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Knodel 5 Expires: September 12, 2019 ARTICLE 19 6 March 11, 2019 8 Feminism and protocols 9 draft-guerra-feminism-00 11 Abstract 13 This document aims to describe how internet standrds and protocols 14 and its implementations may impact diverse groups and communities. 15 The research on how some protocol can be enabler for specific human 16 rights while possibly restricting others has been documented in 17 [RFC8280]. Similar to how RFC 8280 has taken a human rights lens 18 through which to view engineering and design choices by internet 19 standardisation, this document addreses the opportunities and 20 vulnerabilities embedded within internet protocols for specific, 21 traditionally maginalised groups. 23 Status of This Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019. 40 Copyright Notice 42 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 43 document authors. All rights reserved. 45 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 46 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 47 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 48 publication of this document. Please review these documents 49 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 50 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 51 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 52 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 53 described in the Simplified BSD License. 55 Table of Contents 57 1. Feminism and protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 58 1.1. 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 59 1.2. Intersectional feminism and diversity . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 1.3. Brief history of feminism and the internet . . . . . . . 3 61 1.4. 2. Expression as a framework of understanding . . . . . . 4 62 1.4.1. 2.1. Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 1.4.2. 2.2. Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 64 1.5. 3. Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 65 1.5.1. 3.1. Access to information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 66 1.5.2. 3.2. Usage of technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 67 1.6. 4. Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 68 1.6.1. 4.1. Free and open source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 69 1.6.2. 4.2. Power and centralisation . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 70 1.7. 5. Networked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 71 1.7.1. 5.1. Freedom of assocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 72 1.7.2. 5.2. Internet governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 73 1.8. 6. Embodiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 74 1.8.1. 6.1. Online violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 75 1.8.2. 6.2. Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 76 1.8.3. 6.3. Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 77 1.8.4. 6.4. Privacy and data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 78 1.8.5. 6.5. Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 79 2. References not yet referenced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 80 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 81 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 82 5. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 83 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 85 1. Feminism and protocols 87 1.1. 1. Introduction 89 The experiences and learnings of the feminist movement in the digital 90 age have extrapolated feminist discourse towards building a more just 91 world to invisioning a more just internet, namely one that recognizes 92 differences across a variety of lived experience and identity. The 93 framework that is used to analyse and research internet protocols and 94 standards through a feminist lens is a document called The Feminist 95 Principles of the Internet. In a series of 17 statements, drafted, 96 redrafted and revised by hundreds of activists, the Principles offer 97 a "gender and sexual rights lens on critical internet-related rights" 98 for the purpose of enabling women's rights movements to explore 99 issues related to internet technology. Likewise, this is an attempt 100 to bring a conversation on the intersection of feminism and internet 101 technology into the technical community. 103 Attempts have been made to highlight where terminology occurs in both 104 technical standards and feminist discourse and distinguish between 105 the two in a meaningful way. A concept like 'security', for example, 106 has differing contextual meanings in internet engineering and 107 feminism. Coming to a shared understanding of concepts and 108 terminology is one goal of this document. With a better 109 understanding of concepts and terms, together the technical and 110 feminist communities can attempt to recognize and discuss how the 111 technical decisions with regard to internet infraestructure, 112 standards and protocols, directly or indirectly may affect internet 113 users around the world. 115 The Principles, like this document, are not designed as a set of 116 rules or recommendations, but as an articulation of key issues with 117 feminist policies and approaches, in order to begin to investigate. 118 They express the kind of internet that feminists would like to have, 119 and with whom to collaborate and imagine. 121 1.2. Intersectional feminism and diversity 123 Why feminism and not gender? The gender and sexual rights lens on 124 critical internet-related rights has been built bottom up by the 125 feminist movement. Feminism treats most prominently people who are 126 negatively discriminated against on the basis of their gender and 127 sexuality, but not exclusively. Because the threats to women and 128 queer people, whose bodies and manifestations are already under 129 strong, albeit sometimes invisible, social, cultural and political 130 surveillance, a critical feminist analysis also applies to other 131 marginalised groups. Aiming to use a feminist framework to analyse 132 the impacts of internet protocols on society assumes that values are 133 inherent to technological design. What follows are specifics of how 134 those values can either support or create barriers for gender justice 135 and equity for internet users. 137 1.3. Brief history of feminism and the internet 139 It is significant to highlight the ways in which feminists have 140 understood, used and mobilised on the internet. Given myriad 141 expressions of feminism online and feminist movement building online, 142 one thread is perhaps instructive to this exercise. More about the 143 nature of the complex community that created the Feminist Principles 144 of the Internet can be found at feministinternet.org. 146 1.4. 2. Expression as a framework of understanding 148 With the popularization of the internet, the freedom of expression of 149 both women and other gender identities traditionally marginalized 150 from public life and social acceptance (whom we will refer to as 151 queer) has been greatly enhanced. In contexts where women do not 152 have their rights fully guaranteed, or where sexual and gender 153 diversity are socially condemned, the Web has served to meet, 154 organize and resist. 156 By adding content in formats like text, audio and video, these groups 157 have been able to connect with each other, as well as open spaces for 158 discussion and visibility of topics that previously seemed vetoed. 159 The web has become a space for activism, reclamation and protest 160 against injustice and gender inequality. It has allowed the 161 construction of international networks of solidarity, support and 162 mobilization, and with this, the strengthening of feminism and other 163 movements that fight for equal rights and for a fair recognition of 164 difference. 166 The political expression of gender has not been limited to voices, 167 but has made use of the body and its representation. However, the 168 use of body as a form of political expression on the internet implies 169 a series of risks and vulnerabilities for the people involved in 170 these movements, especially if they do not understand how internet 171 technology works. In this sense, it is important to recognize that 172 freedom of expression on the internet, and in general its use, is 173 determined by gender, along with other social, economic, political 174 and cultural conditions. 176 Where women and queer people have traditionally been marginalized, 177 their participation in the internet is rejected through different 178 forms of violence by other users, as well as institutions, platforms 179 and governments. But the effects of these violences, which are 180 nothing more than extensions of the traditional violence that these 181 groups and individuals face in social life, increase to the extent 182 that there is not enough technical knowledge to neutralize them, and 183 this is the case of most people who struggle for the recognition of 184 their gender difference. 186 These "use cases" must be known within the IETF, in order to join 187 efforts for the elimination of online gender-based violence, which 188 today seems to be a rule in digital environments. In order to 189 identify ways and strategies to contribute to this purpose, we review 190 below the ways in which both _safety_ and _gender_ have been 191 approached in IETF rfcs and drafts. The following sections consist 192 of a preliminary analysis of the terms used in the IETF drafts and 193 RFCs archive. 195 By filtering from specific terms, the analysis consists of 196 identifying patterns and regularities in the contexts in which these 197 terms are used. For example, if they are used as an example in "use 198 cases" or if they are part of a technical explanation, and if they 199 are normally accompanied by other terms. The analysis presented is 200 only an initial revision that must be completed and synthesized. 202 1.4.1. 2.1. Safety 204 For the last years, there has been criticism of the way in which 205 digital security accompaniments, advice and training are developed 206 for people who are not directly involved in the development of 207 information technology. It is worth mentioning that digital 208 security, unlike cybersecurity, is more geared towards internet users 209 [Comninos]. Some of these criticisms refer to the fact that the 210 approach to digital security is centred on tools and not on usage 211 practices, and "attacks", "adversaries" or "enemies" in a generic 212 way, without recognising the specific contexts in which different 213 information protection needs are generated. 215 Given the common incidents suffered by women and queer people, from a 216 gender perspective it has been preferred to use the term _safety_ to 217 recognize their main need to be able to inhabit digital environments 218 without being the target of attacks such as trolling, harassment, 219 stalking, threats, non-consensual dissemination of intimate images, 220 among others. When speaking of _safety_ rather than _security_, 221 their participation is recognized as users at the most surface level, 222 not as administrators, developers or generators of computer 223 knowledge. In recent years, feminist infrastructure projects have 224 begun to appear while the inclusion of women in developers 225 communities has been promoted. However, today there is still a huge 226 gender gap in the technical and political development of the 227 internet. 229 In [RFC4949] _safety_ is defined as "the property of a system being 230 free from risk of causing harm (especially physical harm) to its 231 system entities", which is compared to _security_ as the "system 232 condition in which system resources are free from unauthorized access 233 and from unauthorized or accidental change, destruction, or loss". 234 But _safety_ has traditionally, especially in the early years of the 235 IETF, been referred to human activities [RFC1244], [RFC2122], 236 [RFC2310] and human rights [RFC1746], [RFC1941], [RFC3694]. 238 1.4.2. 2.2. Gender 240 As IETF is centered on "identifying, and proposing solutions to, 241 pressing operational and technical problems in the Internet" and as 242 according to the Tao of the IETF, "we believe in rough consensus and 243 running code", it is not supposed to concentrate on the particular 244 characteristics of internet users, but on the proper functioning of 245 the systems [Tao]. In addition, due to the characteristics of the 246 type of technologies that are designed in the IETF, many times the 247 the "use cases" or implementations refer to the way in which 248 companies arrange the infrastructure for their clients, not 249 necessarily to the way internet users interact with that 250 infrastructure. 252 In this sense, it seems not within the mandate of the IETF to imagine 253 the particular needs of users' gender, race or ethnicity. However, 254 in the drafts and RFCs archive there appear subjects with gender as 255 well as supposedly universal entities that sometimes represent 256 concrete functions of the systems, and other times the voluntary 257 actions of the operators. As a first step in imagining possible 258 gender considerations when designing internet protocols, below is a 259 very brief description of how gender appears in IETF documents. This 260 is also a very preliminary analysis, which could later be 261 complimented and added to the search for entities with cultural and 262 phenotypic characteristics that could make them vulnerable on the 263 internet. 265 1.5. 3. Access 267 Internet access is recognized as a human right [UNGA], but its 268 effective guarantee depends on different and unequal social, 269 cultural, economic and political conditions. In 2018, barely half of 270 the world's population has access to the internet and in 88% of 271 countries, men have more access than women [ITU]. Geographical 272 location, age, educational and income level, as well as gender, 273 significantly determine how people access to the internet 274 [WebFoundation]. 276 The Feminist Principles of the Internet [FPI] enphasizes that access 277 must be to a universal, acceptable, affordable, unconditional, open, 278 meaningful and equal internet, which guarantees rights rather than 279 restricts them. As some bodies have always been subject to social 280 and cultural surveillance and violence because of their gender and 281 sexuallity, their access to internet is not satisfied with connected 282 devices, but with safety and useful digital enviroments [SmKee]. 284 In this sense, access must be considered in several dimensions, in 285 addition to internet access as a possibility of being connected: 287 1.5.1. 3.1. Access to information 289 Information in one's own language is the first condition, as pointed 290 out with the cencept of 'Localization' [RFC8280], referred to the act 291 of tailoring an application for a different language, script, or 292 culture, and involves not only changing the language interaction but 293 also other relevant changes, such as display of numbers, dates, 294 currency, and so on. 296 But it is also necessary to be able to access relevant information, 297 related for example to sexual and reproductive health and rights, 298 pleasure, safe abortion, access to justice, and LGBTIQ issues. Some 299 goverments and ISPs block pages with this content or monitor online 300 activity by sexual and gender related terminology. Therefore the 301 considerations for anticensorship internet infrastructure 302 technologies also consider, and can possibly alleviate, a gendered 303 component to using the internet. 305 1.5.2. 3.2. Usage of technology 307 Beyond content, access implies the possibility to use, which means 308 code, design, adapt and critically and sustainably use ICTs. As 309 almost 75% of connected individuals are placed in the Global South 310 [WhoseKnowledge], technology is developped mainly in rich countries 311 where student quotas and jobs are filled mainly by men. 313 The concept of 'Internationalization' [RFC6365] refers to the 314 practice of making protocols, standards, and implementations usable 315 in different languages. This is a first step to democratize the 316 development of technology, allowing its implementation in non- 317 English-speaking countries. 319 However, there is still a long way to go in terms of inclusion of 320 more diverse populations in the spaces of technology development and 321 definition of protocoles and standards for the internet 322 infrastructure [RFC7704]. The presence of gendered subjects in the 323 IETF RFCs and drafts archive demonstrates stereotyped male and 324 feminine roles. On the other hand, the generalized mention of agents 325 - as universal subjects - in those documents, ignores the existence 326 of other corporealities, which includes non binary identities or with 327 a marked physical difference. 329 Building and engineering critical internet technology is a component 330 of 'usage'. There are challenge the cultures of sexism and 331 discrimination in all spaces, some of which can be found in existing 332 RFCs. 334 1.6. 4. Economy 336 1.6.1. 4.1. Free and open source 338 The digital gender gap has relegated women and other marginalized 339 groups to be internet users, adding content for the benefit of the 340 platform itself but without a deep understanding of how these 341 platforms work. Promoting transparency [RFC8280] and simplifying 342 technical terminology is necessary to bridge this gap. This requires 343 shared terminology upon which technology is created to enable 344 experimentation and values exchange. Not only that, but documenting, 345 promoting, disseminating, and sharing knowledge about technology is 346 at the heart of the long-standing free software community's ethos. 347 This aligns with a feminist approach to technology. 349 Given the established community of "free software", it is important 350 to note that freedom is not freedom for everyone, always. It is 351 important to identify different dimensions of freedom and how it is 352 expressed in different contexts. 354 1.6.2. 4.2. Power and centralisation 356 A feminist approach to technology requires a strong critique of 357 capitalist power, centralisation of services and the logic of 358 vertical integration while holding nuance for the tensions between 359 trust, reliability and diversity. Centralisation of services is a 360 current discussion in the IETF that should be informed by feminist 361 critique of capitalist structures [Arkko]. 363 1.7. 5. Networked 365 1.7.1. 5.1. Freedom of assocation 367 Given the shrinking of civic space offline, the internet provides a 368 global public space, albeit one that relies on private infrastructure 369 [tenOever]. For social causes that push for equality, it is 370 therefore critical that the internet be maintained as a space for 371 alignment, protest, dissent and escape. In the scope of this 372 document, this is a call to maintain and enable the creation of 373 spaces for sustained feminist movement building. Elements of freedom 374 of assocation as explained in the UDHR include individual and 375 collective rights to privacy and anonymity, as discussed in more 376 detail below. At the same time, the internet provides new and novel 377 ways for communities to come together across borders and without 378 limits of geolocation. However this positive aspect of internet 379 communications is threatened by centralised systems of control and 380 cooptation, specifically surveillance and other online repression. 382 Association of system architectures is a concept that overlaps neatly 383 with the ideals of real-world associations of organisations and 384 communities. "The ultimate model of P2P is a completely 385 decentralized system, which is more resistant to speech regulation, 386 immune to single points of failure and have a higher performance and 387 scalability [tenOever]." 389 1.7.2. 5.2. Internet governance 391 While there is no agreement regarding the ability of the internet to 392 negatively or positively impact on social behaviors, or shape 393 desirable practices [RFC8280], more women and diverse populations' 394 participation in technical development and decision-making spaces 395 will lead to greater possibilities for ICTs to reflect greater 396 inclusiveness and enable less risky and harmful interactions 397 [RFC7704]. 399 It is critical for groups who represent civil society interests, 400 social change and the larger public interest to challenge processes 401 and institutions that govern the internet. This requires the 402 inclusion of more feminists and queers at the decision-making table, 403 which can be achieved through democratic policy making. Greater 404 effect will be possible through diffuse ownership of and power in 405 global and local networks. 407 1.8. 6. Embodiment 409 Most of the threats women and non binary people face on line, occur 410 on the user levels of application and content. Most adversaries are 411 other users, but also include institutions, platforms and 412 governments. 414 For a long time, perhaps since the internet became popular, its use 415 ceased to be a functional matter and became emotional. The access to 416 chat rooms to connected with people at huge distances, the 417 possibility of having personal e-mails, the appearance of social 418 networks to share music, photos and then video, determined not only 419 the social use of a new tool but also the configuration of digital 420 sensitivities, understood by some as sensory extensions of the body. 422 The internet connections embedded have also meant a radical 423 transformation in the way people access the internet. Much more, 424 considering that today most internet connections, especially in the 425 global south, are mobile connections. People build their own public 426 digital identities, use private communications to disseminate 427 information, explore their sexuality in text, image and video, share 428 their initmity with others. In internet-connected devices, it has 429 become much easier for leisure and work to mix, which implies 430 different risks for users. 432 Sharing personal information, and often sensitive data, through 433 platforms that are synchronized with email accounts and other 434 platforms where information considered non-sensitive is published, 435 implies losing control over such information. Much more, considering 436 that each platform hosts the information of its users according to 437 their own terms and conditions in the treatment of data. For women 438 and other groups marginalized by race or gender, these risks are 439 greater. 441 Just as the internet connection can be considered an extension of the 442 body, social problems such as discrimination and exclusion have been 443 projected into the digital environment- sometimes intensified, 444 sometimes reconfigured. And once again, women, queers, racialized 445 people are the most vulnerable. Most of the threats they face on 446 line, occur in the user level. Most of their "adversaries" are other 447 users, who also act at the user level, with technical or social 448 skills that threaten participation and expressions. Institutions, 449 platforms and governments who are adversarial have great advantage. 451 At this point, what level of autonomy do these people have as 452 internet users? 454 1.8.1. 6.1. Online violence 456 The security considerations to counter online violence are critical. 457 There is opportunity in a connected world for those who would 458 perpetuate violence against women and other marginalised groups 459 through the use of internet-enabled technologies, from the home to 460 the prison. 462 Privacy is a critical component of security for populations at risk. 463 The control of information is linked to privacy. Where some would 464 like privacy in order to live privately, others need privacy in order 465 to access information and circumvent censorship and surveillance. 466 The protection of privacy is critical for those at risk to prevent 467 vicimisation through extortion, doxxing, and myriad other threats. 468 Lack of privacy leads to risks such as stalking, monitoring and 469 persistent harrassment. 471 While making public otherwise private details about a person can 472 consitute a form of abuse, the converse is also a risk: Being erased 473 from society or having one's online identity controlled by another is 474 a form of control and manipulation. Censorship, misinformation and 475 coersion may consitute violence online. Other forms of non- 476 consensual manipulation of online content includes platform "real 477 name policies", sharing of intimate images and sexual abuse, 478 spreading false accusations, flamming and other tactics. 480 Key to mitigating these threats is the element of consent. 482 1.8.2. 6.2. Consent 484 Some elements of consent online include but are not limited to the 485 following list of issues, which should be elaborated on: 487 - Data protection * Exposure of personal data 489 - Culture, design, policies and terms of service of internet 490 platforms 492 - Agency lies in informed decisions * Real name policies 494 - Public versus private information * Dissemination of personal or 495 intimate information * Exposure of intimacy * Unauthorized use of 496 photos 498 1.8.3. 6.3. Anonymity 500 While anonymity is never just about technical issues but users 501 protection activities, it becomes more necessary to strenghten the 502 design and functionality of networks, by default. There are several 503 considerations for internet infrastructure related to enabling 504 anonymity for online users. This is particularly important for 505 marginalised groups and can be ennumerated, and expanded upon, 506 thusly: 508 - Right to anonymity 510 - Enables other rights like freedom of expression * Censorship * 511 Defamation, descredit * Affectations to expression channels 513 - Breaking social taboos and heteronormativity * Hate Speech, 514 discriminatory expressions 516 - Discrimination and safety from discrimination 518 1.8.4. 6.4. Privacy and data 520 While mentioned at the intersection of previous issues outlined 521 above, this section is particularly critical for women, queers and 522 marginalised populations who are already at greater risk of control 523 and surveillance: 525 - Right to privacy 527 - Data protection 529 - Profit models 531 - Surveillance and patriarchy by states, individuals, private 532 sector, etc. Those that enable surveillance, eg spouseware. 534 1.8.5. 6.5. Memory 536 One's consent and control of the information that is available to 537 them and about them online is a key aspect of being a fully empowered 538 individual and community in the digital age. There are several 539 considerations that deserve deeper inspection, such as: 541 - Right to be forgotten 543 - Control over personal history and memory on the internet 545 - Access all our personal data and information online 547 - Delete forever 549 2. References not yet referenced 551 In plain sight, on sexuality, rights and the internet in India, Nepal 552 and Sri Lanka https://www.genderit.org/articles/plain-sight- 553 sexuality-rights-and-internet-india-nepal-and-sri-lanka 555 Human Rights and Internet Protocols: Comparing Processes and 556 Principles https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/ 557 ISSUE_human_rights_2.pdf 559 Principles of Unity for Infraestructuras Feministas 560 https://pad.kefir.red/p/infraestucturas-feministas Feminist 562 Principles of the Internet https://feministinternet.org The UX Guide 563 to Getting Consent https://iapp.org/resources/article/the-ux-guide- 564 to-getting-consent 566 From steel to skin https://fermentos.kefir.red/english/aco-pele 567 Responsible Data https://responsibledata.io 569 Impact for what and for whom? Digital technologies and feminist 570 movement building internet https://www.genderit.org/feminist-talk/ 571 impact-what-and-whom-digital-technologies-and-feminist-movement- 572 building 573 Design Justice https://docs.google.com/presentation/ 574 d/1J3ZWBgxe0QFQ8OmUr-QzE6Be8k_sI7XF0VWu4wfMIVM/ 575 edit#slide=id.gcad8d6cb9_0_198 577 Design Action Collective Points of Unity 578 https://designaction.org/about/points-of-unity 580 CODING RIGHTS; INTERNETLAB. Violencias de genero na internet: 581 diagnostico, solucoes e desafios. Contribuicao conjunta do Brasil 582 para a relatora especial da ONU sobre violencia contra a mulher. Sao 583 Paulo, 2017. https://www.codingrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ 584 Relatorio_ViolenciaGenero_v061.pdf 586 Barrera, L. y Rodriguez, C. La violencia en linea contra las mujeres 587 en Mexico. Informe para la Relatora sobre Violencia contra las 588 Mujeres Ms. Dubravka Šimonović. 2017. 589 https://luchadoras.mx/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ 590 Informe_ViolenciaEnLineaMexico_InternetEsNuestra.pdf 592 Sephard, N. Big Data and Sexual Surveillance. APC issue papers. 593 2016. https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/ 594 BigDataSexualSurveillance_0_0.pdf 596 3. Security Considerations 598 As this document concerns a research document, there are no security 599 considerations. 601 4. IANA Considerations 603 This document has no actions for IANA. 605 5. Informative References 607 [Arkko] Arkko, J., "Considerations on Internet Consolidation and 608 the Internet Architecture.", 2018, 609 . 612 [Comninos] 613 Alex Comninos, ., "A cyber security Agenda for civil 614 society: What is at stake?", 2013, 615 . 618 [FPI] Association for Progressive Communications, "The Feminist 619 Principles of the Internet", n.d., 620 . 622 [ITU] International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 623 "Statisctics. Global, Regional and Country ICT Data.", 624 2018, . 627 [RFC1244] Holbrook, J. and J. Reynolds, "Site Security Handbook", 628 RFC 1244, DOI 10.17487/RFC1244, July 1991, 629 . 631 [RFC1746] Manning, B. and D. Perkins, "Ways to Define User 632 Expectations", RFC 1746, DOI 10.17487/RFC1746, December 633 1994, . 635 [RFC1941] Sellers, J. and J. Robichaux, "Frequently Asked Questions 636 for Schools", FYI 22, RFC 1941, DOI 10.17487/RFC1941, May 637 1996, . 639 [RFC2122] Mavrakis, D., Layec, H., and K. Kartmann, "VEMMI URL 640 Specification", RFC 2122, DOI 10.17487/RFC2122, March 641 1997, . 643 [RFC2310] Holtman, K., "The Safe Response Header Field", RFC 2310, 644 DOI 10.17487/RFC2310, April 1998, 645 . 647 [RFC3694] Danley, M., Mulligan, D., Morris, J., and J. Peterson, 648 "Threat Analysis of the Geopriv Protocol", RFC 3694, 649 DOI 10.17487/RFC3694, February 2004, 650 . 652 [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", 653 FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, 654 . 656 [RFC6365] Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in 657 Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365, 658 DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011, 659 . 661 [RFC7704] Crocker, D. and N. Clark, "An IETF with Much Diversity and 662 Professional Conduct", RFC 7704, DOI 10.17487/RFC7704, 663 November 2015, . 665 [RFC8280] ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights 666 Protocol Considerations", RFC 8280, DOI 10.17487/RFC8280, 667 October 2017, . 669 [SmKee] Jac Sm Kee, ., "Imagine a Feminist Internet.", 2018, 670 . 672 [Tao] Internet Engineering Task Force, "The Tao of the IETF.", 673 n.d., . 675 [tenOever] 676 ten Oever, N., "Freedom of Association on the Internet", 677 n.d., . 680 [UNGA] United Nations General Assembly, "The promotion, 681 protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 682 Internet.", 2012, . 686 [WebFoundation] 687 Web Foundation, "Advancing Women's Rights Online: Gaps and 688 Opportunities in Policy and Research.", 2018, 689 . 693 [WhoseKnowledge] 694 Whose Knowledge, "Decolonizing the Internet, Summary 695 Report.", 2018, . 698 Authors' Addresses 700 Juliana Guerra 701 Derechos Digitales 703 EMail: juliana@derechosdigitales.org 705 Mallory Knodel 706 ARTICLE 19 708 EMail: mallory@article19.org