP 538 The Keying-Material AVP contains the rRK sent by the home EAP server 539 to the ER server, in answer to a request containing an ERP-RK-Request 540 AVP, or the rMSK sent by the ER server to the authenticator. How 541 this material is derived and used is specified in RFC 6696 [RFC6696]. 543 8.3.3. Key-Name AVP 545 This AVP contains the EMSKname which identifies the keying material. 546 The derivation of this name is specified in RGC 6696 [RFC6696]. 548 8.3.4. Key-Lifetime AVP 550 The Key-Lifetime AVP contains the lifetime of the keying material in 551 seconds. It MUST NOT be greater than the remaining lifetime of the 552 EMSK from which the material was derived. 554 9. Result-Code AVP Values 556 This section defines new Result-Code [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] 557 values that MUST be supported by all Diameter implementations that 558 conform to this specification. 560 9.1. Permanent Failures 562 Errors that fall within the Permanent Failures category are used to 563 inform the peer that the request failed and SHOULD NOT be attempted 564 again. 566 DIAMETER_ERROR_ EAP_CODE_UNKNOWN (TBD) 568 This error code is used by the Diameter server to inform the 569 peer that the received EAP-PAYLOAD AVP contains an EAP packet 570 with an unknown EAP code. 572 10. Contributors 574 Hannes Tschofenig wrote the initial draft of this document. 576 Lakshminath Dondeti contributed to the early versions of the 577 document. 579 11. Acknowledgements 581 Hannes Tschofenig, Zhen Cao and Jouni Korhonen provided useful 582 reviews. 584 Vidya Narayanan reviewed a rough draft version of the document and 585 found some errors. 587 Many thanks to these people! 589 12. IANA Considerations 591 This document requires IANA registration of the following new 592 elements in the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) 593 Parameters [1] registries. 595 12.1. Diameter Application Identifier 597 This specification requires IANA to allocate a new value "Diameter 598 ERP" in the "Application IDs" registry using the policy specified in 599 Section 11.3 of RFC 3588 [RFC3588]. 601 12.2. New AVPs 603 This specification requires IANA to allocate new values from the "AVP 604 Codes" registry according to the policy specified in Section 11.1 of 605 Fajardo, et al. [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] for the following AVPs: 607 ERP-RK-Request 609 ERP-Realm 611 These AVPs are defined in Section 8. 613 12.3. New Permanent Failures Result-Code AVP Values 615 This specification requires IANA to allocate a new value from the 616 "Result-Code AVP Values (code 268) - Permanent Failure" registry 617 according to the policy specified in Section 11.3.2 of Fajardo, et 618 al. [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] for the following Result-Code: 620 DIAMETER_ERROR_EAP_CODE_UNKNOWN TBD 622 This result-code value is defined in Section 9. 624 13. Security Considerations 626 The security considerations from the following documents apply here: 628 o Fajardo, et al. [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] 630 o RFC 4072 [RFC4072] 632 o RFC 6696 [RFC6696] 634 o Zorn, Wu and Cakulev [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] 636 14. Normative References 638 [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] Zorn, G., Wu, W., and V. Cakulev, 639 "Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for 640 Cryptographic Key Transport", 641 draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-14 (work 642 in progress), August 2011. 644 [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., 645 and G. Zorn, "Diameter Base Protocol", 646 draft-ietf-dime-rfc3588bis-34 (work in 647 progress), June 2012. 649 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in 650 RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", 651 BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 653 [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, 654 E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, "Diameter 655 Base Protocol", RFC 3588, 656 September 2003. 658 [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., 659 Carlson, J., and H. Levkowetz, 660 "Extensible Authentication Protocol 661 (EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004. 663 [RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, 664 "Diameter Extensible Authentication 665 Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, 666 August 2005. 668 [RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, 669 V., and M. Nakhjiri, "Specification 670 for the Derivation of Root Keys from 671 an Extended Master Session Key 672 (EMSK)", RFC 5295, August 2008. 674 [RFC6696] Cao, Z., He, B., Shi, Y., Wu, Q., and 675 G. Zorn, "EAP Extensions for the EAP 676 Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)", 677 RFC 6696, July 2012. 679 [1] 681 Authors' Addresses 683 Julien Bournelle 684 Orange Labs 685 38-40 rue du general Leclerc 686 Issy-Les-Moulineaux 92794 687 France 689 EMail: julien.bournelle@orange-ftgroup.com 691 Lionel Morand 692 Orange Labs 693 38-40 rue du general Leclerc 694 Issy-Les-Moulineaux 92794 695 France 697 EMail: lionel.morand@orange-ftgroup.com 699 Sebastien Decugis 700 INSIDE Secure 701 41 Parc Club du Golf 702 Aix-en-Provence 13856 703 France 705 Phone: +33 (0)4 42 39 63 00 706 EMail: sdecugis@freediameter.net 708 Qin Wu 709 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd 710 Site B, Floor 12F, Huihong Mansion, No.91 Baixia Rd. 711 Nanjing 210001 712 China 714 EMail: sunseawq@huawei.com 716 Glen Zorn 717 Network Zen 718 227/358 Thanon Sanphawut 719 Bang Na, Bangkok 10260 720 Thailand 722 EMail: glenzorn@gmail.com