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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 ACE Working Group M. Jones 3 Internet-Draft Microsoft 4 Intended status: Standards Track L. Seitz 5 Expires: May 3, 2018 RISE SICS 6 G. Selander 7 Ericsson AB 8 E. Wahlstroem 10 S. Erdtman 11 Spotify AB 12 H. Tschofenig 13 ARM Ltd. 14 October 30, 2017 16 Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) 17 draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-01 19 Abstract 21 This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT) 22 that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of- 23 possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also 24 sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification 25 provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key 26 Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800), but using CBOR and 27 CWTs rather than JSON and JWTs. 29 Status of This Memo 31 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 32 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 34 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 35 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 36 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 37 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 39 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 40 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 41 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 42 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 44 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2018. 46 Copyright Notice 48 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 49 document authors. All rights reserved. 51 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 52 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 53 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 54 publication of this document. Please review these documents 55 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 56 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 57 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 58 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 59 described in the Simplified BSD License. 61 Table of Contents 63 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 64 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 65 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 66 3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys . . . . . . . . 3 67 3.1. Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 68 3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key . 5 69 3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of- 70 Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 71 3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key 6 72 3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 7 73 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 74 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 75 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 76 6.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 9 77 6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 78 6.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 79 6.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 80 6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 81 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 82 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 83 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 84 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 85 Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 86 Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 87 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 89 1. Introduction 91 This specification describes how a CBOR Web Token [CWT] can declare 92 that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of- 93 possession (PoP) key. Proof of possession of a key is also sometimes 94 described as being the holder-of-key. This specification provides 95 equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for 96 JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" [RFC7800], but using CBOR [RFC7049] and CWTs 97 [CWT] rather than JSON [RFC7159] and JWTs [JWT]. 99 1.1. Notational Conventions 101 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 102 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 103 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 104 [RFC2119]. 106 Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values 107 are case sensitive. 109 2. Terminology 111 This specification uses terms defined in the CBOR Web Token [CWT], 112 CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152], and Concise 113 Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] specifications. 115 These terms are defined by this specification: 117 Issuer 118 Party that creates the CWT and binds its claims to the proof-of- 119 possession key. 121 Presenter 122 Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key 123 cryptography) or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a 124 recipient. 126 Recipient 127 Party that receives the CWT containing the proof-of-possession key 128 information from the presenter. 130 3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys 132 By including a "cnf" (confirmation) claim in a CWT, the issuer of the 133 CWT declares that the presenter possesses a particular key and that 134 the recipient can cryptographically confirm that the presenter has 135 possession of that key. The value of the "cnf" claim is a CBOR map 136 and the members of that map identify the proof-of-possession key. 138 The presenter can be identified in one of several ways by the CWT 139 depending upon the application requirements. If the CWT contains a 140 "sub" (subject) claim [CWT], the presenter is normally the subject 141 identified by the CWT. (In some applications, the subject identifier 142 will be relative to the issuer identified by the "iss" (issuer) claim 143 [CWT].) If the CWT contains no "sub" claim, the presenter is 144 normally the issuer identified by the CWT using the "iss" claim. The 145 case in which the presenter is the subject of the CWT is analogous to 146 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 147 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation usage. At least one of 148 the "sub" and "iss" claims is typically present in the CWT and some 149 use cases may require that both be present. 151 3.1. Confirmation Claim 153 The "cnf" claim is used in the CWT to contain members used to 154 identify the proof-of-possession key. Other members of the "cnf" map 155 may be defined because a proof-of-possession key may not be the only 156 means of confirming the authenticity of the token. This is analogous 157 to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation element 158 in which a number of different subject confirmation methods can be 159 included (including proof-of-possession key information). 161 The set of confirmation members that a CWT must contain to be 162 considered valid is context dependent and is outside the scope of 163 this specification. Specific applications of CWTs will require 164 implementations to understand and process some confirmation members 165 in particular ways. However, in the absence of such requirements, 166 all confirmation members that are not understood by implementations 167 MUST be ignored. 169 This specification establishes the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods" 170 registry for these members in Section 6.2 and registers the members 171 defined by this specification. Other specifications can register 172 other members used for confirmation, including other members for 173 conveying proof-of-possession keys using different key 174 representations. 176 The "cnf" claim value MUST represent only a single proof-of- 177 possession key. At most one of the "COSE_Key" and 178 "Encrypted_COSE_Key" confirmation values defined below may be 179 present. Note that if an application needs to represent multiple 180 proof-of-possession keys in the same CWT, one way for it to achieve 181 this is to use other claim names, in addition to "cnf", to hold the 182 additional proof-of-possession key information. These claims could 183 use the same syntax and semantics as the "cnf" claim. Those claims 184 would be defined by applications or other specifications and could be 185 registered in the IANA "CBOR Web Token Claims" registry 186 [IANA.CWT.Claims]. 188 /--------------------+-----+-------------------------------\ 189 | Name | Key | Value type | 190 |--------------------+-----+-------------------------------| 191 | COSE_Key | 1 | COSE_Key | 192 | Encrypted_COSE_Key | 2 | COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0 | 193 | kid | 3 | binary string | 194 \--------------------+-----+-------------------------------/ 196 Figure 1: Summary of the cnf names, keys, and value types 198 3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key 200 When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the 201 "COSE_Key" member is a COSE_Key [RFC8152] representing the 202 corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example (using 203 CBOR diagonstic notation) demonstrates such a declaration in the CWT 204 Claims Set of a CWT: 206 { 207 /iss/ 1 : "coaps://server.example.com", 208 /aud/ 3 : "coaps://client.example.org", 209 /exp/ 4 : 1361398824, 210 /cnf/ 8 :{ 211 /COSE_Key/ 1 :{ 212 /kty/ 1 : /EC/ 2, 213 /crv/ -1 : /P-256/ 1, 214 /x/ -2 : b64'18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM', 215 /y/ -3 : b64'-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA' 216 } 217 } 218 } 220 The COSE_Key MUST contain the required key members for a COSE_Key of 221 that key type and MAY contain other COSE_Key members, including the 222 "kid" (Key ID) member. 224 The "COSE_Key" member MAY also be used for a COSE_Key representing a 225 symmetric key, provided that the CWT is encrypted so that the key is 226 not revealed to unintended parties. The means of encrypting a CWT is 227 explained in [CWT]. If the CWT is not encrypted, the symmetric key 228 MUST be encrypted as described below. 230 3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key 232 When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the 233 "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member is an encrypted COSE_Key [RFC8152] 234 representing the symmetric key encrypted to a key known to the 235 recipient using COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0. 237 The following example (using CBOR diagnostic notation, with 238 linebreaks for readability) illustrates a symmetric key that could 239 subsequently be encrypted for use in the "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member: 241 { 242 /kty/ 1 : /Symmetric/ 4, 243 /alg/ 3 : /HMAC256/ 5, 244 /k/ -1 : h'6684523ab17337f173500e5728c628547cb37df 245 e68449c65f885d1b73b49eae1A0B0C0D0E0F10' 246 } 248 The COSE_Key representation is used as the plaintext when encrypting 249 the key. The COSE_Key could, for instance, be encrypted using a 250 COSE_Encrypt0 representation using the AES-CCM-16-64-128 algorithm. 252 The following example CWT Claims Set of a CWT (using CBOR diagnostic 253 notation, with linebreaks for readability) illustrates the use of an 254 encrypted symmetric key as the "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member value: 256 { 257 /iss/ 1 : "coaps://server.example.com", 258 /sub/ 2 : "24400320", 259 /aud/ 3: "s6BhdRkqt3", 260 /exp/ 4 : 1311281970, 261 /iat/ 5 : 1311280970, 262 /cnf/ 8 : { 263 /COSE_Encrypt0/ 2 : [ 264 /protected header / h'A1010A' /{ \alg\ 1:10 \AES-CCM-16-64-128\}/, 265 /unprotected header/ { / iv / 5: h'636898994FF0EC7BFCF6D3F95B'}, 266 /ciphertext/ h'0573318A3573EB983E55A7C2F06CADD0796C9E584F1D0E3E 267 A8C5B052592A8B2694BE9654F0431F38D5BBC8049FA7F13F' 268 ] 269 } 270 } 272 The example above was generated with the key: 274 h'6162630405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10' 276 3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key 278 The proof-of-possession key can also be identified by the use of a 279 Key ID instead of communicating the actual key, provided the 280 recipient is able to obtain the identified key using the Key ID. In 281 this case, the issuer of a CWT declares that the presenter possesses 282 a particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm 283 proof of possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf" 284 claim in the CWT whose value is a CBOR map with the CBOR map 285 containing a "kid" member identifying the key. 287 The following example (using CBOR diagnostic notation) demonstrates 288 such a declaration in the CWT Claims Set of a CWT: 290 { 291 /iss/ 1 : "coaps://server.example.com", 292 /aud/ 3 : "coaps://client.example.org", 293 /exp/ 4 : 1361398824, 294 /cnf/ 8 : { 295 /kid/ 2 : h'dfd1aa976d8d4575a0fe34b96de2bfad' 296 } 297 } 299 The content of the "kid" value is application specific. For 300 instance, some applications may choose to use a cryptographic hash of 301 the public key value as the "kid" value. 303 3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified 305 Proof of possession is typically demonstrated by having the presenter 306 sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by 307 the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a 308 "challenge". 310 The means of communicating the nonce and the nature of its contents 311 are intentionally not described in this specification, as different 312 protocols will communicate this information in different ways. 313 Likewise, the means of communicating the signed nonce is also not 314 specified, as this is also protocol specific. 316 Note that another means of proving possession of the key when it is a 317 symmetric key is to encrypt the key to the recipient. The means of 318 obtaining a key for the recipient is likewise protocol specific. 320 4. Security Considerations 322 All of the security considerations that are discussed in [CWT] also 323 apply here. In addition, proof of possession introduces its own 324 unique security issues. Possessing a key is only valuable if it is 325 kept secret. Appropriate means must be used to ensure that 326 unintended parties do not learn private key or symmetric key values. 328 Applications utilizing proof of possession should also utilize 329 audience restriction, as described in Section 4.1.3 of [JWT], as it 330 provides different protections. Proof of possession can be used by 331 recipients to reject messages from unauthorized senders. Audience 332 restriction can be used by recipients to reject messages intended for 333 different recipients. 335 A recipient might not understand the "cnf" claim. Applications that 336 require the proof-of-possession keys communicated with it to be 337 understood and processed must ensure that the parts of this 338 specification that they use are implemented. 340 Proof of possession via encrypted symmetric secrets is subject to 341 replay attacks. This attack can, for example, be avoided when a 342 signed nonce or challenge is used since the recipient can use a 343 distinct nonce or challenge for each interaction. Replay can also be 344 avoided if a sub-key is derived from a shared secret that is specific 345 to the instance of the PoP demonstration. 347 As is the case with other information included in a CWT, it is 348 necessary to apply data origin authentication and integrity 349 protection (via a keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data 350 origin authentication ensures that the recipient of the CWT learns 351 about the entity that created the CWT since this will be important 352 for any policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary 353 from changing any elements conveyed within the CWT payload. Special 354 care has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the CWT 355 since those not only require integrity protection but also 356 confidentiality protection. 358 As described in Section 6 (Key Identification) and Appendix D (Notes 359 on Key Selection) of [JWS], it is important to make explicit trust 360 decisions about the keys. Proof-of-possession signatures made with 361 keys not meeting the application's trust criteria MUST NOT not be 362 relied upon. 364 5. Privacy Considerations 366 A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the 367 same key is used with multiple parties. Thus, for privacy reasons, 368 it is recommended that different proof-of-possession keys be used 369 when interacting with different parties. 371 6. IANA Considerations 373 The following registration procedure is used for all the registries 374 established by this specification. 376 Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis 377 after a three-week review period on the cwt-reg-review@ietf.org 378 mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. 379 However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, 380 the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are 381 satisfied that such a specification will be published. [[ Note to 382 the RFC Editor: The name of the mailing list should be determined in 383 consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name: cwt-reg- 384 review@ietf.org. ]] 386 Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use 387 an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to Register CWT Confirmation 388 Method: example"). Registration requests that are undetermined for a 389 period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention 390 (using the iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution. 392 Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts include 393 determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing 394 functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general 395 applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application, 396 and evaluating the security properties of the item being registered 397 and whether the registration makes sense. 399 It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are 400 able to represent the perspectives of different applications using 401 this specification in order to enable broadly informed review of 402 registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could 403 be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular 404 Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other 405 Experts. 407 6.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration 409 This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA "CBOR Web 410 Token Claims" registry [IANA.CWT.Claims] established by [CWT]. 412 6.1.1. Registry Contents 414 o Claim Name: "cnf" 415 o Claim Description: Confirmation 416 o JWT Claim Name: "cnf" 417 o Claim Key: TBD (maybe 8) 418 o Claim Value Type(s): map 419 o Change Controller: IESG 420 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]] 422 6.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry 424 This specification establishes the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods" 425 registry for CWT "cnf" member values. The registry records the 426 confirmation method member and a reference to the specification that 427 defines it. 429 6.2.1. Registration Template 431 Confirmation Method Name: 432 The human-readable name requested (e.g., "kid"). 434 Confirmation Method Description: 435 Brief description of the confirmation method (e.g., "Key 436 Identifier"). 438 JWT Confirmation Method Name: 439 Claim Name of the equivalent JWT confirmation method value, as 440 registered in [IANA.JWT.Claims]. CWT claims should normally have 441 a corresponding JWT claim. If a corresponding JWT claim would not 442 make sense, the Designated Experts can choose to accept 443 registrations for which the JWT Claim Name is listed as "N/A". 445 Confirmation Key: 446 CBOR map key value for the confirmation method. 448 Confirmation Value Type(s): 449 CBOR types that can be used for the confirmation method value. 451 Change Controller: 452 For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the 453 name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal 454 address, email address, home page URI) may also be included. 456 Specification Document(s): 457 Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, 458 preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of 459 the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be 460 included but is not required. 462 6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents 464 o Confirmation Method Name: "COSE_Key" 465 o Confirmation Method Description: COSE_Key Representing Public Key 466 o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "jwk" 467 o Confirmation Key: 1 468 o Confirmation Value Type(s): map 469 o Change Controller: IESG 470 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of [[ this document ]] 472 o Confirmation Method Name: "Encrypted_COSE_Key" 473 o Confirmation Method Description: Encrypted COSE_Key 474 o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "jwe" 475 o Confirmation Key: 2 476 o Confirmation Value Type(s): array (with an optional COSE_Encrypt 477 or COSE_Encrypt0 tag) 478 o Change Controller: IESG 479 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [[ this document ]] 481 o Confirmation Method Name: "kid" 482 o Confirmation Method Description: Key Identifier 483 o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "kid" 484 o Confirmation Key: 3 485 o Confirmation Value Type(s): binary string 486 o Change Controller: IESG 487 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of [[ this document ]] 489 7. References 491 7.1. Normative References 493 [CWT] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, 494 "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-ace- 495 cbor-web-token-07, June 2017, 496 . 499 [IANA.CWT.Claims] 500 IANA, "CBOR Web Token Claims", 501 . 503 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 504 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 505 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 506 . 508 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 509 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 510 2003, . 512 [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform 513 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, 514 RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, 515 . 517 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 518 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, 519 DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, 520 . 522 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 523 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, 524 DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, 525 . 527 [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and 528 Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity 529 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 530 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer 531 Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March 532 2011, . 534 [RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object 535 Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, 536 October 2013, . 538 [RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", 539 RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017, 540 . 542 7.2. Informative References 544 [IANA.JWT.Claims] 545 IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims", 546 . 548 [JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web 549 Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, May 2015, 550 . 552 [JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token 553 (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, May 2015, 554 . 556 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] 557 Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, 558 "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion 559 Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core- 560 2.0-os, March 2005, 561 . 563 [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data 564 Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March 565 2014, . 567 [RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of- 568 Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)", 569 RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016, 570 . 572 Acknowledgements 574 Thanks to the following people for their reviews of the 575 specification: Michael Richardson and Jim Schaad. 577 Open Issues 579 o Convert the examples from JSON/JWT to CBOR/CWT. 581 Document History 583 [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] 585 -01 587 o Now uses CBOR diagnostic notation for the examples. 589 o Added a table summarizing the "cnf" names, keys, and value types. 591 o Addressed some of Jim Schaad's feedback on -00. 593 -00 595 o Created the initial working group draft from draft-jones-ace-cwt- 596 proof-of-possession-01. 598 Authors' Addresses 600 Michael B. Jones 601 Microsoft 603 Email: mbj@microsoft.com 604 URI: http://self-issued.info/ 606 Ludwig Seitz 607 RISE SICS 608 Scheelevaegen 17 609 Lund 223 70 610 Sweden 612 Email: ludwig@ri.se 613 Goeran Selander 614 Ericsson AB 615 Faeroegatan 6 616 Kista 164 80 617 Sweden 619 Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com 621 Erik Wahlstroem 622 Sweden 624 Email: erik@wahlstromstekniska.se 626 Samuel Erdtman 627 Spotify AB 628 Birger Jarlsgatan 61, 4tr 629 Stockholm 113 56 630 Sweden 632 Phone: +46702691499 633 Email: erdtman@spotify.com 635 Hannes Tschofenig 636 ARM Ltd. 637 Hall in Tirol 6060 638 Austria 640 Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com